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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis addresses the nature of European Union criminal law (ECL). It claims that 
ECL has evolved along two main expanding dynamics, both with a significant punitive 
emphasis. The first dynamic of ECL focuses on the fight against a particular type of 
criminality that the European Union perceives as threatening to its goals - ‘Euro-crime’ - 
a criminality with particular features (complex in structure and which attempts primarily 
against public goods) that reflects the nature of contemporary societies. This focus was 
brought about by rationales such as the fight against organised crime, the protection of 
EU interests and policies, and recently, the protection of the victim. In turn, the second 
dynamic of ECL reinforces the State’s capacity to investigate, prosecute and punish 
beyond its own national borders. It does so, not only in relation to Euro-crime, but also 
in relation to a broader range of criminality.  
 
This thesis will further argue that these two dynamics have contributed to a more severe 
penality across the European Union by increasing levels of formal criminalisation; by 
facilitating criminal investigation, prosecution and punishment; and by placing more 
pressure on more lenient States. Furthermore, it will claim that this punitive emphasis of 
ECL has, more recently, begun to be nuanced. This has taken place at the national level 
as some Member States have shown reluctance to fully accepting the enhanced punitive 
tone of ECL instruments.  It has also taken place at EU level as the punitive emphasis of 
EU legal instruments was modulated and the protection of fundamental rights has taken 
a more central place in the ‘post Lisbon’ framework. Thus, at this later stage of ECL a 
dialectic between punitiveness and moderation began to surface. 
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Introduction: The nature of European Union criminal law 
 
As a central and sensitive element of national sovereignty and the relationship between 
the State and its citizen-subjects,1 criminal law was not initially envisaged as an area of 
competence of the European Communities (EC). In fact, although cooperation in 
criminal matters between Member States began in the 1970s and European Community 
law was already indirectly influencing national criminal law,2 it was not until 1993, with 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU(M)), that criminal matters were 
given a place in the Treaties.3 Nonetheless, at this stage, these provisions were kept in a 
separate institutional framework (the so-called ‘third pillar’). The third pillar was 
enacted by a different Treaty—the Treaty on the European Union (TEU(M))—and 
encompassed more intergovernmental methods of decision-making (with unanimous 
voting), allowing for very limited involvement by some EU institutions such as the 
European Parliament (EP) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
maintaining the Council and hence Member States at the core of the decision making 
process.4 Subsequently, the framework of the ECL was brought forward in 1999 with 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (TEU(A)).5 Amsterdam brought 
significant ambition to the field by creating an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’, 
with the goal of providing EU citizens with a ‘high level of safety’.6 Nonetheless, 
regardless of an increase in the scope of cooperation and improved roles of some EU 
institutions, criminal matters were maintained in the autonomous institutional 
framework of the third pillar and thus continued to be removed from core EC 
competences.7 
 
It was not until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009 (TEU(L) 
and TFEU)8 that ECL became a domain of fully shared competence between the EU and 
Member States.9 Criminal law is now, to some extent, like many other fields of EU 
                                                                  
1 D. Garland, “The Limits of the Sovereign State, Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary 
Society” (1996) 36 The British Journal of Criminology  445, 448-449. 
2 E. Baker and C. Harding, “From Past Imperfect to Future Perfect? A longitudinal Study of the 
Third Pillar” (2009) 34 European Law Review 25, 27-30; M. Delmas-Marty, “The European 
Union and Penal Law” (1998) 4 European Law Journal 87. 
3 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht version), OJ C 191/1 [1992]. 
4 Idem. The ‘first pillar’ was in turn based on a separated Treaty – Treaty on the European 
Communities (TEC) and included matters of economic, social and environmental integration. 
5 Treaty on European Union (Amsterdam version), OJ C 340/1 [1997]. 
6 Article 29, ibid.. 
7 Title VI, ibid.. 
8 Treaty on European Union (TEU(L)) and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), OJ C 83/1 [2010]. 
9 Article 4 (2) TFEU. 
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integration.10 This implies that decision making is now operated by qualified majority 
voting (QMV) and not unanimity; EU institutions such as the EP and the CJEU, which 
previously had limited roles in the field, will now have full rights of participation in 
criminal matters; whilst legal acts adopted by the EU will also have a stronger legal 
value than previous measures. This new institutional framework represents one of the 
most significant shifts in the history of ECL as it brings criminal matters fully into the 
supranational framework of the European Union (EU). 
 
Nevertheless, criminal law remains an area of particular legal, cultural and political 
sensitivity.11 This is reflected in the Treaty itself, which notes that national security 
remains the responsibility of Member States. Article 4(2) of the TEU (L) holds, 
 
“The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as 
their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their 
essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national 
security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.”12 
 
This Treaty provision is symbolic of a main tension at the heart of ECL’s 
development—the tension between States as established, sovereign and legitimate penal 
actors and the evolution of the EU from a merely economic sphere of action into an 
emerging penal sphere. This tension became more visible following the institutional 
shifts brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon given the degree of supranationalisation of 
ECL that the Treaty provided. However, it has always lain at the heart of the 
developments in the field. This tension has had an impact in the shaping and 
understating of ECL, whose nature has been—and remains to some extent—
fragmented,13 contested14 and in transition.15   
 
                                                                  
10 Article 4 (2) TFEU identifies as areas of shared competence between the EU and Member 
States the internal market, social policy (for aspects specifically defined), economic and social 
cohesion, agriculture and fisheries, environment, consumer protection, transport, trans-European 
networks, energy, area of freedom, security and justice and common safety concerns in public 
health matters. 
11 See, for instance, opinion of Advocate General J. Mazak, Case C-440/05 Commission v 
Council ECR I-9100 [2007] para 67-68. 
12  Article 4 (2) TEU (L), OJ C 115 [2008]. 
13 European Parliament, Report on an EU approach on criminal law (2010/2310(INI)), 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 24 April 2012, para 11, 16; E. Baker, 
“The Emerging Role of the EU as a Penal Actor” in T. Daems, S, Snacken and D. van Zyl Smit 
(eds) European Penology? (Oxford: Hart Publications, forthcoming – 2013). 
14 V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009) 5.  
15 A. Klip, European Criminal Law (Antwerp-Oxford-Portland: Intersentia, 2009) 1. 
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This dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of these issues by asking precisely 
what the nature of European Union criminal law is. In doing so it will provide an overall 
analysis of the field and look at the context and content of ECL, exploring its patterns, 
rationales, focus and qualities.  
 
Preliminary remarks: the scope, approach and context of the dissertation 
 
Before engaging with the argument of this thesis, it is necessary to address some 
preliminary points regarding the scope of this study. The first being: what is European 
Union criminal law? At present, regardless of the fact that criminal matters were 
introduced in the EU’s agenda almost three decades ago, there are still several 
approaches to its study and no clear or official definition of ECL exists yet.16 The 
definition and delimitation of the ‘criminal law’ has been discussed at the European 
level without any definite conclusions being reached. Advocate General Mazák noted in 
Commission v Council17 that there is no uniform concept of ‘criminal law’ and Member 
States may have very different ideas regarding the details, purposes and effects that 
‘criminal law’ should have. He suggested that a way to define what should be included 
in the concept of ‘criminal law’ could be the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (EcHR), which has identified the possible application of a ‘criminal sanction’ as 
the defining element of ‘criminal law’. In particular, in 1984 the EcHR held in the case 
Öztürk, that the criminal nature of the penalty can be deducted from the general 
character of the rule, the nature of the offence and the purpose and severity of the 
penalty that could be applied, regardless of the formal classification that could have been 
given to a norm.18 In the case in question, the EcHR applied this reasoning to the 
situation in which road traffic offences had been classified as mere ‘regulatory offences’ 
and not as ‘criminal offences’ in Germany. Consequently, the offender was not entitled 
to a free interpreter during the so-called ‘administrative procedure’. In particular, the 
EcHR held that  
 
"there is in fact nothing to suggest that the criminal offences referred to in the 
Convention necessarily imply a certain degree of seriousness" and that it would be 
"contrary to the object and purpose of Article 6 (...), which guarantees to “everyone 
charged with a criminal offence” the right to a court and to a fair trial, if the States 
                                                                  
16 G.J.M. Corstens and J. Pradel, European Criminal Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002) 2; E. Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal 
Law (Oxford-Portland: Hart Publishing, 2012) 1. 
17 Opinion of Advocate General Jan Mazak, Case C-440/05, supra note 11, para 69. 
18 Judgement of the EcHR of 21 February 1984, Öztürk v. Germany, A 73, at paras. 47-49. 
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were allowed to remove from the scope of this Article (...) a whole category of offences 
merely on the ground of regarding them as petty.”19 
 
Klip uses precisely the criteria of the nature of the sanction to delineate the scope of 
‘European criminal law’—which he considers to be a multilevel field of law in which 
the European Union either has normative influence on substantive criminal law and 
criminal procedure or on the co-operation between the Member States. Observing that 
this denotes more the European character of the definition than its criminal nature, he 
then considers that the criteria of the ‘criminal nature of a charge’, as defined in Article 
6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)20 and as defined by the EcHR 
in the landmark case Öztürk, has been commonly accepted as the definition that 
separates ‘criminal law’ from other fields of law and uses it as a delineating concept for 
ECL. The use of this criterion leads Klip to include ‘competition law’ in his book on 
European criminal law.21 This is uncommon in ECL textbooks thus far given that the 
nature of the sanctions applicable in EU competition law (whether they are 
‘administrative’ or ‘criminal’) is still open to debate.22 Indeed, the author systematises 
his analysis of ECL in a relatively similar fashion to that followed by many manuals on 
national criminal law rather than EU law or ECL (different chapters include, amongst 
others, the constitutional principles of Union law, European substantive law, European 
criminal procedure, European sentencing and penitentiary law, bilateral cooperation in 
criminal matters, multilateral cooperation and direct enforcement).23  
 
This criterion of the nature of the sanction overlooks the institutional framework of 
criminal matters in the EU and comes closer to the structure of the criminal law at the 
national level rather than at the EU level. However, the institutional framework of the 
development of criminal law within the EU context has been of central importance to the 
development of ECL. As mentioned, the framework for the EU’s action in criminal 
matters has, for a long time, been placed in the separate institutional framework of the 
third pillar and an analysis of the ‘nature’ of ECL necessitates taking that context into 
                                                                  
19 Ibid. paras 47-49, 53 and 70-71. The criteria of what is to be considered a ‘criminal charge’ 
was further developed in Judgement of the ECtHR of 8 June 1976, Engel and others v. the 
Netherlands, A 22. 
20 Right to a fair trial. 
21 A. Klip, European Criminal Law, supra note 15, 1-2. 
22 E. Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law , supra note 16, 
14. There are increasingly strong arguments to consider these sanctions as ‘criminal sanctions’, 
see, inter alia, D. Slater, S. Thomas, D. Waelbroek, “Competition law proceedings before the 
European Commission and the right to a fair trial: no need for reform?” The Global Competition 
Law Centre Working Papers Series, Working Paper 04/08, Bruges, Belgium. Note that 
‘administrative sanctions’ is not a term used in the UK jurisdictions, where they are referred to as 
non-criminal penalties, C. Harding, “Exploring the Intersection of European Law and National 
Criminal Law” (2000) 25 European Law Review 374. 
23 A. Klip, European Criminal Law, supra note 15, 1-2.  
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account as a reference. Indeed, several authors have preferred an approach that takes the 
particular institutional framework under which criminal matters in the EU were placed, 
as a starting point. Mitsilegas, for example, includes five main areas of development of 
EU action in criminal matters in his ‘EU Criminal Law’ textbook: ‘harmonisation and 
competence’, ‘mutual recognition’, ‘bodies, offices and agencies’, ‘databases’ and the 
‘external dimension of EU criminal law’.24 Similarly, Fletcher, Lööf and Gilmore 
assemble the domains of ‘police cooperation in criminal matters’, ‘judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters’, ‘substantive criminal law’ (which corresponds to harmonisation of 
national criminal law) and the ‘external dimension of EU action in criminal matters’ 
under the title of ‘EU Criminal Law and Justice’.25 These headings correspond largely 
(but not only) to the three main dimensions that criminal matters might assume within 
the EU legal order. The first dimension—that of harmonisation of national criminal law 
(also referred to, on occasion, as ‘substantive criminal law’)—concerns the EU legal 
measures adopted with the purpose of approximating national substantive criminal law, 
in particular the minimum elements constituent of crimes and penalties.26 The second 
dimension, corresponds to the principle of mutual recognition which has been, since 
1999, the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU and aims at 
ensuring that judicial decisions of one Member State should, as far as possible, be 
recognised in other Member States.27 Finally, the third dimension—police cooperation 
in criminal matters—concerns a wide range of norms which vary from measures 
concerning crime prevention, the collection and exchange of data relating to policing 
and other forms of cooperation between national law enforcement authorities, as well as 
the functioning of EU bodies with a role on policing and cross-border police 
operations.28 The approaches to the study of ECL that follow this institutional 
dimension, rather than concerning themself with finding a definition of what ECL is 
exactly, consider the different ‘criminal law dimensions’ within EU’s legal order. 
 
Facing the difficulty in determining what ECL is and the different approaches to its 
study and analysis, it is useful to look at national definitions of the ‘criminal law’ for 
some guidance. In doing so, one finds that the definition of ‘criminal law’ at a national 
level is also complex. Indeed, it will be seen, defining criminal law at national level has 
proven difficult and has led to the emergence and prevalence of formal definitions. As 
Sanders and Young suggest, there is no universal definition of ‘criminal law’ and what 
                                                                  
24 V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law, supra note 14. 
25 M. Fletcher, R. Loof and B. Gilmore, EU Criminal Law and Justice (Cheltenham-
Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2008). 
26 Harmonisation of national criminal law finds its legal base today under Article 83TFEU and 
partly under Article 82(2)TFEU. ‘Partly’ as Article 82(2)TFEU refers to harmonisation of 
criminal procedure for the purposes of facilitating mutual recognition only. 
27 Mutual recognition finds its legal base today under Article 82 TFEU. 
28 Police cooperation in criminal matters rest today under Article 87-89 TFEU. 
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is defined as ‘criminal law’ will vary from society to society and across time.29 As a 
starting point, Lacey, Wells and Quick note that ‘criminal law’ is one amongst several 
sets of practices through which a society defines, constructs and responds to ‘deviance’,  
‘wrong doing’ or ‘harmful conduct’; equally, it is also a system which sets down 
standards of conduct, and which enforces, in distinctive ways, those substantive 
standards or norms. In constructing the notions of ‘deviance’, ‘wrongdoing’ or ‘harmful 
conduct’, contemporary ‘criminal law’ can be identified by two distinctive features. 
First, it can be identified as an institutionalised practice, structured by fixed norms and 
procedures and administered by official personnel. This clearly envisages ‘criminal law’ 
as a legal response distinct from other types of institutional responses. Second, ‘criminal 
law’ can also be distinguished from other categories of legal responses, such as civil 
law. The distinction between criminal and civil law often cannot be explained by reason 
of ‘subject-matter’ since many conducts are covered by both fields. In this sense, 
‘criminal law’ can be defined in terms of its distinctive ‘criminal procedure’, such as 
rules of evidence, burdens and standards of proof, special enforcement mechanisms such 
as public policing and prosecution and particular tribunals and forms of trial.30  
 
A comparable, distinctive formal feature of ‘criminal law’ in relation to other areas of 
law and, in particular, in relation to civil law, is identified by Figueiredo Dias, who 
argues that the ultimate symbol and hence, the ultimate distinctive feature of ‘criminal 
law’ is – not the following of a criminal procedure per se - but the nature of the sanction 
applied at the end of that procedure. Hence, a norm will be considered to be a criminal 
norm when its violation potentially entails the application of a ‘criminal sanction’ (in 
opposition to a civil one). In this sense, the author argues, criminal law is defined as 
distinctive from other areas of law by a teleological and formal element: the 
‘consequence’ of the violation of its norms.31  
 
                                                                  
29 A. Sanders and R. Young, Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, Third 
Edition) 3. 
30 As the authors go on to explain, if the distinctive feature is to be the criminal procedure to be 
followed, in England and Wales, criminal law can be defined as a “legal response to deviance 
over which the State has the dominant if not exclusive right of action; in which defendants must 
be proved by the prosecution to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt; and under which, if which, if 
charged with an offence of a certain degree of seriousness, they are entitled to trial by a jury. It 
is equally that are of legal regulation in which certain sorts of evidence are inadmissible, and in 
which the result of the conviction if typically the imposition is a punitive (as opposed to 
compensatory) sentence executed by or on behalf of the state. Criminal law, in other words, can 
be identified in terms of the distinctive features of criminal procedure.( ..) And if anyone is 
sufficiently presumptuous to ask how we can tell whether criminal law procedure should (legally) 
apply, she can be met by a simple answer – ‘whenever the law identifies itself as criminal’.”, N. 
Lacey, C. Wells and O. Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, Fourth Edition) 7; For a similar approach in relation to Scotland see, for instance, 
G.H. Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland (Edinburgh: W Green, 1978) 15. 
31 The author identifies German academics, namely Luhmann and Roxin, as the precursors of this 
approach to criminal law, J. Figueiredo Dias,  Direito Penal (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2007) 5.  
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Whilst the distinctive criteria of ‘criminal law’ is increasingly being identified with the 
nature of the procedure and of the sanction, the ambit of what is identified with ‘criminal 
law’ also provides some guidance as to what can be understood as ‘criminal law’. Here 
differences between Anglo-Saxon and Continental European jurisdictions come to the 
fore. As Lacey and Zedner outline, for Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, ‘criminal law’ 
encompasses substantive rules of conduct, rules determining how liability should be 
attributed and how breaches of criminal norms should be graded. Other aspects related 
to ‘criminal law’ such as prosecution, trial procedure, sentencing, and punishment, 
among others, tend to be dealt with by ‘criminal justice studies’. This separation 
between ‘criminal law’, criminal procedure and sentencing, however, will not be found 
as such in continental European jurisdictions.32 Indeed, the latter often make a 
distinction between ‘substantive criminal law’33—which corresponds largely to the 
Anglo-Saxon conception of ‘criminal law’—and ‘criminal law in a broad sense’, which 
also includes the domains of criminal procedure, sentencing and sentence enforcement. 
In the French system, for instance, ‘criminal law in a broad sense’ concerns itself with 
the so-called ‘substantive criminal law’ and with ‘criminal procedure in a broad sense’ 
(i.e. norms which concern the penal procedure, rules on sentencing and punishment and 
the rules of organisation of judicial institutions and their modes of intervention).34 
Similarly, in Portugal, for example, ‘criminal law in a broad sense’ concerns itself with 
‘substantive criminal law’ (the rules which determine what is to be understood as a 
wrongdoing, the rules of liability and the consequences of a crime); with procedural 
criminal law, which concerns the realisation of the punitive power (namely, 
investigation and judicial evaluation of the crime); and, finally, with sentencing and 
sentence enforcement (so-called ‘executive’ penal law).35  
 
Regardless of these differences, some commonalities can be found across domestic legal 
orders. In fact, the distinction between substantive criminal law, criminal procedure, 
                                                                  
32 N. Lacey and L. Zedner, “Legal Constructions of Crime”, in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. 
Reiner (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 4th Edition (Oxford: OUP, 2012, Fifth 
edition) 159, 161; see also L. Zedner, Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 
63. 
33 Often identified by ‘general penal law’ (‘droit pénal général’ or ‘parte geral do direito penal’, 
respectively in French and Portuguese law, for instance).   
34 In the concept of general criminal law, Pradel includes substantive criminal law, rules on 
sentencing and punishment and criminal procedure (droit pénal général’; ‘droit pénal spécial’; ‘le 
droit des infractions et sanctions’; la procedure pénal; le droit de l’exécution des peines), J. 
Pradel, Droit Pénal Général (Paris: Éditions Cujas, 2006) 53-56; Similarly, Carbasse, for 
instance, refers to ‘criminal law’ as incorporating substantive criminal law (“droit penal strictu 
sensu”) and to the general norms of criminal procedure, including the judicial organisation and 
the modes of intervention (“les grandes lignes de la procèdure penale (caracteres generaux de 
l’organisation judiciaire et de ses modalités d’intervention”)). The author also remarks that these 
distinctions between substantive criminal law and criminal procedure are relatively recent in the 
historical development of the discipline and used to be integrated in a single unitary concept. J.M. 
Carbasse, Histoire du droit penal et de la justice criminelle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2009, 2ºEdition) 23. 
35 J. Figueiredo Dias, Direito Penal, supra  note 31, 6-7. 
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sentencing and sentence enforcement is primarily a formal one as these ‘different 
branches’ of ‘criminal law’ intrinsically complete each other. As Fletcher argues, 
substantive criminal law and procedural criminal law are two sides of the same coin:  
 
“Being guilty is one thing; being prosecuted and punished is another. Whether one is 
ever held liable for a particular offence depends on the rules of procedure. These rules 
determine how the state enforces the criminal law by proving the occurrence of crime 
and convicting and punishing those responsible for the crime./ In general terms, we can 
say that the substantive rules establish ‘guilt in principle.’ The procedural rules 
determine whether individuals are ‘guilty in fact.’”36 
 
Can national criminal law thus provide some guidance to the delimitation of the scope or 
the definition of ECL? Certainly, there appears to be no uniform approach to ‘criminal 
law’ at a national level. Moreover, there seems to be no correspondence between the 
structure of national criminal law—as given by different jurisdictions—and that of ECL. 
In fact, many of the studies in ECL find little correspondence to what is traditionally 
understood as criminal law at the national level. They include, as seen above, for 
example, police cooperation and EU-wide information sharing tools such as databases as 
well as other domains of the external dimension of ECL. These topics, as seen, are not 
included in the ambit of ‘criminal law’ at the national level.  
 
In spite of these contrasts, some commonalities can be found between the European 
Union criminal law and various national criminal law, as harmonisation of national 
criminal law and mutual recognition in criminal matters offer EU’s own framework for 
the enactment of norms which comprise the different branches of what is understood as 
‘criminal law in a broad sense’ in continental European jurisdictions (substantive 
criminal law, criminal procedure, sentencing and sentence execution). Hence, under the 
framework of harmonisation of national criminal law, matters pertaining to substantive 
criminal law such as the definition of offences, the rules relating to the establishment of 
liability and the sanctions applicable have been adopted. The inclusion of harmonisation 
of national criminal law into the concept of ECL does not present difficulties as it 
largely corresponds to the ‘core of criminal law’ in continental jurisdictions and to 
‘criminal law’ in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. Furthermore, under the framework of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters, issues relating to criminal procedure, sentencing, 
sentence enforcement and also, indirectly, to substantive criminal law, have been 
enacted. Examples range from evidence, surrender, recognition and execution of 
penalties, and the rights of participants in the criminal procedure, amongst others. Thus, 
                                                                  
36 G. Fletcher, Basic Principles of Criminal Law (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998) 7-8. 
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it makes sense to consider the domains under mutual recognition as part of ECL. First, 
because the scope of mutual recognition at the EU level finds correspondence in the 
broad scope of national ‘criminal law’ in Continental European jurisdictions. Second, as 
mentioned earlier, domains of criminal procedure and substantive criminal law are 
increasingly seen as two sides of the same coin.37 In a similar line of reasoning, and 
particular to the context of the ECL, Mitsilegas notes, in relation to the European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW)—the central measure adopted thus far in the context of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters—that although an EAW is not a decision determining 
guilt and punishment, its execution certainly facilitates prosecution. Hence, a narrow 
definition of the scope of criminal law, such as one which would exclude surrender from 
its ambit, would overlook the punitive character of that instrument.38 Finally, the 
exclusion of mutual recognition from the concept of ECL would ill suit the EU’s 
institutional framework for criminal matters, which has always grouped harmonisation 
and mutual recognition in criminal matters. These ‘headings’ were previously placed 
under the institutional framework of the third pillar and, more specifically, under the 
context of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. After the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the two now lie under chapter 4, Title V, of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
 
Hence, if ones takes into account the institutional framework of ECL and the 
correspondence between national ‘criminal law in a broad sense’ and ECL, it makes 
sense to delineate the two headings of harmonisation of national criminal law and 
mutual recognition as the core of ECL. Therefore, European Union Criminal Law, for 
the purposes of this dissertation, consists of the legal measures adopted under the 
mechanisms of ‘harmonisation of national criminal law’ (also referred to as 
approximation of minimum elements constituent of crimes and penalties) and 
‘mutual recognition in criminal matters’ (or, until 1999—the date of the 
introduction of the principle in criminal matters—under the general goal of 
‘judicial cooperation in criminal matters’). 
 
The historical-legal approach to the study of ECL 
 
In seeking to delineate the nature of ECL, this thesis will adopt a combined historical-
legal approach. The first part of the thesis (chapters 1, 2 and 3) will analyse legal 
developments through recent history, building a road map of the evolution of ECL. In 
doing so, this section will shed light on the patterns, assumptions, rationales and focus 
                                                                  
37 Ibid.. 
38 V. Mitsilegas, “The Transformation of Criminal Law in the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice” (2007) 26 Yearbook of European Law 26-27.  
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that gave rise to the field. This first part follows a ‘descriptive-analytical’ approach in 
order to shed light on the scope and content of ECL by analysing its general features, 
revealing what has been criminalised and systematising measures adopted into broader 
themes. This systematisation will shed light on the ‘focus’ of ECL and its ‘rationales’.39   
 
This is relevant for, as Lacey, Wells and Quick note, the ‘substance of criminalisation’, 
i.e. how societies define deviance and determine which deviance is identified as 
criminal, is of central importance to the understanding of criminal law.40 As the authors 
go on to note, a reflection on the criminal law is—to a great extent—a matter of 
historical development, understandable in terms of the salience of particular issues at 
particular moments. In this sense, what is criminalised is contingent and a construct of 
particular legal and social systems that reflects specific temporal and geographic 
arrangements, interests and imperatives.41 The mapping of the field’s evolution also 
brings to light the patterns, continuities and discontinuities that are often determinant of 
choices and modes of criminalisation.42 The relevance of an historical approach to 
studies in criminal law is further enhanced by the changing scope of criminal law in the 
last century. Indeed, at a national level, the definition and understanding of the nature of 
criminal law has become increasingly difficult given that, historically, the scope of 
crime has changed significantly. This is true both in relation to the scope of specific 
crimes and in relation to the scope of criminal law in general. Hence, the scope of 
particular criminal offences has been modified over time. By way of illustration, Zedner 
points to examples such as child sexual abuse and homosexuality. She notes how, child 
sexual abuse, for instance, was barely recognised as a criminal offence until the Second 
World War and came to be regarded as one of the most heinous crimes after that.43 
Furthermore, difficulties in the definition of criminal law have been particularly 
exacerbated by a significant increase in its scope. This expansion has been experienced 
both in Anglo-saxon and continental European jurisdictions and has, in fact, led to the 
rise of formal definitions of criminal law such as those mentioned in the previous 
section. Accordingly, in both systems, criminal law has moved from the protection of 
core fundamental values of society, to a more regulatory, less morally charged role. 
According to Farmer, the prevalence of formal definitions in contemporary criminal law 
over definitions centred on the content of the criminal law can be understood in England 
and Wales, precisely in the context of this marked expansion of criminal law since the 
nineteen century. The author argues that this expansion was primarily effected by the 
                                                                  
39 The terms ‘rationales’, ‘narratives’ and ‘themes’ will be used interchangeably in this 
dissertation.  
40 N. Lacey, C. Wells and O. Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law, supra note 30, 13. 
41 Ibid., 13. 
42 D. Garland, The Culture of Control, Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford: 
OUP, 2001) 3. 
43 L. Zedner, Criminal Justice, supra note 32, 40-41; Sexual Offences Act 1967 S.I.  
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creation of summary offences tried in magistrate courts—a product of the expanding 
functions of the modern administrative state for which criminal law became an 
increasingly important tool.44 Similarly, in European continental systems, the same 
increase in the scope of criminal law was felt. This led to the emergence and 
development of the so-called ‘administrative penal offences’, which are tantamount to 
‘regulatory offences’—wrongdoings deemed to violate social or administrative norms of 
organisation but not the core fundamental moral values of a society.45       
 
This expansion of criminal law also brought about a shift in its substantive scope. As 
Lacey and Zedner observe, the search for rationales in criminal law across criminal 
justice systems has become less straightforward in recent years. For example, the 
authors note that,  
 
“In a system in which criminal law is regarded as a regulatory tool of government and 
in which (in England and Wales) there are very weak constitutional constraints on what 
kinds of conduct can be criminally proscribed – everything from homicide and serious 
fraud through dumping litter to licensing infractions and ‘raves’ can be criminalized –it 
seems impossible to distinguish criminal law by reference to its substance.”  
 
The authors go on to explain that this is a contingent matter and that, historically, things 
have not always followed this trend. Hence, in legal commentaries of the eighteen and 
nineteen centuries, a richer and more confident assertion of a rationale for criminal law 
could be found and the interests and values that criminal law set out to protect and 
express were clearer. These rationales would vary from the protection of god, religion, 
and the state, to the protection of the individual or property.46  
 
Hence, as Lacey, Wells and Quick note, this tendency to resort to formal approaches 
when defining criminal law draws from 
 
“a prevailing tension in contemporary criminal law: that between older ideas of crime 
as public wrongdoing and the modern reality of criminal law as a predominantly 
administrative system managing enormous numbers of relatively non serious and 
‘regulatory offences’: between the older, quasi moral and retributive view of criminal 
                                                                  
44 The author argues that this expansion was effected primarily by the creation of summary 
offences tried in magistrates courts which were a product of the expanding functions of the 
modern administrative state for which criminal law became an increasingly important tool, L. 
Farmer, “The obsession with Definition” (1996) Social and Legal Studies 64-66. 
45 J. Figueiredo Dias, Direito Penal, supra note 31, 153-160. 
46 The authors also note that the existence of stronger rationales is expected in very circumscribed 
systems of criminal law but less so in the type of systems we have nowadays, in relation to which 
the scope and functions of criminal law have increased immensely, N. Lacey and L. Zedner, 
“Legal Constructions of Crime”, supra note 32, 164.    
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law and the instrumental, regulatory aspect of criminal law which has become 
increasingly dominant under modern and late modern conditions.”47 
 
Furthermore, as Duff et al. remark, the expansion of criminal law also took place, more 
recently, in relation to wrongdoings such as terrorism, pornography and certain types of 
sexual exploitation.48 Finally, changes in the scope of criminal law have also been taking 
place due to the increasing intervention of different actors. At the national level, the 
State began to devolve responsibility in crime control to civil society;49 whilst at the 
supranational level, international organisations and EU involvement in crime related 
issues also began to take place in recent years.50    
 
Hence, in a world where it is increasingly difficult to delimit the boundaries and scope 
of the criminal law, the appearance and development of European Union criminal law 
calls for an enquiry into its own nature. Is it possible to find common underlying 
rationales or themes in ECL? When and how did they appear? Is the EU concerned with 
particular types of criminality? Is it possible to delimit the boundaries of ECL? What are 
its patterns of development? What are ECL’s own distinctive features?  
 
The political and institutional context of ECL 
 
An analysis of the nature of ECL requires the taking into account of its own context. As 
Lacey suggests, studies in criminal law need to be contextualised. This means, first and 
foremost, to escape the implicit reliance of the idea of crime as given and to look at a 
multiplicity of actors and interpretative and enforcement practices which are relevant to 
the understanding of criminalisation.51 This need for context is also suggested by Duff et 
al., who note that one cannot ask about the proper aims of criminal law independently 
of, or prior to, any particular political structure. Hence, any enquiry into criminal law 
needs to take into account the set of political institutions it depends on, if it does not 
                                                                  
47 N. Lacey, C. Wells and O. Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law, supra note 30, 9. 
48 RA Duff, L. Farmer, SE Marshall, M. Renzo and V. Tadros, “Introduction: The Boundaries of 
the Criminal Law”, in RA Duff et al., The Boundaries of the Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 
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J. Figueiredo Dias, Direito Penal, Parte Geral II - As Consequências Jurídicas do Crime 
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49 D. Garland, “The Limits of the Sovereign State, Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary 
Society”, supra note 1, 445, 448-449; L. Johnston and C. Shearing, Governing Security: 
Explorations in Policing and Justice (London: Routledge, 2003). 
50 RA Duff, L. Farmer, SE Marshall, M. Renzo and V. Tadros, “Introduction: The Boundaries of 
the Criminal Law, supra note 48, 13. 
51 N. Lacey, “Contingency and Criminalisation”, in I. Loveland (ed) Frontiers of Criminality 
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want to be talking about a simple abstract legal entity. This, accordingly, is an enquiry 
reachable only via an historical review.52  
 
In historicising the evolution of ECL, its broader context has to be taken into account.  
Indeed, although the norms enacted under the goals of ‘harmonisation of national 
criminal law’ and ‘mutual recognition in criminal matters’ will be the main focus of this 
dissertation, they need to be contextualised, for their existence was influenced by other 
norms, actors, practices and institutions. As it will be shown, the institutional framework 
of the EC and EU and of the ‘third pillar’ has always strongly influenced the scope and 
shape of the ECL. In particular, it has strongly limited the areas in which the EU could 
intervene in criminal matters. Furthermore, within this institutional framework, 
particular areas of development have influenced ECL. This is the case, prima facie, of 
police cooperation in criminal matters and of the CJEU. As seen earlier, many studies in 
European Union criminal law have brought developments relating to police cooperation 
into their scope. Indeed, police cooperation has been a central axis of development of 
criminal matters in the EU and has significantly influenced the scope of ECL. This was 
predominantly the case during the first stages of ECL’s development. Another important 
axis of development has been the case law of the CJEU. The Court has influenced the 
scope of ECL by strengthening one of its mains rationales of intervention and has 
influenced its shape by providing guidance on the modus operandi of ECL as well as on 
national criminal law. Equally, political developments in EU criminal matters have 
deeply influenced the scope of ECL. In general, these different domains of interaction 
with criminal matters provide the general context of the development of ECL and are 
important to the understanding of the EU’s own criminalisation process. Hence, these 
and other related developments that have provided context to the development of ECL 
will be referred to throughout the thesis when they are necessary to fully explain the 
nature of ECL. Their use will not be comprehensive, but merely accessory to the aim of 
providing context to ECL. 
 
The historical perspective and the political and institutional context of ECL are used as a 
means to give context and shape to the present dynamics of ECL. Chapter 4 and 5 will 
then look at the qualities of ECL, through the analysis of the two main mechanisms: 
harmonisation and mutual recognition in criminal matters. The approach in these two 
chapters will be more legal and analytical than the previous chapters. The focus will be 
on the mode and intensity of ECL as well as on how criminalisation operates within 
ECL. In relation to harmonisation of national criminal law, which covers matters related 
to ‘substantive criminal law’, the emphasis of the research enquiry will be on the main 
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 24 
elements of the definition of offences, liability and penalties. Chapter 4 will look at how 
far ECL operates in the definition of offences that national legal orders ought to 
criminalise; at whether ECL offers narrow or broad offence definition and 
categorisations; to whom does ECL articulate matters of liability; and how does it 
articulate the type and level of sanctions to be applied.53 It will also focus on the 
identification of common features that can be discernable from the legal acts adopted. In 
relation to mutual recognition in criminal matters—which relates primarily to matters of 
criminal procedure, prosecution, sentence and sentence enforcement—the focus of 
analysis will be on how ECL operates with these domains. Chapter 5 will look at the 
type of legal mechanisms introduced by ECL; how they operate; and what type of values 
they allocate and how. Similar to the first part of the thesis, ECL will be contextualised. 
Thus, domestic implementation, use, enforcement or adjudication relating to ECL will 
be referred to when necessary, to provide context and clarity to the EU norm. Finally, 
Chapter 6 will look at the most recent developments of ECL, particularly those after the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. It will look at how the most recent legislative 
and judicial developments in the field framed the themes and mechanisms of ECL. 
 
The analysis will primarily be carried out by investigating the political and legal acts 
adopted throughout the evolution of the field. The different taxonomies proposed—
namely the dynamics of ECL, the rationales/themes/narratives of the fight against 
organised crime, protection of EC/EU interests and policies and protection of 
fundamental rights as well as the classification of Euro-crimes—do not attempt to draw 
precise, exhaustive or mutually exclusive categories. Rather, these are flexible, often 
overlapping and continuously evolving spheres and themes that can provide a useful 
systematisation and understanding of ECL. Moreover, the words severe, harsh and 
lenient are used with neutrality and express the idea that a certain norm is harsher or 
more lenient than those usually found or than those used in comparison. 
 
The argument 
 
This dissertation claims that European Union criminal law has two main dynamics. The 
two share a significant punitive emphasis and overlap in some features, yet have 
distinguishable origins, modus operandi, rationales and focus. The first dynamic goes 
back to the origins of the European Union project and engages the EU as a penal actor, 
focusing on the fight against a particular type of criminality that the EU perceives as 
threatening to its own values and policy goals - ‘Euro-crime’- crime characteristic of 
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L. Farmer, SE Marshall, M. Renzo and V. Tadros, “Introduction: The Boundaries of the Criminal 
Law”, supra note 48, 1, 14. 
 25 
contemporary societies that primarily affects public goods and is complex in structure. It 
will be suggested that this focus on Euro-crime was brought about by rationales such as 
the fight against organised crime, the protection of EC interests and policies and, later, 
on the protection of fundamental rights (mainly, victims’ rights). In this sphere of ECL, 
the EU deploys a specific legal apparatus to secure the criminalisation and punishment 
of these offences. It will be contended that the intensity of the EU’s criminalisation of 
Euro-crime is high and has the potential to bring about harsher criminal law across the 
European Union. This is so as the EU tends to adopt very broad definitions of criminal 
offences (which potentially lead domestic legal orders to introduce new crimes or 
enlarge the scope of pre existent criminal offences); seeks to extend liability not just to 
natural persons but also to legal persons (often expanding the type of liable subjects at 
national level); and seeks to harmonise the minimum levels of maximum penalties (but 
not maximum levels). This severity in the criminalisation of Euro-crime is further 
emphasised by the way that criminalisation is envisaged through minimal 
harmonisation, which places added pressure on more lenient criminal justice systems. 
This potentially affects the latter more as these are more likely to have to amend their 
national provisions in order to meet the minimum EU standard. On the contrary, more 
severe legal orders will more likely already meet such a minimum standard of 
criminalisation and punishment. 
  
The second dynamic of ECL engages the State as a penal actor and seeks to enhance the 
national punitive apparatus by creating new tools that are at the disposal of Member 
States for investigation, prosecution and punishment beyond national borders. This 
dimension of ECL reinforces the ius puniendi of the State. It no longer necessarily 
follows the thematic narratives of Euro-crime, focusing rather on a broader range of 
criminality (potentially any criminality) and engages with a variety of domains in 
national criminal justice systems (from evidence to custodial sentences or financial 
penalties, among others). This second dimension is more recent in the history of ECL 
and was enhanced particularly by the introduction of the principle of mutual recognition 
in criminal matters in 1999.54 This principle requires Member States to recognise and 
enforce each other’s judicial decisions in criminal matters. In particular, mutual 
recognition largely restricts the capacity of the executing State to refuse or set conditions 
for cooperation, by imposing swift procedures and limiting grounds for refusal to 
cooperate. In doing so the principle acquires a clear punitive bias, potentially favouring 
more ‘active’ States - those who more readily prosecute - as these will more likely make 
use of these EU tools for enhanced investigation, prosecution and punishment. Certain 
features of mutual recognition further emphasise this punitive impetus, particularly the 
                                                                  
54 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 1999, para 33. 
 26 
removal of the principle of dual criminality, which required a certain type of behaviour 
to be considered a crime in both States involved in cooperation. Most legal instruments 
implementing the principle of mutual recognition no longer allow States to refuse 
cooperation based on the fact that the acts for which cooperation is being asked are not 
deemed as criminal in their own legal orders. Consequently, States with more lenient 
laws are placed under increasing pressure, having to cooperate in the investigation, 
prosecution or punishment of conducts their penal systems might not deem as criminal. 
 
This thesis will further highlight that, more recently, the punitive emphasis of ECL 
began to be nuanced. This took place at both an EU and national level, primarily as a 
reaction to the expanding features of the second dynamic of ECL. First, the punitive 
impetus of this second dimension led to a counter response at the national level in which 
certain Member States showed reluctance to accepting the full effects of mutual 
recognition, at times introducing qualifications to the principle. These qualifications 
were generally in the sense of resisting the abolition of the principle of dual criminality 
and introducing or maintaining additional protections for national citizens as well as the 
fundamental rights of defendants. Second, at the EU level, newer measures on mutual 
recognition attenuated their punitive impetus either by fully or partially reintroducing 
the principle of dual criminality or by reconnecting with the figure of the defendant and 
prisoner. Furthermore, the CJEU contributed to the moderation of the punitive impetus 
by adjudicating a series of cases on the principle of ne bis in idem and adopting a stance 
largely beneficial for the defendants in such cases. Finally, the rights of the defendant 
and of the victim have also been acknowledged in the post Lisbon framework which, 
although it reinforced the punitive apparatus of the two dimensions of ECL, it also 
added some moderating features by endorsing the individual - both the defendant and 
victim - to a greater extent than the previous framework of ECL.  
 
The chapters 
 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation will analyse the very early origins of ECL and cover the 
period from approximately 1957 until 1993, date of the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Maastricht (TEU (M)). Previous to 1993, the founding Treaties were mostly silent 
regarding matters of criminal matters and did not attribute any competence to the 
European Communities to act in this field.55 However, regardless of this silence, the EC 
was not completely estranged from criminal matters matters, particularly those of 
criminal law. In fact, through CJEU case law and secondary legislation, the EC began to 
have an influence in national criminal law. This happened at times through the EC’s 
                                                                  
55 Chapter 1, section 1. 
 27 
influence on Member States to introduce national provisions of a penal nature to seek 
compliance with EC provisions, and at other times by requiring Member States to 
remove existing national law or by affecting the level and type of sanctions at national 
level when these were found to hinder EC objectives.56 Furthermore, ever since 1976, 
that EC Justice and Home Affairs Ministers saw the European Communities as a forum 
where agreements and cooperation in criminal matters could be facilitated. This 
cooperation was taking place mostly through the Trevi group, an ad hoc, informal and 
rather secretive forum set in place to mainly discuss terrorist threats from an operational 
perspective.57  
 
In 1985 however, a significant shift took place in the way criminal matters were 
perceived with the release of the Commission’s White Paper on the Single Market58 and 
the signature of the Schengen Agreement—both of which envisaging the removal of 
internal borders throughout the EC.59 These two initiatives arrived at a time when 
Member States were also concerned with pressures from international criminality and 
changing patterns in terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime across the globe and 
in Europe. Although the link between the removal of internal borders and a possible 
increase in such criminality was not established, politically, the link between the two 
was made and initiatives for cooperation amongst Member States began to take place 
under the auspices of Trevi.60 Hence, in the years between 1985 and 1993, cooperation 
in matters of law and order was streamlined.61 Through mostly secretive negotiations by 
the Trevi group (composed of Interior Ministers and police officers), intervention in 
topics as diverse as terrorism, illegal immigration, drug trafficking or trafficking in 
human beings began to be discussed, rationalised and organised in preparation for the 
incorporation of matters of law and order into the Treaty of Maastricht, which came into 
force in 1993.62 Some of these documents began to offer a broad view of organised 
crime, significantly shaping the importance and definition of organised crime in the 
years to come.63 In fact, it will be seen how during those years, two main narratives 
begin to take shape—that of the fight against organised crime and the protection of EC 
interests and policies via criminal law. These two remain at the core of ECL today. 
                                                                  
56 Chapter 1, sections 1, 1.1, 1.2 and 2.2. 
57 Chapter 1, section 1.2. 
58 European Commission, Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to 
the European Council, Milan, 28-29 June 1985, COM (85) 310 final, Brussels, 14 June 1985. 
59 The Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 - The Schengen Agreement was negotiated and 
signed in 1985, providing for the gradual removal of internal borders between Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands and Germany. Schengen acquis - Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux 
Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on the gradual 
abolition of checks at their common borders, at OJ L239/19 [2000]. Chapter 1, section 2.  
60 Chapter 1, section 2. 
61 Chapter 1, section 2.1. 
62 Chapter 1, section 2.2. 
63 Chapter 1, section 2.3. 
 28 
 
Chapter 2 will follow up on this ‘silent birth’ of ECL and analyse the developments 
from 1993 up to 1999. The Maastricht years were years of construction of a new field of 
cooperation in matters of law and order. The legal framework provided for the TEU(M) 
was limited in its institutional structures and scope.64 Institutionally, criminal matters 
were placed in the so-called ‘third pillar’ where the intergovernmental method prevailed, 
transparency was limited and accountability by other EU institutions was largely absent. 
It is within this setting that priorities for action began to be defined. From a structural 
perspective, police and judicial cooperation were envisaged in great detail with the 
establishment of several networks and structures, mostly with the aim of exchanging 
know-how and information between national authorities.65 Furthermore, harmonisation 
of national criminal law began to take place in areas as varied as fraud against the EC 
budget, corruption, drug trafficking, racism and xenophobia, sexual exploitation of 
children, and money laundering among others. This took place regardless of the 
TEU(M)’s silence in relation to the EU’s competence to harmonise national criminal 
law.66 Whilst this amalgam of initiatives and measures was adopted with no clear policy 
orientation and based on rather brief and non-explanatory Treaty provisions, the two 
rationales of fighting organised crime and protecting EC policies and interests clearly 
establish themselves as embedded themes throughout both policy documents and 
legislations (at the time, mostly through conventions and joint actions).67  
 
Hence, it will be contended that since the 1970s and especially throughout the 
Maastricht era, ECL has expanded significantly along these two rationales. These two 
themes surface in political declarations and preambles in a significant amount of 
legislation aimed at facilitating police cooperation, judicial cooperation and at 
harmonising national criminal law. These measures focus on a variety of criminality 
ranging from terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, money laundering, 
trafficking in human beings, corruption or fraud. This type of offences stands in contrast 
with crimes such as rape, murder, assault, robbery or theft, for example. It appears first 
of all to be a criminality that reflects the nature of late modern societies where all 
interactions become more volatile and interrelated. People move more than ever between 
continents and countries; capital is increasingly more mobile between different financial 
systems as the world becomes financially and economically more interdependent; 
similarly, information flows without boundaries through the internet.  
 
                                                                  
64 Chapter 2, section 1. 
65 Chapter 2, section 2. 
66 Chapter 2, section 2.2. 
67 Chapter 2, section 3, 3.1, 3.1.1 and 3.2. 
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But what defines these Euro-crimes vis-à-vis other type of criminality?  It is suggested 
that there are two dominant features: first, the nature of the goods protected. The 
criminalisation of these behaviours tends to protect public goods or goods related to 
collective institutions or collective interests, such as the stability of the political and 
financial systems, the security of the State (in this case of the European Communities 
and the European Union) or the efficacy of its policies. The criminalisation of money 
laundering, for example, attempts to protect the stability of financial systems; the 
criminalisation of terrorism protects democratic values as well as the structures and 
ultimate survival of the State; criminalisation of corruption aims at the protection of a 
political system and of the principles and institutions that are embedded in it. This stands 
in contrast with the protection of private property or the integrity of the person, which 
are protected by crimes such as assault, theft, rape or even murder for example.68  
 
A second defining feature is that Euro-crimes also have a distinctive structure. They 
appear as complex offences in a twofold manner: they often involve the use of some sort 
of infrastructure in a broad sense such as the use of means of transport (a case in point 
being human trafficking which usually involves transport to move people), technology 
or the use of support materials (the commission of terrorism-related offences, for 
example, usually involves the use of materials or means such as the construction or 
assembly of chemical or other type of weaponry or the use of sites to assemble and 
prepare a terrorist attack). Likewise, many of these offences are complex in the sense 
that they involve a degree of collective action: usually more than one perpetrator is 
required and a certain degree of coordination between the different participants must 
take place. Trafficking in human beings, terrorism or even corruption are rarely actions 
that can be performed by a single individual alone.69   
 
It is in this setting that the TEU(A) entered into force. Chapter 3 will look at the new 
stage of development of ECL that came about through this Treaty. It will remark that the 
TEU(A) significantly reshaped the institutional and substantive frame of ECL. First, at 
an institutional level, it brought about significant empowerment and formalisation of the 
role of the EU in criminal matters as well as broadened the range of tools and the scope 
of intervention.70 The fight against organised crime is solidified,71 the protection of EC 
interests and policies expanded72 and a new rationale emerges—the protection of 
fundamental rights and mostly of the rights of the victim.73 A clear dynamic, which 
                                                                  
68 Chapter 2, section 4. 
69 Chapter 2, section 4. 
70 Chapter 3, section 1 and 1.2. 
71 Chapter 3, section 2.11. 
72 Chapter 3, section 2.1.2. 
73 Chapter 3, section 2.1.3. 
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engages the EU as a penal actor and seeks the protection of values or policies it sees as 
fundamental to its existence, is further solidified and continued to grow during this 
period.  
 
However, it will be seen that the idea of ECL as focused on a specific type of criminality 
with identifiable patterns, focus and rationales is partly relegated to second plan with the 
emergence of a second distinct dynamic in ECL. This took place in 1999 with the 
introduction of the principle of mutual recognition as the ‘cornerstone of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.’74 The principle was endorsed by the European Council 
in the Tampere Conclusions75 and in fact completely reshaped ECL with the aim of 
facilitating cooperation and avoiding the political difficulties of harmonisation of 
national criminal law. The gist of the principle was that national judicial decisions were 
to be recognised and enforced throughout the territory of the European Union with 
automaticity. Measures that brought this principle to life no longer relied on the 
narratives of the fight against organised crime or protection of EC interests nor did they 
focus on Euro-crimes alone. In fact, the principle’s aim became one of facilitating and 
securing State investigation, prosecution and punishment in relation to any criminality, 
regardless of its EU connection.76 With the TEU(A) and especially with the introduction 
of the principle of mutual recognition, ECL became potentially capable of affecting the 
entire national systems of criminal justice.  
 
This chapter will also look at the changes that came about through the TEU(L) and 
TFEU. These Treaties brought about substantial supranationalisation of the field and, it 
will be suggested, further avenues for future expansion, raising questions about the 
limits of ECL. However, the TFEU also recognised EU’s competence to act in 
procedural matters, potentially opening the door for a more moderate tone of ECL, 
particularly in relation to defence rights and due process. 77  
 
Once the dynamics of ECL are set this thesis will turn to evaluating the qualities that 
emerged out of the two dynamics of ECL. It will do so by looking at the harmonisation 
of national criminal law and mutual recognition in criminal matters. It will contend that 
both principles are contributing to a more severe penality78 across the European Union, 
in particular by increasing levels of formal criminalisation of Euro-crime, by facilitating 
criminal investigation and prosecution, and securing punishment in relation to a 
                                                                  
74 Chapter 3, section 2.2.  
75 Tampere European Council, supra note 54, para 33. 
76 Chapter 3, section 2.2 (see also chapter 5). 
77 Chapter 3, section 3 and 3.3. 
78 ‘Penality’ refers to the general practices, ideas and discourses about punishment, as defined by 
M. Cavadino and J. Dignan, Penal Systems A comparative Approach (London: Sage, 2006) xiv. 
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significantly broader range of crimes, and by placing more pressure for change upon 
more lenient legal orders than upon more severe ones.  
 
Chapter 4 will shed light on the harmonisation of national criminal law. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam had envisaged harmonisation of the minimum elements constituent of 
criminal offences and penalties in relation to drug trafficking, terrorism and organised 
crime.79 The chapter will highlight how the Treaty’s provisions were interpreted 
extensively and secondary legislation adopted across a wide range of Euro-crimes. 
Furthermore, the intensity of the EU’s criminalisation of these offences was significant. 
This will be shown through the example of organised crime, which has been a central 
rationale for criminalisation by the EU.80 This is particularly evident in the Framework 
Decision on fighting organised crime,81 which called for the criminalisation of one or 
both offences of membership in a criminal organisation or the agreement to actively take 
part in the execution of offences related to the activities of the criminal organisation. 
This dual option given by the Framework Decision was a result of the political 
incapacity to agree on one single approach to criminalisation. More significant to this 
chapter’s argument on the intensity of EU’s criminalisation, was the wide definition of 
what a criminal organisation is. It will be shown how the definition agreed upon is very 
broad definition in comparison with both academic commentaries on the phenomena of 
organised crime and with examples of legislation at the national and international level 
which—even in their broadest examples—are more limited in scope than the EU’s. The 
latter’s definition is in fact, broad and flexible enough to cover a wide range of 
criminality, from Mafia-like associations, business related criminal groups, small groups 
of pick-pocketers, large illegal drug and human trafficking networks, national or 
transnational, more or less structured, among many others. The EU’s definition is able to 
cover not only traditional organised crime groups but also looser structures and networks 
of criminals which rather than being organised crime groups can also be groups that 
commit crimes that are organised or, said differently, groups that can organise 
themselves to commit certain crimes but which do not amount to what was usually 
thought to be organised crime in the strictest sense.  
 
In fact, it will further be argued in this chapter that this broad definition of offences was 
seen in a large number of examples and, in general, definitions of crimes proposed by 
the EU legislator were very broad. This required some Member States to widen the 
scope of existing offences or introduce new criminal offences altogether.82 Furthermore, 
                                                                  
79 Chapter 4, section 1. 
80 Chapter 4, section 2. 
81 Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime, 
OJ L 300/42 [2008].  
82 Chapter 4, section 2.1. 
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the EU sought to extend liability to legal persons and focused solely on laying down 
minimum maximum penalties primarily regarding imprisonment. This, it will be 
suggested, equally led some Member States to extend the class of subjects who can 
attract criminal liability at the national level and to secure minimum maximum sentences 
for harmonised offences, often increasing national levels of punishment.83 These three 
features of harmonisation of national criminal law led to an increase in formal 
criminalisation at the national level by requiring States to introduce new crimes or to 
extend the scope of pre-existing offences and by requiring them to extend liability to 
legal persons as well as establish minimum maximum punishment. Furthermore, it will 
also be argued that minimum harmonisation placed more pressure on more lenient States 
as these are more likely to have to amend their national provisions in order to meet the 
EU standard.84 However, the chapter will also outline how minimum harmonisation and 
this trend towards more severity in ECL encounters several limitations. First and 
foremost, it does not create harmony amongst national legislation, since definitions 
offered are too broad and vague;85 second, the increase in criminalisation suggested is 
merely formal as ECL does not account for practices of policing, prosecution and 
punishment in each Member State. Hence, whilst it can be argued that ECL is leading to 
a trend of increased formal criminalisation (the ‘law in the books’), the same cannot be 
said of substantive criminalisation (‘actual levels of criminalisation’ which are also 
dependent on the practices of criminal justice in each Member State--which remain 
unpredictable and substantially untouched by EU law).86 
 
Chapter 5 will provide an analysis of the legal mechanisms of ECL and focus on the 
principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters as the cornerstone of judicial 
cooperation. It will suggest that although the principle was thought to be politically more 
feasible than harmonisation, it has brought about deep and controversial changes to 
criminal justice across the European Union. It has done so by granting Member States 
enhanced tools for investigation, prosecution and punishment beyond their own national 
borders in relation not only to Euro-crime but also in relation to other serious criminality 
or, even in some cases, any criminality.87 By doing so, the principle particularly benefits 
more ‘active’ States–those who more readily prosecute—as they will be more likely to 
make use of these tools. This punitive bias is further accentuated by the abolition of the 
principle of dual criminality in most mutual recognition instruments. The principle 
required an act to be considered a criminal offence in both legal systems involved in 
order for cooperation to be operated. The abolition of this principle thus clearly favours 
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86 Chapter 4, section 4.2. 
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legal orders that punish more severely to the detriment of more lenient ones. The 
punitive emphasis of the principle of mutual recognition has been highlighted through 
the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) which aims at facilitating 
‘extradition’ between Member States by introducing an almost automatic procedure and 
removing traditional State guarantees against extradition of individuals - such as the 
principle of non extradition of nationals, the principle of dual criminality and the refusal 
to extradite based on human rights’ grounds.88 Indeed, the high number of the EAW 
issued suggests this instrument streamlined cooperation with a punitive emphasis across 
the European Union. More specifically, the great variation in how different States use 
the EAW brings to light how the principle suits different legal orders differently. Hence, 
whilst some Member States, such as Poland for example, have been enthusiastic issuers 
of EAWs, other States have used the new tool with considerably more restraint.  
 
Chapter 5 will further illustrate how ECL was, for the first time, met with resistance 
from certain domestic legal orders that were reluctant to accept the different dimensions 
of the punitive bias of mutual recognition and of the EAW. Some Member States thus 
introduced qualifications as to whether or not and how they would allow the surrender of 
individuals to other Member States. These changes were primarily in the form of 
additional safeguards for defendants or resistance to the priority given to more severe 
legal orders.89 In fact, it will be shown how these national reactions led to a subsequent 
moderation of mutual recognition also at the EU level.90 To be sure, mutual recognition 
continued to expand in order to secure the recognition and enforcement of financial 
penalties,91 evidence,92 and imprisonment as well as alternative sanctions.93 However, 
the principle of dual criminality was either partially or fully reintroduced in some of 
these measures and the impact of punishment on the individual began to be taken into 
account, mainly by the CJEU adjudication on the principle of ne bis in idem.94 The 
protection of fundamental rights mainly via the endorsement of procedural rights has 
also been highlighted ever since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Hence, 
these most recent developments suggest that a better balance between punitiveness and 
moderation is finding place in ECL. 
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Chapter 1 The silent birth of European Union Criminal law: the pre-Maastricht 
era (1957-1993) 
 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 will look at the European Communities’ relationship with matters of law and 
order from the nineteen sixties until the early nineties. Criminal law was introduced in 
the realm of the Treaties only with the TEU(M) in 1993. Before that, arguably, criminal 
law was not part of the EC’s remit nor did the European Communities have the 
competency to act in matters of crime control. However, both Member States, in an 
intergovernmental fashion, and the EC, in an indirect way, were not completely isolated 
from law and order related matters. This chapter seeks to explore the early origins of 
European Union criminal law and identify what initiatives were taking place as well as 
show how arrangements were being built and in turn silently reshaping the EC and 
Member States’ relationship with law and order matters in the EC context. The chapter 
will argue that two broad narratives, the fight against organised crime and the protection 
of EC interests and policies, began to take form during those years and how these were 
pursued via indirect, informal and often secretive means. This modus operandi suited the 
EC’s lack of proper competencies in criminal matters vis-à-vis its political will to have a 
say in this field regardless. Additionally, it will be shown how the EC’s intervention in 
criminal law was narrow and discrete, yet, significant enough to raise concerns over its 
secrecy and lack of accountability in this area. Within the broad context of the thesis, 
this chapter will shed light on how the first and for many years central dynamic of 
European Union criminal law (ECL) emerged indirectly during this period and set the 
tone for the development of the field for many years to come.  
The first section of this chapter will focus on the period up to 1985, a period when the 
EC’s position on law and order matters was rather neutral. However, it will suggest that 
even though criminal law was not part of the EC’s formal framework, a significant albeit 
indirect dialogue with national criminal law was taking place as the EC allowed or even 
facilitated the use of national laws to guarantee the enforcement of its own policies. This 
section will further show how the CJEU sought changes at the national level by, on 
occasion, removing domestic penal provisions which could hinder the functioning of the 
common market. At the same time, Member States began to see the EC structures as a 
convenient framework to develop parallel initiatives in police cooperation and counter 
terrorism. The second part of the chapter will look at the momentum created in 1985 
with proposals for the completion of a single market and internal border removals to 
facilitate free movement within the EU space. It will note how both politicians and law 
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enforcement agencies were keen to expand police cooperation amongst Member States 
in order to combat the increasing fears of organised crime and illegal immigration 
although data on this possible increase were scarce. It will show how organised crime 
was, for the first time, endorsed as a concept underlying Member States’ embryonic 
common field in law and order matters. Finally, this section will show how the nature of 
the arrangements created and their corresponding dynamics raised important 
apprehension regarding the lack of accountability  and lack of transparency of EC’s 
action in this field.   
 
1. The EC and criminal law: the neutrality of the early years 
 
Criminal law was initially not envisaged as being part of the European integration 
process and none of the three initial founding Treaties focused on matters of law and 
order. The ESCC (European Coal and Steel Community) Treaty, signed in Paris in 1951, 
aimed solely at establishing a common market in coal and steel and to supervise the 
conditions of production across Europe. The Euratom Treaty (European Atomic Energy 
Community) and the EC Treaty (European Economic Community), both enforced in 
1957, aimed respectively at fostering the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Europe and at 
creating a common market by regulating issues such as a common union, the four 
freedoms (free movement of goods, persons, services and capital), commercial policy 
and a general degree of fiscal and economic coordination between Member States. 
Besides creating a common market the ECT also established a Common Agricultural 
Policy. The three Treaties were thus silent regarding criminal matters and did not 
attribute any competence to the EC to act in this field. This was further reasserted by the 
European Commission who noted in 1974, that penal law was a subject which did not 
enter the Community sphere95 and by the CJEU who held in 1981 that  
 
“in principle, criminal legislation and the rules of criminal procedure are matters for 
which the Member States are still responsible.”96  
 
This is not to say that there was no room for criminal law or criminal law related matters 
within the process of EC integration. First and foremost, one provision in criminal law 
related matters could be found in the Treaties. Article 194 (1) Euratom Treaty imposed 
an obligation of professional secrecy and required Member States to treat an 
infringement of this obligation as falling within their jurisdiction and therefore to 
prosecute the civil servant in question. This Article imposed a duty to prosecute upon 
                                                                  
95 European Commission, 8th Report of Activities, Brussels, Luxembourg, February 1974, 79. 
96 Case 203/80 Criminal proceedings against Guerrino Casati [1981] ECR 2595, para 27. 
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the request of other Member States or of the Commission in similar conditions as it 
would prosecute  
 
“an act prejudicial to its rules on secrecy and as one falling, both as to merits and 
jurisdiction, within the scope of its laws relating to acts prejudicial to the security of the 
State or to disclosure of professional secrets”.97  
  
Besides this minimal presence in the Treaties, there were other avenues through which 
criminal law was indirectly and slowly making its way into the political and legal 
spheres of the European project. This happened first as the EC made room for national 
laws to criminalise behaviours that could negatively influence EC policies or, more 
importantly, to introduce provisions—often of a penal nature—which could ensure 
efficiency and compliance with EC norms. Second, the EC’s role was shaped through an 
occasional influence of the CJEU. The latter sought to eliminate penal hindrances to the 
completion of the single market, setting aside domestic criminal law provisions. Lastly, 
at a political level, the EC provided a useful and suitable framework for the development 
of police cooperation primarily in relation to terrorism and later on with regard to 
serious criminality. These levels of influence will be described in the following section.  
 
 
1.1. The pursuit of EC interests and policies via national criminal law 
 
As mentioned, the ECT was silent in relation to criminal law. However, this is not to say 
that criminal law had no place in the broad framework of the EC’s development. In fact, 
during the first decades of the EC’s existence, Community law was increasingly 
influencing Member States’ criminal law, thus facilitating the realisation of the EC’s 
interests and policies. Hence, although the Community had no competence in criminal 
matters, national criminal law was indirectly being used as a tool to regulate the 
common market and to facilitate the enforcement of EC policies. 
 
This influence took two forms. First, via legislative acts when EC measures were 
implemented into domestic legal orders via criminal law provisions. Second, when the 
CJEU would set conditions upon domestic criminal law. This influence was made 
possible mainly through two constitutional principles developed by the CJEU: the 
primacy or supremacy of EC law over national law and the principle of direct effect. The 
former was developed very early on in the case Costa v Enel in which the Court held 
that EC law could not be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however these were 
                                                                  
97 Article 194 Euratom Treaty, OJ C 84/1 [2010] (consolidated version). 
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framed.98 The principle of direct effect, in turn, was recognised in Van Gend en Loos 
(and further developed in several subsequent cases) in which the Court held that 
provisions of EC law that were sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional, could be 
invoked by individuals before national courts.99  
 
Regarding the legislative influence of Community law in national criminal law, 
examples vary throughout policy areas such as transport, environmental policy, 
agriculture and fisheries. The EC’s influence could be seen, for instance, in the Council 
Regulation on the harmonisation of social legislation related to road transport,100 which 
sought to: determine the minimum age of drivers engaged in the carriage of goods and 
passengers,101 set limits on duration of continuous driving periods and daily driving 
time, 102 stipulate resting periods,103 and to enact mechanisms of control for these 
provisions.104 The coordination of these elements targeted several objectives, which 
ranged from promoting harmonious competition in the domain of transport to an 
improvement in road safety as well as greater control by the EC (and national 
authorities) regarding the type and mode of road transport used in the EU space. The 
Regulation required vehicle crew members to carry an ‘individual control book’ where 
information regarding rest periods, driving hours, etc. should be registered. Finally, 
article 18 (1) of the Regulation provided that national legislation complementing the 
Council Regulation should cover the organisation, procedure and means of control as 
well as the penalties to be imposed in the case of a breach of such provisions.105  
 
The common fisheries policy was another important domain in which the effectiveness 
of EC measures was to be guaranteed by national legal orders. In this domain, a 
Regulation establishing control measures for the fishing activities of the Member 
                                                                  
98 Case 6/64 Costa v Enel ECR 1141 [1964], in particular at 594. 
99 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Administration ECR 1 [1963]; see for 
further developments of the principle, inter alia, Case 41/74 Van Duyne ECR 1337 [1974], Case 
2/74 Reyners ECR 631 [1974], Case 43/75 Defrenne ECR 455 [1976]. 
100 Regulation (EEC) No 543/69 of the Council of 25 March 1969 on the harmonisation of certain 
social legislation relating to road transport, OJ L 77/49 [1969]. 
101 Article 5, ibid.. 
102 Articles 7, 8, 9 and 10, ibid.. 
103 Articles 11 and 12, ibid.. 
104 Articles 14 and 15, ibid.. 
105 Later on, intervention was streamlined with the adoption of Regulation 3820/85 on the 
harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to transport which repealed Regulation 543/69 
- this Regulation aimed at harmonising competition between methods of inland transport, whilst 
improving working conditions and road safety. The same lines of action were maintained 
although the Regulation provided for fewer exemptions from the obligations to install the control 
mechanisms provided for in its text. Furthermore, it again reasserted that “Member States shall, 
in due time and after consulting the Commission, adopt such laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions as may be necessary for the implementation of this Regulation. Such measures shall 
cover, inter alia, the organisation of, procedure for and means of control of the penalties to be 
imposed in case of breach.”, Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 of 20 December 1985 on the 
harmonization of certain social legislation relating to road transport, OJ L 370/1 [1985]. 
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States106 sought to ensure the good functioning of common fisheries by providing 
mechanisms of control regarding the maximum fishing quotas assigned to each Member 
State. The Regulation required large vessels to fill out a declaration of landing at the end 
of each voyage, given that  
 
“this declaration constitutes the sole means of monitoring their activities thereby 
permitting the degree of observance of conservation measures in force”.107  
 
More significantly, the Regulation imposed a general obligation on Member States to 
inspect Community vessels in their ports and waters and to ensure compliance with 
Community management regulation on fisheries as well as to prosecute or take 
administrative action whenever a breach was identified.108  
 
Further examples can be found in the domain of the common agricultural policy, 
particularly Regulation 729/70 on the financing of the common agricultural policy, 
which aimed at protecting the EC budget by seeking to ensure it was governed 
soundly.109 In this context, the European Commission was responsible for the 
administration of the funds available, but the control of irregularities and negligence in 
the management of such funds was to be ensured by national authorities. Thus, the 
Regulation sought to guarantee good supervision of national expenditure by requiring 
Member States to ensure the prosecution of irregularities and the reclamation of the 
sums of money lost as a consequence of these irregularities.110 These national 
                                                                  
106 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2057/82 of 29 June 1982 establishing certain control measures 
for fishing vessels of the Member States OJ L 220/1[1982], amended by Council Regulation 
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Regulation (EEC) No 3723/85 of 20 December 1985 with the same title, OJ L361/42 [1985]. For 
more details on these regulations and on Member States obligations in relation to fisheries see 
R.R. Churchil, EEC Fisheries Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987) 23.  
107 Preamble, Regulation 2057/82, ibid.. 
108 See, for instance, Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 among others, ibid.. In this domain, new measures 
were also adopted later on, namely Regulation 2241/87 establishing certain control measures for 
fishing activities. This Regulation sought primarily to ensure that permissible levels of fishing 
(so-called “national quotas”) were observed. It required Member States to keep records and 
submit statements of their fishing activities and to “verify the accuracy of entries in logbooks, 
landing and shipment declarations” among other control activities. In particular, the Regulation 
stated that if the competent authorities of Member States observed that “the relevant rules and 
control measures are not being complied with, they shall take penal or administrative action 
against the master of such a vessel or any person responsible.”, Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2241/87 of 23 July 1987 establishing certain control measures for fishing activities, OJ L 207/1 
[1987]. 
109 Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 of the Council of 21 April 1970 on the financing of the common 
agricultural policy, OJ L 94/13 [1970], subsequently replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 
1258/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the financing of the common agricultural policy, OJ L 160/103 
[1999]. 
110 Article 8(1), Regulation (EEC) 729/70, ibid.. 
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obligations were further confirmed by subsequent Regulations on the same matter and 
other related issues.111  
 
This modus operandi of securing the enforcement of EC norms via national criminal law 
was also taking place in the context of some directives, whose implementation led to the 
adoption of criminal sanctions at the national level. This was the case, for instance, with 
the Directive on insurance against civil liability of motorcars and on the enforcement of 
the obligation to insure against such liability.112 This Directive sought to address the 
disparities between Member States’ domestic legislation by abolishing vehicle checks 
between Member States, compensated for by the compulsory insurance of all vehicles 
circulating in the EU. By addressing disparities between Member States’ domestic 
legislation, this measure spoke to the core of the single market, namely with regard to 
transport policy, by favouring the movement of goods and persons within the EC, whilst 
also endorsing the interests of persons who may be victims of accidents, and subtly 
leading to a de facto EC driven criminalisation at the national level.  
 
However, none of these measures contained specific obligations to adopt criminal 
sanctions at the national level, leaving Member States with the freedom to decide which 
measures to adopt. Nonetheless, the text in these measures often carried a strong 
suggestion to use criminal law. The rule of thumb for this intervention was that the EC 
would set the norm and Member States would set the sanction.113 However, this was not 
a widespread method.114 Indeed, there were only sporadic examples in certain policy 
domains and EC law was never clear-cut about the type of action it required Member 
States to engage in. As shown, the EC set demands on Member States for the 
introduction of means of control and penalties to be imposed in case of breach regarding 
the respective provisions, to undertake inspections, to ensure compliance or to prosecute 
or take administrative action. These obligations were often reflected in the de facto 
adoption of criminal legislation at the national level.  
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This could be seen, for instance, in relation to Regulation 543/69/EEC on the 
harmonisation of certain social legislation related to road transport.115 The UK adopted 
the Transport Act of 1968 and then the European Communities Act of 1972 providing 
for criminal penalties for the violation of the provisions of the EC Regulation.116 
Furthermore, Regulation 1696/71 on the common organisation of the market in hops 
was implemented in the UK by the Hops Certification Regulation and introduced 
offences related to the uncertified and improperly packed hops which was penalised by 
fine or imprisonment.117  
 
The Directives on insurance liability and conservation of wild birds also brought about 
the enactment of criminal provisions in the UK. Directive 72/166 on insurance against 
civil liability of motor cars was implemented in the UK by the Motor Vehicles 
(Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 1973 which created the summary offence of using 
a motor vehicle without an insurance policy covering civil liability, punishable by a fine. 
Likewise, the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 which implemented Directive 79/409 
on the conservation of wild birds made it a criminal offence to engage in activities 
harmful to the conservation of wild birds and provided for criminal fines for the 
commission of such offences.118   
 
This legislative dialogue between EC and national legal orders, which resulted at times 
in the implementation of EC measures via national criminal law, was clearly legitimised 
by the CJEU in Amsterdam Bulb.119 In this case, the Court held that Member States were 
required to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations derived from Community 
institutions’ actions. In doing so Member States were entitled to choose the measures 
which they considered appropriate, including criminal sanctions.120 Therefore, as 
Member States were clearly entitled to secure the protection of Community provisions 
via the application of criminal sanctions, it is apparent that criminal law was not 
completely outside the realm of Community law. As Harding noted, the CJEU’s position 
in this case was permissive towards more rather less enforcement at the national level.121  
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Moreover, other realms of interaction between EC and domestic criminal law were 
being shaped. Since very early on, the CJEU began to influence national criminal law in 
the context of some cases. At first, the Court’s influence upon national criminal law 
differed from the legislative one seen above in that, instead of permitting or encouraging 
the introduction of penal provisions, it rather sought to remove them or tone them down 
when they would run counter to an EC provision or policy goal. Later on in the chapter 
it will be shown that, over time, the CJEU also began to set some positive obligations on 
Member States. Ultimately, the aim of the CJEU was to guarantee the effectiveness of 
EC policies and the completion of the common market regardless of any penal options 
Member States chose to pursue.  
  
Sporadic examples of the Court’s influence on national legal orders can be found quite 
early on.122 The CJEU influenced, for instance, the definition of national criminal 
offences. This took place in relation to the offence of ‘smuggling’ in the case 
Redmond.123 A Northern Ireland regulation prohibited the transport of bacon pigs unless 
to specific purchasing centres and required the transporter to be in possession of a 
document authorising the transport to those centres. The Court found that this 
prohibition on transport was incompatible both with freedom of trade between Member 
States and with the common organisation of the market in pig meats. Thus, it could not 
be justified (not even as a means of frontier control against certain fraudulent 
operations). And therefore, it found that the national regulation amounted to a measure 
having the equivalent effect of a quantitative restriction on exports, hence violating the 
free movement of goods. Similarly, in relation to smuggling pornographic materials, the 
Court held in Henn and Darby that a ban to import pornographic materials into the UK 
could be authorised only in so far as the articles imported would be considered obscene 
under domestic law hence restricting the scope of the national offence.124 This 
understanding was later on confirmed in Conegate.125 Hence, material not considered 
obscene should not be covered by the national criminal law provision.      
 
The Court also weighed in on the type and level of penalties found at the national level, 
often finding them incompatible with the effectiveness of EC goals and with the 
principle of proportionality. In relation to the free movement of persons and services, for 
example, the Court held in Watson—a case concerning an Italian law which obliged 
nationals to report non-nationals staying in the country within three days of their entry to 
                                                                  
122 For a comprehensive overview and analysis of the influence of the CJEU on national criminal 
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the Italian police; failure to do so being punishable with a fine or a maximum of six 
months of detention126- that such a penalty was disproportionate to the gravity of the 
infringement and could become an obstacle to the free movement of persons.127 Within 
the same subject matter the Court found in Bonsignore that the penal goal of ‘general 
deterrence’ or of a ‘general preventive nature’ was not in itself sufficient ground to order 
deportation of a person convicted of a criminal offence (according to the Court, a 
deportation order could only be made for breaches of the peace and public security 
which might be committed by the individual in question).128 The Court further clarified 
this decision in Bouchereau, holding that previous criminal convictions can only be 
taken into account for grounds of deportation in so far as the circumstances which it 
gave rise to that conviction are evidence of personal conduct which remain a present 
threat.129 
 
Along the same lines, but in relation to commercial policy, the Court noted in Cayrol,  
 
“in general terms, any administrative or penal measure which goes beyond what is 
strictly necessary… must be regarded as a measure having equivalent effect to a 
quantitative restriction prohibited by the Treaty.”130 
 
Equally, in Donckerwolcke,131 another case on commercial policy, the CJ held that an 
offence of false declarations made in order to facilitate the illegal import of goods 
should not be punished with criminal penalties. This, the Court noted, would be 
disproportionate to the nature of a contravention of a purely administrative nature and 
must be regarded as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction 
prohibited by the ECT.132 
 
The Court also noted that EC law could affect domestic rules of criminal procedure. It 
did so, for instance, in both Tymen and Bout holding that where national criminal 
proceedings are brought by virtue of a national measure that is held to be contrary to EC 
law, a conviction under those proceedings will be deemed incompatible with EC law.133  
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Hence, the Court, whilst recognising national autonomy and competency in criminal 
matters, set limits to the scope of criminal offences and penalties, noting that these 
should be compatible with the smooth functioning of the internal market and should not 
hinder the efficacy of EC law provisions. In Guerrino Casati, a case on the free 
movement of capital, the logic of the Court is spelled out quite clearly:  
 
“In principle, criminal legislation and the rules of criminal procedure are matters for 
which the Member States are still responsible. However, it is clear from a consistent line 
of cases decided by the court, that Community law also sets certain limits in that area as 
regards the free movement of goods and persons. The administrative measures or 
penalties must not go beyond what is strictly necessary, the control procedures must not 
be conceived in such a way as to restrict the freedom required by the Treaty and they 
must not be accompanied by a penalty which is so disproportionate to the gravity of the 
infringement that it becomes an obstacle to the exercise of that freedom.”134  
 
Indirectly and occasionally then, the CJEU began to ensure that national criminal law 
was either not an obstacle or, when possible, facilitated the realisation of EC goals and 
the protection of EC’s interests and policies.  With this modus operandi, the Court 
positioned itself to potentially influence any provision of national criminal law if it 
would affect the effectiveness of Community norms and policies. 
 
1.2. Beyond EC policies and the common market: reaching out against transnational 
criminality 
 
Besides this subtle emergence of a link between domestic criminal law and EC policies, 
a different and more significant set of arrangements in criminal matters were secretly 
taking place in Europe. After the Second World War, criminal matters at the 
international level was dealt with mostly under the auspices of the United Nations, the 
Council of Europe and the European Political Cooperation initiatives (EPC),135 leading 
to the adoption of numerous conventions and the creation of cooperation fora. Whilst 
many of these initiatives were close to the EC through Member States memberships and 
shared concerns, they could not be taken on board by the latter given its lack of 
competence to engage in criminal matters and the delicate nature of such political issues.  
 
                                                                  
134 Case 203/80, Casati, supra note 96, para 27. 
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Nonetheless, this status quo began to be challenged in the 1970s, when Member States 
started seeing the European Communities as a forum where agreements in this area 
could be facilitated. The most emblematic example of this was the Trevi Group, an ad 
hoc forum, created outside of the Treaties framework in 1976 to discuss criminal matters 
matters from an operational perspective. The group was set up by EC’s Justice and 
Home Affairs Ministers, following a UK proposal.136 At the time, the UK faced internal 
challenges with the Irish Republican Army, which was responsible for a number of 
bombings in Aldershot, London, Guilford and Birmingham during the first half of the 
1970s. Support for the UK’s initiative was unsurprisingly easy to gather as most of its 
EC counterparts were likewise facing internal problems of political violence.137 
Furthermore, transnational connections between different states became very visible 
after the Scheleyer kidnapping in Germany in 1977, when Palestinians hijacked a 
Lufthansa plane to put pressure on German authorities to free imprisoned members of 
the German Rote Armee Fraktion, highlighting the potential international dynamics of 
terrorism.138 Events such as this made terrorism one of the most salient security issues 
during those years and Trevi was set in motion in this context. The group was thus 
formed by the gathering of the Justice and Interior Ministers of the twelve Member 
States of the EC, as well as the so-called ‘seven friends of Trevi’, who attended the 
meetings as observers; namely Austria, Canada, Morocco, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the USA.  
 
Trevi was not based on any convention or treaty and remained outside the framework of 
the EC institutions in a rather ad hoc and informal arrangement. This was further 
accentuated by the secretive nature of the group, whose documents surfaced in 1989, as 
noted by the Home Office Select Committee: “December 1989 the first written 
communiqué, for public use, from a Trevi council meeting was made available.”139 
Research on previous work done by this group is nearly impossible given the lack of 
proper archives.140 A Home Office Circular, issued in April 1993, however does allow 
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for some understanding of the first years of Trevi and some review of its structure and 
aims.141 
 
The group focused primarily on practical cooperation between national authorities 
adopting an operational and problem-solving approach by focusing on issues such as the 
exchange of information and the enhancement of police cooperation in relation to 
terrorist incidents, and the exchange of scientific and technical knowledge on police 
matters.142 The House of Commons, for example, defined the task of the group as merely 
to “develop cooperation on the ground”,143 whereas Mitsilegas refers to it as a “looser 
mechanism of police cooperation”.144 As mentioned, Member States’ transnational 
cooperation concerns at the time were focused largely on terrorism and on the 
facilitation of communication and intelligence between national police forces in order to 
implement counter-terrorist practices. In this regard, Trevi encouraged Member States to  
 
“produce reports outlining the experience gained from handling any major terrorist 
incident”; “exchange information on their arrangements for handling major terrorist 
incidents, particularly at governmental level, to enhance cooperation in the event of an 
incident involving more than one country”; “establish contact points for the exchange of 
information on international terrorist matters”; and provide and exchange information 
on “police technical matters and police training” “…on its present technical and 
training arrangements… in these fields.”145  
 
To this end, two operational working groups of police and security officers were created 
in 1976 and focused respectively on the exchange of information on terrorist activity and 
the provision of mutual assistance during incidents, and on the exchange of scientific 
and technical knowledge on police matters and training.146 Trevi was further composed 
of two more groups at a ministerial and senior official level where Interior Ministry 
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officials, police officers and security services participated.147 The ministerial group met 
annually whilst the senior officials and the working groups met more frequently.148 
Before every ministerial meeting the working groups – effectively the most prominent 
part of Trevi’s structure – prepared a report that was channelled through the senior 
officials to the ministerial meeting.149 
 
Until 1985, this was the status quo of the EC’s relationship with criminal law in 
particular and with criminal matters in general. Although the Treaties were mostly silent 
in this regard and the official position of most institutions was that criminal law ought to 
be handled in the domestic sphere, there was an understanding that the EC did not need 
to absent from this field altogether. On the contrary, it would – and in fact did – make 
use of Member States’ legal and operational resources to indirectly pursue its own goals. 
 
2. The emergence of a European Union narrative on crime: the 1985 shift 
 
The initial limited remit of Trevi lasted approximately until the mid-eighties when a 
critical junction in security matters was reached at the EC level. Although 1985 was not 
the date of any particular treaty or significant change in the European integration 
process, it was the start of an era that deeply transformed the former understanding of 
criminal matters in the EU and which served as a background for the field of European 
Union criminal law. While criminal matters matters remained outside the framework of 
the Treaties, there was nonetheless a growing understanding that these matters were no 
longer to be merely tolerated or ignored by the EC. This turn came about mostly as a 
consequence of the release of two important texts for the European integration project. 
In 1985, the Commission released the White Paper on the completion of the single 
market150 and the Schengen Agreement151 was negotiated and signed, both of which 
envisaging the removal of internal borders throughout the EC. In consequence, fears 
over an increase in transnational and organised crime began to surface.  
 
The Commission acknowledged these concerns:  
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“The Commission’s efforts and initiatives in this area have been aimed at making checks 
at internal frontiers more flexible, as they cannot be abolished altogether until, in line 
with the concerns expressed by the European Council, adequate safeguards are 
introduced against terrorism and drugs.” 152  
 
Along the same lines, the Schengen Agreement also held that the signatory parties 
should,  
 
“…reinforce cooperation between their customs and police authorities, notably in 
fighting crime, particularly illicit traffic in drugs and arms, the unauthorised entry and 
residence of persons and customs and tax fraud and smuggling. To that end and in 
accordance with their national laws, the Parties shall endeavour to improve the 
exchange of information and to reinforce it where information likely to be of interest to 
the other parties in combating crime is concerned.”153  
 
The release of these two documents essentially changed the criminal law related matters 
discourse in the European Union space. 
 
Furthermore, Mitsilegas et al note how, during the 1970s and 1980s, besides the single 
market shift, there were increased pressures upon Member States, namely due to an 
expansion in  
 
“…drug trafficking, the growth of international trade and financial transactions, and 
the increasing economic interpenetration in Western Europe led to a spread of cross-
border activities of organised crime groups almost everywhere in Europe.”154  
 
Official data available from this time is scarce but Recommendation 1044 of the Council 
of Europe, for example, broadly refers to an,  
 
“…alarming increase in international crime, that is, predominantly organised crime 
with international ramifications, in member countries of the Council of Europe and the 
world as a whole”.155  
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After 1985 official documents continued to highlight that the removal of internal 
frontiers would bring about more criminality. For example, the Declaration of the 
Ministers of the Trevi Group in 1989, observed,  
 
“… we note with growing concern the development of organised crime across frontiers. 
Terrorists and professional criminals are increasingly adept at exploiting the limits of 
competence of national agencies, the difference between legal systems which exist 
between countries, and gaps in cooperation between respective services. Crimes such as 
terrorism, drug trafficking, traffic in human beings, as well as the laundering of profits 
obtained in these and other criminal activities, are now being planned and organised on 
a transnational scale, taking advantage of all facilities offered by the development of 
communications and international travel. Furthermore, these facilities bring about 
certain risks with respect to public order and internal security.”156  
 
The scarcity of information on this sort of criminality, though, is not surprising as its 
measurement and tracking are extremely difficult. The European Institute for Crime 
Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations, voiced—nearly three decades 
later in 2010—how the measurement of this type of crime is still not straightforward, 
noting the  
 
“current availability of data, especially administrative statistics, on such crimes is 
particularly limited, thus making the analysis and understanding of the dimensions and 
characteristics of crime problems a very difficult task.”  
 
These complexities might explain why the United Nations only covered this type of 
criminality in its surveys and reports very recently.157  In 2012, Maguire notes there is  
 
“very little strong evidence available about the scale of crime that crosses international 
borders (such as EU-subsidy fraud, money-laundering, smuggling, and drug or people 
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trafficking), and especially about crime that is committed by highly organized 
groups.”158  
 
The scarcity of data on international crime during the 1980s led Bigo to argue that many 
of the concerns with criminality that emerged after 1985, did so in the absence of 
significant research on whether the removal of internal borders in particular and the 
single market in general would have a significant impact on levels of criminality. Bigo 
further suggested that Justice and Home Affairs ministers did not want to be perceived 
as anti-European at that point in time, thus they had to accept the principle of free 
movement of persons. In turn, they decided to create mechanisms that could compensate 
for the abolition of internal borders and for the consequent ‘security deficit’ that this 
could bring. Hence, under the label of the fight against terrorism and increase in 
organised crime, the ministers were actually aiming to defend against a potential wave 
of illegal immigration and refugees coming into Europe.159  
 
Indeed, the above mentioned preliminary study carried out in 1993 by the Centre for the 
Study of Public Order of the University of Leicester suggested, 
 
“international terrorism will neither increase nor decrease as the consequence of the 
open borders’ and that ‘the relaxation of border controls is unlikely to see the pattern of 
organized drugs trafficking in the European Union change significantly.”160  
 
Benyon et. al. found that there was no relevant increase in serious or transnational 
criminality and that the increasing threats of terrorism and organised crime appeared, in 
the light of the data analysed, merely the official justification for adopting these new 
security measures.161 In fact, although it is not an unreasonable assumption that the 
creation of the single market and the establishment of the four freedoms could have an 
effect on the levels and shapes of criminality, that link was clearly uncertain at the 
time.162   
                                                                  
158 M. Maguire, “Crime Statistics and the Construction of Crime”, in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and 
R. Reiner (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Oxford: OUP, 20012, Fifth Edition) 206, 
233.  
159 D. Bigo, “L’Europe de la sécurité intérieure”, in D. Bigo (ed) L’Europe des Polices et de la 
Securité Interieure (Bruxelles: Editions Complexes, 1992) 17-20.  
160 Benyon et al., Police Cooperation in Europe, supra note 149, 60. 
161 Benyon et al., ibid., 60. 
162 In fact, more recent data seems to suggest that the enlargement of spaces of free movement – 
such as happened with the 2004 European Enlargement – does not necessarily lead to more 
organised crime. Changes seem to be either linked to internal factors to those groups or external 
factors such as “economic, social and technological developments.” Borders can have an impact 
in isolated situations only “tightening of controls at certain border crossing-points and its 
subsequent effects change crime opportunities.”, Europol Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
 50 
 
The fear around the relaxation of internal borders was significant as, in the beginning of 
the 1990s, anxieties about security increased as immigration and asylum became a major 
concern in some Member States, most prominently so in Germany. The fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989, a liberal asylum law and a particularly attractive geographical location 
made Germany especially vulnerable to immigration pressures. Lavenex and Wallace 
note how in the early 1990s nearly two and half million people from former socialist 
countries arrived in Germany claiming citizenship by virtue of their descent.163 
Mitsilegas et al. further mention how, in the period between 1987 and 1992, the number 
of asylum applications in Germany rose from 57,379 to 438,191. Whilst numbers in all 
Member States at the time were increasing, applications lodged in Germany comprised 
78.76 percent of that total.164 It is no surprise then that in the 1990/1991 International 
Conference, Germany took the (failed) initiative to set up a European asylum and 
immigration policy.165 But Germany was not the only country facing these pressures: the 
UK, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands all saw a significant increase in entrance of 
asylum seekers and immigrants during this time period. 166 
  
In addition to the important role of politicians who were dealing with incoherent data on 
crime while addressing their own fears regarding floods of immigrants, national police 
forces were under great internal pressure during those years as well due to an increase in 
domestic crime.  As Reiner notes “The 1980s were a decade of explosive crime 
increase” with the recorded crime between 1981 and 1993 almost doubling in the UK. 
This trend was also seen in a large majority of European countries, both in relation to 
property crime and violent crime, namely criminal damage and violence against the 
person.167  
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The central actors in the Trevi framework – Interior Ministers and police officers - were 
thus both under major internal pressures. Politicians faced the fear of losing control of 
the quantity and quality of immigrants and asylum seekers arriving upon their domestic 
territory. Likewise, police forces faced an additional strain on their already pressurised 
domestic crime landscape. Both sides fed each others’ fears while also offering helpful 
remedies. 
 
Anderson et al. noted how the general expectation that the removal of internal borders 
was to make crime control more difficult was in fact the general perception mostly in 
law enforcement circles (although literature had conflicting views on whether borders 
are useful in the fight against crime).168 Consequently, regardless of the seeming lack of 
clear data or studies on the existent levels of criminality and on its potential increase 
with the completion of the single market, in the years between 1985 and 1993 (year of 
the entry into force of the TEU(M)), cooperation in criminal matters was streamlined. 
As will be explained below, the Trevi structure was expanded and many other ad hoc 
groups were created. The scope of intervention was broadened and issues ranging from 
terrorism to illegal immigration, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings or 
hooliganism among others began to be addressed in this transcontinental context. 
Overall, a narrative of the need to fight an increasing threat of organised crime (broadly 
understood and deeply related to the single market) began to emerge in the background 
of European integration, in what can be called the early origins of Euro-crime.169 Post-
1985 was thus an era of the relative formalisation and rationalisation of law criminal law 
related concerns and initiatives across the EC which ultimately allowed for their 
incorporation later on into the TEU(M).     
 
2.1. An incremental claim: expanding structures and themes 
 
After 1985, the change in the political discourse on crime, together with the internal 
market, brought about changes in criminal law related matters, namely a significant 
proliferation of structures and the broadening scope of the EC’s interest in criminal 
matters as well as an attempt at the formalisation and rationalisation of such a 
framework. The legacy of those years remained at the core of the new developments that 
created additional layers to the initiatives already in place. From a structural point of 
view, the most significant and immediate change was the expansion of Trevi’s 
configuration. First, the remit of the second working group, which had been established 
in 1976, was expanded to cover matters such as football hooliganism, leading to the 
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establishment of a permanent correspondents network created to monitor and exchange 
information on football supporters.170 Besides the two initial operational groups on 
terrorism and police cooperation, a third group on Serious Organised International 
Crime was established in 1985. It aimed at the coordination of activities against serious 
crime, especially drug trafficking but also money laundering, environmental crime or 
stolen vehicles and illicit traffic in works of art. In 1988 a fourth working group was 
created called “Trevi 1992”. The group addressed the national security implications of 
the removal of internal borders and sought to adopt compensatory measures for the free 
movement of persons, such as the intensification of exchange of information across 
borders. In 1992, yet another Working Group on Europol was set in place with the aim 
of establishing a European Drugs Unit (EDU) and later on, a European Police Office 
(Europol).171  
 
Additionally, other groups were also formed alongside Trevi, many of which centred on 
very similar topics to the ones explored by the Trevi ministers. These groups were not 
formally part of the Trevi’s structure but reported to the Trevi ministers and their 
representatives were identical to those of the Trevi working groups, often meeting at the 
same time and venues. Examples of these groups include the Ad Hoc Group on 
Immigration set up in October 1986 under the UK presidency, composed of senior civil 
servants from the national immigration departments. The group was responsible for 
drafting or helping to draft conventions on asylum and external borders; the most 
notable example being the Dublin Convention.172 Additionally, the Working Group on 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters composed of senior officials was in charge of 
drafting conventions and agreements in order to facilitate mutual legal assistance in 
areas such as facilitation and simplification of extradition, terrorism funding and fraud 
against EC budget.173 In 1988, a Coordinators Group on the free movement of persons 
was created at the Rhodes European Council meeting in December and was set up to 
bring together the different groups on terrorism, policing, customs, drugs, immigration, 
and legal cooperation, as well as to prepare the infrastructure which was to underpin 
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justice and home affairs matters under the TEU(M).174 The meetings of the Group were 
not meant to be an extra forum for discussion but rather a tool to unblock the  
 
“…whole complex of intergovernmental and Community work in the field of free 
movement of persons”, to draft a “report on the free movement of persons and the 
establishment of an area without frontiers, including the measures to be adopted by the 
responsible bodies and a timetable for their implementation”.175  
 
Finally, the Ad Hoc Group on International Organised Crime was created in September 
1992 at a meeting of the ministers of Interior and Justice called for by Italy and France 
after the murders of Italian anti-mafia judges in the summer of that same year. The 
Group was established to fight international organised crime at an intergovernmental 
level, and more specifically to collect and document the nature and structure of the 
Mafia and other organised crime groups across Europe.176 The group also agreed to 
continue to collect data on the spread of organised crime, to establish a network of 
contact points to facilitate cooperation in specific cases, to analyse legislation in the 
different Member States in order to identify obstacles to practical cooperation and to 
urge the Working Group on Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters to prioritise its 
work in relation to extradition.  
 
These fora continued to focus primarily on operational matters, particularly police-
related. Indeed, as seen in the two previous paragraphs, Trevi III aimed at coordinating 
activities in several domains of serious crime such as drug trafficking, money 
laundering, environmental crime among others, Trevi 92 was dedicated to an 
intensification of exchange of information and Trevi II was extended and put in charge 
of the creation of a network of correspondents to monitor and exchange information, 
particularly through a telegram reporting system in relation to football hooliganism. 
Along the same lines, the Ad Hoc Group on International Organised Crime aimed at the 
collection and documentation of the nature and structure of the mafia across Europe, the 
establishment of a network of contact points and the identification of legal obstacles to 
practical cooperation.  
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This operational drive arose strongly from several documents issued by Interior 
Ministers along with several police forces. The Declaration of the Belgian Presidency in 
1987, for example, approved the constitution of an international exchange of 
information on thefts and discoveries of arms and explosives for terrorist purposes and 
approved a procedure for evaluating terrorist threats in the EC Member States.177 
Moreover, it allowed for drug liaison officers posted in third countries to be used for the 
benefit of the EC and agreed on the continuation of work on special enquiry methods for 
illegal drug trafficking.178 Likewise, the Palma Document, a Declaration drawn up by 
the ‘Coordinators Group on the Free movement of persons’ distributed the work 
throughout the numerous groups created within and outside the Trevi structure and 
called for the adoption of measures in a wide range of topics from terrorism, to drugs, 
immigration, visas and control of external borders (see below, for more details). It 
incentivised the adoption of measures that would  
 
“…involve closer cooperation between the Member States’ law enforcement authorities 
and agencies, and an improved system for exchanging information.”179 It also called for 
measures on the “intensification of the exchange of information about the removal of 
citizens of third countries which represent a possible terrorist danger to security”;180 for 
a “permanent exchange of information concerning known members of and activities of 
terrorist groups”;181  
 
for the intensification of coordination between police forces;182 for the establishment of a 
public registry of false documents, explosives, detonators, and other information which 
could strengthened the fight against terrorism;183 and the creation of a common system 
for the identification of wanted persons.184 Furthermore, it also asked Member States to 
create or designate a central authority responsible for transmitting and receiving 
extradition requests and called for the ratification of the European Convention on 
Extradition by those Member States who had not yet done so,185 among other measures.  
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Likewise, the Programme of Action to combat terrorism and other forms of organised 
crime also reasserted the operational goals of cooperation amongst Member States 
during those years. Among many other examples it stated that  
 
“central departments shall intensify their regular exchanges and permanent updating of 
detailed information concerning the activity of terrorist groups”.186  
 
Additionally, liaison officers in terrorist matters were to be appointed; common 
standards for ‘wanted posters’ were to be agreed to;187 and similar measures in relation 
to drug trafficking188 and organised crime189 were proposed. Furthermore, the 
Programme called for an evaluation of the conditions under which trans-frontier 
observation and pursuit rights could be given to national authorities when serious 
offences were committed.190 It also called for the study of a common information system 
containing data and description of persons and objects.191 
 
The Schengen Convention192 was signed in 1990 and laid down the specific provisions 
implementing the 1985 Schengen Agreement, which at that date provided for the 
gradual removal of internal borders between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and Germany.193 The Schengen area and cooperation established by the 
Schengen Agreement - and further implemented by the Schengen Convention - 
remained outside the scope of the Treaties and it did not involve all EC Member States, 
although the number of participating Member States was gradually increasing.194 Hence, 
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in relation to the participant States at the time Schengen further contributed to streamline 
the operational nature of cooperation in police matters by introducing measures which 
allowed for police officers to carry out cross border observation195 and the pursuit of 
criminals across borders (so-called ‘hot pursuit’) into the territory of other signatory 
States.196 Furthermore, Schengen proposed the setting up of an information system with 
data on persons,197 the application of the ne bis in idem principle transnationally,198 the 
facilitation of extradition199 and the transfer of the execution of criminal judgements 
between the signatory States.200 Operational concerns were taken further with the 
proposal for a European Police Office (Europol) in 1991201 and its predecessor – the 
European Drugs Unit (EDU). The latter paved the way to Europol and was to be focused 
on the “exchange and analysis of intelligence in relation to illicit drug trafficking, the 
criminal organisations involved and associated money laundering activities affecting 
two or more Member States.”202 However, the Schengen Convention, EDU and later 
Europol only entered into force after the TEU(M). 
 
Whilst for a for cooperation were proliferating, the scope of cooperation in these matters 
was also becoming broader. From a substantive point of view, the activities of the 
several groups created under Trevi and the other ad hoc groups expanded the domains of 
intervention considerably. Whilst before 1985 the focus was on counter terrorism 
measures, it was considerably enlarged after 1985, as measures in different areas ranging 
from terrorism, to illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking, hooliganism among 
others, began to be considered. Indeed, the previously referred to Declaration of the 
Belgian Presidency,203 issued in 1987, called for the strengthening of cooperation in 
relation to immigration, the fight against drugs and terrorism, and more specifically, for 
a unified system of visas, the strengthening of controls at external borders, including the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
to take part in some aspects of Schengen, namely police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, the fight against drugs and the SIS, see Council Decision 2000/365/EC, OJ L 131/43 
[2000]; Council Decision 2002/192/EC, OJ L 64/20 [2002]; and Council Decision 2004/926/EC, 
OJ L 395/70 [2004]. The Schengen Protocol annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty and the UK, 
Ireland and Denmark participation were subsequenlty ammended by the Treaty of Lisbon; see 
Protocol on the Schengen acquis integrated into the Framework of the European Union, OJ C 
310/348 [2004]. See also supra note 59. 
195 Article 40, Schengen Convention, ibid.. 
196 Article 41, ibid..  
197 Articles 92 and 94, ibid..  
198 Article 54, ibid..  
199 Article 59, ibid.. 
200 Article 67, ibid.. 
201 “The Development of Europol: Report from Trevi Ministers to the European Council in 
Maastricht”, Maastricht, December 1991, in Bunyan, Key Texts on Justice and Home Affairs, in 
T. Bunyan, Key Texts in Justice and Home Affairs, supra note 141, 40-41. 
202 Ministerial Agreement on the establishment of the European Drugs Unit, Copenhagen, 2 June 
1993, in Bunyan, Key Texts on Justice and Home Affairs, in T. Bunyan, Key Texts in Justice and 
Home Affairs, supra note 141, 47. 
203 Trevi Ministers, “Declaration of Ministers of the Trevi Group”, supra note 156. 
 57 
means to repatriate third country nationals illegally residing in the Community, for 
measures to avoid abuse of political asylum and a further intensification of cooperation 
in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and drug trafficking. The document 
also referred briefly to cooperation in the domains of fire, firearms and hooliganism. 
This Declaration of the Trevi Ministers makes official the shift from the subject matter 
of terrorism alone, which continued to be central, to other domains such as drug 
trafficking and illegal immigration.  
 
From 1987 onwards these issues began to be addressed together in many declarations, 
actions plans and other official documents. This was clear, for instance, from the Palma 
document which defined the type of measures that should be decided by a group or 
groups and which called for measures on the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and 
other illicit trafficking, improved cooperation of law enforcement bodies, judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and the control of articles accompanying travellers. 
Regarding the external frontiers of the EC, it called for administrative and technical 
instruments for the treatment of non-Community citizens, namely a visa policy, a list of 
persons to be refused entry and the determination of competencies to decide on asylum 
applications.204 Along the same lines, the Schengen Convention brought in the 
possibility for cooperation in police and security matters in relation to offences such as 
murder, rape, counterfeiting, armed robbery, extortion, traffic in human beings, illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, illicit explosives and illicit 
carriage of toxic and dangerous waste among others.205 The umbrella of interest amongst 
EC related groups was gathering more and more areas of criminality in a crescendo of 
topics and initiatives that would finally be officially absorbed by the European Union in 
1993 with the entering into force of the TEU(M).   
 
2.2. A broader scope: beyond core EC policies  
 
At the EC level, there was an expanding rationale for intervention in criminal matters. 
As seen in the first part of this chapter, the protection and enforcement of Community 
policies could influence domestic criminal laws. This influence was taking place on two 
different levels: through the choice of implementation of Community measures via 
national criminal law; and via the Court’s judicial intervention, setting limits to the 
scope of national criminal offences and penalties.  
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After 1985, indirect requests for Member States to use their national law as a means to 
protect EC interests, were also further expanded to other domains of criminality with 
measures adopted on money laundering, drugs and weapons control as well as insider 
dealing practices. In these measures, the use of criminal offences and penalties by the 
national legislator was implied or even, on occasion, referred to in a direct way.  
 
Intervention in drug related matters was said to be essential for the completion of the 
single market, particularly related to the correct application of law and customs 
regulations in agricultural matters.206 The Council noted that it was important in this 
context “that each Member State provide for sufficiently dissuasive penalties.”207 
Therefore, a Regulation laying down measures to be taken to discourage the diversion of 
certain substances to the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances, for instance, provided for the introduction of measures  
 
“…to monitor trade between the Community and third countries in substances 
frequently used for the illicit manufacture of narcotics drugs and psychotropic 
substances for the purposes of preventing the diversion of such substances.”208  
 
The Regulation went beyond monitoring by providing that  
 
“Each Member State shall determine the penalties to be applied for infringement of the 
provisions of this Regulation. The penalties shall be sufficient to promote compliance 
with those provisions.”209 
 
Likewise, Directive 91/308 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purpose of money laundering was adopted. Strikingly, the use of criminal law at the 
national level was specifically mentioned in the preamble.210 Moreover, the body of the 
Directive did not make express reference to criminal provisions, yet article 14 of the 
Directive held that  
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“Each Member State shall take appropriate measures to ensure full application of all 
the provisions of this Directive and shall in particular determine the penalties to be 
applied for infringements of the measures adopted pursuant to this Directive.”211  
 
Likewise, Article 15 once again left Member States the option to adopt stricter measures 
than the ones provided for by the Directive. Finally, Directive 91/477 on control of the 
acquisition and possession of weapons called for the harmonisation of measures on 
weapon control, namely for the purposes of hunting and target shooting.212 Once again 
the Directive made use of the usual formula and stated that  
 
“Member States shall introduce penalties for failure to comply with the provisions 
adopted pursuant to this Directive. Such penalties must be sufficient to promote 
compliance with such provisions.”213 
 
Directive 89/592, which coordinated regulations on insider dealing, was a further 
example of the Court’s influence in national criminal law.214 The initial proposal made 
by the Commission expressly required Member States to make insider dealing a criminal 
offence.215 The final draft was not as ambitious but still used a language that clearly 
incentivised Member States to adopt a criminal approach to insider dealing. First, Article 
2 stated that “Each Member State shall prohibit any person who” possesses inside 
information by virtue of his membership, holding capital or access to information, from 
taking advantage of that information.216 Furthermore, Article 3 held that,  
 
“Member States shall prohibit any person subject to the prohibition laid down in Article 
2 who possesses inside information from: (a) disclosing that inside information to any 
third party [or to] (b) recommend or procuring a third party on the basis of that 
information […].”  
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Finally, in Article 6, the Directive specifically left the door open for Member States who 
wished to adopt more stringent provisions than those laid down by the Directive.217  
 
These measures mainly called for the use of national criminal law to protect the aims of 
the respective EC measures, clearly leading to an ‘augmentation effect’218 or ‘extension 
of national criminal law.’219 This augmentation effect was further qualified by the CJ in 
1988 in the case Greek Maize.220 In this dispute, the Court made use of yet another 
principle of EC law to protect EC interests and policies via national criminal law. It 
relied on the principle of loyal cooperation laid down initially in Article 5 TEC, which 
stated that  
 
“Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to 
ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action 
taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of 
Community’s tasks.” 
 
Hence, based on Member States’ duty of loyal cooperation the Court held that, 
 
“The Member States are required by virtue of Article 5 of the EEC Treaty to penalize 
any persons who infringe Community law in the same way as they penalize those who 
infringe national law. The Hellenic Republic failed to fulfil those obligations by omitting 
to initiate all the criminal or disciplinary proceedings provided for by national law 
against the perpetrators of the fraud and all those who collaborated in the commission 
and concealment of it.”221  
 
The Court went on noting that,  
 
“It should be observed that where Community legislation does not specifically provide 
for an infringement or refers for that purpose to national laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions, Article 5 of the Treaty requires the Member States to take all 
measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community 
law.”222  
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“For that purpose, whilst the choice of penalties remains within their discretion, they 
must ensure in particular that infringements of Community law are penalized under 
conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to 
infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any 
event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive.”223 
 
In Greek Maize the Court set two general obligations upon Member States. First, an 
obligation of assimilation or equivalence, by requiring Member States to ensure that 
breaches of Community law are sanctioned on conditions, substantive and procedural, 
analogous to those applying to breaches of national law of a similar nature and 
importance; and that national authorities must proceed in relation to breaches of 
Community law with the same diligence as they use in implementing national law. And, 
second, an obligation of efficacy, holding that whilst Member States retain a choice of 
sanctions, measures taken should in every case confer on the sanction an effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive character. 
 
Klip has suggested that this decision can cause difficulties of interpretation in some legal 
orders as the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute at a national level can be 
discretionary in some Member States. Whilst in some national legal orders prosecution 
of crimes is pursued based on the principle of legality, which holds that all offences that 
come to the attention of the police or the prosecution must be prosecuted; other legal 
orders allow for more discretion, in accordance with the principle of opportunity, which 
conveys that a prosecutor may decide not to prosecute based on general interest. In 
practice, however, differences between the two are not very steep as both principles 
allow for exceptions and have qualifications made to them. According to Klip the 
enforcement obligation set by the CJEU  
 
“... does not require Member States to do the impossible. In other words, if the case has 
been seriously investigated and there is simply insufficient evidence to sustain a 
conviction, a Member State may refrain from bringing charges, on condition that it 
would do the same with regard to the enforcement of national law unrelated to Union 
law.” 224 
 
The requirement of ‘effectiveness’ set by the CJEU in Greek Maize can also leave some 
room for doubt as to the exact meaning of the ‘effective, dissuasive and proportional’ 
character of a sanction; the Court did not elaborate upon this. Harding offered some 
guidance in how to read these these criteria. First, the author notes that the Court, in it’s 
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reasoning, clearly places effectiveness as the main goal and links it directly with 
proportionality and dissuasion. Then Harding moves on to explain what can be 
understood by the three criteria proposed by the Court, suggesting that, 
 
“Beginning with the, perhaps obvious but nonetheless crucial, statement that in the 
present context effectiveness means supporting and reinforcing the value of the norms 
and standards which have been breached, it should be clear that such strategy requires 
(a) taking into account the nature and gravity of and the damage caused by the breach, 
and (b) acting in a way to secure the rules or standards in the future, inhibiting further 
violations. The first of these elements, proportionality of response, is important in 
achieving a sense of fairness in enforcement, which in turn helps to ensure confidence in 
and general support for the system of enforcement. The second element, dissuasion, is a 
natural objective of a measure taken in response to the breach of a prohibitive norm, in 
that it seeks to guarantee future respect for such a norm.”225 
 
As Harding further notes, the conduct in question in Greek Maize was a relatively 
straightforward example as the fraudulent conduct of the Greek authorities and fraud, in 
general, attracted a clear and widespread moral condemnation. Hence, according to the 
author, in the case in question,  
 
“a failure to use criminal proceedings to deal with such offending conduct would not 
only breach the principle of assimilation, but would also undoubtedly be regarded as 
insufficiently dissuasive.”226 
 
As the author continues, the question was however left open in relation to other cases 
and it necessarily requires a consideration of each particular case and of the use of 
particular measures in particular contexts of enforcement as this will vary from Member 
State to Member State.227  
 
Regardless of this possible variation, the Court deeply reshaped the relationship between 
the Community and national criminal law with this judgement. Most of the CJEU’s 
intervention had thus far been in setting limits to national criminal law when the latter 
would impair the attainment of an EC goal or provision. Greek Maize however, clearly 
set an obligation that can potentially involve measures of criminal nature at a national 
level, namely criminal prosecution and application of criminal penalties. This rather than 
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limiting national criminal law, it potentially expands Member States’ action in criminal 
matters. 
 
This relationship between Community law and national criminal law thus brought the 
EC much closer to criminal law, even if the ECT remained silent in relation to criminal 
matters. The pursuit of this goal was indirectly expanding the Community’s influence 
into substantive and procedural criminal law of the Member States. The driving force 
behind this legislative and judicial intervention was clearly the effectiveness of 
Community law. National criminal law was thus increasingly being used as a tool to 
regulate the single market and accomplish EC goals. 
 
2.3. The shaping of organised crime as the motto for the European Union narrative on 
crime 
 
Pertinent to the narrative of protection and enforcement of EC policies via national penal 
laws, the idea of the fight against organised crime as an underlying rationale for 
intervention in EC criminal matters began to quietly emerge out of this expanding 
dynamic of intervention. Step by step, organised crime began to provide a political and 
legal rationale for integration in criminal law related matters, although this intervention 
was only formally established after 1999 with the adoption of the TEU(A). In the 
Declaration of Ministers of the Trevi Group issued in 1989 the idea of organised crime 
as an all-embracing concept came across very clearly,  
 
“… we note with growing concern the development of organised crime across frontiers. 
Terrorism and professional criminals are increasingly adept at exploiting the limits of 
competence of national agencies, the difference between legal systems which exist 
between countries, and gaps in cooperation between respective services. Crimes such as 
terrorism, drug trafficking, traffic in human beings, as well as the laundering of profits 
obtained in these and other criminal activities, are now being planned and organised on 
a transnational scale, taking advantages of all facilities offered by the development of 
communications and international travel. ”228  
 
In view of these realities, Interior Ministers called for an increase in cooperation in 
counter terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, traffic in human beings and other principal 
aspects of organised crime including laundering of illicit profits, and called for an 
improvement in exchanges and communications between national agencies.229 Types of 
                                                                  
228 Trevi Ministers, “Declaration of the Ministers of the Trevi Group”, supra note 156, para 3.  
229 Ibid., para 3 and 4, 35-36. 
 64 
criminality that could also be understood separately were brought together under the 
unifying concept of organised crime.  
 
Furthermore, the 1990 Programme of Action, mentioned earlier, further explored this 
discourse by introducing a single section on the fight against organised crime, together 
with two other sections on counter terrorism and drug trafficking. Specifically, the 
Declaration called for the regular exchange and permanent update of information with 
regard to  
 
“…various forms of organised crime, in particular as far as armed attack is concerned, 
and crimes connected with the traffic of individuals, arms and explosives or dangerous 
products, valuable pictures, works of art, cultural property, forged currency, vehicles as 
well as the laundering of illicit profits.”230  
 
Along the same lines, the Declaration of the Ministers of the Trevi Group noted that the 
purpose of the Declaration was  
 
“…to give a wider publicity to the measures which Interior Ministers and Justice 
Ministers of European Community Member States are seeking to develop to reinforce 
co-operation in the fields of law enforcement and security, in view of the growth of 
international organised crime and the completion of the Single Market after 1992.”231  
 
The “Programme of Action relating to the reinforcement of police cooperation and of 
endeavours to combat terrorism and other forms of organised crime” also signalled the 
intertwined nature of the single market, organised crime, terrorism and illegal 
immigration, namely by proposing a  
 
                                                                  
230 Trevi Ministers, “Programme of Action relating to the reinforcement of police co-operation 
and of the endeavours to combat terrorism or other forms of organised crime”, supra note 204, 
para 4. The activities of all the new groups and the generalised concern with criminality across 
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internal security landscape closely linked to the completion of the single market, According to 
the author, this led to the emergence of an ideology of a continuum of security – from drug 
trafficking to immigration or asylum – in which the prevention and repression of crime and the 
prevention and repression of illegal immigration seemed to have a direct link. These changes 
were at the heart of the emergence of a so-called ‘European security field’ or a ‘European crime 
prevention space.’ D. Bigo, "The European Internal Security Field: Stakes and Rivalries in a 
Newly Developing Area of Police Intervention", in M. Anderson, M. Den Boer (eds) Policing 
Across National Boundaries (London: Pinter Publications, 1994) 63; L’Europe des Polices et de 
la Securite Interieure (Brussels: Editions Complexes, 1992) 32. 
231 Trevi Ministers, “Declaration of Ministers of the Trevi Group”, supra note 156, 35, para 2. 
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“…synthesis of the arrangements considered between police and security services with a 
view to more effective prevention and repression by those services of terrorism, drug 
trafficking or any forms of crime including illegal immigration.”232  
 
This was all to take place through an increased cooperation between Member States.  
 
2.4. Moving away from the state: concerns over lack of accountability and transparency 
 
The high level of intergovernmental activity in criminal matters outside of the Treaties 
and national framework, raised concerns and difficulties. Similarly to what happened 
before 1985, the multitudes of groups created were outside the framework of the 
Treaties and operated in an ad hoc basis with no scrutiny from national or European 
Parliament. Neither did they receive review by the CJEU in what seemed to now be the 
traditional formula for cooperation amongst Member States in security related 
matters;233 whilst at the national level national bureaucracies were able to evade 
procedural and political constitutional constrains.234 The European Parliament, for 
instance was very critical of its non-role.235 Similarly, the Home Affairs Select 
Committee was also concerned with the fact that the  
 
“consultative and democratic procedures of the Community were not followed in the 
case of Trevi.”236  
 
However, despite these concerns over the accountability of this system and its actors, 
others felt this was not so problematic. The British Home Secretary, for example, was of 
the opinion that accountability of Trevi and the Working Groups was not necessary. He 
noted to the Home Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons  
 
“It does not need any safeguards. You have to remember what Trevi is. Trevi is merely a 
gathering together of the Ministers of the Interior of the EC countries to give, hopefully, 
political impetus to various plans or closer policing co-operation. That is all it is. It is 
not an executive body. Therefore, accountability is from individual Ministers of the 
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Interior to their own governments, and there is no need for the body as a whole to be 
thought of as responsible to any organisation.”237  
 
Along the same lines, Walker also noted that  
 
“For all the political salience of its areas of interest, Trevi was no more than a forum for 
policy discussion and information exchange, one that operated in the shadow of the 
supranational legal structure.”238 
 
Whilst the issue of the lack of accountability was left untouched, small improvements 
resulting from theses criticisms of Trevi and Trevi-like structures began to be made. 
Steps towards more transparency, for example, were taken and the former secretive 
nature of Trevi began to be abandoned. Indeed, after 1985, several documents of the 
Trevi Ministers, of European Councils of the Justice and Home Affairs meetings and of 
the work of several Groups began to be released to the public. This was important given 
the negativity around the secrecy of Trevi on the part of  national authorities and 
academics alike. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the activities of Trevi before 1986 are 
difficult to pin down, as there are very few documents available from the work of the 
group during those years, highlighting the secret nature for which Trevi came under 
criticism. Bunyan, for example, notes how between 1976 and 1993 the Trevi Group 
worked in secret without accountability and how much of the information available 
today especially in reference to the period before 1986 only surfaced in 1993.239 
 
Hence, the first document to be released was the “Declaration of the Belgium 
Presidency” issued in 1987 by the Trevi Group Ministers with the single market in 
mind.240 Subsequently, the Palma document, drawing the structures to be created under 
the TEU(M), was adopted in 1989.241 In the same year the Ministers of the Trevi Group 
issued a Declaration to give wider publicity to the measures the Ministers of Interior and 
Justice were seeking to develop and in 1990 the Trevi 92 Group drafted the Programme 
                                                                  
237 Ibid.,162-163. 
238 N. Walker, “The pattern of Transnational Policing”, in T. Newburn (ed) Handbook of Policing 
(Devon: Willan Publishing, 2008, 2nd Edition) 119, 126. 
239 T. Bunyan, Key Texts in Justice and Home Affairs, supra note 141, 33. Furthermore, the 
scarcity of data on Trevi was a concern also shared by national authorities, namely by the House 
of Commons as mentioned earlier in this section, House of Commons, “Practical Police 
Cooperation in the European Community”, supra note 143, para 62, xxiii. 
240 Declaration of the Belgium Presidency”, supra note 177. 
241 Coordinators’ Group, “The Palma Document” Free Movement of Persons, A Report to the 
European Council by the Coordinators’ Group, supra note 175. 
 67 
of Action relating to the reinforcement of police cooperation and of endeavours to 
combat terrorism and other forms of organised crime.242  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has suggested that the origins of European Union criminal law date back to 
the early period of European integration. It showed that although until 1993 the EC 
lacked a mandate to act in criminal matters, such issues were being pushed forward 
mostly by Interior Ministers and civil servants in police cooperation domains, or by EC 
bureaucrats, experts in the single market. The field was thus starting to be driven mostly 
by political concerns rather than penological ones. Regardless, during those years, 
through indirect, ad hoc and at times secretive means, the EC built the founding 
structure of the future field of justice and home affairs.  
It did so, on the one hand, by infusing national criminal law with its hidden demands for 
the enforcement of its own norms. At stake here were no longer concerns over terrorism 
and organised crime but rather the completion of the single market and the proper 
enforcement of EC policies. On the other hand, the chapter also argued that a criminal 
law related sphere was being further built through a number of intergovernmental 
arrangements such as Trevi and its structures, seeking cooperation at first in terrorism 
matters and later on in a panoply of topics – primarily those around transnational 
criminality - which was easily integrated under the umbrella of organised crime. Such 
cooperation was narrow and mostly focused on operational matters. Yet, the 
displacement of criminal matters issues from the realm of the state into other fora raised 
concerns over the lack of transparency and lack of accountability of these new structures 
and arrangements.  
The chapter suggests that the foundation for the future architecture of ECL, to be set in 
motion by the TEU(M), was laid very early on in the history of EU integration. As the 
thesis is developed, it will be shown how some of these indirect and rather secretive 
patterns of intervention, the areas of criminality explored, and concerns voiced before 
1993, remained central to criminal matters in the EC and EU.  The next chapter will 
analyse the so-called Maastricht era and show how the EU set its first official and formal 
claim as an actor in criminal matters in the European Union. 
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Chapter 2 - The Evolution of European Union criminal law during the Maastricht 
era: shaping Euro-rationales and Euro-crime (1993-1999) 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will analyse the evolution of European Union criminal law (ECL) during 
the Maastricht period.243 The Treaty of Maastricht (TEU(M)) brought criminal law into 
the context of the Treaties, officially recognising the EU as an actor in criminal matters. 
It envisaged the EU’s role as limited to areas of ‘common interest’ to Member States 
and established mechanisms of judicial and police cooperation aiming mostly at 
coordinating action and information sharing between national authorities. Overall, the 
EU’s role was envisaged as limited and complementary to that of Member States. 
However, it will be argued that the arrangements set in place were in fact broad, both 
from a structural and substantive perspective overshadowing the minimalist approach 
laid down by the TEU(M). Indeed, the latter was interpreted by the legislator in a very 
ambitious manner. First, both judicial and police cooperation – to which the TEU(M) 
made specific reference to - were developed significantly. Secondly, despite the silence 
of the TEU(M) in relation to the harmonisation of national criminal law, the latter began 
to take place, namely regarding the minimum elements that constitute crimes and 
penalties.  
 
This broad approach was even more poignant from a substantive point of view. The 
TEU(M) made reference in Article K.1 to cooperation in areas of common interest, 
namely judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation for the purposes 
of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious 
forms of international crime. These categories blossomed into intervention in a wide 
range of criminality. This wide scope was facilitated by the reaffirmation - both in 
political declarations and through the legal measures adopted - of the fight against 
organised crime and the protection of EC interests as being priorities in this arena. 
Indeed, organised crime, although not directly mentioned by the TEU(M), became the 
primary rationale for the adoption of legislation, both in relation to mechanisms of 
judicial and police cooperation and harmonisation amongst Member States. A large 
majority of resolutions, declarations, joint actions and conventions made particular 
reference to the organised criminality ravaging Europe. The emergence of this idea took 
place mostly in the absence of significant data on this topic, yet under the perception that 
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the single market and the consequent internal border removal were facilitating the 
increase and modus operandi of such criminality. Consequently, organised crime 
became an ‘umbrella concept’ justifying the adoption of measures ranging from 
trafficking in human beings to fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment 
or corruption, among many others. This was particularly so as organised crime was 
referred to in political declarations and in the preambles of most legal measures adopted 
(mostly joint actions and conventions) as a main rationale for the adoption of many of 
these measures. Furthermore, the narrative of protection of EC interests and policies also 
became stronger. Indeed, although Article K.1 did not make particular reference to 
crimes affecting EC policies and interests, measures with such aim were adopted, 
namely those aimed at at the fight against fraud and corruption affecting EU financial 
interests. Furthermore, the CJEU and secondary legislation continued to play an 
important role in increasing the protection of EC policies via national criminal law. This 
chapter will draw attention to how the articulation of these two main legal and political 
rationales by the EU legislator facilitated the EU’s focus on a specific type of criminality 
– Euro-crime – a fluid concept which predominantly relates to modern times, largely 
involving collective action, the use of some form of infrastructure and often the attempt 
against institutional goods. Crimes of trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, illegal 
immigration and fraud on a transnational scale are all offences that differ from rape, 
murder, and robbery among many others—offences that were left within the domestic 
sphere. Thus, during the Maastricht years, the EU began to lay claim to particular 
discourses and ideas of criminality. 
 
1. The Treaty of Maastricht and criminal matters: a limited framework for criminal law 
in the European Union 
 
The TEU(M) introduced a brand new dynamic into European integration in general and 
into security matters in particular. It paved the way to political integration, with the 
introduction of a EU citizenship, the reinforcement of the parliamentary powers and the 
launch of the economic and monetary union (EMU), among other initiatives. The new 
TEU(M) ventured into new domains, envisaging new objectives and more nuanced 
frameworks for decision-making. For that, it created a European Union divided into 
three distinct legal and institutional groups –the so-called “three pillars”. The first pillar 
comprised the European Communities; the second, Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP); and the third, Justice and home affairs, namely police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and matters of immigration, asylum, visas and judicial 
cooperation in civil matters (JHA). The inclusion of the latter domain in the Treaties 
established the EU as an actor in criminal matters and allowed for the formalisation and 
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solidification of many developments which had begun to take place outside the 
framework of the Treaties in the previous decades.244  
  
The EU’s claim in criminal matters was to be complementary to Member States which 
remained central in this regard. This was made clear in the TEU(M), which clarified the 
EU’s new competencies in this domain:  
 
“This Title shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member 
States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security.”245  
 
Hence, the EU claimed competence on discrete areas of “common interest” only, where 
cooperation in justice and home affairs in general was to be developed, namely those of 
asylum, external borders, immigration, drugs issues (trafficking and addiction), fraud on 
an international scale, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, customs 
cooperation and police cooperation in the domains of terrorism, drug trafficking and 
other forms of international crime. 246  
 
More specifically, in the criminal justice matters concerned, Article K.1 of the TEU(M) 
stated: 
 
“For the purposes of achieving the objectives of the Union, in particular the free 
movement of persons, and without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, 
Member States shall regard the following areas as matters of common interest: …  
7.  judicial cooperation in criminal matters; …  
9.  police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combatting terrorism, 
unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime, including if 
necessary certain aspects of customs cooperation, in connection with the organization 
of a Union-wide system for exchanging information within a European Police Office 
(Europol).” 
   
The scope of intervention in these areas of common interest was addressed in Article 
K.3, which mentioned that, in the areas referred to in article K.1, Member States should 
“inform” and “consult” one another within the Council in order to “establish 
cooperation” between the relevant departments of their administrations. 
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Rather limited in scope and depth, the TEU(M) maintained that Member States should 
remain at the centre of these new arrangements but attributed the most prominent role to 
the Council and a rather secondary role to all other main institutions. Hence, the Council 
was the central institution and its work was to be supported by a Committee – the K4 
Committee – which ought to give opinions and prepare the Council’s discussions.247 
Other institutions were given minor roles only. Article K.4 (2), for example, provided 
that the European Commission did not have any right of initiative in criminal law related 
matters even if it ought to be “fully associated” with the work developed in the domains 
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.248 The European Parliament had 
no role in the decision making process but again, similarly to the European Commission, 
was also to be “informed” of the discussions in the area involving themes in Title VI and 
consulted on the “principle aspects of activity”. Finally, the Court of Justice was also 
given no jurisdiction in criminal matters except if a specific Convention would stipulate 
its jurisdiction to interpret their provisions and to rule on disputes regarding their 
application.249  
 
These institutional arrangements centred on the Council and the K4 Committee, leaving 
the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice in the 
periphery of the decision-making process, in turn prolonging and accentuating old 
concerns over the lack of transparency and accountability of the EU’s activity in 
criminal law related matters. The European Commission, for example, which, according 
to the TEU(M), was to be fully associated with the role of the K4 Committee, had very 
little opportunity to do so and there is very little evidence that the Committee associated 
the former with its work as stipulated.250 As for the EP, it was consulted only once 
before 1997.251 In a similar fashion, the CJEU’s limited competencies were not used at 
all during these years. As a matter of fact, only in 2008 and 2010 did two preliminary 
references regarding conventions signed during the Maastricht period reach the Court – 
both regarding Europol staff disputes.252 
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Furthermore, as suggested by some authors, this weak role of the EP, Commission and 
CJEU was not compensated for by the intervention of national parliaments or courts.253 
As a matter of fact, as Chalmers notes, these new arrangements allowed Member States 
to evade national political controls, e.g. national parliaments, while enacting legislation 
in criminal matters.254 Thus, justice and police cooperation in criminal matters were 
almost completely reliant on Member States’ political will and unanimous votes causing 
discomfort in a domain where the rule of law and constitutional guarantees were 
strongly associated with the national level. 
 
Furthermore, besides this limited framework regarding accountability, transparency 
continued to be a main concern, as all stages of decision-making remained rather 
secretive during the Maastricht period. Indeed, the Council’s work continued to be 
carried out in a very reserved fashion; the decision making process at the working group 
level was equally guarded.255 O’Keefe pointed out in 1996 how the structure of the K4 
Committee,  
 
“was and still is largely unknown, save to the specialists. Its subgroups meet in secret 
and are not subject to the ‘copious leaks’ which occur at community level and which are 
an unorthodox but practical way of remedying the information deficit.”256  
 
The lack of transparency in the decision making process was further aggravated by the 
complex institutional arrangements set in place. This was mainly noteworthy again at 
the level of the coordinating Committee – K4 – but also in relation to the Schengen 
Group.257 Both groups seemed to have wide and bureaucratic structures - the K4 
Committee, for example, was assisted by three Steering Committees, whilst Schengen 
was also assisted by several subgroups.258 
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The need for more openness in the work of the Council was recognised in 1994 by the 
European Council in Corfu:  
 
“The European Council … stresses that openness and subsidiaries are essential 
components which require further elaboration.”259  
 
Steps began to be taken in this direction, which were acknowledged at national level. 
This was the case in the UK, for example, with the House of Commons noting in 1994 
that  
 
“On 6 December 1993, the Council adopted new Rules of Procedure which provided for 
greater publicity for Council proceedings as envisaged in the Edinburgh Conclusions, 
except in the case of decisions taken under the two inter-governmental pillars”260  
 
Yet, the impact of these changes was limited. This was well illustrated by three cases 
reaching the CJEU aimed at obliging the Council to release documents, mainly minutes 
of meetings and working programmes agreed to during the Maastricht years.261 The 
unwillingness of the Council to do so was clear in the exchange of letters between the 
journalist John Carvel of the Guardian and the Council, the origin of the first of those 
cases. In these letters the Council said that the journalist could not have access to 
documents of three specific Council meetings because  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
group on civil and penal justice incorporated six sub groups, specifically on extradition, penal 
law, commercial law (mostly protection of financial interests), extension of the Brussels 
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 74 
 
“they refer directly to the deliberations of the Council and its preparatory instances. If it 
did allow access, the Council would fail to protect the confidentiality of the 
proceedings… [including] the position taken by Member States of the Council during the 
deliberations.”262  
 
The CJEU annulled this and other Council decisions to refuse to access the documents, 
but even then the Council showed some reservations in releasing all the documents that 
had been asked for.263 The logic at play was similar to the pre-Maastricht years when 
criminal matters were discussed secretly and were far removed from public debate as 
they were thought to be mere cooperation initiatives. 
 
Indeed, the TEU(M) limited remit in this domain was felt further, for example, in the 
nature, legal value and scope of the legal instruments specifically created for the new 
third pillar - joint positions, joint actions and conventions.264 Although these were 
clearly meant to be weaker than the instruments available in the first pillar – regulations 
and directives - the TEU(M) did not offer details regarding their nature, legal value or 
scope. Joint positions were seldom used and their legal value seemed to be very weak.265 
This could be derived from the text of the Joint Position on the definition of ‘refugees’, 
for example, which clearly stated that it would “not bind the legislative authorities or 
affect decisions of the judicial authorities of the Member States”.266 Conventions were 
better known as typical instruments of international law, hence they were legally binding 
upon Member States after being duly ratified.267 Joint actions were the measures more 
frequently adopted. Their legal value was nonetheless still relatively weak compared to 
first pillar instruments such as directives or regulations, not only because they had to be 
adopted by unanimity, but also because they lacked direct or indirect effect268 and were 
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not subject to control or enforcement mechanisms. It was thus difficult to control their 
implementation by Member States or to follow through on any steps taken at the 
domestic level. Their exact legal value was also contested. The large majority of 
Member States and the Council were of opinion that joint actions were  
 
“obligatory in law and that the extent of the obligation on the Member States depends on 
the content and the terms of each Joint Action.”269  
 
But other Member States such as the UK and Portugal disagreed with this view and had 
the opinion that Joint Actions were not automatically binding and that this would depend 
on the text of each measure. Such an understanding appeared to be shared by Calderoni 
who notes,  
 
“the lack of obligations on Member States made Joint Actions useful tools for political 
purposes without any actual obligation upon governments.”270  
 
The heart of the matter was that, as Walker noted, these third pillar measures revealed 
themselves to be rather weak as they  
 
“tended to be ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’- facilitative rather than compulsory – and did not 
penetrate the national legal systems sufficiently to confer rights and obligations on 
individuals”.271  
 
This section has shown how the TEU(M) empowered the EU as an actor in criminal law 
related matters for the first time in the history of European integration. It did so by 
attributing a rather limited role to the EU in such a field. However, it will be seen in the 
following section how this restrained formal approach was in contrast with the wide and 
fast political and legal narratives on crime which were particularly felt at a structural 
level.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
more details D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law (Cambridge: 
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269 Outcome of proceedings of K.4 Committee of 7 April 1995, Council Document 6684/95 of 4 
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270 F. Calderoni, “A Definition that Could not Work: the EU Framework Decision on the Fight 
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271 N. Walker, “The pattern of transnational policing”, supra note 238, 127. It should also be 
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matters, also made a large use of soft law instruments such as decisions and recommendations 
and that these were necessarily non-binding upon Member States, Peers, EU Justice and Home 
Affairs Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011, Third Edition) 14.  
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2. Beyond the tools given by the Treaty: police, judicial cooperation and more 
 
As seen in the previous section, Article K.3 envisaged that Member States should inform 
and consult one another in order to establish cooperation in the areas of common 
interest mentioned by Article K.1. These included  
 
“judicial cooperation in criminal matters” and “police cooperation for the purposes of 
preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms 
of international crime, including if necessary certain aspects of customs cooperation, in 
connection with the organization of a Union-wide system for exchanging information 
within the European Police Office (Europol).”272 
 
The wording of the TEU(M), especially in reference to informing and consulting 
between Member States in order to establish cooperation, indicates a limited functional 
remit in criminal matters which was compatible with the understanding, laid down by 
the TEU(M) as well, that Member States were to remain primarily responsible for 
criminal matters regardless of the new actor in this field, i.e. the EU. 
 
In practice, however, the framework built in the implementing of these TEU(M) 
provisions was far from minimal, both from a functional and from a substantive 
perspective. Judicial and police cooperation were treated in great depth with the creating 
of contact points, networks for information sharing and mutual training, as well as 
specific EU or multinational organs to facilitate cooperation among other initiatives. 
Yet, the extent of the wide interpretation given to the words of the TEU(M) was even 
better portrayed in several initiatives of approximation of national laws, which could 
hardly find correspondence in any of the terms and wording of the TEU(M). The EU 
was clearly comfortably stepping into its new role and even stretching it with regard to 
its corresponding competencies.  
 
2.1. Police and judicial cooperation 
 
Regarding police and judicial cooperation, mechanisms were made easier, networks of 
police and judicial authorities were established, specific programmes of training and 
exchange between national authorities were set in place, whilst specific EU bodies to 
facilitate such cooperation were created. In general, most of these initiatives were 
seeking a broader, general goal of efficient exchange of information between national 
authorities: information on goods, on know-how, on expertise and most importantly, on 
                                                                  
272 Article K.1 (9) TEU(M). 
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the individual. The building of a mutual understanding and of a framework where 
cooperation and information sharing were to be easier was thus initiated through the 
simplification and streamlining of mechanisms aimed at a better mutual understanding 
of national systems and at facilitating prosecution across Member States. The number 
and depth of measures adopted was considerable in this regard which perhaps comes as 
no surprise given the high level of development of this field even prior to the TEU(M).  
 
This was seen where judicial cooperation was concerned, for example, in 1995 when a 
Convention was signed on the simplification of extradition which sought to reduce the 
time necessary for extradition and to make procedures easier.273 The Convention dealt 
mainly with issues of consent and sought to impose a maximum period of twenty days 
for the extradition to take place.274 Additionally, specific networks of experts were 
formed, namely the European Judicial Network – a network of judicial contact points 
between the Member States, which sought to enable direct contacts between the national 
judicial authorities in order to help the prevention and combat of all forms of 
international crime, including organised crime.275 Along the same lines, the Grotius 
Programme – a programme of incentives and exchanges for legal practitioners – was 
also set in place, with the aim of fostering a mutual knowledge and understanding of the 
EU’s legal and judicial systems and to facilitate the lowering of barriers to judicial 
cooperation between Member States, namely through training, exchange and work-
experience programmes, meetings, studies, research and the distribution of 
information.276  
 
Other efforts to improve mutual understanding were also taken, such as the adoption of a 
Joint Action on good practice on mutual legal assistance, requiring each Member State 
to deposit a “Statement of good practice” in executing and sending requests to other 
                                                                  
273 The Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty of the European Union, on 
simplified extradition procedure between the Member States of the European Union, OJ C 78/2 
[1995]. The effort to simplify and make extradition quicker was criticised by R. Errera, for 
example, who thought that the previous regime – under the 1957 European Convention on 
Extradition – was satisfactory and allowed for the creation of an authentic European common 
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basic principles of the rule of law were respected, namely the right of judicial review, which was 
lacking in the Convention, in R. Errera, “Combating fraud, judicial criminal matters and police 
cooperation”, in J.Winter, D. Curtin, A. Kellermann and B. de White, Reforming the Treaty of the 
European Union (TCM Asser Institute: Kluwer Law International, 1995) 407, 410. 
274 Articles 7, 8, 11 and 12 of the Convention on simplification of extradition, ibid.. 
275 Joint Action 98/428/JHA of 29 June 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 
of Treaty on European Union, on the creation of a European Judicial Network, OJ L 191/4 
[1998]. 
276 Preamble and Article 1 (3) of the Joint Action of 28 October 1996 adopted by the Council on 
the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on a programme of incentives and 
exchanges for legal practitioners, OJ L 287/3 [1996]. 
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Members.277 The Joint Action on drug trafficking made a similar call and urged Member 
States to  
 
“make the practices of their police, customs services and judicial authorities more 
compatible with each other”.278  
 
Along the same lines, the Joint Action on combating racism and xenophobia also called 
upon Member States to improve their judicial cooperation in relation to contact points, 
sharing of information and the seizure and confiscation of tracts, pictures or material 
containing expressions of racism and xenophobia. 279 All these measures aimed at 
developing better communication and mutual understanding between national 
authorities.  
 
Police cooperation was the domain where initiatives were more numerous and 
significant. This came as no surprise given the strong inheritance the pre-Maastricht 
years had left at this level. Hence, many of these initiatives came to formalise and make 
official structures and initiatives already taken and debated during the Trevi period. 
Nonetheless, significant new steps and projects were put forward, namely attempts at 
centralisation and the creation of more structured arrangements for cooperation. Overall, 
police cooperation followed the same objective and rationale as judicial cooperation – 
sharing information and knowledge. 
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Initiatives ranged from the creation of a framework for liaison officers with “more rapid 
and effective cooperation between law enforcement agencies” in mind,280 to frameworks 
of cooperation between contact points and exchange of information between national 
authorities in relation to terrorism and sexual exploitation of human beings, for example. 
This was the case of the Joint Action on the exchange of counter terrorism expertise281 
and of the Joint Action establishing incentives and exchange programmes for persons 
responsible for combating trade in human beings and the sexual exploitation of 
children.282 The first envisaged the enhancement of cooperation between national 
counter-terrorist agencies, namely through the creation and availability of a directory of 
counter-terrorist competences, skills and expertise,283 whilst the second established a 
programme to develop and coordinate initiatives such as training, studies or exchange of 
actions on the combat of trafficking in human beings, on the sexual exploitation of 
children, on the disappearance of minors and on the use of telecommunications 
facilities.284  
 
Subsequently, efforts for a better mutual knowledge were streamlined with the creation 
of EU’s own bodies in relation to police cooperation. The first of those bodies was the 
European Drug Unit (EDU) a non-operational team whose main objective was to 
provide support and assistance to national police and other agencies to combat criminal 
activities namely through the exchange and analysis of information and intelligence, 
created in 1993.285 Initially these exchanges were to be related to offences on drug 
trafficking and associated money laundering and organised crime but the remit was later 
on extended to the fight against illegal trade in radioactive and nuclear substances, 
illegal immigration networks, vehicle trafficking and associated money laundering 
operations.286 The EDU was composed of national liaison officers which acted according 
to their national legislation. Furthermore, the EDU also had four analysts whose task 
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was to develop a system for strategic and operational analysis, although there was yet no 
possibility of storing personal data in any central database.287  
 
Towards the mid-nineties police cooperation was further streamlined, as EDU was 
quickly replaced by a European Police Office - Europol - whose Convention was 
approved in June 1995. Europol’s remit was significantly larger than EDU’s. Its 
objective was  
 
“to improve […] the effectiveness and cooperation of competent authorities in the 
Member States in preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and 
other serious forms of international crime where there are factual indications that an 
organised criminal structure is involved and two or more Member States are affected by 
the forms of crime in question in such a way as to require a common approach by the 
Member States owing to the scale, significance and consequences of the offences 
concerned.” 288  
 
This broad remit was to be achieved progressively and initially Europol was to focus on 
a more limited number of offences, namely those of  
 
unlawful drug trafficking, trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances, illegal 
immigrant smuggling, trade in human beings and motor vehicle crime”289  
 
which corresponded largely to EDU’s remit. Europol was to pursue these objectives by 
facilitating cooperation between Member States, namely by facilitating the exchange of 
information by obtaining, collating and analysing information and intelligence, by aiding 
national investigations, forwarding information to national units, maintaining an 
information system, and providing for strategic intelligence among other similar tasks.290  
 
But the streamlining did not end here as, outside the framework of the TEU(M), police 
cooperation was also being agreed to and developed. This happened mostly with the 
signature of the Schengen Convention. As seen in chapter one, the Schengen Convention 
was signed in 1990 and laid down detailed rules on visas and asylum, cooperation 
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between police forces in matters of hot pursuit and cross border observation, on mutual 
assistance in criminal matters, extradition, protection of personal data, transport and 
movement of goods, transfer and execution of criminal judgments, the fight against 
drugs, and the coordination of fire arms legislation. It also established the Schengen 
Information System (SIS). The Convention entered into force on 26 March 1995 among 
seven Member States of the EU – France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain - and was probably the measure which further pushed 
for a deepening in police cooperation between Member States. This was particularly so 
with the introduction of mechanisms of cross border observation291 or pursuit of 
criminals across borders and into the territory of other signatory States (the so-called 
‘hot pursuit’).292 Adding to these two mechanisms the Convention also contained 
provisions on the facilitation of extradition293 or the transfer of the execution of 
judgements between the signatory States,294 among others.  
 
2.2. Beyond the letra legis of the Treaty: harmonisation of national criminal law 
 
The TEU(M) only made express reference to judicial and police cooperation. Yet, a 
significant bulk of measures was adopted with the intent of harmonising minimal 
elements of national criminal law and penalties. Swart, for example, argued that 
harmonisation could be derived from the TEU(M), as “cooperation” could be given a 
wider meaning including the coordination and accommodation of the differences 
between diverse national legislation and policies, which was to be addressed by different 
forms of cooperation, including harmonisation. Certainly, harmonisation had been 
mentioned and attempted in the past but such initiatives had always been unsuccessful 
for political reasons, as one or more countries found difficulties in engaging in such 
deep form of cooperation. 295  
 
According to Anderson and Den Boer, harmonisation was, at the time, felt to be 
necessary at least at two levels: first, to prevent so-called “jurisdiction shopping”, where 
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offenders can choose the country with the most lenient laws to commit a crime; and 
second, because different definitions of crime necessarily lead to different priorities and 
policy responses, namely from a policing point of view, which was no longer desirable 
in the European Union context. This was the case in the early nineties in relation to 
terrorism, organised crime or even drug trafficking.296 
 
However, even if envisaged before and felt as necessary, harmonisation did not appear 
to be an easy task at first. This was due to significant differences between Member 
States' domestic legislation. Indeed, some studies into national laws suggested that 
differences among them could eventually be too significant to allow for harmonisation. 
An “Interim report on cooperation in the campaign against organised crime” by the 
Working Party on International Organised Crime in 1994 and by the K4’s Steering 
Group on Judicial Cooperation in criminal matters, for example, analysed the possibility 
of common charges and increased judicial cooperation in relation to organised crime. 
The Group found at that point in time that it would be difficult to have a concept of 
common charges given the significant differences between the laws of the Member 
States  suggesting instead that judicial cooperation should be made easier.297  
 
Regardless of these difficulties, harmonisation did begin to take place. The focus of 
harmonisation was thus on minimum elements constituent of crimes (this entailed the 
EU’s provision of a definition containing the basic elements that should be criminalised 
at the national level), on the call for the liability of legal persons in certain cases and on 
the conditions that national penalties should fulfil. Through harmonisation, the EU 
sought to ensure the criminalisation at the national level of a certain number of Euro-
crimes in a relatively homogeneous fashion. The offences at stake related to EC 
financial interests, corruption of EC officials as well as private corruption, money 
laundering and related behaviours, racism and xenophobia, drug trafficking, trafficking 
in persons and human beings and organised crime.  
 
More specifically, the Convention on the protection of EC financial interests, for 
instance, proposed a common definition of fraud affecting the European Communities’ 
financial interests which covered fraud against both the EC’s expenditure and 
                                                                  
296 N. Walker, “European Integration and European Policing: A Complex Relationship”, in M. 
Anderson and M. Den Boer (eds) Policing across national boundaries (London: Pinter 
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revenue.298 Along the same lines, the First Protocol to the Convention also called for the 
criminalisation of both passive and active corruption of officials of the European 
Union299 and the second Protocol to the Convention called for the adoption of a common 
definition of money laundering and related behaviours.300 Likewise, the Joint Action on 
racism and xenophobia attempted a common understanding of what should be 
considered as racist and xenophobic behaviours by proposing a common definition of 
this crime, which was to include, for example, any public incitement to discrimination, 
violence or racial hatred of persons or groups defined by reference to colour, race, 
religion or national or ethnic group, among other related behaviours.301 Similarly, the 
Joint Action on drug trafficking called for the criminalisation of behaviours which 
publicly and intentionally  
 
“incite or induce others, by any means, to commit offences of illicit use or production of 
narcotic drugs”,302  
 
whilst the Joint Action on trafficking in persons and sexual exploitation also required the 
criminalisation of the sexual exploitation of children and others when coercion, deceit or 
abuse of authority was used.303 Along the same lines, the Joint Action on money 
laundering,304 the Joint Action on organised crime305 and the Joint Action on private 
corruption306 also required Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that 
the provisions of the joint actions were implemented.307 
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Harmonisation was also attempted in relation to criminal liability of corporations and the 
conditions that the applicable penalties were to fulfil. Three main elements were usually 
required: those of the proportionality, deterrence and effectiveness of the offences 
applied at the national level - conditions which largely mirrored the formula already 
used by the CJEU in its case law as seen in the decision Commission v. Greece.308 
Measures adopted, however, contrary to the CJEU in the latter case, begun to refer 
specifically to criminal penalties. The Convention on the protection of EC budget, for 
instance, required Member States to punish by “effective, proportional and dissuasive 
criminal penalties” the offences the Convention sought to harmonise, including their 
instigation or attempt. Similarly, three other Joint Actions referred to the penalties that 
should be applied at the national level. The Joint Action on drug trafficking held that  
 
“Member States shall ensure that under their legal systems the penalties imposed for 
serious drug trafficking are among the most severe penalties available for crimes of 
comparable gravity.”309  
 
The Joint Action on trafficking in persons and sexual exploitation of children called for 
the application of effective, dissuasive and proportionate penalties (including criminal 
penalties) and, additionally, for the liability of legal persons and the application of 
appropriate administrative measures, such as the closure of establishments.310 Finally, 
the Joint Action on corruption in the private sector required the introduction of effective, 
deterrent and proportional criminal penalties and the creation of provisions which would 
ensure the liability of legal persons at national level.311 
 
Thus, the question emerges as to what type of interests, rationales or themes, if any, 
were driving the EU’s legislative intervention in these domains? Was there a coherent 
discourse underlying EU measures in criminal matters beyond what was clearly 
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308 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece, supra note 220; See chapter 1. 
309 Article 4 of the Joint Action 96/750/JHA, supra note 279. 
310 Title II (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Joint Action 97/154/JHA, supra note 303. 
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identified in the TEU(M)? It was seen in Chapter 1 how concerns over terrorism, illegal 
immigration, organised crime and related criminality were present throughout the main 
political initiatives aimed at cooperation in a rather entangled framework. The TEU(M) 
offered a clearer and more transparent framework for intervention in these domains and 
consequently discourses became clearer from a political as well as a legal point of view. 
In particular, Article K.1 TEU(M) mentioned cooperation in areas of common interest, 
namely judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation in relation to 
terrorism, drug trafficking and other forms on international crime. Yet this TEU(M) 
provision was vague and some previous concerns over transparency and clarity 
continued to be voiced. The most significant evidence of this ambiguity is the fact that 
organised crime, despite not being mentioned in Article K.1, became the all-
encompassing rationale for the EU’s intervention in criminal matters. This was seen 
throughout political declarations and preambles and bodies of joint actions. Furthermore, 
besides organised crime, the protection of EC interests and policies was of no negligible 
importance during the Maastricht era but there was also no clear mandate for 
intervention via criminal law in this domain. In fact, the ECT(M) did not contain any 
provision enabling the EC to adopt criminal law related measures and the TEU(M) did 
not make a particular reference in that regard either. Thus, the following section will 
further explore the narratives and rationales that were embedding the first seeds of 
criminal law in the EU from a political and legal perspective.  
 
3. The scope of intervention: the emergence of Euro-rationales and Euro-offences  
 
The lack of comprehensive guidance by the TEU(M) regarding criminal matters allowed 
for greater flexibility in the interpretation of EU’s competencies by the Council. Indeed, 
as seen earlier, Article K.1 limited itself to defining “areas of common interest” to 
Member States, mentioning domains such as judicial cooperation in criminal matters and 
police cooperation in matters of terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious 
forms of international crime, giving no further details in relation to any of these areas 
nor in relation to the very general concepts of “internationality” and “seriousness”. 
Furthermore, none of the concepts were explained by other provisions of the TEU(M) 
nor addressed in the measures adopted, making them difficult to pin down. The 
delimitation of these ideas became thus very difficult and the result was that such a 
broad wording of the law allowed for an ambitious understanding of the domains in 
which the EU could intervene in and of the forms that such an intervention could have, 
as was shown by the number of measures and domains in which intervention was 
sought.  
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This began to be seen immediately after the TEU(M) entered into force, in the number 
of working programmes or resolutions that addressed more topics than the ones referred 
to in the TEU(M). The “Work Programme for 1994 and structures to be set up in the 
field of Justice and Home Affairs”, where the Presidency of the Council laid down the 
main priorities for intervention, included domains of interest ranging from asylum and 
immigration, police co-operation, customs cooperation to cooperation on the fight 
against drugs and judicial cooperation. Regarding the latter two, the Presidency outlined 
the main priorities to include the establishment of EDU and Europol, the fight against 
organised crime (which was to include the fight against human trafficking, 
environmental crime, radioactive products, vehicles, works of art, forgery, illegal 
immigration and the laundering of the proceeds of crime), terrorism, xenophobic and 
racist violence, hooliganism and other questions related to cooperation between police 
forces (crime analysis, contacts with third countries or training of police officers), drugs, 
extradition, mutual legal assistance (mainly in relation to international organised crime), 
disqualifications from driving and the enforcement of confiscation orders from other 
Member States.312 In 1996, a Council Resolution laid down the ‘priorities for 
cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs for the period from 1 July 1996 to 30 
June 1998’.313 The areas of intervention did not differ much from the areas referred to by 
the 1994 working programme and focused mainly on terrorism, organised crime and 
drugs, improving judicial cooperation, immigration and asylum, corruption and fraud at 
the EC level and officials and magistrates training on crime prevention and trafficking in 
human beings.  Finally, another Council Resolution laid down the priorities for the 
period from 1 January 1998 to the date of that the TEU(A) entered into force and 
reasserted intervention in the same broad range of areas.314  
 
Indeed, during those years, a large variety of subject matters was discussed, such as 
visas, immigration, drug trafficking, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, organised 
crime, laundering of profits, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, arms, explosives 
and other dangerous products, works of art, forged currency or theft of vehicles, for 
example.315 The list coincides with many of the areas of initiative during the pre-
Maastricht years yet it relates to a broad range of criminality varying from trafficking in 
human beings to theft of vehicles or works of art. In this sense, Maastricht was 
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10684/93, JAI 12, Brussels, 2 December 1993. 
313 Council Resolution of 14 October 1996 laying down the priorities for cooperation in the field 
of justice and home affairs for the period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1998, OJ C 319/1 [1996]. 
314 Council Resolution of 18 December 1997 laying down the priorities for cooperation in the 
field of justice and home affairs for the period from 1 January 1998 to the date of the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, OJ C 11/1 [1998]. 
315 See chapter 1. 
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responsible for the formalisation of the EU’s themes of interest whilst the roots of the 
conceptual framework of European Union criminal law go back far before the 
introduction of justice and home affairs into the realm of the Treaties.  
 
Many of the measures that were adopted were responses to shocking crimes happening 
in Europe most of which had a transnational dimension. The focus on illegal 
immigration issues was arguably a reaction to the removal of internal borders, whilst the 
development of drug legislation was a response to increasing drug trafficking issues 
ravaging Europe since the 70s.316 Furthermore, other specific events were clearly linked 
to the adoption of some measures, if not to their content as well. Chalmers pointed out 
this connection between crimes or political strains and legal reaction at EU level noting 
that  
 
“Spanish concern over the refusal of the Belgian court to extradite a suspected ETA 
terrorist led therefore to the La Gomera Declaration in 1995. Fights between the Dutch 
football fans in the Netherlands which resulted in the death of a Dutch national resulted 
in action on hooliganism. Belgian horror over the Marc Dutroux led to action on 
paedophilia and the exploitation of human beings.”317  
 
Regardless of such almost-random or at least reactive sequences of events, there were 
common concerns underlying most of these measures. Thus, at this stage, it was possible 
to begin to grasp the defining features of EU criminal law. This is not to say there was a 
common EU penal policy – far from it, actually. Rather, what is suggested is that there 
were identifiable rationales embedded in the political and legal measures in European 
Union criminal matters. This can clearly be derived from the text of most political 
declarations such as resolutions, Council conclusions, and action plans; or from the text 
of most legal measures, namely joint actions and conventions. The most obvious 
evidence of these was the wording of these texts and their preambles, the most symbolic 
and teleological part of any legal instrument. It is thus argued that during the Maastricht 
decade, two central rationales were embedded in a large number of the measures 
adopted: the fight against organised crime and the protection of EC interests and 
policies.  
 
These narratives do not come across in a clear-cut manner, as the EU did not give 
guidance on what type of programmatic or ideological line, if any, should drive the EU’s 
                                                                  
316 V. Mitsilegas et al. The European Union and Internal Security, supra note 91, 24. 
317 D. Chalmers, “Bureaucratic Europe”, supra note 215, 9. 
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intervention in security matters.318 This is not surprising. As the EU was a new actor in 
criminal matters, with different structures than those of the State yet with a 
complementary role to the latter, it is only expected that its motivating rationales were 
not in the shape of well developed criminal policies. It is under these constraints that the 
EU’s own narratives of integration in criminal matters emerged as distinct from those of 
Member States and the discourses on the fight against organised crime and protection of 
EC interests began to take shape.  
 
3.1. Organised crime 
 
It was seen in chapter one how the idea of combating organised crime emerged in the 
late eighties and began tentatively to be used as a motto and umbrella-concept grouping 
several types of criminality. The discourse on the need to react against transnational 
threats such as organised crime was continued and intensified in the nineties. The 
culmination of this vision was spelled out and systematised in 1997 by the adoption of 
the Action Plan to combat organised crime.319 This Action Plan portrayed a rather grim 
scenario stating that,  
 
“Organised crime is increasingly becoming a threat to society as we know it and want 
to preserve it. […] Crime is increasingly organising itself across national borders, also 
taking advantage of the free movement of goods, capital, services and persons. 
Technological innovations such as the internet and electronic banking turn out to be 
extremely convenient vehicles for committing crimes or for transferring the resulting 
profits into seemingly licit activities. Fraud and corruption take on massive proportions, 
defrauding citizens and civic institutions alike. In comparison, effective means of 
preventing and repressing these criminal activities are developing only at a slow pace, 
almost always a step behind. If Europe is to develop into an area of freedom, security 
and justice, it needs to organise itself better, and to provide strategic and tactical 
responses to the challenge facing it. This requires a political commitment at the highest 
level.”320 
                                                                  
318 In relation to police cooperation specifically, this is argued by M. Den Boer, “Europe and the 
art of international police cooperation: free fall or measured scenario?” in D. O’Keefe and 
T.Twomey (eds) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (London: Chancery Law Publishing, 
1994) 279, 281.  
319 The Action Plan had its origins at the Dublin European Council where the need for a coherent 
approach to combat organised crime in the European Union was discussed and during which the 
Council decided to create a High Level Group in charge of drawing an Action Plan with specific 
recommendations in the field, see Title V of the Presidency Conclusions, Dublin European 
Council, 13 and 14 December 1996, Council Action Plan to combat organised crime, adopted by 
the Council on 28 April 1997, OJ C 251/1 [1997]. 
320 Para 1 of the Action Plan to combat organised crime, ibid..  
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Indeed, already in 1996, organised crime had been elevated to a main priority in justice 
and home affairs, both by the Council Resolution laying down the priorities for 
cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs for the period from 1 July to 10 June 
1998,321 and from the Council Resolution laying down the priorities for cooperation 
from the period from 1 January 1998 to the date the TEU(A) entered into force.322 
 
Politically, organised crime was being promoted as a transnational threat and, in 
consequence, upgraded to a policy priority. Mitsilegas et al. refer to this new status of 
organised crime as its “securitisation”, explaining this happened mainly for three 
reasons: first, it was perceived as a growing problem that threatened the well being of 
western countries and, as a consequence, European States began to envisage it as a 
‘common security’ concern needing collective solutions; second, the paradigm of 
organised crime that was worrying the western world (such as the Italians and 
Americans) was generating considerable alarm even if it didn’t correspond entirely to 
the reality of the European model; finally, organised crime in Europe had been perceived 
as increasing after the Cold War, especially with the emergence of organised crime 
groups in eastern Europe, namely Russia and Albania.323                                                                                                                        
 
Not surprisingly, this political use of organised crime also deeply permeated the legal 
reality of criminal matters in the EU. Organised crime, besides having been made a 
political priority, also became a legal label, a narrative that guided many of the legal 
measures undertaken in criminal law related matters, emerging as one of the main 
justifications for the adoption of secondary legislation in criminal matters. 
 
The Joint Action of 1998 which made it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal 
organisation in the Member States of the European Union (hereinafter Joint Action on 
organised crime) is the central example of this. Its preamble states:  
 
“Whereas the Council considers that the seriousness and development of certain forms 
of organised crime require strengthening of cooperation between the Member States of 
the European Union, particularly as regards the following offences: drug trafficking, 
trafficking in human beings, terrorism, trafficking in works of art, money laundering, 
serious economic crime, extortion and other acts of violence against the life, physical 
                                                                  
321 Council Resolution of 26 October 1996, supra note 257. 
322 Council Resolution of 18 December 1997, supra note 258. 
323 “Securitisation of an issue occurs when it is elevated from the level of routine political 
discussion to a special category status and in consequence a higher priority is attached to 
remedying the problem, and combating the risks justifies the allocation of increased resources.” 
Mitsilegas, Monar and Rees, The European Union and Internal Security, supra note 91, 46-49. 
 90 
integrity or liberty of a person, or creating a collective danger for persons; [..] in order 
to respond to the various threats with which Member states are confronted, a common 
approach to participation in the activities of criminal organisations is necessary”.324 
 
The Joint Action calls for intervention in a number of areas which may or may not be 
related to organised criminal activities, in order to face the “seriousness and 
development of certain forms of organised crime”.325 
 
The list of offences mentioned in the former Joint Action was considerable. This view 
that organised crime was to be understood as including a wide range of criminality was 
confirmed in other measures such as the Joint Action establishing a programme of 
exchanges, training and cooperation for persons responsible for action in combating 
organised crime. This Joint Action led to the so-called “Falcone Programme” in which it 
was stated to be necessary  
 
“to adopt a broad approach to phenomena of organised crime, including economic 
crime, fraud, corruption and money-laundering.”326   
 
Subsequent measures took this approach into consideration, such as the 1998 Joint 
Action on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and 
confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds from crime. This Joint Action not only 
placed itself in the context of the two previously mentioned measures but also held in its 
preamble,  
 
“the potential for disrupting criminal activity in the field of organised crime, by more 
effective cooperation between Member States in identifying, tracing, freezing or seizing, 
and confiscating the assets deriving from crime is being improved … [and whereas]327 
the abovementioned action plan to combat organised crime emphasised the need to 
accelerate procedures for judicial cooperation in matters relating to organised crime, 
while considerably reducing delay in transmission and responses to requests”.328  
 
                                                                  
324 Preamble of the Joint Action 98/733/JHA, supra note 249. 
325 Ibid.. 
326 Joint Action 98/245/JHA of 19 March 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 
of the Treaty on European Union, establishing a programme of exchanges, training and 
cooperation for persons responsible for action to combat organised crime (Falcone Programme), 
OJ L 99/8 [1998]. 
327 Our words. 
328 Joint Action 98/669/JHA, supra note 248. 
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Finally, besides the political and legal influence, the discourse around organised crime 
was also embedded in the organisational structure of the EU framework for cooperation. 
This can be seen in the Joint Action on the “Falcone Programme”329, noted above, whose 
main objective was to monitor the implementation of the Action Plan to combat 
organised crime. This Joint Action noted that  
 
“it is therefore necessary for the implementation of this programme to adopt a broad 
approach to the phenomena of organised crime, including economic crime, fraud, 
corruption and money laundering”.  
 
The Joint Action on the exchange of liaison magistrates highlights how the creation of 
an exchange network would  
 
“…help in effectively combating all forms of transnational crime, particularly organised 
crime and terrorism as well as fraud affecting the interests of the Community”.330  
 
Similar connections appear in the preamble of the Joint Action on trafficking in human 
beings and sexual exploitation of children where it is stated that these  
 
“…may constitute an important form of international organised crime, the extent of 
which within the European Union is becoming increasingly worrying”.331  
 
Likewise, the Joint Action concerning liaison magistrates also mentions their 
significance as they play a  
 
“…role of paramount importance in cooperation in preventing and combating all forms 
of international crime, pursuant to Article K.1 (9) of the Treaty, including organised 
crime”.332 
 
Furthermore, the EU’s newly created operational actors – EDU and later on Europol - 
were also to give a great deal of attention to organised crime. The Europol Convention, 
for example, states in Article 1 that the objective of Europol shall be  
 
                                                                  
329 Joint Action 98/245/JHA, supra note 272. 
330 Preamble of the Joint Action 96/277/ JHA of 22 April 1996 adopted by the Council on the 
basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning a framework for the exchange 
of liaison magistrates to improve judicial cooperation between the Member States of the 
European Union, OJ L 105/1 [1995]. 
331 Preamble of the Joint Action 97/154/JHA, supra note 247.  
332 Preamble of the Joint Action 96/602/ JHA, supra note 224. 
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“…to improve… the effectiveness and cooperation of the competent authorities in the 
Member States in preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and 
other serious forms of international crime where there are factual indications that an 
organized criminal structure is involved and two or more Member States are affected by 
the forms of crime in question…”333  
 
Furthermore, the Outline of the Europol Drug Unit Working Programme for 1998 also 
states,  
 
“Special emphasis will be given to the implementation of the EU Action Plan Against 
Organised Crime as agreed by the Amsterdam Summit.”334  
 
In later years, Europol’s work began to place a great emphasis on understanding the 
reality of organised crime in the EU and border countries.335 Accordingly, in 1999 it 
reported that  
 
“…although some traditional criminal activities, such as drug trafficking remain highly 
lucrative, there are indicators that many criminal groups are moving to more profitable 
but less risky criminal activities, such as large scale frauds, environmental crimes, 
smuggling of tobacco products and alcohol and illegal immigration.” 
 
 Furthermore, the same report continued by noting that  
 
“…criminal groups are increasingly involved in illegal immigration and trafficking in 
human beings for the purposes of sexual exploitation; high tech crimes, involving the 
use of computers” and organised crime groups have a “greater involvement in 
committing frauds against the financial interests of the EU.”336  
 
The political and legal visibility given to organised crime in the European Union, took 
place, once again, as in the 1980s, despite a lack of consensus about the reality of 
numbers in relation to this type of criminality. Hence, these initiatives were at the heart 
of several criticisms made of the discourse of ‘increase in criminality’ before 1993, 
                                                                  
333 Europol Convention, supra note 232. 
334 Europol Drugs Unit, ‘Outline of the Europol Drugs Unit Working Programme 1998’, Doc. 
11796/97, Brussels, 31 October 1997, 1.  
335 Europol, “EU Organised Crime Situation Report – 1998 – Open Version”, The Hague, 8 
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336 Ibid., 5. 
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particularly those initiatives that lacked sufficient research around the possible impact of 
border removal on criminality levels.337  
 
As Mitsilegas, Monar and Rees point out, although some data, such as that found in 
Europol reports, suggested that organised crime did increase between 1985 and 1998, 
the fact that organised crime was viewed as such a threat raised suspicion in the minds 
of commentators.338 Anderson et al. also commented that there were conflicting views as 
to whether a border-free Europe Union would make crime control more difficult and 
whether crime in general would rise in consequence of the abolition of internal borders. 
Moreover, national statistics seldom included data beyond domestic borders.339 In-depth 
comparative analysis was also not possible during those years as data regarding 
transnational and organised crime during the eighties was scarce.340 The lack of such 
data in relation to organised crime is evident in a Note from the K.4 to the Permanent 
Representatives Committee of the Council on the ‘Situation report on organized crime in 
the European Union in 1993’.341 The K.4 Committee notes that in some Member States 
it was not possible, at the time, to provide quantitative information on organised crime 
because of the lack of agreed national definitions and of criteria for the identification of 
such criminal phenomena (only Germany, Italy and the Netherlands were able to prepare 
reports on the extent and trends in organised crime).342 The Committee further goes on 
to remark that reliable and valid results would not be obtained unless effective methods 
for collection and analysis of such information were introduced.343 It was only later, with 
the setting up of Europol and the data sharing and policing cooperation it generated, that 
a clearer picture of the threat of organised crime in the EU emerged.344  
  
Difficulties measuring such criminality are often related to the nature of organised crime 
itself—a fluid phenomenon that takes different shapes in different societies and evolves 
with the times. Approaches to it have been diverse – and are bound to be so -- in 
different legal systems. In addition, because of its flexibility as a legal concept, 
                                                                  
337 Council of the European Union, Note on “Scientific and Technical Research – Research 
projects on criminology and criminal matters”, Doc. 8740/94, Brussels, 26 July 1994. 
338 Mitsilegas, Monar and Rees, The European Union and Internal Security, supra note 91 , 62-
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340 See chapter 1.  
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“organised crime” has also itself shown to be adaptable to different policy priorities and 
hence suitable as a political-legal justification when needed. As Levi notes  
 
“Legal definitions of organized crime, like other social labels such as ‘anti-social 
behaviour’, are based around the measures that legislators want to take against evils, 
both activities and ‘sorts of people’, especially combinations of people.”345  
 
This was relevant especially as the competency of the EU to act in many of these 
domains was not clear-cut. Indeed, although many of the crimes in relation to which the 
EU sought to act upon could be potentially integrated under the very wide concept of 
“serious international crime” used by Article K.1 of the TEU(M), the link between the 
wording of the Treaty and many measures adopted was rather feeble and particularly 
where harmonisation measures were concerned, which clearly went beyond the level of 
cooperation envisaged by the TEU(M).  
 
3.1.1. The ancillary use of organised crime as a legal concept 
 
The use of organised crime as an umbrella legal concept to allow for intervention in 
domains in which the EU’s competence was not necessarily clear, was further perceived 
in drugs and drug trafficking matters in relation to which Article K.1 specifically 
recognised the EU’s competence. Drug trafficking is a traditional field of organised 
crime and the links between the two cannot be easily overlooked.346 Thus, one would 
expect that if the rationale of the fight against organised crime is as wide as previously 
described, drug trafficking would certainly be part of it. However this is not necessarily 
so – or at least – this is not acknowledged as such by the preambles of the legal 
measures in this regard. Indeed, the Joint Actions on drug trafficking,347 on new 
synthetic drugs and on chemical profiling of drugs,348 for example, did not mention 
organised crime in their preambles or bodies, in clear contrast with the large majority of 
measures described earlier. Article K.1 however particularly mentioned drug addiction 
                                                                  
345 M. Levi, “Organized Crime and Terrorism”, in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner, The 
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and drug trafficking, hence giving clear competence to the EU to intervene in this area. 
Likewise, this was the case with terrorism related cooperation as well. Although 
terrorism is not necessarily a phenomenon related to organised crime, the links between 
the two are often relevant and recent literature has become more aware of the increasing 
connections in today’s world.349 Furthermore, during the pre-Maastricht period, 
organised crime, drug trafficking and terrorism were domains associated with each other 
in official documents.350 
 
The fact that their link to organised crime was not mentioned or explored in preambles, 
especially when the approach to the former has been so broad, comes to emphasise the 
ancillary use of organised crime as a motto or justification for the adoption of measures 
outside the limited reach of the TEU(M). Hence, when the TEU(M) specifically gave 
competence to the EC and the EU to intervene in a specific domain – as it did to drug 
trafficking and terrorism – the preamble of these measures no longer makes a particular 
reference to organised crime. Hence, the non-use of the discourse of organised crime in 
drugs and terrorism related matters draws attention to the instrumental use of the 
discourse of the fight against organised crime made by the EU in other domains during 
the Maastricht period.  
 
3.2. Protection of EC interests and policies  
 
The use of criminal law to protect Community interests and policies was also further 
developed during the nineties although the ECT(M) continued to be silent in relation to 
criminal law, which had now been placed under the institutional framework of the third 
pillar (TEU(M)). Nonetheless, the EC did not remain completely alienated from criminal 
matters, seeking the protection of its policies and interests via criminal law through both 
judicial and legislative means.  
 
The CJEU continued to be an important actor in this regard, either placing limits on 
national criminal law or obligations upon Member States. For instance, the Court 
continued to place limitations on the definition of criminal offences or on the level of 
penalties applicable at the national level when these would compromise an EC goal. In 
Bordessa, for example, the Court limited the scope of a national criminal offence, 
holding that a Spanish law prohibiting the export of coins, banknotes or bearer cheques 
in excess of PTA 5 million per person and per journey, unless subject to prior 
                                                                  
349 See, for example, H. Abadinsky, Organized Crime (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2010, 9th Edition) 
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350 See chapter 1. 
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authorisation, could hinder the free movement of capital in accordance with EC law, and 
hence ran contrary to the second paragraph of Article 4 of Directive 88/361.351  
 
In other cases, the Court looked at the intensity of penalties applied for certain crimes. In 
Skanavi, for example, the Court took the view that although Member States remained 
competent to impose penalties on individuals who breached their obligation to exchange 
driving licences within one year of taking up resident in another Member State, Member 
States were not entitled to impose a penalty so disproportionate to the gravity of the 
infringement that it became an obstacle to the freedom of movement.352 
 
The fact that the CJEU evaluates the proportionality of an offence in relation only to the 
possibility of it affecting the Community’s policy goals was clear in Banchero. Here, the 
Court, when assessing national criminal law and, in this particular case, national 
criminal penalties, noted that, 
 
“The penalties facing Mr Banchero do not hinder in any way the importation of tobacco 
products from other Member States, but merely tend to dissuade consumers form 
obtaining supplies of tobacco products”353 (…) “The severity of those penalties is thus 
not a matter for assessment under Community law.”354  
 
Furthermore, during this period, the Court expanded the scope of its case law in criminal 
matters, ruling on what can be called a ‘duty of positive action’ on the part of Member 
States. This was the case in Commission v France (the so-called ‘Spanish strawberries’ 
case), which concerned the action of French farmers who launched a campaign to stop 
the import of Spanish strawberries.355 The campaign was violent and involved repetitive 
road blockages, the burning of lorries carrying goods and threats against shops. At the 
time, despite numerous criminal offences committed by the French farmers, French 
authorities were very passive towards the events. In consequence, the European 
Commission sued France before the CJEU. In its decision, the Court noted that when a 
Member State abstains from taking action, or fails to adopt adequate measures to prevent 
obstacles to the free movement of goods that are created by the actions of private 
individuals in their territory, this abstention is likely to obstruct intra Community 
                                                                  
351 Joined Cases C-358/93 and C-416/93 Aldo Bordessa v Vicente Mellado and Concepción 
Maestre ECR I-376 [1995] para 25. 
352 Case C-193/94 Criminal proceedings against Sofia Skanavi and Konstantin 
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353 Case C-387/93 Criminal proceedings against Giorgio Domingo Banchero ECR I-4683 [1995] 
Para 60. 
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trade.356 The Court continued by noting that the ECT(M) required Member States to take 
all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that the free movement of goods is 
respected within their territory.357 Thus, in relation to the behaviour of the French 
authorities, the Court held that, 
 
“Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that in the 
present case the French Government has manifestly and persistently abstained from 
adopting appropriate and adequate measures to put an end to the acts of vandalism 
which jeopardize the free movement on its territory of certain agricultural products 
originating in other Member States and to prevent the recurrence of such acts.”358  
 
To be clear, the Court did not directly state that the French authorities should have taken 
measures of a criminal nature. This remains only implicit in its decision and contrasts 
with the Conclusions of Advocate General Lenz who explicitly referred to criminal 
measures. The Advocate General first noted that it was not clear why the national 
authorities did not at least do more to arrest the offenders and to secure sufficient 
evidence to have enabled a prosecution. He then noted that, in his opinion, the national 
authorities failed to prosecute the offences committed with the necessary vigour.359  
 
Even if the Court did not specifically mention that measures of a criminal nature ought 
to be adopted by Member States in situations of this kind, it clearly imposed a strong 
duty of positive action on the part of Member States in order to ensure that the free 
movement of goods – one of the central goals of the internal market – was protected. As 
Chalmers et al. note, this is tantamount to a duty to actively police EU law.360 Thus, this 
decision brought more realms of national criminal law into the context of the EC as, 
under this ruling, Member States are clearly under obligation to adopt appropriate and 
adequate measures to put an end to acts which might jeopardise free movement within 
the European Community. At times, this obligation will certainly require measures of a 
criminal nature. 
 
Furthermore, beyond the role of the Court--which dealt mainly with questions of how 
national criminal law should be adjusted to fulfil the EC’s goals--many EC legislative 
measures continued to influence national criminal law. The large majority of measures 
adopted before 1993 regarding agriculture, fisheries and transport were kept in force or 
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replaced by newer instruments during the Maastricht era. Consequently, demands 
continued to be made at the national level in relation to EC policies, particularly 
regarding agriculture and structural funds.361  
 
Furthermore, the principle of assimilation, established by the Court in Greek Maize, was 
now incorporated in Article 209a of the ECT(M). This provision, similar to the Court’s 
decision in the case, did not make particular reference to measures of a criminal nature 
but established a duty of similar diligence in the treatment of national or community 
offences. In particular it stated that  
 
“Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial 
interests of the Community as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial 
interest.” 
 
More significant to the idea that EC interests and policies were increasingly being 
pursued via national criminal law, the creation of the third pillar opened new 
possibilities for EU action in criminal matters. Measures were thus not only adopted to 
fight organised crime, as seen in the previous section, but also to foster the protection of 
EC interests and policies. In particular, steps were taken to improve the protection of the 
EC budget, as fraud continued to increase.362 Hence, under the third pillar, a Convention 
on fraud against the financial interests of the Community sought to harmonise national 
definitions of fraud against the EC budget, including both fraud against the revenue and 
the expenditure. The Convention also established penalties, the liability of business 
heads, as well as rules of jurisdiction, cooperation and extradition.363 The Convention 
was complemented by three protocols. The first regarding corruption by national or EC 
officials resulting in damage to the EC budget,364 the second in relation to the laundering 
of proceeds resulting from fraud or corruption against the community,365 and a third 
protocol regarding the preliminary rulings by the CJ in relation to the Convention as 
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well as the first protocol. 366 The Convention supplemented the 1995 Regulation on the 
Protection of the Financial Interests of the Communities adopted under the first pillar, 
and created a general administrative framework for investigating and repressing acts and 
omissions which could cause financial harm to the Community.367 
 
Nonetheless, a slow ratification process considerably reduced the practical significance 
of the Convention. Indeed, by 18 May 1999 only two Member States had ratified the 
Convention. The direct protection of EC financial interests via criminal law thus 
remained limited. Despite significant ambition in this domain, results were politically 
and legally difficult to achieve. This was also perceived in the Corpus Iuris proposal 
released in 1997 in the context of the European Commission European Legal Area 
Project, launched by the Directorate General for Financial Control.368 The Corpus Iuris 
was an academic study that called for a uniform European code of criminal offences to 
deal particularly with fraud to the EC budget. Furthermore, it proposed the creation of a 
European Public Prosecutor (EPP) who would have investigatory powers, among others, 
and be responsible for bringing cases of fraud against the EC budget before the national 
courts. However, the Corpus Iuris was never adopted as questions of incompatibility 
with national criminal laws were raised.369 
 
The limited number of legal measures aimed at the protection of EC interests and 
policies via criminal law and their slow ratification process suggested that the fight 
against organised crime – the main rationale underlying the measures adopted under the 
third pillar – remained the strongest narrative in the criminal law of the EU during the 
Maastricht period. In fact, the theme of fighting organised crime was approached in such 
a broad manner that even measures directly aimed at the protection of EC interests and 
policies continued to be linked with the fight against organised crime. This thematic link 
between these two narratives was mirrored specifically in the Action plan on organised 
crime, which called for the definite ratification of the Convention protecting EC 
                                                                  
366 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the 
fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member 
States of the European Union, OJ C 391/01 [1998]. 
367Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95, supra note 361. For an analysis of the 
advantages and disadvantages in the creation of the two separate instruments see B. Swart, “From 
Rome to Maastricht and Beyond: The Problem of Enforcing Community Law”, in C. Harding 
and B. Swart (eds) Enforcing European Community Rules, Criminal Proceedings, Administrative 
Procedures and Harmonization (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996) 17-19.  
368 M. Delmas-Marty et al., Corpus Juris, introducing provisions for the purpose of the financial 
interests of the European Union (Paris: Economica, 1997). See also for a later follow up on the 
project M. Delmas-Marty e J. Vervaele (eds) The implementation of the Corpus Juris in the 
Member States (Antwerpen-Groningen-Oxford: Intersentia, 2000-2001) vol. I. 
369 House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union, “Prosecuting Fraud on the 
Communities’ Finances – the Corpus Iuris”, Ninth Report, 18 May 1999, Para 23. The Treaty of 
Lisbon envisages the creation of the EPP once again, Article 86 TFEU.  
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financial interests in order to guarantee an effective fight against organised crime across 
the European Union.370  
 
This link, as portrayed in the Action Plan on organised crime, was also symbolic of the 
growing intertwine between financial criminality and organised crime. Indeed, authors 
had been drawing attention to the growing commonalities between business/financial 
and organised criminality. Ruggiero, for example, pointed out that white-collar criminals 
and organised crime have many commonalities: they use and need similar skills and 
share common values.371 In a similar line of reasoning, Levi had observed a  
 
“growing involvement of professional and organized criminals in sophisticated fraud, 
and the increasing use of financial institutions to launder vast quantities of money from 
fraud.”372   
 
This intertwine was not only seen at national level but also at the EC level. In relation to 
the latter, Quirke noted that fraud against the EC budget could be perpetrated both by the 
‘organised fraudster’ and entrepreneurs who resort to fraud as a means of supporting 
failing enterprises or companies in financial difficulties.373  
 
 
4. The idea of Euro-crime 
 
It has been argued thus far that the Council adopted legal measures in considerably more 
domains than the ones specifically mentioned in the TEU(M), hence taking a broad 
approach to the competencies stipulated by the Treaty, tending to read these in a fluid, 
loose manner which permitted its intervention in a diverse range of crimes. It was also 
seen though how the EU’s claim in criminal law related matters was complementary of 
national claims yet limited in its scope. In this sense, it will be further argued that the 
EU focused mostly on a specific type of criminality – Euro-crime.374 This idea of Euro-
                                                                  
370 Action Plan to combat organized crime adopted by the Council on 28 April 1997, OJ C 251/1 
[1997]. 
371 V. Ruggiero, Organised and Corporate Crime in Europe: Offers that can’t be refused 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996) 1-24. 
372 M. Levi, Regulating Fraud - White-Collar Crime and the Criminal Process (London: 
Tavistock, 1987) 15. 
373 B. Quirke, “Fraud against European Public Funds”, supra note 362, 173. 
374 Other authors have already referred to the concept of Euro-crime to describe crimes that the 
EU requires Member State to criminalise and intervene upon, although not developing it from a 
substantive perspective. Anderson et al., for example, refer to Euro-crime as a “diverse range of 
criminal activities that have transnational characteristics and tendencies, but that are still 
defined in the terms of national criminal laws.” At another point in the same book, the same 
authors argue that “The term Euro-crime, occasionally used in law enforcement circles, is not yet 
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crime is a fluid concept, with loose boundaries and an ever-expanding nature, yet 
specific and solid enough to be distinctive to the European Union. Euro-crime appears as 
a criminality of late modernity, of a Europe that becomes ever more supranational and a 
world that becomes ever more globalised (crimes such as money laundering or organised 
crime did not pose such a pervasive threat in the nineteen century, if they even existed in 
certain forms at all375). As seen in the introductory chapter to this dissertation, at national 
level, the boundaries of the criminal law have shifted considerably ever since the 
nineteen-century. This shift was initially driven by the emergence, followed by a 
significant increase, in regulatory offences. More recently, however, there was another 
wave of expansion of the criminal law which involved new or newly perceived threats, 
such as terrorism, for example.376 It is to this new wave of expansion of the criminal law 
that the EU primarily relates to. Euro-crime thus represents a criminality that emerged 
mainly out of the nature of modern societies where things became more volatile - from 
the movement of people between continents and within Europe itself, to the movement 
of money through financial systems across the world or the flow of information on the 
internet. These developments and common challenges created complexities and common 
perceived threats that the EU sought to criminalise. Euro-crime has thus an intrinsic 
relation to our times and to what Levi calls  
 
“tools of later modernity”, such as “transnational air travel and communications, 
internet and the spread of information about weapons construction, globalisation of 
financial services and commerce including the arms trade and covert networking.”377  
 
Indeed, the EU seemed to focus primarily on crimes such as money laundering, fraud, 
trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, or organised crime. Article K.1 TEU(M) 
referred in particular to terrorism, drug trafficking and other forms on international 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
matured as a juridical concept, because it suggests there is a genuine European justice system…. 
The only appropriate application of the term ‘Euro-crime’ is to crimes committed against the EU 
itself, such as agricultural fraud or budgetary fraud.” M. Anderson et al., Policing the European 
Union (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 13- 15. On a more restrictive note Euro-crimes was used 
by D. Marty and J. Vervaele in the Corpus iuris project to define crimes affecting the financial 
interests of the European Union, see M. Delmas-Marty and J. Vervaele (eds) The implementation 
of the Corpus Juris in the Member States, note 368. Andre Klip also refers, on occasion, to the 
crimes in relation to which the EU adopts harmonisation measures – or rather EU’s special part 
criminal law wise - as Eurocrimes, A. Klip, European Criminal Law, supra note 15, 197. 
Offences in the new list of crimes in Article 83(2) TFEU have also been referred to as ‘Euro-
crimes’. 
375 For an account of the different and limited shapes of organised crime in the ‘pre-globalisation 
era’ see M. Galeotti (ed) Organized Crime in History (NY: Routledge, 2009).  
376 J. Figueiredo Dias, Direito Penal, Parte Geral II - As Consequências Jurídicas do Crime, 
supra note 48, 66; L. Zedner, Criminal Justice, supra note 32, 63. 
377 M. Levi, “Organized Crime and Terrorism”, in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner, The 
Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Oxford: OUP, 2007, Fourth Edition) 775.  
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crime. Furthermore, it was seen that measures on money laundering, fraud, trafficking in 
human beings or organised crime, inter alia, were also adopted. These offences are in 
clear contrast with others such as rape, robbery, murder or defamation in relation to 
which the EU did not directly intervene.378 It seemed that the first group of offences fell 
more within the realm of EU interests whilst the second one in that of the Member 
States. Hence, Euro-crime presents two general distinctive features: the first one being 
its focus on the protection of public goods or goods related to collective institutions or 
interests; the second being that the offences at stake appear to present a ‘complex’ 
structure in that they usually involve collective action and the use of infrastructure.  
 
Hence, Euro-crime is distinctive regarding the nature of the goods protected.379 Many of 
these tend to be public goods or goods related to collective institutions and interests, 
such as the political and financial system or the security of the State and the efficiency 
of its policies.380 Crimes such as money laundering or fraud, for example, clearly are 
attempts against the financial system. Likewise, the criminalisation of corruption 
(private or public) aims primarily at the protection of political systems and institutions 
and of the principles which embed them; the fight against terrorism aims at the 
protection of those same democratic values but also at the security of the State itself and 
the infrastructures that sustain it; whilst the fight against human trafficking, for example, 
is well known to be, in the EU context at least, also suitable to protect immigration 
policies by keeping people out as it is at protecting the victims.381 
 
Finally, the specifics of Euro-crime can also be found in the structure of the offences 
endorsed. A significant number of offences that the EU legislated on on were 
characterised by a certain “complexity” in that they required a degree of collective 
action and infrastructure. Indeed, the use of infrastructure in the sense of technology, 
                                                                  
378 It will be seen later in this thesis that this criminality, even if not the direct target of EU 
norms, was not completely out of its reach. This is so because EU’s criminal law is a constantly 
expanding body of law and, moreover, has the potential to, indirectly reach deep and far within 
national legal systems.    
379 A wide approach to the concept of “goods” is taken similarly to Geuss who notes “’Goods’ 
can mean several things. First, it can designate concrete objects that have some use-value […]. 
Second, it can be taken abstractly as meaning ‘that which is, or is considered to be, good.” So the 
fact that the streets are secure and safe may be a public good; that I have spent an enjoyable 
evening in conversation with a friend might be an instance of a private good. In neither of these 
cases in the ‘good’ in question an object. Third, ‘goods’ can mean ‘conceptions of the good’ 
[…].” In R. Geuss, Public Goods – Private Goods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 
9. 
380 Assuming that the personal sphere relates to personal and private matters of the individuals 
whilst the public sphere relates to the political and institutional domain of society shared spaces 
or institutions.  
381 See, for example, H. Askola, Legal responses to trafficking in women for sexual exploitation 
in the European Union (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
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means of transport, telecommunications or a network which allows for the completion of 
the offence could be found in many of the offences at stake. Trafficking in human 
beings, for example, often requires the use of transport to move people, or the setting up 
of physical structures to keep them. Terrorist acts traditionally involve the use of 
materials, the construction of chemical or other type of weaponry able to cause severe 
bodily harm to others, and often the use sites for assembly and preparation. Likewise, 
the laundering of crime related profits involves infrastructures such as particular 
businesses or the use of financial systems in general through which money can be 
moved and laundered. Furthermore, the large majority of examples given also require a 
certain degree of organisation or at least of a certain collective action, if they are to be 
effective. Organised crime, terrorism, trafficking in human being, drugs or theft of 
works of art or money laundering, for example, are all offences that require usually more 
than one perpetrator and a certain degree of coordination (although not necessarily 
organisation). These two elements of the offences themselves bring us back to the first 
characteristic of Euro-crime - the link with modernity and its tools that allow for the 
easy flow of persons, money and goods.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter focused on the evolution of European Union criminal law during the 
Maastricht period and sought to understand the nature of criminal matters in the EU that 
emerged during these years. It showed how the formal arrangements laid out by the 
TEU(M) envisaged a minimal scope and depth for European Union criminal law. It was 
then argued that legal and political discourses provided an ambitious reading of the letra 
legis of the TEU(M), both regarding the mechanisms of development of European 
Union criminal law and the range of applicable legal measures. Hence, from a structural 
perspective, not only were judicial and police cooperation extensively developed but 
also the harmonisation of national criminal laws – not mentioned in the TEU(M) - was 
initiated; whilst from a substantive perspective, measures covered a substantially wider 
number of areas than those officially contemplated by the Treaty. These political and 
legal texts were driven by two main concerns and rationales, namely the fight against 
organised crime and the protection of EC interests. The former well suited the EU’s 
desire for legislative expansion and justified the adoption of measures in areas ranging 
from corruption to human trafficking. It was also used at times to allow for the adoption 
of measures aimed at protecting EC interests, primarily financial in nature. Protecting 
the EC’s interests also began to feature as a main rationale for the adoption of numerous 
conventions and several joint actions. These two rationales were often intertwined and, 
as was argued, led to the EU’s focus on a particular sphere of criminality – Euro-crimes. 
This criminality was distinct from that which national or international systems had 
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traditionally focused on. Indeed, Euro-crimes tended to be considered as serious 
criminality, potentially transnational, often with elements of collective action and use of 
certain forms of infrastructure. In all, during this period, the EU laid down the 
groundwork for its own idea of criminal justice across the European Union. Some of the 
main features of ECL were this shaped during these years regardless of of EC’s and 
EU’s limited competence in criminal matters. It will be seen in the next chapter how the 
tendency to read the Treaties ambitiously, to follow an expansionist dynamic regardless 
of fragile institutional arrangements, and to make use of legal concepts such as 
organised crime allowed the EU to continue exploring and advancing its wide stance on 
criminal law related matters. 
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Chapter 3 The evolution of European Union criminal law from Amsterdam to 
Lisbon: an ever expanding dynamic (1999-2009) 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will shed light on the evolution of European Union Criminal Law (ECL) in 
its most recent period – the Amsterdam-Lisbon era382 – and evaluate its patterns, focus 
and narratives. It will be shown that ECL continued to be driven by an expansionist 
dynamic that could be seen in different dimensions. First and foremost, expansion took 
place at an institutional level as the Treaties envisaged further empowerment of the role 
of the EU in criminal matters. More specifically, EU actors were empowered, decision 
making facilitated and stronger legal acts envisaged. Furthermore, expansion was also 
seen at a substantive level as the Treaties considerably enlarged the EU’s competencies. 
However, the actual scope of ECL was significantly broader than the one directly 
envisaged by the Treaties. This was seen both in political and legal acts and texts, which 
tended to frequently extrapolate the scope of ECL as envisaged by primary law. 
Consequently, the range of topics addressed and legal measures adopted by the EU was 
considerably wider than what was stated in the Treaty of Amsterdam TEU(A). To be 
sure, the main focus of ECL continued to be Euro-crime, even if new offences such as 
cyber or environmental crime were added. With this expansion of ‘Euro-crime’ and the 
offences it encompassed, political and legal rationales underlying the adoption of legal 
acts also became increasingly solidified, broader and interlinked. The fight against 
organised crime, which already had strong historical roots in ECL, continued to run 
through most measures, especially those seeking to approximate the minimum elements 
of crime and penalties. Whilst organised crime now had a place in the Treaties, it 
continued to be used in a broader manner allowing for the adoption of several measures, 
some only indirectly related to organised criminality. Furthermore, the narrative of 
protection of EC interests and policies was also considerably enlarged as the focus 
moved from the exclusive protection of EC financial interests (and some policies 
indirectly via national criminal law) to the protection of other EC policies such as the 
environment or transport. Finally, as narratives of criminalisation around the former two 
themes developed, concerns over fundamental rights began to surface as an independent 
narrative. This focused mostly on the protection of victims’ rights via the adoption of 
legislation on this matter which contrasted greatly with the absence of legislative 
                                                                  
382 This era covers the period from the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (ECT(A) and 
TEU(A)) until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (TEU(L) and TFEU). The Treaty of 
Amsterdam was signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999, followed by the 
Treaty of Lisbon which was signed on 13 December 2007, and entered into force on 1 December 
2009. 
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measures in relation to defendants’ rights. Overall, these three narratives (fight against 
organised crime, protection of EC interests and policies and fundamental rights) found 
among political declarations, Actions Plans, Council Presidency Conclusions and 
preambles of framework decisions, aimed primarily at criminalisation and facilitation of 
prosecution of Euro-crime, which the Council and the Commission saw as endangering 
the EU’s values and goals.  
 
Moreover, the chapter will further suggest that as the EU’s competencies developed, its 
main focus and narratives began to fade in order to facilitate national and transnational 
prosecution beyond merely Euro-crime. The introduction of the principle of mutual 
recognition in judicial cooperation in criminal matters continued to expand the EU’s 
influence on national legal orders far beyond the forms of criminality and rationales 
encompassed in the concept of Euro-crime. This mutual recognition was not only about 
the EU’s assertion of its own interests and the fight against criminality that it saw as 
endangering its legal order, but also about the facilitation of national prosecution and 
punishment across the EU. Indeed, the principle of mutual recognition ensured the 
recognition of Member States’ judicial decisions in criminal matters by making national 
decisions effective de facto across the territory of the European Union. Whilst mutual 
recognition was facilitated ad extremum in relation to serious offences383 (specifically a 
list of 32 serious offence types including all Euro-crimes among other serious criminal 
offences), other non-serious criminality was also included in its scope. Consequently, 
the reach of ECL spread to the entire realm of national decisions and sentences in 
criminal matters, clearly expanding national enforcement capacity beyond the States’ 
borders. This was tantamount to bringing a new dynamic to ECL, with different 
rationales, different modus operandi and different goals. 
 
Finally, the chapter will argue that the structure of ECL as divided into two dynamics as 
well as its incremental remit were solidified with the Treaty of Lisbon (TEU(L) and 
TFEU). The TFEU explores Euro-crime as the centre of ECL, addressing it through a 
more integrated framework, further empowering EU actors and granting stronger legal 
instruments in the third pillar context. Furthermore, the Lisbon reforms bring mutual 
recognition to the core of ECL’s development. Moreover, in general, these reforms 
reassert the expansionist trend vis-à-vis the two dynamics of ECL as it clearly 
legitimises, at least theoretically, the possibility of further growth of the field.  
                                                                  
383 In rigour the list includes ‘criminal behaviours’ rather than criminal offences as definitions are 
not offered and some entries are set out in very generic terms such as for example ‘computer 
related crime’. For the purposes of this dissertation however we will refer to the list of behaviours 
as ‘types of offences’ or ‘offence types’. See, for instance, Council Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and surrender procedures between Member States, 
OJ L 190/1 [2002]. 
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1. Treaty of Amsterdam: expansion and formalisation of the EU’s role in criminal 
matters 
 
With the entry into force of the TEU(A) in 1999, ECL entered a new period of 
development and expansion: EU actors were empowered and ECL’s remit enlarged. 
These changes were inserted under Title VI of the TEU(A) which envisaged the creation 
of an area of freedom, security and justice in the EU, where  
 
“the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with 
respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and 
combating of crime”.384 
 
The association of criminal matters, with free movement of persons and market 
integration, was markedly still a ‘Maastricht trait’.385 The TEU(A), however, moved this 
idea forward and brought it into a context more closely linked to the European citizen in 
the area of freedom, security and justice. Article 29TEU(A) lays down this new 
framework: 
 
 “Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union’s objective 
shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security 
and justice by developing common action among the Member States in the fields of 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by preventing and combating 
racism and xenophobia. That objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating 
crime, organised and otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and 
offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption 
and fraud, through: 
- closer cooperation between police forces, customs authorities and other 
competent authorities in the Member States, both directly or through the 
European Police Office (Europol), in accordance with the provisions of Articles 
30 and 32; 
                                                                  
384 Article 2 TEU(A).  
385 Jorg Monar notes how this new wording of the Treaty marks a clear step beyond the Schengen 
rationale and its focus on free movement; See J. Monar, “Justice and Home Affairs after 
Amsterdam: the Treaty reforms and the challenge of their implementation”, in J. Monar and W. 
Wessels (eds) The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam (London/NY: Continuum, 
2001) 267, 287. See also chapter 2.  
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- closer cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities of the 
Member States in accordance with the provisions of Articles 31 (a) to (d) and 
32; 
- approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters in the Member 
States, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 (e).” 
     
This movement towards an increased role of the EU in criminal matters was enhanced 
by the empowerment of the EU actors vis-à-vis the Member States, as the European 
Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and the CJEU acquired a more significant 
role with the TEU(A). The CJEU, for example, was given jurisdiction—subject to 
Member States’ acceptance—to deliver preliminary rulings on the validity and 
interpretation of framework decisions and decisions, on the interpretation of conventions 
and of measures implementing them. Member States could choose to limit jurisdiction to 
courts of last appeal or alternatively to allow any national court to refer a question.386 
The EP was given compulsory consultation powers. Article 38 TEU(A) required the 
Council to consult with the EP before adopting decisions, framework decisions or 
conventions. The EP could also ask questions or make recommendations to the Council 
as well as hold a yearly debate on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.387 
In turn, the Commission was once again to be “fully associated with the work in the 
areas referred to in this Title”,388 whilst also having power to initiate legislation (shared 
with the Council and any Member State).389 Indeed, Member States and the Council 
remained nonetheless at the centre of the decision-making process. Article 34 (2) 
TEU(A) clearly stated  
 
“The Council shall take measures and promote cooperation, using appropriate form and 
procedures as set out in this Title, contributing to the pursuit of the objectives of the 
Union. To that end, acting unanimously on the initiative of any Member States or of the 
Commission the Council may”  
 
adopt common positions, framework decisions, decisions or conventions. 
 
Furthermore, the role of EU in criminal matters was enhanced by the introduction of 
new and more efficient legal instruments for intervention in criminal matters, namely 
common positions, decisions and framework decisions, whilst maintaining conventions 
as an instrument to legislate in this domain. Article 34 TEU(A) provided that common 
                                                                  
386 Article 35 TEU(A).  
387 Article 39 (3) TEU(A). 
388 Article 36 (2) TEU(A). 
389 Article 34 (2) TEU(A). 
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positions would be suited to define the EU’s approach in a particular matter, framework 
decisions were to be used to approximate laws and regulations of Member States, whilst 
the purpose or use of conventions was left open without any guidance of when they 
should be preferred over another instrument.  
 
In practice, framework decisions were the measures more frequently adopted by the EU 
and were at times used for other purposes besides the approximation of domestic laws. 
Article 34 (b) also clarified legal value of framework decisions, thus avoiding 
uncertainties like the ones surrounding joint actions during the Maastricht period:  
 
“Framework decisions shall be binding upon the Member States as to the result to be 
achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of forms and methods. 
They shall not entail direct effect”.  
 
Their legal nature was further clarified by the CJEU in 2005 when the Court extended 
the application of the principle of indirect effect to framework decisions, by holding that 
national courts must interpret national law in so far as possible in the light of the 
wording and purpose of the text of framework decisions.390  
 
Finally, the TEU(A) provided for more efficient mechanisms of cooperation or for the 
reinvigoration of pre-existent ones. This was done in the axes of police cooperation, 
judicial cooperation and approximation of laws. In relation to police cooperation, for 
example, Article 30 stipulated that common action in this domain should include 
operational cooperation between law enforcement agencies; the collection, processing, 
analysis and exchange of information by law enforcement services, in particular through 
Europol; the continuation in the cooperation and joint initiatives in training, research and 
investigative techniques, in particular in relation to serious forms of organised crime; 
and a strengthening of the role of Europol. 
 
In turn, regarding judicial cooperation, Article 31 TEU(A) held that collaboration should 
include further cooperation between national authorities in relation to proceedings and 
enforcement of decisions, a facilitation in the rules of extradition, the compatibility 
between national rules as well as the prevention of conflicts of jurisdiction and the 
                                                                  
390 Case C-105/03 Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285; The Court 
also noted that the Framework Decision must be interpreted in such a way that fundamental 
rights, including the right to a fair trial as set out in Article 6 of the ECHR are respected, para 59 
of the Framewok Decision. For more details on the judgement see, for example, S. Peers, 
“Salvation outside the Church: Judicial Protection in the Third Pillar after the Pupino and Segi 
judgements” (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 5.  
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progressive harmonisation of the minimum elements constituent of crimes and penalties 
in the fields of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking: 
 
“Common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall include: 
 
(a) facilitating and accelerating cooperation between competent ministries and 
judicial or equivalent authorities of the Member States in relation to 
proceedings and enforcement of decisions; 
(b) facilitating extradition between Member States; 
(c) ensuring compatibility in rules applicable in the Member States, as may be 
necessary to improve such cooperation; 
(d) preventing conflicts of jurisdiction between Member States; 
(e) progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating to the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the fields of organised 
crime, terrorism and drug trafficking.” 
 
Whilst the TEU(A) article mentions judicial cooperation in general, in 1999, the 
Tampere European Council introduced the principle of mutual recognition as the 
cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters.391  
 
1.2. A timid empowerment: limitations to the framework created 
 
Despite its great dimensions, the role of the EU in criminal matters had significant 
limitations. As the TEU(A) itself stated, Member States remained responsible for the 
“maintenance of law and order and safeguarding of internal security.”392 Indeed, 
mechanisms were envisaged to facilitate cooperation among Member States but not as 
an absolute transfer of competencies and responsibilities in criminal law.  
 
Therefore, the new institutional arrangements were limited and conveyed a multifaceted 
criminal matters reality within the EU. Decision-making arrangements, for example, 
continued to raise accountability and transparency concerns similar to those during the 
Maastricht period. On the one hand, the secrecy of some negotiations and the lack of 
proper debate around important measures continued to be an issue. Douglas-Scott 
commented on this in relation to the adoption of the Framework Decision on the EAW. 
                                                                  
391 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, supra note 54. Tampere also envisaged 
the creation of Eurojust, a body aimed at improving the fight against serious organised crime 
through a more efficient judicial cooperation between Member States; Eurojust was officially 
established in 2002 by the Council Decision of 28 February 2002 which set up Eurojust with a 
view to reinforce the fight against serious crime, OJ L 63/1 [2002]. 
392 Article 33 TEU(A). 
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The author noted how it was adopted swiftly and left national parliaments very little 
time to evaluate the draft of the proposal. 393 On the other hand, accountability around 
the EU’s actions remained weak, given the limitations on the role of institutions able to 
provide checks and balances - such as the CJEU, the EP or national parliaments. Indeed, 
regardless of the empowerment of various EU actors, as shown above, their role 
remained rather narrow. The Court, for example, was merely given an optional 
competence in order to accommodate the interests of some countries less willing to 
cooperate in this domain, such as the UK.394 Hence, Article 35 (1) TEU(A) held that the 
Court had jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of 
framework decisions and decisions, on the interpretation of conventions adopted under 
Title VI TEU(A) and on the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing 
them. However, this jurisdiction was dependent on Member States’ acceptance. Hence, 
paragraph 2 and 3 held that Member States could accept the jurisdiction of the Court by 
a declaration in which they should specify whether any court or tribunal against whose 
decision there would be no judicial remedy under national law could request the CJEU 
to give a preliminary ruling; or whether any court or tribunal, even against whose 
decision there would be judicial remedy, could do so.  Paragraph 5 clarified that the 
CJEU had no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried 
by the police or other law enforcement agencies with regard to the maintenance of law 
and order and the safeguarding of internal security. These limitations of competence on 
the Court were further exacerbated by the slowness of some Member States and the 
refusal of others in accepting the former’s jurisdiction. In 2001, only six countries had 
made such declarations of acceptance,395 whilst in total only 19 Member States accepted 
the Court’s jurisdiction (all except the UK, Ireland, Denmark, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, 
Bulgaria and Malta).396 Moreover, regarding the EP, a similarly weak framework 
existed. Indeed, although it was to be consulted before the adoption of measures, such a 
consultation was merely advice-giving and the Council could act when no opinion was 
                                                                  
393 S. Douglas-Scott, “The Rule of Law in the European Union – Putting the Security into the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” (2004) 29 European Law Review 219, 221, 228. 
394 B. Smith and W. Wallace point out how the UK’s stance during the negotiations of the Treaty 
affected this outcome, for example, in “Constitutional Deficits of EU Justice and Home Affairs: 
Transparency, Accountability and Judicial Control”, J. Monar and W. Wessels (eds) The 
European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam (London/NY: Continuum, 2001) 125, 141. 
395 Austria, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Belgium and The Netherlands were the only 
countries to have opted in the Court’s jurisdiction at the date of the signing of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. Smith and Wallace, ibid. at 141. See also House of Lords – European Union 
Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment, Volume 1 – Report, HL Paper 62-I, 13 
March 2008, 125.   
396 For a summary of the status quo in December 2009, before the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, see information concerning the Declaration by the Republic of Cyprus and Romania 
on their acceptance of the Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union to give 
preliminary rulings on the acts referred to in Article 35 of the Treaty on European Union, OJ L 
56/14 [2010]. 
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given within three months.397 The same could be said about the European Commission. 
As Monar notes, although the Commission was given a shared right of initiative, it was 
to assert it in  
 
“the ‘climate’ of the intergovernmental framework which tends to limit its actual 
possibilities of influencing decision making” at least in the earlier stages of its new 
role.398 
 
Furthermore, the primary instrument of ECL introduced by Amsterdam – the framework 
decision – was of limited strength. Article 34 (2) (b) TEU(A) held that framework 
decisions were binding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved, leaving 
national authorities the choice of form and methods. The Article further noted that 
framework decisions were not to have direct effect. This exclusion was a clear 
differentiation from directives, the equivalent instrument in the context of the first pillar. 
The fact that framework decisions could not entail direct effect was highly limiting in 
legal force, even more so in a domain where individual fundamental rights are often at 
stake, such as in criminal law.399 Furthermore, the TEU(A) did not provide for any 
mechanism of enforcement or control of Member States’ implementation of framework 
decisions. This, once again, was in sharp contrast with the first pillar, under which the 
Commission could lodge infringement actions under Article 226 ECT(A) if it found a 
Member State had not implemented a directive correctly or had not implemented it at all 
and it had failed to follow the Commission’s advice to do so. Likewise, conventions 
remained weak as legal instruments mainly because they depended on the political 
goodwill of Member States to be ratified and this process was not always expedited. 
This difficulty was felt strongly - to the point that some mechanisms to compensate for 
these limitations were created. Den Boer notes how the introduction of the ‘rolling 
ratification’ procedure aimed precisely at avoiding the paralyses of a draft convention, 
as it allowed their entry into force once adopted by at least half of the Member States (in 
their territory only).400  
 
                                                                  
397 Article 38 TEU (A).  
398 J. Monar, “Justice and Home Affairs after Amsterdam: The Treaty Reforms and the Challenge 
of their Implementation”, supra note 385, 267, 283.  
399 The principle of direct effect, briefly, allows individuals to invoke EU law provisions before a 
national court against the State (vertical direct effect) or against another individual (horizontal 
direct effect) when certain conditions are met; See for more details D. Chalmers et al., European 
Union Law, supra note 268, 268-300. 
400 M. den Boer, “An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Bogged Down by Compromise”, in 
D. O’Keefe and P. Twomey (eds) Legal Issues After the Treaty of Amsterdam (Oxford/Portland: 
Hart Publishing, 1999) 279, 317. 
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2. The new scope of European Union criminal law: Euro-crime and narratives  
 
How did these changing structures reflect themselves upon the material body of ECL? 
What themes, rationales or narratives derived from it? It will be suggested that an 
expanding dynamic continued in this field as the EU formalised intervention in areas not 
mentioned by the TEU(M) but in relation to which the legislator had used the ‘umbrella’ 
of the fight against organised crime to intervene. This formalisation occurred, for 
example, in relation to organised crime, trafficking in persons, offences against children 
and corruption. The concept of organised crime also made its way into Article 
29TEU(A). Hence, Article 29 TEU(A) as mentioned earlier in this chapter held that the 
Union’s objective was to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of 
freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member States 
in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters as well as in 
combating racism and xenophobia. More specifically, in relation to the domains of 
criminality in which intervention was to take place, Article 29 TEU(A) mentioned crime 
- organised or otherwise - such as terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against 
children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud. In 
relation to harmonisation of national criminal law this provision was complemented by 
Article 31(1)(e) TEU(A) which noted that common action should include progressively 
adopting measures establishing minimum rules on the constituent elements of criminal 
acts and penalties in the fields of organised crime, terrorism and drug trafficking. 
Nevertheless, as it will be seen below, measures were adopted in domains not directly 
mentioned in the TEU(A), such as cyber crime, money laundering, victims’ rights and 
environmental crime. These were all areas of harmonisation not mentioned in Article 
29TEU, let alone in the short list of Article 31 (1)(e) (which mentioned organised crime, 
terrorism and illicit drug trafficking only). 
 
It will be contended that ECL continued to have, as its focal point, a specific type of 
criminality: Euro-offences.401 Hence, whilst Euro-crime continued to rest on ideas 
around the fight against organised crime (for which there was, at this stage, a clear legal 
basis), the narrative of protection of EC interests and policies via criminal law was 
further enhanced, whereas concerns with fundamental rights (mostly in the form of 
procedural victims’ rights) became more visible, albeit very limited. The latter two 
themes however, were in a realm of uncertain competence for the EU to enact 
legislation. This was so, given that the TEU(A) did not directly attribute competence for 
the EU to adopt criminal law measures that aimed at the protection of EC interests and 
policies or relating to criminal procedure.  
                                                                  
401 See chapter 2. 
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This was seen first seen at a political level as several action plans, which laid down 
guidelines for intervention, and mentioned further areas for intervention than those 
mentioned in the TEU(A). This was the case of the Vienna Action Plan,402 which placed 
a great emphasis on police cooperation, calling for the strengthening of Europol’s role in 
relation to the counterfeiting of the Euro, illegal immigrant networks and terrorism, and 
to judicial cooperation, namely regarding money laundering as well as the harmonisation 
of criminal law.  
 
Similarly, the Tampere Conclusions,403 adopted in 1999, were a benchmark during the 
Amsterdam years. The document separately endorsed objectives in the domains of 
freedom, security, justice and external policy. In the specific context of the EU-wide 
fight against crime, Tampere placed the focus on Euro-offences setting as specific 
objectives: the improvement in prevention and cooperation between judicial and police 
authorities, particularly in the domains of money laundering, and it called for action 
against trafficking in drugs, human trafficking, terrorism, serious organised crime, high 
tech crime, environmental crime, financial crime and victims’ rights.404 Money 
laundering, high tech crime, environmental crime and financial crime were all domains 
outside the narrow scope of Amsterdam. Furthermore, Tampere endorsed the principle 
of mutual recognition as the cornerstone for cooperation in judicial criminal matters 
despite the fact that this principle had no presence in the TEU(A). 
 
Likewise, the Hague programme in 2005, continued the work and focus of the Tampere 
Conclusions further developing the AFSJ and called for the deepening of cooperation 
and action in ECL matters, particularly in the domains of cross-border organised crime, 
serious crime, drugs, corruption and terrorism.405 Finally, the Stockholm programme, 
which lays down the political priorities for the period 2010-2014, focuses its attention 
from a criminal law point of view on specific criminality such as terrorism, organised 
crime, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography, cyber-crime, economic crime, corruption and drugs.406 The political 
mandate for the EU to legislate in criminal law related matters was being shaped by 
                                                                  
402 Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the provisions of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam in the area of freedom, security and justice of 3 December 1998, OJ C 
19/1 [1999]. 
403 Tampere European Council, supra note 54. 
404 See para 6, 40, 43, 44, 46 and 48 of the Tampere Conclusions, ibid..  
405 Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and 
justice in the European Union, OJ C 53/1 [2005], see in particular sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.7, 2.8 or 
3.3.2.  
406 Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe 
serving and protecting the citizens, OJ C 115/1 [2010], see in particular sections 4.1 and 4.4.. 
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these political declarations, which gave it a wider scope of intervention than that 
envisaged by the Treaties. In particular, these programmes mentioned more topics of 
intervention than those mentioned in the Treaties.407  
 
Furthermore, in practice, a wide range of measures implementing these programmes and 
working plans was adopted, namely framework decisions on attacks against information 
systems,408 trafficking in human beings,409 money laundering,410 fraud and counterfeiting 
of non-cash means of payment,411 victims’ rights,412 terrorism,413 sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography,414 illicit drug trafficking,415 organised crime,416 
corruption.417  
 
                                                                  
407 For an analysis and comparison of the different programmes and mainly so of Tampere and 
Hague Programmes see, for example, E. Baker, “The European Union’s ‘Area of Freedom, 
Security and (Criminal) Justice’ ten years on” (2009) 12 Criminal Law Review 833. For a review 
of the Stockholm Programme and an argument that it got much closer to the hard core of States’ 
sovereignty in a broader context see Editorial Comment, “The EU as an Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice: Implementing the Stockholm programme” (2010) 47 Common Market Law 
Review 1307. 
408 Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against 
information systems, OJ L 69/67 [2005], an initiative by the Commission, COM (2002) 173, OJ 
C203 E/109 (2002). 
409 Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in 
human beings, OJ L 203/1 [2002] an initiative by the Commission, COM(2000)854final/2.  
410 Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA of 26 June 2001 relating to money laundering, 
identification, tracing, freezing or seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds from 
crime, OJ L 182/1 [2001], a proposal by France, Council doc 9930/00 and 11305/00, 23 
September 2000. 
411 Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA of 28 May on combatting fraud and 
counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, OJ L 149/1 [2001], an initiative from the 
Commission COM(1999)438, 14 September 1999, OJ C 376 E/20 (1999). 
412 Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in 
criminal proceedings, OJ L 82/1 [2001], a Portuguese proposal, OJ C 243/4 (2000). 
413 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism OJ L 164/3 [2002]; and 
Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA amending Framework Decision on combating 
terrorism OJ L 330/21 [2008], a Commission’s proposal, COM(2001) 521, 19 September 2001, 
OJ C 332 E/300 (2001) and COM (2007) 650 final Brussels, 6 November 2007. 
414 Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA of 22 December 2003 on combating sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography, OJ L 13/44 [2004], an initiative by the 
Commission, COM (2000) 854, Brussels, 21 December 2000. 
415 Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 15 October 2004 laying down minimum 
provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking, OJ L 335/8 [2004], another Commission’s initiative, COM (2001)259, Brussels, 23 
May 2001. 
416 Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October on the fight against organised 
crime, OJ L 300/42 [2008], a proposal by the European Commission, COM(2005)6, Brussels, 19 
January 2005. 
417 Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the 
private sector, OJ L 192/54 [2003], an initiative from Denmark, Council Doc 9953/02, 14 June 
2002. 
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The large majority of framework decisions in these topics were harmonisation measures 
– aimed at approximating minimum elements constituent of crimes and penalties. Other 
measures aimed mostly at facilitating judicial cooperation, also kept Euro-offences as 
their focal point, such as framework decisions on EAW,418 illegal entry and residence,419 
financial penalties,420 probation decisions,421 among other related matters.422  
 
The types of offences at the centre of these measures were clearly those of Euro-
criminality - crimes primarily related to late modernity, to globalisation and to the 
volatility of today’s societies. People today move more between regions, countries and 
continents; capital is also increasingly more mobile between different financial systems 
as the world is financially and economically ever more interdependent; similarly, 
information flows without geographical restrictions as the Internet accelerates 
globalisation.423 Newer offences harmonised after the TEU(A) continued to fit the 
sphere of Euro-crime. The criminalisation of cyber crime, for example, clearly relates to 
the late modern age, to the widespread use of the Internet and the privacy and security 
issues it raises. Likewise, concerns with the environment and the criminalisation of 
environmentally damaging actions have been increasing in the last decades as has 
related legislation around pollution and global warming-related issues.424 Criminality 
such as cyber crime simply did not exist until the later years of the twentieth century.  
Furthermore, the connection with crimes of late modernity is further seen in new 
measures that were more rights-oriented such as the Framework Decision on the 
standing of victims in criminal proceedings.425 In fact, the promotion of the victim has 
been one of the most important currents of change in the crime control sphere in the last 
                                                                  
418 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant, supra note 383. 
419 Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of 
the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, OJ L 
328/1 [2002], a French initiative, OJ C 2000 C 253/6. 
420 Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties, OJ L 76/16 [2005], a joint initiative by 
Sweden, UK and France, OJ C 278/4 (2001). 
421 Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition to judgements and probation decisions with a view to the 
supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions, OJ L 337/102 [2008], a Joint French 
and German initiative, OJ C 147/1 (2007). 
422 Mitsilegas refers to many of these instruments as a ‘third wave’ of third pillar law which 
extends to most criminal law integration and reinforces the idea that ECL is a flourishing field, V. 
Mitsilegas, “The Third wave of third pillar law: which direction for EU criminal justice?”, Queen 
Mary University of London, School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No 33/2009, 523-560.  
423 See Chapter 2. See, for example, A. Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalisation is Re-
shaping our Lives (London: Profile, 2002). 
424 Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer speak in this regard of the ‘globalisation of 
environmental policy’ with the emergence of numerous international pacts and agreements since 
the 1970s, See AG Opinion delivered on 26 May 2005, Case C-176/03, Commission v Council, 
ECR I-7881 [2005] para 61-65. 
425 Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, supra note 412. 
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thirty years and epitomises and important shift in the focus of criminal justice systems. 
For much of the twenthieth century the victim remained in the background of the 
criminal process whilst the offender was the key determinant of action.426 This has now 
changed and ECL, it will be seen, is representative of such a shift. Procedural rights of 
the victim, their role as an active part of the prosecution, the taking into account of the 
impact that such participation might have in their lives and development are elements 
accounted for in ECL.427  
 
2.1. Narratives in European Union criminal law: developing old themes, creating new 
ones 
 
What drove this expanding scope? What concerns and rationales led to this enlarged 
focus? Surely, many developments came to upgrade or replace previous measures 
adopted. Hence, the fight against organised crime continued to be the paramount 
concern during this period. The broad nature of the term continued to allow for the EU’s 
intervention in a very wide range of criminality even if only indirectly related to 
“organised crime”. Moreover, the protection of EC policies and interests via criminal 
law continued to be pursued and enlarged as additional concerns over budgetary or 
financial issues arose, as well as with transport or environmental policies. Finally, the 
protection of fundamental rights, namely through protection of the victim and the need 
for certain procedural rights began to emerge.  
 
2.1.1. The fight against organised crime  
 
The fight against organised crime continued to be the central narrative of ECL. The 
knowledge of this type of criminality was by now well developed via national and 
European police information sharing and was disseminated to the public and law 
enforcement authorities via Europol’s annual reports on organised crime. The reliability 
of this data is however still disputable. In fact, once significant institutional structures 
and law enforcement means are set in place to tackle, identify and report on a certain 
type of criminality, the amount of information available may suggest an increase and 
therefore present a bleak picture of that form criminality. Moreover, some authors have 
voiced fierce criticisms of the methods and type of data used by Europol to put together 
its ‘Organised Crime Situation Reports’ arguing that the information provided in these 
reports is altogether unreliable. They suggest that the data collection system is defective 
and entirely dependent on what Member States decide to report to Europol (and in turn 
                                                                  
426 D. Garland The Culture of Control, supra note 42, 11-12. 
427 It will be seen in chapter 6 how this has also been one of the domains of development in the 
post-Lisbon framework. 
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they do not always use reliable methods themselves), that the definition and criteria 
used are flawed and conclusions are of a very general nature.428 
 
Nonetheless, whilst the dimension of the actual threat of organised crime across the 
European Union continued to be controversial, legal and political narratives were in fact 
strengthened. Article 29 TEU(A) finally made express reference to organised crime 
particularly in domains of terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against 
children, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, corruption and fraud. Yet, organised crime 
continued to provide a useful political justification for legal intervention in a wide range 
of topics, which could be directly or indirectly related to organised crime, including 
areas of criminality not necessarily mentioned by the TEU(A). Once again, this emerges 
from the legal and political message being conveyed in action plans, Council 
conclusions and preambles of secondary legislation adopted (mostly through framework 
decisions).  
 
In 1999, in the Tampere European Council Conclusions set the agenda in the area of 
freedom, security and justice. For example, the Presidency used a particularly symbolic 
tone when it held: 
 
“People have the right to expect the Union to address the threat to their freedom and 
legal rights posed by serious crime. To counter these threats a common effort is needed 
to prevent and fight crime and criminal organisations throughout the Union. The joint 
mobilisation of police and judicial resources is needed to guarantee that there is no 
hiding place for criminals or the proceeds of crime within the Union.” 429 
 
A year later, an Action Plan to combat organised crime – the so-called Millennium Plan 
on Organised Crime - was agreed to at the Amsterdam European Council. The 
document aimed at strategizing initiatives to be taken in the field in the light of the entry 
into force of the TEU(A), whilst noting the changing nature of the phenomenon and the 
links to other forms of criminality, namely economic crime:   
 
“The level of organised crime in the EU is increasing. The contributions of Member 
States to the annual organised crime situation report provide evidence of this 
                                                                  
428 Van Duyne and Beken suggest that data on organised crime in the EU, namely in relation to 
Europol’s threat assessment levels is not based on clear concepts, definitions and methods whilst 
excessively dependant on Member States. For an overall analysis on collection, analysis and 
reporting methods on organised crime since the 1990s, see P. van Duyne and T.V. Beken, “The 
incantations of the EU organised crime policy making” (2009) 51 Crime, Law and Social Change 
261, 261-281. 
429 Tampere European Council, supra note 54, para 6. 
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phenomenon and of the multifaceted way in which organised crime is infiltrating into 
many aspects of society throughout Europe. 
(…) 
Although the threat from organised crime groups outside the territory of the European 
Union appears to be increasing, it is the groups that originate and operate throughout 
Europe, composed predominantly of EU nationals and residents, that appear to pose the 
significantly greater threat. These groups are strengthening their international criminal 
contacts and targeting the social and business structure of European society for example 
through money laundering, drug trafficking and economic crime. They appear to be able 
to operate easily and effectively both within the European arena and in other parts of 
the world, responding to illegal demand by acquiring and supplying commodities and 
services ranging from drugs and arms to stolen vehicles and money laundering. Their 
concerted efforts to seek to influence and hamper the work of law enforcement and the 
judicial system illustrate the extent and professional capability of these criminal 
organisations. 
This calls for a dynamic and coordinated response by all Member States, a response 
that not only takes into account national strategies but also seeks to become an 
integrated and multidisciplinary European strategy. Addressing the ever-changing face 
of organised crime requires that this response and strategy remain flexible. 
The threat of national and international organised crime requires concerted actions by 
the Member States of the European Union, and by the European Union itself, under the 
first, second and third pillars…”430 
 
The Millenium Action Plan portrayed a bleak reality in relation to organised crime 
within the EU. It noted first that it was on the rise and increasingly infiltrating many 
aspects of society throughout Europe. Interestingly, it noted that groups originating 
from and operating within the EU itself posed a major threat. The solution proposed was 
one that called for a dynamic and coordinated response and, mainly, for a strategy that 
remains flexible enough to combat the ever-changing face of organised crime. This, it 
will be shown in chapter 4, was a goal achieved partly by the adoption of a very broad 
and vague definition of a criminal organisation.  
 
Likewise, in 2005, the Hague Programme further elaborated the approach given to the 
fight against organised crime, focusing on methods and means to achieve such a goal. 431  
 
                                                                  
430 European Council, “The Prevention and Control of Organised Crime: A European Union 
Strategy for the Beginning of the New Millennium” (2000/C 124/01) OJ C 124/1 [2000] 3. 
431 Hague Programme, supra note 405, section 2.7. 
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Moreover, secondary legislation adopted after Amsterdam approached organised crime 
in a rather comprehensive manner. It did so, first, by legislating directly on organised 
crime, seeking the criminalisation of the membership of a criminal organisation or of the 
agreement to commit such offences in the context of a criminal organisation.432 Second, 
more generally, by adopting several framework decisions criminalising offences which 
often are or can be related to organised crime, such as money laundering, etc.433 This 
link to organised crime is usually made directly in the preambles of the majority of 
measures adopted in domains which ranged from trafficking in human beings,434 sexual 
exploitation of children or crimes against information systems,435 to illicit drug 
trafficking.436  
 
The Framework Decision on the trafficking of human beings, for example, stated in its 
Preamble that it aims to complement existing measures such as the UN Convention 
against transnational organised crimes and the Joint Action on making it a criminal 
offence to participate in a criminal organisation, now replaced by a Framework 
Decision.437 Along the same lines, the Framework Decision on sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography is also contextualised within the realm of organised 
crime, requiring that  
 
“Penalties must be introduced against the perpetrators of such offences which are 
sufficiently stringent to bring sexual exploitation of children and child pornography 
                                                                  
432 Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA, supra note 416; The framework decision was an 
initiative by the Commission (COM(2005)6 final, Brussels, 19.1.2005) and came to replace the 
Joint Action making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation. For a detailed 
analysis of the Joint Action see V. Mitsilegas, “Defining organised crime in the European Union: 
the limits of European criminal law in an area of ‘freedom, security and justice’” European Law 
Review 26 (2001); and for an analysis of the Framework Decision see F. Calderoni, “A Definition 
that Could not Work”, supra note 270. See also chapter 4. 
433 Van Duyne identifies four main areas of legal intervention which tend to be deeply connected 
to organised crime, namely human misery and trafficking; economic crime; corruption and 
money laundering; and prohibited goods, P. Van Duyne, “Cross-border crime: a relative concept 
and broad phenomenon” in P. Van Duyne et al. (eds) Cross-border crime in a changing Europe 
(Prague: Tilburg University, Institute of Criminology and Social Prevention, 2000) 1, 4-12. 
Terrorism is also increasingly being brought into the context of organised crime, W. Laqueur, 
The new terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 217. In a 
more comprehensive approach, the United Nations identifies eighteen activities that are regarded 
as endemic in transnational organised crime, in a non exhaustive list, see A. Wright, Organised 
Crime (Devon/ Portland: Willan Publishing, 2006) 49. 
434 Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, supra note 409. 
435 Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA and Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, 
supra note 414 and note 408. 
436 Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA, supra note 415.  
437 Recitals (4) (8) and  (9) of the Preamble of Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, supra note 
409. 
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within the scope of instruments already adopted for the purpose of combating organised 
crime…”438 
 
The use of such a rationale was further expanded to new domains, such as cyber crime. 
Indeed, in the preamble of the Council Framework Decision on attacks against 
information systems it is noted how  
 
“…threats from organised crime and increasing concern at the potential of terrorist 
attacks against information systems … form part of the critical infrastructure of the 
Member States. This constitutes a threat to the achievement of a safer information 
society and of an area of freedom, security and justice.”439  
 
Furthermore, the fight against organised crime continues to focus greatly on the 
protection of the stability of the EU’s financial system. The Council adopted a 
Framework Decision on money laundering; as well as on the identification, tracing, 
freezing and confiscation of the instruments and the proceeds from crime.440 
Accordingly, the Framework Decision’s preamble declares,  
 
“money laundering is at the very heart of organised crime and should be rooted out 
wherever it occurs.”441  
 
The emphasis in relation to financial crime is also seen in other measures, namely the 
Framework Decision on combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of 
payment.442 The preamble of the Framework Decision justifies its adoption with a call 
for action via the Action Plan to combat organised crime adopted in 1997 and the 
Vienna Action Plan of 1998.443 Likewise, the Framework Decision on confiscation of 
crime related proceeds, instrumentalities and property444 is deeply related to the fight 
against organised crime and is seen throughout its preamble, whose intent (1) states,  
 
“The main motive for cross-border organised crime is financial gain. In order to be 
effective, therefore, any attempt to prevent and combat such crime must focus on 
tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscating the proceeds from crime.”  
                                                                  
438  Para (9) of the preamble of the Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, supra note 414. 
439 Recital (2) and (3) of the Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, supra note 408. 
440 Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA, supra note 410. 
441 Recital (6), ibid.. 
442 Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA, supra note 411. 
443 Intent (3) of the Preamble, ibid..  
444 Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on Confiscation of Crime-
Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property, OJ L 68/49 [2005]. 
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The preamble then moves on to contextualise the adoption of the Framework Decision 
within the framework of the Vienna Action Plan, of the Tampere Conclusion of 1999 
and of the UN Convention of 12 December 2000 against Transnational Organised 
Crime.445 
 
All these measures are clearly contextualised under the umbrella framework of the fight 
against organised criminality which stands out as the main goal and underlying rationale 
of  the EU’s intervention in criminal matters. The expansive approach taken to the idea 
of organised crime is also seen also in the link made to financial criminality. Many of 
these measures adopted in the context of organised crime were concerned with financial 
criminality. Hence, boundaries between financial, business crime and organised crime 
remained fluid. This thematic intertwine reflects the fact that, as seen in earlier in this 
dissertation, the concept of organised crime, as observed by the EU, has developed in a 
particularly wide ranging, broad and fluid manner. Consequently, goals of the single 
market are also pursued via the fight against organised crime. Although the EC had no 
competence under the first pillar to adopt criminal law measures to protect its interests 
and policies, this protection was sought under the third pillar. Hence, third pillar 
measures were adopted with the aim of directly protecting EC interests or policies or 
with the aim of complementing existing first pillar instruments.  Examples are the 
protection of immigration and labour markets with the Framework Decision on 
trafficking of human beings, or the protection of the financial system, through the 
Framework Decisions on money laundering, fraud, etc. In fact, measures to fight human 
trafficking or money laundering in the context of the third pillar, for example, were 
adopted mainly to complement and render efficacy to a vast bulk of legislation on the 
topic already existent in the realm of the first pillar. Money laundering, for example, was 
the object of several measures adopted in the realm of the first pillar in the nineties, 
directed at the single market. EU legislation has been adopted since 1991 to protect the 
financial system and financial activities from being misused for money laundering.446 
                                                                  
445 See intents (2), (4) and (6), ibid.. 
446 The first measure adopted in the context of the fight against money laundering was the 1991 
Directive on the prevention of use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, 
supra note 164. The Directive was adopted in the context of the freedom of establishment and 
single market provisions, based on a threat posed to the financial system, although its scope went 
well beyond a strictly financial rationale and established a comprehensive framework of 
repression and prevention of money laundering. The Commission then replaced the Directive of 
1991 by a Directive in 2001 and by another in 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, OJ L 309/15 [2005]. The 
Directive now covers the laundering of drug trafficking, organised crime and fraud as defined in 
the EU instruments, corruption in general, and of offences that generate considerable proceeds 
and which are punishable by severe sentences of imprisonment, in accordance with the law of the 
Member State. 
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Furthermore, the criminalisation of trafficking of human beings came to complement a 
broad range of measures to fight irregular immigration, namely the Directive on 
facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence447 and the Framework Decision 
on strengthening the penal framework to prevent the facilitation on unauthorised entry, 
transit and residence.448 Nonetheless, besides the importance of the narrative of the fight 
against organised crime, the rationale of protecting EC interests and policies via the 
criminal law was also expanded and solidified during the Amsterdam years. This will be 
explored in the following section. 
 
 
2.1.2. Protection of EC/EU interests and policies 
 
The idea that criminal law had a role to play in the furtherance of EC interests and 
policies was bolstered during the Amsterdam years. This took place even if the Treaties 
remained either silent or unclear regarding the relationship between criminal law and 
Community law. On the one hand, in Article 29 of the TEU(A), express reference was 
made to intervention in crime—organised or otherwise—and, in particular, to terrorism, 
trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit 
arms trafficking, corruption and fraud. Similarly, Article 31 (e) referred specifically to 
the harmonisation of national criminal law—particularly in regard to organised crime, 
terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.  On the other hand, the ECT(A) continued to be 
mostly silent regarding criminal law. If anything, it made clear in two different 
provisions that certain elements were to remain within the sphere of Member States. 
Both Articles 135 and 280(4) of the ECT(A)—on the adoption of Community measures 
on customs cooperation and on the prevention and fight against fraud respectively—
clarified that Community initiatives should not concern the application of national 
criminal law or the national administration of justice.  
 
Regardless, criminal law, continued to be used as a tool to protect EC interests and 
policies at various levels in order to promote the effectiveness of Community law. 
Hence, measures aimed at the protection of EC interests and policies via criminal law 
were adopted under the third pillar. This was the case, for instance, in the Framework 
Decision on combating corruption in the private sector449 aiming prima facie at the 
protection of the single market—particularly its competitiveness and economic 
                                                                  
447 Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised 
entry, transit and residence, OJ L 328/17 [2002]. 
448 Ibid.. 
449 Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA, supra note 417. 
 124 
development,450 thus requiring Member States to criminalise both intentional active and 
passive corruption.451 Furthermore, other measures aiming primarily at strengthening the 
penal framework of first pillar policies were also put forward. This was the case of the 
Framework Decision, adopted in 2000, which required Member States to criminalise the 
counterfeiting of the Euro. The importance of this measure was noted in the Preamble:  
 
“The worldwide importance of the euro means it will be particularly open to the risk of 
counterfeiting. Account should be taken of the fact that there is already evidence of 
fraudulent activity with regard to the euro.”452  
 
A Framework Decision on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the 
facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence was also adopted in 2002. Its 
preamble held that the Framework Decision  
 
“supplements other instruments adopted in order to combat illegal immigration, illegal 
employment, trafficking in human beings and the sexual exploitation of children.”453  
 
But the adoption of these measures—even under the legal framework of the third 
pillar—was not necessarily clear-cut as the TEU(A) provisions did not directly attribute 
competence to the EU to adopt measures protecting EC policies via criminal law (as 
seen in the first section of this chapter). Article 29 TEU(A) made no reference to the 
smuggling of human beings, corruption or the counterfeiting of the Euro, whilst Article 
31 (e) TEU(A), the legal basis under which these measures were adopted, only made 
reference to the approximation of minimum elements of crimes and penalties in relation 
to organised crime, terrorism and drug trafficking. Clearly, the article was being read in 
a broad way and the list of criminal domains mentioned was taken as non-exhaustive. 
The lack of controversy in relation to the adoption of measures under the third pillar was 
a clear sign of the EU’s political will to strengthen the protection of EC policies and 
                                                                  
450 See page 2 of the Report based on Article 9 of the Council Framework Decision on combating 
corruption in the private sector, COM (2007)328 final, Brussels, 18.6.2007. 
451 Article 1 (a) and (b) of the Framework Decision, supra note 417. The Framework Decision 
also establishes that inchoate offences shall be punishable (Article 3) and that legal persons can 
be held liable (Article 5). The offences shall be punishable by a penalty of a maximum of at least 
one to three years of imprisonment (Article 4). This Framework Decision is one of the rare cases 
to add other penalties, beyond imprisonment, to be applicable to natural persons. There is also the 
possibility of prohibiting a person convicted, at least in the cases whre he or she occupied a 
leading position in the company, from carrying with that particular or a comparable business 
activity (Article 4(3)), ibid.. 
452 Intent (7) and (8) of the Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA of 29 May 2000 on 
increasing protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting the euro, OJ 
L 140/1 [2000], as amended by Council Framework Decision 2001/888/JHA of 6 December 
2001, OJ L329/3 [2001]. 
453 Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA, see supra note 419.  
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interests (in this case the single currency, immigration policies and the sound 
functioning of the single market) via criminal law.  
 
This choice of the third pillar as the legal base for the adoption of these measures 
appeared to be, at times, a functional choice. Indeed, it was not so much that the third 
pillar was perceived by all actors as the ideal legal basis for the adoption of these 
measures but rather—as Mitsilegas notes, in relation to the Framework Decision on the 
facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence—the third pillar allowed for a 
compromise to be reached in light of Member States’ reluctance to confer competence in 
criminal matters to the Community. Accordingly, the solution was the adoption of 
‘parallel’ and interlinked measures: a first pillar measure describing the conduct and a 
third pillar measure determining that such conduct should be deemed a criminal offence 
and therefore stipulating criminal sanctions.454 With these measures aiming at the 
furtherance of EC policies or interests via the criminal law of the third pillar, the 
division between the pillars became ever more intertwined from a thematic point of 
view. 
 
Moreover, the idea that criminal law had an important role to play in the attainment of 
EC goals was also boosted under the first pillar. To be sure, as seen thus far, criminal 
law and criminal law related matters had been clearly placed in the realm of the TEU(A) 
(third pillar) and remained outside the scope of the ECT(A) (first pillar). Nonetheless, 
this formal separation between the two Treaties was not as clear-cut in practice. First of 
all, as just seen, third pillar measures were being adopted specifically with the aim of 
protecting policies and goals placed under the first pillar. Second, the existence and 
extent of an EC competence in the domain of criminal law was an on-going debate. One 
of the important expressions of this possibility had thus far been the case law of the 
CJEU defining that, in principle, matters of criminal law and criminal procedure did not 
fall within Community competence; nonetheless, Members were under obligation to 
ensure the enforcement and effectiveness of EC law through the principle of assimilation 
and by imposing effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for breaches of EC 
law. It was seen earlier in the thesis that this case law and some secondary legislation 
had led, de facto, to the use and transformation of some national criminal law.455 
 
Thus, as Mitsilegas summarises, the debate remained divided between, on the one hand, 
those who thought of criminal law as a special field of law, close to the core of State 
sovereignty and touching upon sensitive areas such as the relationship between the 
                                                                  
454 V. Mitsilegas, “Constitutional Principles of the EC and European Criminal Law” (2007) Vol 
VIII European Journal of Law Reform 303.  
455 See sections 1.1. and 2.2. chapter 1 and section 3.2. chapter 2. 
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individual and the State and which, in consequence, should remain within the sphere of 
the State; and, on the other hand, those who thought about criminal law as any other 
field of law and therefore saw no particular reason why the EC should not be able to call 
upon criminal law to attain its own goals and to safeguard the integrity of its own legal 
order.456     
 
Indeed, a role for criminal law in the protection of EC interests and policies was 
becoming more established even in the context of the first pillar. The CJEU was, once 
again, a fundamental actor in this regard, reaffirming its long established case law on the 
relationship between Community and national criminal law. The assimilation principle, 
for example, was further elaborated in Nunes and de Matos, in which the Court held 
that, 
 
“Article 5 of the Treaty requires the Member States to take all effective measures to 
penalise conduct harmful to the financial interests of the Community. Such measures 
may include criminal penalties even where the Community legislation only provides for 
civil ones. The penalty provided for must be analogous to those applicable to 
infringements of national law of similar nature and importance, and must be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive.”457   
 
Moreover, the Court further elaborated on the limits of the influence of Community law 
on national criminal law, restating that a Directive cannot, of itself and independently of 
a national implementing act, determine or aggravate the criminal liability of persons 
who act in contravention of a directive.458 The Court also incorporated general principles 
of national criminal law into its own interpretation, such as the principle of retroactive 
application of a more lenient penalty. This was clear in Berlusconi, in which the Court 
asserted that the principle, being part of the constitutional traditions common to Member 
States, also forms part of the general principles of Community law which must be 
followed by courts when applying legislation implementing Community law.459   
 
                                                                  
456 V. Mitsilegas, “Constitutional Principles of the EC and European Criminal Law”, supra note 
454, 302-303; see also S. White, “Harmonization of Criminal Law under the First Pillar”  (2006) 
31 European Law Review 81;  and M. Wasmeier and N. Thwaites, “The Battle of the Pillars: 
Does the EC have the power to approximate national criminal laws?” (2004) 29 European Law 
Review 613. 
457 Case C-186/98 Criminal proceedings against Maria Amélia Nunes and Evangelina de Matos 
ECR I-4890  [1999] para 14. 
458 Case C-457/02 Criminal proceedings against Antonio Nisselli ECR I-10853 [2004] para 29. 
This limitation had already been elaborated upon in the earlier stages of the development of ECL, 
see Cases C-80/86 Criminal proceedings against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen ECR 3969 [1987] para 
13; and C-168/95 Criminal proceedings against Luciano Arcaro ECR I-4705 [1996] para 37. 
459 Joint Cases C-387/02, C-391/02, C-403/02 Criminal proceeeings against Silvio Berlusconni 
and others ECR I-3565 [2005] para 68-69. 
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More notably, the most significant development towards the protection of EC interests 
and policies via the criminal law was made by the CJEU when adjudicating on a dispute 
regarding the competence of the EC (not the EU) to directly adopt measures of a 
criminal nature. Indeed, despite the silence of the ECT(A) in relation to Community 
competence on criminal matters as well as the existence of the third pillar, the 
furtherance of EC goals via criminal law, in the context of the first pillar, was becoming 
a pressing point in the Commission’s agenda. As Borgers and Kooijmans point out, the 
importance of the legal basis for adopting criminal measures had everything to do with 
the characteristics of Community law and EU law relating to police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. Under the first pillar, measures would be adopted within 
the Community’s competences and by means of a directive and not of a framework 
decision. This would imply that  
 
“(…) the legislative procedure designated in the EC Treaty has to be followed – usually 
the co-decision procedure in which decisions can be taken ‘only’ by qualified majority – 
and the Court of Justice can rule in an infringement action on the way in which the 
relevant directive is to be implemented, as well as give interpretation of the rules of that 
directive in a preliminary ruling procedure.”460 
 
As the authors go on to argue, and as seen earlier in this chapter, under the third pillar 
framework decisions were adopted by unanimity and the role of the CJEU was limited. 
This suggested that, in principle, legal acts to protect EC interests and policies could be 
more easily adopted under the first pillar than under the third and that they would further 
benefit from the role of the Court syndicating the enforcement of these measures in 
national legal orders. 
 
In this context, the Commission made several attempts during the Amsterdam era to deal 
with issues of criminal law within the first pillar itself. This was the case, for example, 
of a proposal for a Directive on fraud against the Community Financial Interests461 as 
well as a proposal for a Directive on the protection of the environment via criminal law, 
both made in 2001.462 The Council opposed the Commission’s view that criminal 
measures could be adopted under the first pillar and rejected the Commission’s 
proposals. Furthermore, the Council went ahead and followed through on an initiative by 
                                                                  
460 M. J. Borgers and T. Kooijmans, “The Scope of the Communities Competence in the Field of 
Criminal Law” (2008) 16 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 380. 
461 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the criminal law protection of the Communities’ financial interests’, 
COM(2001)272final, Brussels, 23 May 2001. 
462 Ibid..  
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Denmark to adopt a Framework Decision on the protection of the environment.463 This 
reflected the Council’s view that a framework decision, in the context of the third pillar, 
was the correct instrument to impose on Member States any obligation to provide for 
criminal sanctions. The Commission strongly disagreed with this view and lodged an 
action before the CJEU seeking the annulment of the Framework Decision.464 The 
Commission essentially argued that the Framework Decision had been adopted under 
the wrong legal basis and that, although in principle the Community did not have a 
general competence in criminal matters, it did have competence under Article 175 
ECT(A) to prescribe criminal penalties for infringements of Community environmental 
protection legislation, if such means were necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the 
legislation at stake. The Commission further noted that the harmonisation of national 
criminal laws is designed to be an aid to the EC’s environmental policy.465 Although 
recognising that there was no precedent in this area, the Commission submitted that it 
relied on the case law regarding the duty of loyal cooperation as well as on the principles 
of effectiveness and equivalence to support its opinion.466 The Council opposed this 
view and argued that as the law stood, the Community had no power to require Member 
States to impose criminal penalties regarding the conduct covered by the Framework 
Decision.467 It noted that there was no express conferral of power in that regard and, 
given the significance of criminal law for the sovereignty of Member States, there were 
no grounds for accepting that this power could have been implicitly transferred to the 
Community at the time when specific substantive competences were conferred (such as 
those exercised under Article 175 ECT(A)).468 The Council also noted that both Articles 
135 and 280(4) of the ECT(A) confirm this interpretation by reserving to the Member 
States the application of national criminal law and the administration of justice.469 
Furthermore, according to the Council, the conferral of a competence in criminal matters 
to the European Union contradicted the Commission’s argument that the authors of the 
ECT(A) intended to confer such competence implicitly to the Community.470 Finally, the 
Council noted that the CJEU, having decided in several cases pertaining to the criminal 
law of Member States, had never required them to adopt criminal penalties.471 
 
                                                                  
463 Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003 on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law, OJ L 29/55 [2003]. 
464 Case C-176/03 Commission v. Council ECR I- 07879 [2005], para 18. 
465 Ibid., para 19. 
466 Ibid., para 20. 
467 Ibid., para 26. 
468 Ibid., para 27. 
469 Ibid., para 28. 
470 Ibid., para 29. 
471 Ibid., para 31. 
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The Court decided with the Commission in this dispute and annulled the Framework 
Decision.472 It based its reasoning on Article 47 TEU(A) which provided that nothing in 
the TEU(A) should affect the ECT(A).473 It noted that the protection of the environment 
constitutes one of the essential objectives of the Community. This was derived from 
Article 2 of the ECT(A), which stated that the Community was tasked to promote a high 
level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment; and from Article 
3 of the ECT(A) which provided for the establishment of a policy in the sphere of the 
environment.474 The Court further observed that in proposing a Framework Decision on 
the subject, the Council was concerned with the rise in environmental crime and its 
impact, which was increasingly extending beyond the border of State in which the 
offences are committed. Thus, it concluded that a ‘though response’ and a ‘concerted 
action to protect the environment under criminal law’ were necessary.475     
 
This led the Court to revisit its ‘formula’, according to which, as a general rule, criminal 
law and the rules of criminal procedure do not fall within the Community’s 
competence.476 Nonetheless, the Court further elaborated that 
 
“ (…) the last-mentioned finding does not prevent the Community legislature, when the 
application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the 
competent national authorities is an essential measure for combating serious 
environmental offences, from taking measures which relate to the criminal law of the 
Member States which it considers necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it 
lays down on environmental protection are fully effective.”477 
 
Accordingly, the Court found that the Articles of the Framework Decision, which 
determined that a certain conduct particularly detrimental to the environment ought to be 
criminal, could have been properly adopted under Article 175 EC (which defines the 
basis of the Community environmental policy).478 
 
With this decision, the Court departed considerably from its previous case law and 
deeply reshaped previous understandings about the role of criminal law within the entire 
EC/EU context. It suggested that, although, in general, criminal law and criminal 
procedure continue to fall outside the realm of the EC’s competence, exceptions could 
                                                                  
472 For details on the facts see, for instance, S. White, “Harmonization of Criminal Law under the 
First Pillar” supra note 454, 81-83. 
473 Case C-176/03, supra note 464,  para 38. 
474 Ibid., para 41. 
475 Ibid., para 46. 
476 Ibid., para 47. 
477 Ibid., para 48. 
478 Ibid., para 49-51. 
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exist (which were beyond the use of effective, dissuasive and proportional penalties by 
Member States or their duty to treat EC interests with the same diligence as they treat 
national ones, as the Court had established in previous case law). In fact, the Court held 
that, in the context of serious environmental crime, the Community itself could now take 
measures relating to the criminal law of Member States and, in particular, it could 
require the application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties.  
 
The decision can be read in both a broad and a narrow sense. In a broad sense, for the 
first time, the Court de facto expanded the Community’s competence to now adopt 
measures directly relating to the criminal law of Member States. In a narrow sense, 
however, the Court was careful in its reasoning and delimited EC competence to the 
domain of environmental policy only - an essential objective of the Community - and to 
situations when the application of criminal penalties is an ‘essential’ measure for 
combating serious criminal offences. In these cases, the EC can take measures that relate 
to the criminal law of the Member Sates, when it considers them necessary to ensure the 
effectiveness of the Community rules on environmental policy.   
 
The Court’s ruling was significant not only from a ‘competence’ and ‘legal basis’ point 
of view; it also raised questions in relation to the justification for this criminalisation. As 
seen, the attribution of competence for the Community to adopt criminal law-related acts 
is directly associated with the effectiveness of EC objectives. As Herlin-Karnell notes, 
the Court assumes that criminal law per se is effective.479 This assumption is however 
open to challenge. Faure, for example, argues that the idea that criminal law is the most 
effective weapon to combat environmental crime is naïve and that administrative 
sanctions are often more effective.480 Earlier on, Lange had also voiced a similar opinion 
in light of the German experience regarding the enforcement of EC environmental 
policies.481 The recourse to criminal law by the EC, without a detailed assessment and 
justification of this choice,482 deviates from traditional views of criminal law as ultima 
ratio and, as Mitsilegas notes, clearly portrays criminal law as a ‘means to an end’,483 i.e. 
in this case as a means to guarantee the effectiveness of EC environmental law.  
 
                                                                  
479 E. Herlin-Karnell, “Commission v. Council: Some Reflections on Criminal Law in the First 
Pillar” (2007) 13 European Public Law 74. 
480 M. Faure, “European Environmental Criminal Law: Do we really need it?” (2004) Jan. 
European Environmental Law Review 18-29. 
481 Lange explores the limitations of criminalisation in the success of the control of 
environmental crime at the national level. See, B. Lange, “Environmental Criminal Law in a 
European Context: Europeanization or Localization of Law? A German Case Study”, in C. 
Harding and B. Swart (eds) Enforcing European Community Rules, Criminal Proceedings, 
Administrative Procedures and Harmonization (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996) 173-199. 
482 See Case C-176/03, supra note 464, in particular para 48. 
483 V. Mitsilegas, “Constitutional Principles of the EC and European Criminal Law”, supra note 
454, 307. 
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Regardless of the Court having placed the measures at stake in the narrow context of 
environmental crime, the European Commission, perhaps not surprisingly, issued a 
communication on its own interpretation of the Court’s decision, noting that, in its 
opinion, the reasoning of the Court could be extended to other policy areas.484 In 
particular, the Commission noted that, 
 
“The provisions of criminal law required for the effective implementation of Community 
law are a matter for the TEC. This system brings to an end the double-text mechanism 
(directive or regulation and framework decision) which has been used on several 
occasions in the past. In other words, either a criminal law provision specific to the 
matter in hand is needed to ensure the effectiveness of Community law, and it is adopted 
under the first pillar only, or there does not appear to be a need to resort to the criminal 
law at Union level – or there are already adequate horizontal provisions – and specific 
legislation is not included at European level.”485 
 
Following this Communication, the Commission sought the annulment of yet another 
Council Framework Decision: the Council Framework Decision to strengthen the 
criminal law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution.486 
The Court annulled this Framework Decision as well and took the opportunity to clarify 
the scope of EC competence in criminal matters.487 To develop its reasoning, the Court 
relied once again on Article 47TEU(A), which layd down that none of the provisions of 
the ECT(A) were to be affected by provisions of the TEU(A). It reiterated the formula 
that, in principle, criminal law and rules of criminal procedure do not fall within the 
EC’s competence, but found that the case was again exceptional: 
 
“(…) the fact remains that when the application of effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent national authorities is an essential 
measure for combating serious environmental offences, the Community legislature may 
require the Member States to introduce such penalties in order to ensure that the rules 
which it lays down in that field are fully effective”.488 
 
The Court went on to note that the provisions laid down in the Framework Decision 
related to conduct likely to cause particular environmental damage as a result of the 
                                                                  
484 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implications of the Court’s judgement of 13 September 2005 (Case C-176/03 Commission v 
Council), COM(2005)0583final. 
485 Point 11, ibid..  
486 Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 to strengten the criminal-law 
framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution, OJ L 255/164 [2005]. 
487 Case C-440/05 Commission v Council  ECR I-9097 [2007]. 
488 Para 66, ibid.. 
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infringement of Community rules on maritime safety. It then ascertained that the 
necessity of criminal penalties to ensure compliance with such rules had been recognised 
by the preambles of both Directive 2005/667 and Framework Decision 2005/667. 
Accordingly, as Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Framework Decision were designed to ensure 
the efficacy of the rules adopted in the field of maritime safety, they were regarded as 
being aimed at improving maritime safety as well as environmental protection and thus 
could be adopted under the ECT(A) (Article 80(2)). The Court then turned to note that, 
in contrast, the determination of the level and type of penalty to be applied did not fall 
within the Community’s sphere of competence (hence, the provisions of the Framework 
Decision which related to the type and level of penalties were not in infringement of 
Article 47TEU(A)). However, the Court considered that these provisions were 
inextricably linked with those relating to conduct; hence, the Framework Decision ought 
to be annulled in its entirety.489      
 
The Court thus extended the Community’s competence in criminal matters to the field of 
ship-source pollution and further emphasised the need for the effectiveness of EC law as 
a central justification for criminalisation. However, the Court also set limits to this 
competence, namely by clarifying that the imposition of precise sanctions (the choice of 
type and level of penalties) still fell within the realm of the third pillar and repeatedly 
reaffirmed that the objectives at stake were ‘essential Community’ objectives. 
 
Nonetheless, according to Symeonidou-Kastanidou, the Court left three important 
questions unanswered: when is the enforcement of criminal sanctions a ‘necessary’ 
measure; when can the threat of criminal penalties be justified as ‘effective’ (in 
particular, when criminal law still hosts an intense debate as to whether penal sanctions 
actually bear dissuasive powers); and, finally, which are the so-called ‘severe’ or ‘grave’ 
offences against the environment and how can they be distinguished from less severe 
ones.490  
 
Certainly, this judicial “opening of the door” for the protection of EC interests and 
policies via criminal law represented a very ambitious leap in the relationship between 
the EC and criminal law and further expanded the boundaries of the former’s influence 
on the latter. It certainly left many questions unanswered. However, it established 
beyond any doubt the Community’s competence to adopt measures of a criminal nature 
                                                                  
489 Para 74-74, ibid.. 
490 E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou, “Ship-Source Marine Pollution: the ECJ Judgements and their 
Impact on Criminal Law” (2009) 17  European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
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in particular fields, thus solidifying the rationale around the adoption of criminal matters 
for the protection of EC interests and expanding the previous remit of this narrative. 491  
 
2.1.3. Fundamental rights and the victim on the rise 
 
As EU competences broadened into further areas of criminalisation, new narratives 
began to emerge in the third pillar, including the protection of fundamental rights via 
criminal procedure.492 To be sure, the CJEU had developed a significant body of 
fundamental rights law based on national constitutional traditions and on the ECHR. In a 
number of cases along the years, the Court recognised, for example, the right to effective 
judicial remedy,493 the right to be heard in one’s own defence before any measures are 
imposed,494 the right to presumption of innocence,495 the right to a fair trial,496 the right 
to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation in a criminal trial,497 the right to 
protection from self-incrimination,498 as well as non-retroactivity of penal liability.499 
However, as Craig and de Búrca note, despite the Court’s increasing engagement with 
human rights, the number of cases in which the Court actually annulled the challenged 
legislation is low, a dramatic exception being cases in the anti-terrorism field.500  
 
In the specific context of the third pillar, the protection of fundamental rights was 
acknowledged in Article 6 TEU: 
 
                                                                  
491 As will be shown below, the debate on the existence and scope of EC competence in criminal 
matters was finally put to rest with the entry into force of the Lisbon reforms, which not only 
created the conditions for the merging of the pillars into a single and common structure but also 
specifically mentioned the possibility of using criminal law to protect and pursue EC policies and 
interests, thus codifying the idea already developed by the EC over the years and spelled out by 
the CJEU.  
492 In the context of the first pillar the CJEU had already decided on some cases where it set 
conditions on national procedural law in order to guarantee the effectiveness of EC policies and 
objectives. This was the case in, for example, Ian Willian Cowen, the Court stated that the award 
of State compensation for harm caused in that State to the victim of an assault could not be 
condition on the victim’s holding of a residence permit or nationality, Case 186/87 ECR 195 
[1989] para 19-20.  
493 Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary ECR 1651 [1986].  
494 Case 12/74 Transocean Marine Paint v Commission ECR 1063 [1974]. 
495 Case C-45/08 Specter Photo Group NV v CBFA ECR I-12073  [2009] and Case C-344/08 
Rubach ECR I-7033 [2009].   
496 Case C-305/05 Ordre des barreaux francofones et al v Council ECR I-5305 [2009]. 
497 Case C-14/07 Weiss v Industrie – und Handelskammer Berlin ECR I-3367 [2007]. 
498 Joint Cases 374/87 and 27/88 Orkem εt Solvay v Commission ECR 3283 [1989]. 
499 Case 63/83 R v Kent Kirk ECR 2629 [1984]. 
500 P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 372. The reference case in the anti-
terrorism field in which the Court annulled EU law is Kadi I, Cases C-402 and 415/05 P Kadi & 
Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission ECR I-6351 [2008].  
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“1. The Union is founded on principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the 
Member States. 
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in 
Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result for the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.” 
 
The commitment to human rights was also to be found symbolically in several 
preambles. The Framework Decision on the trafficking of human beings, for instance, 
states how the protection of such values is at the centre of the rationale for 
criminalisation:  
 
“Trafficking in human beings comprises serious violations of fundamental human 
rights and human dignity and involves ruthless practices such as the abuse and 
deception of vulnerable persons, as well as the use of violence, threats, debt, bondage 
and coercion.”501  
 
Similarly, the preamble of the Framework Decision on sexual exploitation of children 
states,  
 
“Sexual exploitation of children and child pornography constitute serious violations of 
human rights and of the fundamental right of a child to harmonious upbringing and 
development.”502  
 
Whereas the preamble of the Framework Decision on combating terrorism declares:  
 
“The European Union is founded on the Universal values of human dignity, 
liberty, equality and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. It is based on the principle of democracy and the principle of rule of 
law, principles which are common to the Member States.”503   
 
The reference to fundamental rights in the preamble of these framework decisions sent a 
symbolic message of the importance of the protection of fundamental rights in the 
framework of ECL.  
 
                                                                  
501 Recital (3) of the Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, supra note 409. 
502 Recital (4) of the Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, supra 414. 
503 Recital (1) Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, supra note 413.  
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However, competence to enact legislation in this realm – and mostly so in procedural 
criminal law – was highly contentious. Title VI TEU(A) did not make any particular 
reference to human rights, fundamental freedoms or criminal procedural rights and there 
was no legally binding measure on procedural rights of the defendant at EU level at that 
stage.504 The emphasis on pro-criminalisation and pro-prosecution measures brought 
further to light the lack of action on defence rights. 
 
In fact, during the Amsterdam years, only one measure rekating to criminal procedure 
was agreed to, namely the Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal 
proceedings.505 The latter was adopted in 2001 and listed a number of procedural rights 
that victims, namely,  
 
“the right to be treated with respect for their dignity, the right to provide and receive 
information, the right to understand and to be understood, the right to be protected at 
the various stages of procedure and the right to have allowance made for the 
disadvantage of living in a different Member State from the one in which the crime was 
committed.”506  
 
The importance of the Framework Decision was reinforced by the CJEU in the case 
Pupino.507 Maria Pupino was a nursery school teacher in Italy, where criminal 
proceedings were initiated against her for maltreatment of children. During the criminal 
proceedings the prosecutor requested the children not be heard in court given their 
young age and vulnerability. The Italian Code of criminal procedure only contemplated 
such possibility in cases of charges for sexual offences. The Framework Decision on 
the standing of victims requires “vulnerable victims” to be protected “from the effects 
of giving evidence in open court”, in which case the court itself may decide to enable 
them to testify in a less pressurised setting.508 The CJEU was asked whether the 
Framework Decision entailed indirect effect, and thus whether the national court was 
under an obligation to interpret national law in the light of the Framework Decision. 
The CJEU confirmed that the ‘interpretative obligation’ of national courts was also 
extended to the third pillar and hence the Italian Court was under the obligation to 
                                                                  
504 As it will be seen later in this chapter and in chapter 6 the Lisbon reforms significanlty altered 
the text of the TEU(A). Furthermore, measures regarding the right of victims and defendants in 
criminal procedure were further adopted under the Lisbon framework.  
505 Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, supra note 412. In the context of the first pillar the CJEU 
had already decided on some cases where it set conditions on national procedural law in order to 
guarantee the effectiveness of EC policies and objectives. This was the case in, for example, Ian 
Willian Cowen, the Court stated that the award of State compensation for harm caused in that 
State to the victim of an assault could not be condition on the victim’s holding of a residence 
permit or nationality, Case 186/87, supra note 492, para 19-20. 
506 Recital (8), ibid.. 
507 Case C-105/03, Pupino, supra note 390. 
508 Article 8 (4) of the Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, supra note 412. 
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interpret the national norms of criminal procedure in light of the EU Framework 
Decision. Consequently, those young children, victims of maltreatment, were to be 
authorised to give their testimony in accordance with arrangements that guaranteed 
them an appropriate level of protection. This decision was controversial - not least 
because it increased the scope of national law.509 
 
To be sure, the role of the victim is also acknowledged in the text of many framework 
decisions. The Framework Decision on terrorism, for instance, provides that 
investigations and prosecutions shall not be dependent upon a complaint by a victim 
and that Member States must provide support to victims’ families.510 The Framework 
Decision on trafficking in human beings and the Framework Decision on sexual 
exploitation of children contain similar provisions with the additional condition that 
children should be considered as ‘particularly vulnerable’ (interpretation also 
confirmed by the CJEU in the Pupino case).511 The Framework Decision on organised 
crime also mentions that investigation and prosecution shall not be dependent on the 
complaint of the victim.512 
 
The idea of protection of the victim at EU level appeared to have at this stage at least 
two particular features. The first relates to the type of victim in question. EU law 
focuses more on the protection of particularly vulnerable victims than on any other 
victim (along the lines of the Pupino case and other framework decisions). Second, the 
protection of the victim often suits prosecutorial goals as it focuses largely on the 
procedural conditions for the victim to provide evidence and be a part of the 
investigation and judicial process and for the latter not to be dependant on the victims’ 
will to initiate or pursue criminal proceedings. The fine line between the protection of 
the victim and its prosecutorial benefits is clearly seen in relation to third country 
nationals, victims of trafficking in human beings. The Council Directive on the 
residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in 
human beings who cooperate with the competent authorities, for example, defines the 
conditions for national authorities to grant short term residence permits (generally 6 
                                                                  
509 The principle of indirect effect had only been recognised thus far in relation to first pillar 
instruments and this obligation appeared as conflictual to some degree given the ‘weak’ legal 
nature that that framework decision had been imbued with. Para 43 and 61 of the judgement, 
Case C-105/03, Pupino, supra note 390. Recently the Court further clarified that the same 
Framework Decision aimed at ensuring the victims’ rights of participation in the criminal 
procedure; whilst this did not preclude a Member State to impose mandatory penalties of a 
minimal duration even against the victim’s wishes, Joined cases C-483/09 and C-1/10, Gueye and 
Salmeron Sanchez, 15 September 2011, decision not yet published. 
510 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, Article 10, supra note 413. 
511 Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, Article 7, supra note 414. 
512 Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA, Article 8, supra note 416. 
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months) to third-country national victims of trafficking or to facilitate illegal 
immigration for those who cooperate in the fight against trafficking in human beings.513 
Such victims can be entitled to a short-term residence permit as long as they are 
cooperating with police investigations or judicial proceedings, manifest a clear 
intention to cooperate and have severed all relations with those suspected of crimes.514 
If these conditions are not fulfilled – hence when the victim no longer is able or willing 
to cooperate with the authorities or in case it re-enacts or does not break ties with hers 
or his traffickers – he or she shall be expelled from the European Union.515 Although 
these measures speak directly to the intertwining of criminal law and EU/ EC policies, 
and the indirect implications that measures such as the framework decision on 
trafficking in human beings have on immigration policies, it is a clear example of the 
use of the victim for prosecutorial benefits to their possible detriment and with 
disregard of their other fundamental rights.516  
 
Whilst the protection of victims’ rights was settled comfortably in EU legal narratives, 
the rights of suspects were not yet, at the time, directly acknowledged by a third pillar 
instrument.517 Vogel, for instance, noted how in the system of EU criminal law  
 
“the interest of the prosecuted person and their defence was clearly neglected. Indeed, 
the defence is simply missing from the integrated European criminal justice system as it 
stands now.”518   
 
Kaiafa-Gbandi remarked that  
 
“…characteristic are not only the divergence from basic criminal law principles but 
also the lack of fundamental rights institutional protection within the EU framework, 
                                                                  
513 Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third 
country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of 
an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities, OJ 
L261/19 [2004]. 
514 Article 8 (1), ibid.. 
515 Articles 13 and 14, ibid.. 
516 For more details see H. Askola, Legal Responses to Trafficking in Women for Sexual 
Exploitation in the European Union, supra note 381, 92-95. 
517 To be sure, the rights of the defendant remained ackowledged and protected at national level 
accoridng to Member State’s own rules on criminal procedure. Furthermore,  For an overview of 
defence rights in a broader European context (EU, Council of Europe – ECHR and 9 different 
national jurisdictions) see E. Cape et al., Effective Criminal Defence in Europe 
(Antwerp/Oxford/Portland: Intersentia, 2010) or for a practical perspective, see E. Cape et al., 
Suspects in Europe, Procedural Rights at the Investigative Stage of the Criminal Process in the 
European Union (Antwerp/ Oxford/ Portland: Intersentia, 2007). 
518 J. Vogel, “The European Integrated Criminal Justice System and its Constitutional 
Framework” (2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 125, 136. 
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although the EU has already organs whose action may infringe people’s rights (i.e. 
Europol)”  
 
whilst showing concern with the  
 
“…additional plus of deficits of the liberal element that in parallel [to prosecution and 
punishment]519 accompanies criminal law as a measures of people’s freedom”.520  
 
To be sure, the European Commission had put forward a Green Paper on Procedural 
Safeguards for suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings521 and subsequently a 
Proposal for a Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal 
proceedings throughout the European Union.522 However, agreement in relation to the 
latter failed despite only five basic rights being covered:  
 
“access to legal advice, both before the trial and at the trial; access to free 
interpretation and translation; ensuring that persons who are not capable of 
understanding or following the proceedings receive appropriate attention; the rights to 
communicate, inter alias, with consular authorities in the case of foreign suspects; and 
notifying suspected persons of their rights (by giving them a written “Letter of 
Rights”).”523  
 
Disagreements were many:524 some Member States asked for derogations and 
limitations of some provisions, for example, in cases where there is suspicion of 
involvement of the suspect in terrorist activities (the main provisions affected would be 
the right to legal advice and of communication; the Commission was opposed to these 
                                                                  
519 Our parenthesis.  
520 M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, “The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and challenges for 
criminal law at the commencement of the 21st Century” (2005) 13 European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 483, 484-485. Some authors further develop such matters, 
namely by proposing possible solutions and paths forward. See, for instance A. Klip, “The 
Constitution for Europe and Criminal Law: a step not far Enough” (2005) 12 Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law 115-123; B. Schünemann, “Alternative project for a 
European criminal law and procedure” (2007) 18 Criminal Law Forum 227. 
521 Green Paper on Procedural Safeguards for suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings, 
COM (2003) 75 final, 19.2.2003. 
522 Proposal for a Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings 
throughout the European Union, COM (2004) 328, 28 April 2004. 
523 Para 24, page 7, ibid.. 
524 Peers mentions the UK as the main opponent of the measure, having led several Member 
States in opposing the measure, de facto blocking any possibility of its approval under the 
Amsterdam framework, S. Peers, EU Lisbon Treaty Analysis no 4: UK and Irish opt-outs from 
EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) law, Version 3, 26 June 2009, Statewatch, 9. 
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derogations);525 others proposed further rights to be added, such as a right to silence as 
well as to the inclusion of ‘suspected persons’ and not only defendants. They found the 
existent rights to be “too vague and set at too low a threshold”,526 whilst in general the 
question of whether the EU had competence to legislate in procedural matters was in 
itself highly controversial.527  
 
The difficulties in the adoption of this latter instrument epitomise the greater emphasis 
that was being been given to the discourse of criminalisation namely in relation to 
organised crime and serious forms of criminality (and related ideas such as that of 
victimhood). The latter had been favoured to the detriment of more procedural and 
defendant-related approaches to criminal law. Indeed, even if the argument was to be 
accepted that the TEU(A) did not provide a legal basis for the EU to enact measures 
regarding procedural guarantees, such an argument could have been equally valid vis-à-
vis the adoption of some harmonisation measures which sought the criminalisation of 
behaviours of organised crime or EC interests and policies related, let alone victims’ 
rights on criminal procedure. However, as seen, the silence of the TEU(A) on these 
matters suited diverse goals differently. On the one hand, the provisions of the TEU(A) 
were interpreted broadly regarding criminalisation (and also victims’ rights), thus 
allowing for the enactment of framework decisions in domains not directly mentioned in 
Article 29 or 31 (e) TEU(A); on the other hand, however, they were interpreted narrowly 
in relation to rights of suspects and defendants as some actors argued for EU’s lack of 
competence. 528  
 
2.2. Beyond Euro-crime and narratives: the ever-expanding scope of ECL 
 
Whilst the hub of ECL continued to be Euro-criminality and these three justificatory 
themes continued to play a central role in the preambles and texts of most legal acts, 
other discrete themes were also present. The most important of these was the fight 
against terrorism which after 2001 became quite visible in the EU’s political discourse 
                                                                  
525 C. Morgan, “Proposal for a Framework Decision on certain procedural rights applying in 
proceedings in criminal matters throughout the European Union”, in M. Leaf Cross-Border 
Crime: Defence rights in a new era of international judicial co-operation (Justice, 2006) 93, 100. 
526 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 9th Report of Session 2008-09, “Procedural 
Rights in EU criminal proceedings – an update”, Authority of House of Lords, London, 11 May 
2009, 5-6. 
527 Lööf, for example, was of opinion that the EU could already legislate in areas of procedural 
safeguards to the extent in which it was strictly necessary for the operation of the principle of 
mutual recognition, R. Lööf, “Shooting from the Hip: Proposed Minimum Rights in Criminal 
Proceedings throughout the EU” (2006) 12 European Law Journal 421, 428.  
528 This scenario is now changing in the post Lisbon framework. See below in this chapter and 
chapter 6.  
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and, to some extent, in its legal one as well.529 Regardless of its salience, it did not 
permeate the legal texture of the EU as deeply and to the same extent as the other three 
narratives.530 
 
Furthermore, it will be suggested that the main rationales of development of ECL thus 
far were pertinent mostly in relation to harmonisation measures and operational bodies. 
This was no longer the case in some domains of judicial cooperation where the use of 
such themes was dropped by the legislator. Indeed, with the introduction of the principle 
of mutual recognition as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters by 
the Tampere European Council in 1999, the potential reach of ECL was expanded far 
beyond the core of Euro-crime and the narratives developed up to that time. Hence, 
mutual recognition brought about a major conceptual shift in criminal matters in the EU 
by expanding its influence beyond Euro-crimes and criminality related to organised 
crime or EU interests and policies to potentially any criminality.531   
 
The principle of mutual recognition helped in the realisation of the idea of an area of 
freedom, security and justice in which domestic judicial decisions in criminal matters 
are recognised and implemented across the whole territory of the European Union. The 
principle thus engaged the State as a penal actor and was no longer engaged with Euro-
crime alone, but rather with a more varied type of criminality.  
 
Mutual recognition was thus developed via several framework decisions, namely on the 
European arrest warrant,532 financial penalties,533 decisions on supervision measures534 
or decisions rendered in absentia,535 among others. Their core seeks to facilitate the 
                                                                  
529 For more details see, for example, B. Saul, “International Terrorism as a European Crime: The 
Policy Rationale for Criminalization” (2003) 11 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 323 and B. Gilmore, “The Twin Towers and the Third Pillar: Some Security 
Agenda Developments”, EUI Working Paper 7 /2003, Florence. 
530 Terrorism had particular relevance in the adoption of the Framework Decision on the EAW 
(see supra note 316 and chapter 5) and on the creation or expansion some EU agencies such as 
Europol (whose remit was augmented after 9/11) and Eurojust whose creation had already been 
envisaged but which was only set in motion also after 9/11. See on this matter S. Douglas-Scott, 
“The Rules of Law in the European Union”, see supra note 393, 234-238.   
531 Chapter 5. 
532 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, supra note 383. 
533 Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA, supra 420. 
534 Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the application between 
Member States of the European Union of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions on 
supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention, OJ L 294/20 [2009]. 
535 Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework 
Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing 
the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial, OJ L 81/24 
[2009]. 
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recognition of national sentences, penalties and national requests (surrender, evidence, 
etc.) in relation to different groups of crimes. First and foremost, in relation to serious 
criminality, namely almost all Euro-crimes but also other offences in relation to which 
harmonisation has not been attempted, such as rape, murder, arson, genocide, etc. 
(serious criminality left in the domain of national or international legal systems). Indeed, 
framework decisions implementing the principle of mutual recognition set a particular 
regime for 32 serious criminal offence types (39 in the case of the Framework Decision 
on the mutual recognition of financial penalties).536 In relation to those offences, 
Member States cannot make recognition of other Member States’ sentences or decisions 
in criminal matters dependent on the verification of the principle of dual criminality – 
which requires that a certain act be considered a criminal offence in both states for the 
recognition to take place. This means that for those specific offences Member States 
have to recognise the decision or penalty at stake even if it refers to a conduct which is 
not deemed as criminal by their own domestic law. Finally, the remaining criminality, 
which does not fall under the previous category, is also under the reach of the principle 
of mutual recognition, although Member States can still control for dual criminality in 
relation to these offences. This means that Member States are not required to execute 
requests for recognition and cooperation if these relates to acts not deemed as criminal 
offences by their domestic criminal law. 
 
                                                                  
536 The list provided for, for example, by the Framework Decision on the EAW, on the 
supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions, on decisions on supervision 
measures as alternatives to provisional detention and confiscation orders, among others, is the 
following: participation in a criminal organisation; terrorism; trafficking in human beings; sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography; illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances; illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives; corruption; 
fraud, including that affecting the financial interests if the European communities within the 
meaning of the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of EC interests; laundering the 
proceeds of crime, counterfeiting currency, including the Euro; computer-related crime; 
environmental crime, including illicit trafficking in endangered animal species and in endangered 
plant species and varieties; facilitation of unauthorised residence and entry; murder, grievous 
bodily injury; illicit trade in human organs and tissue; kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-
taking; racism and xenophobia; organised and armed robbery, illicit trafficking in cultural goods, 
including antiques and works of art; swindling; racketeering and extortion; counterfeiting and 
piracy of products; forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein; forgery of means 
of payment; illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters; illicit 
trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials; trafficking in stolen vehicles; rape; arson; crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court; unlawful seizure of aircrafts/ships; and 
sabotage. In turn, the Framework Decision of recognition of financial penalties lists 39 offence 
types and to the ones already mentioned it adds: conduct which infringes road traffic regulations, 
including breaches of regulations pertaining to driving hours and rest periods and regulations on 
hazardous goods; smuggling of goods; infringement of intellectual property rights; threats and 
acts of violence against persons, including violence during sport events; criminal damage; theft; 
offences established by the issuing State serving the purpose of implementing obligations arising 
from instruments adopted under the EC Treaty or under Title VI of the EU Treaty. For the 
extended list see Article 5 (1) of the Framework Decision, supra note 383. 
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Ultimately, the entire range of national judicial decisions in criminal matters can thus be 
affected by the general application of mutual recognition and – even if Member States 
can introduce exceptions537 – these decisions (and hence a broader realm of criminality) 
are still under the influence of ECL. This is so as they are still within the scope of 
mutual recognition instruments and hence national authorities can still make use of these 
ECL tools for cooperation by sending requests, for example, for the recognition of 
sentences or cooperation in investigation in relation to other types of offences beyond 
the 32 types listed. This indicates that ECL’s influence potentially stretches to the entire 
range of decisions that the framework decisions make reference to (i.e. financial 
penalties, supervision measures, decisions in absentia and the decisions referred to by 
the Framework Decision on the EAW). These are no longer decisions regarding Euro-
crime or even any of the offences included in the list of 32 or 39 serious crime types in 
relation to which double criminality cannot be exerted. In fact, these potentially cover 
the whole range of judicial decisions in criminal matters that national courts can 
deliver.538  
 
Hence, the application of the principle of mutual recognition through these framework 
decisions created, beyond Euro-crime, a second dynamic of ECL. This dynamic can be 
nuanced in two further spheres of focus of ECL and of its influence upon national 
systems – one still related to serious criminality whilst another related to any type of 
offence included by those EU measures aimed at facilitating mutual recognition. It did 
so by expanding the previous boundaries of ECL that had been primarily confined 
mostly to Euro-crime as seen in previous chapters and earlier in this chapter. Preambles 
of these measures rarely make reference to any particular type of criminality or concrete 
goal beyond the general objective of completion of an area of freedom, security and 
justice and the occasional general statement of respect for fundamental rights.539  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
537 See chapter 5. 
538 As it will be seen in chapter 5 of the thesis this broad application of the principle raised 
complex questions of compatibility and trust between Member States.  
539 The decay of strong language against organised crime in preambles is also noted in policing as 
the new EU Council Decision on Europol incorporates what Dorn argues to be a ‘vocabulary 
shift’ from ‘organised crime’ to ‘serious crime’. Indeed, Europol’s first mandate was mostly 
fixed on the idea of organised crime as developed in this dissertation, covering most examples 
(but not all) of what we here call ‘Euro-crimes’. However, the new Decision broadens Europol’s 
scope to an even more ambiguous and flexible concept of serious criminality. See N. Dorn, “The 
end of organised crime in the European Union” (2009) 51 Crime, Law and Social Change  283. 
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2. The features of the new supranationalisation: Lisbon and after 
 
The pattern of expansion of ECL is most likely to be continued and facilitated under the 
new institutional framework set in place by the Treaty of Lisbon. Indeed, the TEU(L) 
and TFEU entered into force on 1 December 2009 and significantly changed the 
institutional framework under which ECL has operated since the 1990s.540 Some of these 
changes were considerable, such as the creation of conditions for the merger of first and 
third pillar, whereas others were limited to a formalisation and solidification of many 
developments taking place over the previous years. In general, the TFEU further 
supranationalised the field by empowering EU actors, facilitating decision-making and 
creating further possibilities of expansion of ECL’s scope. 
 
Changes were envisaged both at an institutional and material level. In relation to the 
former, the post-Lisbon Treaties brought about a clearer and more dynamic framework. 
They created the conditions for the elimination of the “pillar structure” which kept 
criminal law outside the EC framework. Hence, the former third pillar, institutional 
home to criminal law matters, was moved to the realm of the previous first pillar – the 
‘Community legal order’ merging the different frameworks into a single one (this is an 
ongoing process). This brought about a number of formal changes.  
 
Criminal law matters rest now on Chapter 4 of Title V,541 which contains five Articles 
on criminal law (Articles 82-86 TFEU) and chapter 5, which contains three Articles on 
policing (Article 87-89 TFEU). Rights of initiative now belongs to the Commission or to 
a quarter of Member States.542 This full association of the Commission and EP with 
criminal matters is further complemented by the general jurisdiction of the CJEU.543 
Furthermore, measures in police and judicial cooperation matters are no longer to be 
adopted by unanimity in the Council. Instead they will now be adopted by qualified 
majority voting and co-decision between Council and EP (ordinary legislative 
                                                                  
540 OJ C 306/1 (2007). See also Protocol on Transitional Provisions, Article 10 for the stipulation 
of a five year transition period, OJ C 306/163 (2007). 
541 Title V contains provisions on border checks, asylum and immigration, judicial cooperation in 
civil matters, judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation. 
542 Article 76 TFEU. 
543 Article 267 TFEU. However, the provisional arrangements determined that the exercise of 
new enforcement procedures by the Commission and generalised preliminary competences of the 
CJEU shall not apply during the first five years to the instruments already adopted which also 
retain their former status (unless they are amended). For more details on the jurisdiction of the 
Court after the Treaty of Lisbon see, for example, V. Hatzopoulos, “Casual but Smart: The 
Court’s new clothes in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) after the Lisbon 
Treaty”, Research Papers in Law, 2/2008 (European Legal Studies, College of Europe).  
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procedure).544 This will imply de facto that Member States will have to accept measures 
in criminal matters to which they do not necessarily agree to (although an ‘emergency 
brake’ mechanism was introduced).  
 
Indeed, the veto power did not disappear completely as the TFEU creates an ‘emergency 
brake mechanism’. The emergency brake is not a veto in the strict sense but it balances 
the use of ordinary legislative procedure (pre-QMV) in a domain of political sensitivity:  
 
“Where a member of the Council considers a draft directive referred to (…) would affect 
fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system, it may request that the draft directive 
be referred to the European Council. In that case, the ordinary legislative procedure 
shall be suspended. After discussion, and in the case of consensus, the European 
Council shall, within four months of this suspension, refer back to the Council, which 
shall terminate the suspension of the ordinary legislative procedure.”545 
 
In the TFEU the role of domestic criminal justice systems and their interaction with ECL 
is particularly acknowledged. This is seen in Article 67 TFEU, which replaced the 
former Article 29 TEU(A) and provides the general goals for the entire Title V. As 
Noted by Herlin-Karnell Article 67 “sets the scene and tells us what values the Union 
seeks to enforce: freedom, security and justice and respect for fundamental rights”.546 
Article 67 TFEU, contrary to the former Article 29 TEU, places Member States’ 
traditions and legal systems (together with fundamental rights) at the centre of its 
concerns:  
 
“1. The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for 
fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States. 
2. It shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall frame a 
common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on solidarity 
between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals. For the purpose 
of this Title, stateless persons shall be treated as third-country nationals. 
3. The Union shall endeavour to ensure a high level of security through measures to 
prevent and combat crime, racism and xenophobia, and through measures for 
coordination and cooperation between police and judicial authorities and other 
competent authorities, as well as through the mutual recognition of judgments in 
                                                                  
544 See Articles 82 (1) and 83 (1) TFEU. 
545 See both Article 82 (3) where the part in brackets in our quotation reads ‘paragraph 2’; and 
Article 83 (3) in which it refers to ‘paragraph 1 or 2’. 
546 E. Herlin-Karnell, “Waiting for Lisbon… Constitutional Reflections on the Embryonic 
General Part of EU Criminal Law” (2009) 17 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 234. 
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criminal matters and, if necessary, through the approximation of criminal laws. 
4. The Union shall facilitate access to justice, in particular through the principle of 
mutual recognition of judicial and extrajudicial decisions in civil matters.” 
 
Immigration, security and access to justice take the spotlight in Article 67 TFEU. The 
contrast with former Article 29 TEU(A), besides the already mentioned recognition of 
national systems and traditions, appears at a general level, as the wording used is slightly 
looser and details are left for later sections of Title V.547 No particular areas of crime are 
mentioned in the formula “prevent and combat crime” (Article 29 TEU(A) made 
particular reference to the crimes where intervention should occur), whereas the main 
endeavour is now the provision of a “high level of security” (and not safety as mentioned 
in the TEU(A)).  This can potentially represent a broad mandate.548  
 
Specific provisions on mutual recognition and harmonisation complement Article 67 
TFEU and should be read as lex specialis.549 These reinstate competences in all areas 
mentioned by the TEU(A) and others not mentioned but in which the EU intervened 
regardless. On judicial cooperation, Article 82 TFEU finally incorporated the principle 
of mutual recognition in the realm of the Treaties thus formalising its already central 
role in this domain: 
 
“1. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on the principle 
of mutual recognition of judgements and judicial decisions and shall include the 
approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States in the areas referred to 
in paragraph 2 and Article 83. 
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall adopt measures to: 
 
(a) lay down rules and procedures for ensuring recognition throughout the Union 
of all forms of judgements and judicial decisions; 
(b) prevent and settle conflicts of jurisdiction between Member States; 
(c) support the training of the judiciary and judicial staff; 
(d) facilitate cooperation between judicial or equivalent authorities of the Member 
States in relation to proceedings in criminal matters and the enforcement of 
decisions. 
                                                                  
547 See above in this chapter.  
548 For an argument on the possible dangers of use of Article 67 TFEU as a legal basis for 
legislating instead of Articles 82 and 83 TFEU (respectively on mutual recognition and 
harmonisation) see E. Herlin-Karnell, “Waiting for Lisbon… Constitutional Reflections on the 
Embryonic General Part of EU Criminal Law” , supra note 546, 227, 234-236. 
549 E. Herlin-Karnell, ibid., 235. 
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2. To the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial 
decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, having a cross border 
dimension, the European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives 
adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules. 
Such rules shall take into account the differences between the legal traditions and 
systems if Member States. 
They shall concern: 
(a) mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States; 
(b) the rights of individuals in criminal procedure; 
(c) the rights of victims of crime; 
(d) any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has 
identified in advance by a decision; for the adoption of such a decision, the 
Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament. 
Adoption of minimum rules referred to in this paragraph shall not prevent Member 
States from maintaining or introducing a higher level of protection for individuals.” 
 
The first paragraph introduces the principle of mutual recognition in the realm of the 
Treaties for the first time even if, in practice, the principle was already endorsed as the 
cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters in 1999 by the Tampere 
Conclusions.550  
 
The second paragraph gives the EU competence to harmonise minimum rules of 
criminal procedure regarding the mutual admissibility of evidence, rights of individuals 
and of victims of crime and eventually other specific aspects of criminal procedure, 
identified in advance by the Council and provided they fulfil the conditions of the 
Article. These conditions are tight as the TFEU requires the procedure to adopt 
“minimum rules” to be “necessary to facilitate mutual recognition and police 
cooperation”, to have a “cross border dimension”, and “to take into account” 
differences between legal systems and traditions.  
 
Besides harmonisation of varying aspects of criminal procedure (when necessary to 
facilitate mutual recognition), Article 83 (1) holds that minimal harmonisation 
(independently of mutual recognition) should take place in relation to serious offences 
                                                                  
550 The paragraph replaces the former Article 31 (1) (a) TEU(A). Although some measures which 
clearly involved judicial cooperation, such as the EAW, also draw their legal base from other 
paragraphs of Article 31, namely 31 (1) (b) TEU(A). See Tampere Conclusion, supra note 54. 
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with a cross border dimension. There are ten different offences in relation to which the 
EU had already intervened (either via the first or the third pillar): 
 
“1. The European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives adopted in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules concerning 
the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious 
crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature and impact of such 
offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis. 
These areas of crime are the following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and 
sexual exploitation of children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money 
laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and 
organised crime. 
(…) 
2. If the approximation of criminal law and regulations of the Member States proves 
essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has 
been subject to harmonisation measures, directives may establish minimum rules with 
regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area concerned. Such 
directives shall be adopted by the same ordinary or special legislative procedure as was 
followed for the adoption of the harmonisation measures in question (…).”551 
 
The TFEU now offers an exhaustive list of themes in relation to which approximation of 
laws may take place. Given the often less rigorous and non exhaustive nature of the 
wording of the Treaties, such a shift towards an exhaustive list implies that the letra 
legis of the TFEU refers to more domains than the TEU(A) did. In fact, the introduction 
of some of these topics merely formalises intervention in many measures previously 
adopted which relied on a broad interpretation of the TEU(A), or whose legal basis (or 
lack of) was disputed. The more precise wording of Article 83 (1) in relation to the 
domains to harmonise was thus welcomed by many.552 
 
3.1. An open door to more criminal law 
 
However, regardless of this added clarity, both Articles referring to harmonisation 
(Articles 82 (2) and 83TFEU) leave an open door to further integration in domains not 
listed. First and foremost, adoption of criminal measures to ensure the effective 
implementation of any EU policy is now a possibility. To be sure, the CJEU had 
                                                                  
551 Article 83 (1) (2) TFEU. 
552 See, for example, M. Fletcher, S. Peers, V. Mitsilegas, D. de la Rochele and J. Straw, among 
others, in House of Lords, The Treaty of Lisbon: an Impact Assessment, supra note 330, 139-143.  
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previously initiated ‘depilarisation’ with the case Commission v. Council,553 recognising 
the EC’s competence for the adoption of criminal law measures in relation to 
environmental policy. This decision, however, was not without controversy, and further 
stirred the discussion regarding the EC’s competence to adopt criminal law measures to 
protect its own policies and interests. Potentially, the new TFEU provision allows for the 
use of criminal law to ensure the implementation of any EU policy (in areas where 
harmonisation had taken place) as long as this proved essential to ensure the 
effectiveness of their implementation: 
 
“If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States proves 
essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has 
been subject to harmonisation measures, directives may establish minimum rules with 
regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area concerned. Such 
directives shall be adopted by the same ordinary or special legislative procedure as was 
followed for the adoption of the harmonisation measures in question, without prejudice 
to Article 76.” 
 
This provision allows for an expansion of criminal law as a regulatory tool to the large 
majority of EU policies to guarantee their effectiveness. This raises a number of difficult 
questions from a policy perspective. As Mitsilegas notes, this approach portrays the use 
of criminal law by the EU as a “means to an end”:  
 
“Criminal law is thus treated not as a separate Community policy or objective, but 
rather merely as yet another field of law (along with civil law, administrative law, etc.) 
which is there to serve the achievement of Community policies.”554 
 
Such provision clearly raises questions about the role, limits and impact of the use of 
criminal law in and by the European Union. The idea of criminal law as ultima ratio 
seems alienated from these arrangements whilst efficiency of EU policies becomes the 
prima facie goal to be pursued. As the author further argues:  
 
“This approach towards criminal law may be of concern to the extent it disregards the 
special place of criminal law in domestic legal systems and the extensive safeguards 
surrounding criminal law at the national level. (…) In this constitutional game, the 
                                                                  
553 See supra note 464. 
554 V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law, supra note 14,110-111. For an argument that the Article 
does not attribute a general power to regulate the single market via criminal sanctions, namely 
because most criminal sanctions would not be ‘essential’ for the effective implementation of 
Union policies, see J. Oberg, “Union Regulatory Criminal Law Competence after the Treaty of 
Lisbon” (2011) 19 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 289. 
 149 
question of ‘why criminal law’, or whether criminal law is actually necessary in specific 
EC instruments appears to be sidelined.”555  
 
Furthermore, the opportunities for expansion of ECL do not end in the effectiveness of 
EU policies. Indeed, the last paragraph of Article 83 (1) mentions the possibility of 
further harmonisation beyond the list of the ten Euro-crimes mentioned. The door for the 
adoption of further measures harmonising minimum elements of crimes and sanctions is 
thus left open, subject to the criteria of the seriousness of the offence and its cross-
border dimension (both loose concepts):  
 
“On the basis of developments of crime, the Council may adopt a decision identifying 
other areas of crime that meet the criteria specified (…). It shall act unanimously after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.”   
 
In addition, Article 82(2) on harmonisation of criminal procedure rules to support 
mutual recognition, also allows for the possibility of adoption of further measures than 
those referred to directly in the Treaties as long as these are adopted by unanimity and 
with the consent of the EP. Indeed, competence is clearly granted to establish “minimum 
rules”, which take “into account the differences between the legal traditions and systems 
of the Member States”, when “necessary” to facilitate mutual recognition, in criminal 
matters with a cross-border dimension, in matters of admissibility of evidence, rights of 
individuals in criminal procedure and rights of victims of crime and:  
 
“any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has identified in 
advance by a decision; for the adoption of such a decision, the Council shall act 
unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.”556  
 
The provisions of the TFEU seem to follow a pattern of providing a sense of limitation 
of competence and then immediately providing for the possibility to surpass such 
restrictions. This pattern is considered to be compensated by the emergency brake 
clause. However, a closer look at this mechanism shows how the same pattern is 
repeated. Indeed, in the case a Member State makes use of this safeguard and an 
agreement is not reached in the European Council after four months, the TFEU opens 
the possibility for a limited number of Member States to adopt the measure among 
themselves only – an enhanced cooperation mechanism: 
 
                                                                  
555 Ibid., 111. 
556 Article 82 (1) (d) TFEU. 
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“(…) in case of disagreement, and if at least nine Member States wish to establish 
enhanced cooperation on the basis of the draft directive concerned, they shall notify the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission accordingly. In such case, the 
authorisation to proceed with enhanced cooperation referred to in Article 20(2) and 
Article 329(1) of this Treaty shall be deemed to be granted and the provisions on 
enhanced cooperation shall apply.”557 
 
This can lead to fragmentation.558 Indeed, having a number of States harmonising 
minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions whilst the 
other group (or one Member State alone) does not do so, hardly creates ‘harmony’ 
between different definitions and penalties.559 Furthermore, the possibility of further 
dissonance is accentuated by country specificities such as the UK and Ireland. The two 
countries will have to decide whether they wish to opt in for every single measure to be 
adopted. Some opt outs to specific measures have in fact already been decided by the 
two countries.560 Furthermore, the UK will be able to decide by the end of the 5 year 
transitional period (the latest by 1 June 2014) if it wishes to opt out of all third pillar 
measures adopted thus far. Finally, Denmark chose a general opt-out in criminal matters 
altogether.561   
 
Not surprisingly, these wide and expansionist provisions raised concerns amongst some 
Member States, who felt the core principles of their criminal justice systems could be 
endangered by the potential implications of this new ECL framework. Both the German 
and the Czech Constitutional Courts, for example, assessed the Lisbon Treaties seeking 
to determine whether the new institutional framework could encroach upon national 
sovereignty or not. More specifically, the German Constitutional Court made important 
qualifications to further integration in European Union criminal matters, noting how it 
would not be acceptable if the core of the German constitutional identity (whose 
criminal law is based on the States’ social values and upon individual freedoms) would 
                                                                  
557 Article 82(2) and 83(3) TFEU. 
558 In general, Fletcher suggests that the degree according to which the Treaty of Lisbon “panders 
to Member States interests” by introducing brake clauses, allowing for enhanced cooperation, etc. 
increases the potential for fragmentation of the wider agenda in ECL, M. Fletcher, “EU Criminal 
Justice: Beyond Lisbon” in C. Eckes and T. Konstadinides (eds) Crime within the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 10, 42. 
559 For more on how harmonisation of national criminal law often does not lead to consonance 
see chapter 4.  
560 See chapter 6 for more details. 
561 If the UK chooses to opt out of all third pillar measures, the Council by QMV or the 
Commission without the UK’s participation will decide on the transitional arrangements and the 
UK will have to bear the financial consequences of ceasing its participation. Article 10(4) of the 
Transitional Protocol, supra note 540.   
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be affected by ECL law.562 This decision speaks to the core of the imbalances of ECL, 
which were voiced at the end of the previous section.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored the evolution of ECL since the entry into force of the TEU(A) in 
1999 until today. It showed how its evolution shifted from being minimal during the 
1990s, to having the potential to influence a large part of national criminal law in the 
post-Amsterdam era. This influence was brought about by institutional and substantive 
changes. Institutionally, there was a process of supranationalisation which developed 
EU’s institutional structures, empowered its actors, and strengthened the nature of the 
legal instruments and mechanisms available, among other elements. It was noted how 
this process was not without limitations and shortcomings but also how, regardless of 
those, the outcome was a significant one. In that regard, it was shown how the scope of 
ECL increased significantly, bypassing its initial focus on Euro-criminality (and its 
inherent rationales) to now also be concerned with many other forms of criminality 
previously considered to be in the domestic or international domains alone.  
 
The chapter has also shown how the entry into force of the TEU(L) and TFEU altered 
the Amsterdam acquis. Much remains unknown at this level. Lisbon was only recently 
adopted and it will take at least five years to be fully in force. Yet, the wording of the 
TFEU makes it very likely that the existing dynamics and framework will be reinforced. 
This is so as, on the one hand, it formalises and legitimises many of the ‘loose ends’ of 
ECL in particular those domains which were not clearly covered by the scope of the 
TEU(A) but in relation to which action was taking (such as the measures on 
environment or victims righst for example). On the other hand, the new TFEU leaves the 
door open for a continuous dynamic of growth in ECL.  
 
Yet, as ECL appears as a field of continuous expansion, its features – mainly as 
solidified by Amsterdam – were somehow biased. This is so as ECL remained clearly 
focused on criminalisation and furtherance of the States capacity to prosecute and punish 
in an increasing number of areas of criminality.563 To be sure, the emergence of a 
narrative of protection of the victim brought in an element of individual rights in 
criminal procedure. Yet it was seen how the protection afforded to the victim was often 
dependant on the prosecutorial benefits of such protection. To a great extent, this shape 
                                                                  
562 Judgment of the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on the Treaty 
of Lisbon, 30 June 2009, Zitierung: BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 421), 
para 253 and 355.  
563 A great deal of of measures were also adopted in relation to police cooperation although those 
developments were largely left outside this chapter. 
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of ECL was conditioned by the limitations of the EU institutional framework in this 
domain.564 Hence, the Amsterdam framework clearly brought to light the fact that the 
consensus in penal matters across EU countries was thin and biased towards further 
criminalisation. Generally speaking, agreement was reached in relation to certain themes 
and goals only: the provision of ‘high level’ of ‘safety’ within an area of freedom, 
security and justice; the enactment of criminalisation measures to fight new threats such 
as organised crime in relation to which policy documents were portraying a distressing 
picture, the enactment of more criminal law also for regulatory goals such as the 
completion of the single market; the facilitation of States’ ius puniendi beyond national 
boundaries; and the figure of the victim. Not surprisingly, some of these themes echo 
emergent features of criminal justice in some western legal systems. The use of criminal 
law into an increasing number of policy domains,565 a politicised tone in discourses 
around criminal justice,566 a focus on criminalisation and less so on procedural rights or 
issues of rehabilitation and ressocialisation of defendants,567 the salience of the figure of 
the victim568 among other traits.569 However, the chapter has also shown that the Lisbon 
reforms brought about important changes to this framework. The TFEU introduced new 
domains of competence in relation to criminal procedure for example and brought in a 
more balanced institutional framework with the full participation of the EP and the 
CJEU. Furthermore, it will also be seen in chapter 6 how measures in the domain of 
criminal procedure have already been proposed or adopted. Nonetheless, the 
identification and mapping of the themes, rationales, focus and institutional patterns of 
ECL, however useful, still says little about the qualities of ECL. The next two chapters 
will thus engage with those issues by analysing harmonisation of national criminal law 
and mutual recognition in criminal matters, the two central legal mecanisms of ECL.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
564 The most striking example of this was the failure of the adoption of measures on basic 
procedural rights which was halted mostly due to the demading decision making criteria. 
565 N. Lacey and L. Zedner, “Legal Constructions of Crime”, supra note 32, 184-185. See also 
chapter 2 for more details on this point. 
566 D. Garland, The Culture of Control, supra note 42, 10. 
567 Ibid., 1-26. 
568 J. Simon, Governing through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American 
Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (Oxford/ New York: OUP, 2007) 75-110; E. Baker, 
“Governing Through Crime – the case of the European Union” (2010) 7 European Journal of 
Criminology 187. 
569 See chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4 Harmonisation of national criminal law: increasing penal severity across 
the European Union 
 
Introduction 
 
Having set the main dynamics of European Union criminal law (ECL), this dissertation 
will now turn to the mechanisms or principles through which ECL is developed. Hence, 
chapter 4 will focus on the harmonisation of national criminal law. It will be suggested 
that harmonisation of Euro-crimes is potentially bringing about a harsher penality across 
the European Union by increasing levels of formal criminalisation.  
 
Harmonisation aims at approximating national criminal laws by creating common 
standards which allow for a certain degree of harmony between different systems. In 
criminal matters, it was envisaged by the TEU(A) in a narrow fashion, namely in 
relation to the minimum elements constituent of crimes and penalties in fields of drug 
trafficking, terrorism and organised crime. However, secondary legislation has been 
adopted that places a broad interpretation on the TEU(A) provisions and, in practice, 
harmonisation measures were adopted in a significantly wider range of topics than the 
ones mentioned by the TEU(A), covering most examples of Euro-crimes.570 
Furthermore, it will be suggested that the fashion according to which the legislator 
developed the ‘minimum elements of crime’ was all but minimal. In fact, it will be 
shown how definitions of crimes adopted tended to be very wide, how liability was 
extended to legal persons and how punishment envisaged was mostly focused on 
custodial sentences namely its minimum maximum. The focus on these features led to 
an increase in criminalisation at national level, either by requiring Member States to 
introduce new crimes or extend the scope of pre existent offences; by requiring them to 
extend liability to legal persons; and by establishing minimum maximum sentences for 
criminal offences harmonised. The chapter will further outline how the nature of 
minimal harmonisation placed more pressure on more lenient Member States vis-à-vis 
more severe ones as the former are more likely to have to amend their national 
provisions more significantly in order to meet the EU standard imposed by the 
framework decisions. 
 
                                                                  
570 This chapter will focus on the Treaty of Amsterdam (TEU(A)) and measures enacted 
previously to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon as most measures currently in force 
were adopted under the pre - Lisbon framework. See also chapter 3. Chapter 6 will provide an 
analysis of the post-Lisbon reforms. 
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The first section of the chapter will lay out the framework for harmonisation as 
determined by the Treaties and then give an overall picture of the measures adopted. 
Section 2 will look particularly at the example of organised crime – on the main 
rationales through which ECL has developed – to explain how the EU tends to adopt 
very wide definitions of the conduct to be criminalised. Section 2.1 will bring the 
argument forward and show how the adoption of broad definitions of crime across the 
large majority of framework decisions led to an increase in the scope of national legal 
orders, thus increasing criminalisation by expanding the number of behaviours 
punishable at national level. Section 3 will show how this increase in criminalisation 
was complemented by an expansion in liable subjects, namely by establishing liability of 
legal persons which many Member States did not provide for beforehand. In turn, 
section 3 will also flesh out how EU’s focus is primarily on minimum maximum 
sentences. Finally, section 4 will analyse the limitations to harmonisation and to the 
effects of increase in criminalisation. It will point out how, on the one hand, the 
measures in force often fall short of actually harmonising Member States’ domestic 
legislation for they are too broad and vague; and, on the other hand, how they cannot 
account for the execution of national implementing norms by domestic criminal justice 
systems, being thus unable to control the actual levels of criminalisation and punishment 
at national level.      
 
1. The legal framework for harmonisation: the narrow approach of the Treaties 
 
The harmonisation of national criminal law attemps to create common standards in order 
to allow for a certain degree of harmony between different domestic legal systems. 
Harmonisation is a mechanism ‘borrowed’ from the context of the single market where 
it became one of the central tools for integration. In European Union criminal matters, it 
was first developed during the Maastricht years, despite there being no clear mandate for 
the EU to do so at the time, and became central after the adoption of the TEU(A).571  
                                                                  
571 It has been debated whether ‘approximation of laws’ as mentioned in the Treaties in the 
context of criminal law and ‘harmonisation’ are different or similar concepts. This purity in the 
distinction of the two terms however disregards the fact that Article 100a EC introduced by the 
Single European Act (SEA) in 1987 - the first provision to introduce the concept of 
harmonisation in the context of the Treaties - referred to ‘approximation of provisions’ and not 
harmonisation; similarly so did Article 94 and 95EC and the current Aticle 114TFEU). In any 
case, some authors suggest that approximation as used in relation to criminal law is less than 
harmonisation, hence demanding less of national legal orders. In this dissertation we will use 
both terms interchangeably. For more details on the particular use of the two concepts in 
European criminal law see, for example F. Calderoni, Organized Crime Legislation in the 
European Union, Harmonization and Approximation of Criminal Law, National Legislation and 
the EU Framework Decision on the Fight Against Organized Crime (Heidelberg/ Dordrecht/ 
London/ New York: Springer, 2010) 1-6, who makes a clear distiction between the two concepts; 
or, for a different opinion on the same subject, namely that the two concepts can have the same 
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Harmonisation was felt to be necessary to avoid criminals exploiting loopholes and 
heterogeneity in different legal systems, by taking advantage of less severe laws in some 
Member States, or by making use of new technical and communication means more 
readily available today.572 All this was of course made easier in an EU without internal 
borders. However, the actual impact and manipulation of differences between legal 
systems by criminals remains largely unknown.  In fact, it has at times been voiced as a 
mere theoretical or academic hypothesis by authors or the European Commission 
itself.573  
 
Regardless, the EU sought harmonisation of most Euro-crimes. The official architecture 
of harmonisation was laid out by the TEU(A) under VI of the TEU.574 Article 29 
TEU(A) held:  
 
“Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union's objective 
shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security 
and justice by developing common action among the Member States in the fields of 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by preventing and combating 
racism and xenophobia. That objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating 
crime, organised or otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and 
offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption 
and fraud, through: approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters in the 
Member States, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31(e).” 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
scope, see A. Weyembergh, L’Harmonisation des législations: condition de l’éspace penal 
européen et révélateur de ses tensions (Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2004) 33.  
572 A.F. Bernardi, “L’opportunite de l’harmonisation”, in M. Delmas-Marty, G. Giudicelli-Delage 
and E. Lambert-Abdelgawad (eds) L’harmonisation des sanctions penales en Europe (Paris: 
Societe de Legislation Compare, 2003) 451, 461; A. Weyembergh, “The Functions of 
Approximation of Penal Legislation within the European Union” (2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 149, 164. 
573 The European Commission for instance voiced these doubts in 2005 noting that: “There is 
also the question of whether there is a risk that certain criminals might relocate to a Member 
State where their nefarious activity is not classified as an offence or attract lighter penalties. It 
would be interesting to consider whether this is a purely academic hypothesis or corresponds to 
reality in the event, for example, of financial, business or computer crime”, European 
Commission, Green Paper on the approximation, mutual recognition and enforcement of 
criminal sanctions in the European Union, COM(2004)334final, Brussels, 30.04.2004, 47. K. 
Nuotio in fact considers the idea that offenders will learn to exploit the heterogeneity of national 
legal orders a ‘problematic assumption’, based on common sense rather than on criminological 
evidence (the author argues that criminal activities rarely follow such strategic cost/benefit 
calculations), “Harmonization of Criminal Sanctions in the European Union – Criminal Law 
Science Fiction” in E. J. Husabo and A. Strandbakken (eds) Harmonization of Criminal Law in 
Europe (Antwerpen/ Oxford: Intersentia, 2005) 79, 92.  
574 Previously the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU(M)) had introduced Article K.1, a more general 
provision on Justice and Home Affairs matters, see chapter 2. 
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Subsequently, Article 31 (3) TEU referred to harmonisation only and provided:  
 
“Common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall include: 
progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating to the constituent 
elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the fields of organised crime, terrorism and 
illicit drug trafficking.” 
 
The approach to harmonisation of national criminal law taken by the TEU(A) was 
clearly a contained one. First, Article 29 TEU made it the exception rather than the rule, 
stating it should be pursued only “where necessary”, therefore conveying the idea that it 
was not always needed and it should not be pursued when that is not the case. Second, 
the TEU(A) noted that common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall 
include progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating to the 
limited the domains for harmonisation to three areas of substantive criminal law, namely 
organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking. Finally, it limited its depth to the 
minimum elements constituent of crimes and penalties, as stated in Article 31 (e) 
TEU(A).  
 
Its scope nevertheless has always been contentious. Indeed, on the one hand, Article 
31(e) TEU(A), although seemingly choosing a narrow approach to EU’s competence to 
seek harmonisation in this field, were not cristal clear on the exact extent of EU’s 
mandate to pursue such harmonisation. On the other hand, there was a clear propensity, 
also shown in the previous chapters, for EU’s secondary law and political initiatives to 
interpret the the TEU(A) (namely Article 29 and Article 31 TEU(A)) ambitiously, thus 
harmonising in a wider range of domains than those clearly mentioned. However, whilst 
it is unclear whether the Treaty’s list was exhaustive or merely indicative,575 clearly, 
there was an attempt to circumscribe narrowly the domains of harmonisation of national 
criminal law. Furthermore, unmistakably, no attempt was made to attribute a 
comprehensive and overarching competence for the European Union to harmonise 
national criminal law.576  
 
However, the minimal approach suggested by the Treaties (even if interpreted broadly) 
contrasts greatly with the amount and wide scope of secondary legislation in these 
                                                                  
575 Peers for example was of opinion that competence to harmonise was not limited to the ‘listed 
offences’, in EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, supra note 250, 387.  
576 In particular, the level of harmonisation attempted at is far from the creation of a common 
‘general part of criminal law’, see, for example, K. Ambos, “Is the Development of a Common 
Substantive Criminal Law Possible? Some Preliminary Reflections” (2005) 12 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 173. 
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matters. Indeed, the European Union adopted a wide range of framework decisions 
aiming at harmonising the minimum elements of criminal offences and penalties at 
national level, many of which were under the umbrella of the fight against organised 
crime.577 The range of areas involved went considerably beyond the domains referred to 
in Article 29 TEU, let alone Article 31 TEU. Hence, framework decisions harmonising 
elements of national criminal law were adopted in areas as diverse as illicit drug 
trafficking,578 sexual exploitation of children and child pornography,579 terrorism,580 
fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment,581 money laundering,582 
trafficking in human beings,583 corruption in the private sector,584 crime against 
information system,585 and environment,586 among others. 
 
Furthermore, the fashion according to which the EU legislator set the scope of minimum 
harmonisation in place was all but minimal. This, it will be contended, can be perceived 
in several elements, namely in the choice of wide definitions of crimes, in the widening 
of criminal liability to legal persons, in the establishment of common minimum 
maximum penalties, and generally on the impact those elements have on national legal 
orders. Ultimately, it will be seen that the attempt to establish a minimum common 
denominator resulted in the setting of a higher intensity of criminalisation namely 
through more and wider criminal law across the European Union.  
 
2. Broad definitions of criminal offences 
 
The EU, in seeking to harmonise minimum elements constituent of crimes and penalties, 
focused first and foremost on the definition of criminal offences. In this regard, ECL has 
showed a tendency to adopt broad definitions of crimes hence potentially criminalising a 
wider range of behaviours than before across the EU. This is clearly seen in the 
approach to the harmonisation of organised crime. It was seen in previous chapters how 
organised crime was often used as an umbrella concept to allow for intervention in areas 
not directly mentioned in the TEU(A) and which could be related to organised crime in a 
more direct or indirect way. The wide approach to organised crime was further 
                                                                  
577 A significant majority of these measures came to replace pre-existent joint actions on the same 
topics. For an overall view on these see chapter 2.  
578 Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA, supra note 415. 
579 Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, supra note 414. 
580 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, supra note 413. 
581 Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA, supra note 411. 
582 Council Framework Decision 2001/500/ JHA, supra note 410. 
583 Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, supra note 409. 
584 Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA, supra note 417. 
585 Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, supra note 408. 
586 Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA, supra note 463. 
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continued by the Framework Decision on fighting organised crime.587 The Framework 
Decision adopts an extensive interpretation of organised crime and on the definition of a 
criminal organisation. This reflects a contemporary approach to the phenomenon but 
also an impetus to criminalise extensively.  
 
First, the 2008 Framework Decision requires Member States to criminalise one or both 
offences of, broadly speaking, membership of a criminal organisation (even if no actual 
offence is committed) or the agreement to actively take part in the execution of offences 
related to the activities of the criminal organisation: 
 
“ Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that one or both of the 
following types of conduct related to a criminal organisation are regarded as offences: 
(a) conduct by any person who, with intent and with the knowledge of either the aim and 
general activity of the criminal organisation or its intention to commit the offences in 
question, actively takes part in the organisation of criminal activities, including the 
provision of information or material means, the recruitment of new members and all 
forms of financing of its activities, knowing that such a participation will contribute to 
the achievement of the organisation’s criminal activities; (b) conduct by any person 
consisting in an agreement with one or more persons that an activity should be pursued, 
which if carried out, would amount to the commission of offences referred to in Article 
1, even if that person does not take part in the actual execution of the activity.”588 
 
Furthermore, the Framework Decision defines a criminal organisation as a: 
  
“structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two persons 
acting in concert with a view of committing offences which are punishable by 
deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more 
serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit;” 
whilst structured association means “an association that is not randomly formed for the 
immediate commission of an offence, nor does it need to have formally defined roles for 
its members, continuity of its membership, or a developed structure.”589  
 
                                                                  
587 Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA, supra note 416, which came to replace the Joint Action 
making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation, Joint Action 98/733/JHA, 
see note 305. For a detailed analysis of the Joint Action see V. Mitsilegas, “Defining organised 
crime in the European Union”, supra note 432; and for an analysis of the Framework Decision 
see F. Calderoni, “A Definition that Could not Work”, supra note 270. 
588 Article 2 of the Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA, note 416.  
589 Article 1, ibid.. 
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This provision portrays a criminal organisation in a wide fashion. The first striking 
element of the definition is the requirement of only three members for an association to 
be considered a criminal organisation. Indeed, the idea that one has of a criminal 
organisation is usually not one association with only three members. Other elements are 
also left open for interpretation as, for example, the notion of ‘financial or material 
benefits.’ Is a material benefit of £100 or £200 enough to be included in the range of the 
concept of organised crime? And what can be considered a material benefit? 
Furthermore, no specification is given to what is to be considered ‘a period of time’ 
(hence how long does a group need to be existent and operational to be considered a 
criminal association) besides the exclusion of groups formed for the immediate 
formation of offences. Moreover, the structure of the group can also be rather loose, its 
members do not need to a have a defined role nor particular continuity in their 
membership. The most solid element of the definition seems indeed to be the seriousness 
of the crime which needs to be punishable by a maximum sentence of at least 4 years. 
No reference to specific crimes is made, which raises some uncertainty as different legal 
orders might punish similar crimes in a diverse manner. 
 
This wide scope contrasts with definitions proposed by many authors along the past 
decades which have tended to be more detailed and narrower.590 Abadinsky, for 
example, mentions eight attributes of an organised crime group, namely the lack of 
political goals (the aims of an organised crime group are money and power), hierarchy, 
limited or exclusive membership, has a unique subculture, perpetuates itself (hence it 
shall survive beyond the life of current memberships), exhibits willingness to use illegal 
violence, is monopolistic and is governed by explicit rules and regulations.591 Maltz 
identifies four main characteristics, namely varieties of the crimes committed, an 
organised structure, the use of violence and corruption.592 Likewise, Calderoni 
emphasises four essential elements to define a criminal organisation, namely continuity, 
violence, enterprise and immunity, and notes how these characteristics have allowed for 
a distinction between mere ‘crimes that are organised’ and ‘organised crime’.593 
 
                                                                  
590 For an overview and comparison of literature on the definition of organised crime see is it 
definitely F.E. Hagan, “’Organized Crime’ and ‘Organized Crime’: Indeterminate Problems of 
Definition” (2006) 9 Trends in Organized Crime 127.  
591 H. Abadinsky, Organized Crime, supra note 349, 3-5. See also W. Laqueur, The new 
terrorism, supra note 433, 210-211. 
592 M. D. Maltz, “On defining organised crime: the development of a definition and a typology” 
(1976) 22 Crime and Delinquency 338, 338-340.  
593 F. Calderoni, “A definition that could not work”, note 270 supra, 272-273. For a general 
overview of the evolution of the concept of organised crime in the literature see A. Wright, 
Organised Crime, supra note 433, 1-26.  
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Similarly, beyond academic comment, definitions of criminal organisations used by law 
enforcement agencies – ‘working definitions’ - also tended to be narrower than the one 
proposed by the Framework Decision. More significantly, in some cases, legal attempts 
to define criminal organisations failed as political compromise on such topics foundered. 
The solution was often a compromise via the adoption of working definitions, used 
mostly by law enforcement agencies. This is the case of Germany, for example, where 
attempts to conceptualise organised crime took place for the first time in the 1970s, 
when a definition was agreed to by a joint working party of law enforcement and 
judicial officials and used in 1998 by the BundesKriminalAmt (Germany's Federal 
Criminal Police Office): 
 
 “Organised crime is the planned violation of the law for profit or to acquire power, 
which offences are each, or together, of a major significance, and are carried out by 
more than two participants who co-operate within a division of labour for a long or 
undetermined time span using (a) commercial or commercial like structures, or (b) 
violence or other means of intimidation, or (c) influence on politics, media, public 
administration, justice and the legitimate economy.” 594  
 
Whilst this definition was thought of as being “vague and a catch-all definition that can 
cover any criminal offence”595 it was nonetheless more specific than the EU’s one. 
Indeed, even if, for example, only a small number of members is required, such relaxed 
criteria were compensated for by other more clear and objective characteristics the 
criminal organisation ought to fulfil to be considered as such, namely the use of violence 
and intimidation, the impact of such criminality in society, etc..596 
 
Similarly, international instruments, although broader than national definitions still 
managed to be marginally narrower than EU’s one. The UN Convention for example 
defines organised crime as:  
                                                                  
594  In A. Leong, The disruption of International Organised Crime: an analysis of legal and non 
legal strategies (Aldershot, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007) 17 or in M. Levi, “Perspectives on 
‘Organised Crime’: An Overview” (1998) 37 The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 335. 
595 For an overview of literature on this matter see V. Mitsilegas, “From National to Global, from 
Empirical to Legal: The Ambivalent Concept of Transnational Organized Crime”, in M. Beare 
(ed) Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering and Corruption 
(Toronto/ Buffalo/ London: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 55, 64-65.  
596 Generally legal approached to organised crime began to emerge at national level since the 
1970s. In Italy with the adoption of Law 646 (the ‘Rognoni-La Torre Law’); in the UK in the 
1980 initially with the adoption of the 1986 Drug Trafficking Offences Act; or even in the USA 
in 1968 with Public Law 90-351 – the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. See 
Mitsilegas, “The Ambivalent Concept of Transnational Organized Crime”, ibid., 56-70; and J. 
Finckenauer, “Problems of Definition: What is Organized Crime?” (2005) 8 Trends in Organized 
Crime 8 (2005) 63, particularly at 69; see also Leong, The disruption of International Organised 
Crime, supra note 594, 91-93.  
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“a structured group of three or more person existing for a period of time and acting in 
concert with the aim of committing one of the more serious crimes or offences 
established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, 
a financial or other material benefit.”597  
 
It refers exclusively to the crimes mentioned in the text of the Convention, thus 
providing more legal certainty than open-ended formula of the Framework Decision 
which seems to refer to serious criminality in general:  
 
“…offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a 
maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty.”598  
 
Such a broad definition of organised crime and of a criminal association has the 
potential to cover a broad range of conducts under its umbrella of what is to be 
understood as organised crime. Indeed, some authors have argued that too narrow a 
definition does not capture the reality of organised crime as an unclear and undefined 
phenomenon. Van Duyne, for example, points out how many of the definitions used do 
not match the empirical evidence which shows a  
 
“…less well-organized, very diversified landscape of organizing criminals [whose] 
economic activities can better be described from the viewpoint of ‘crime enterprises’ 
than from a conceptually unclear framework such as organized crime.”599  
 
This more diversified landscape in crime is exacerbated by the new traits of a globalised 
world where people, goods, services, capital, information, etc move much more freely 
between different countries than decades ago. Ruggiero emphasises the difficulties in 
distinguishing clearly between organised crime and some legal enterprises in this 
context. The author provides a number of examples related to human trafficking, illegal 
immigration, money laundering, drug trafficking and illegal arms transfers – crimes with 
a potential transnational element. He argues,  
 
“…it is appropriate to identify transnational organized crime as the result of 
partnerships between illegitimate and legitimate actors. In other words (…) criminal 
                                                                  
597 Article 2 (a) of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 15 
November 2000; A/RES/55/25. 
598 See Article 1 of the Framework Decision, supra note 416. 
599 P. Van Duyne, Organized Crime in Europe (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996) 53. 
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activity conducted by ‘aliens’ needs a range of indigenous partners and agents, along 
with a receptive environment in which that activity is carried out.”  
 
The author is specifically referring to official employment agencies that can help recruit 
illegal immigration, transport companies or travel and tourist agencies which might help 
with the transport of illegal immigrants, among many other examples.600  
 
In fact, Europol’s reports reflect this reality in European organised crime, first in relation 
to the looseness of the structure of criminal groups and second in relation to the 
interrelationship between illegitimate and legitimate business structures: 
 
“The trend towards more loose network structure with regard to the set-up of OC groups 
continues. The roles of facilitators and professionals are becoming increasingly 
important. These are individuals with specific skills that are required to conduct 
complex or difficult elements of a criminal enterprise.” 601 
 
The report notes further below: 
 
“OC groups are increasingly taking advantage of the benefits of legitimate company 
structures to conduct or hide their criminal. These legal structures are often abused to 
launder profits or reinvest profits. Alternatively they commit economic crimes such as 
VAT fraud as a primary activity.”602 
 
Yet Europol goes beyond this view of organised crime as interlinked with a ‘crime 
enterprise’ and with legitimate activities. It suggests that organised criminality is not 
always related to the commission of serious offences. Indeed, it suggests it is becoming 
an issue of petty crime as well: 
 
“Organised crime seems to be moving more and more into areas of ‘petty crime’ like 
pick-pocketing and shop-lifting but also burglaries and theft by deception of individuals 
often tourists. Members of OC groups, who often originate from Eastern Europe work in 
small groups and are moved around quickly but never stay long in one location… This 
                                                                  
600 V. Ruggiero, “Global Markets and Crime”, in M. E. Beare (ed) Critical Reflections on 
Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering and Corruption (Toronto, Buffalo, London: 
University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2003) 171, 174-77. 
601 Europol, European Union Organised Crime Report, Open Version, December 2004, The 
Hague, 7.  
602 Ibid..  
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development is in line with the realised trend towards the ‘high profit- low risk’ crime 
areas.”603 
 
The EU’s definition of organised crime has thus the potential to cover all the conducts 
mentioned by Europol and potentially others. It is indeed broad and flexible enough to 
cover Mafia-like associations, business related criminal groups, small groups of pick-
pocketers, large illegal drug and human trafficking networks, among many other 
formations one could think of. They can also be large or small groups, national or 
transnational, more or less structured, exist for shorter or longer periods of time, make 
use of corruption of officials or not, use commercial structures or not, make use of 
violence and intimidation or not, and so on. This suggests that, in fact, the EU’s 
definition of a criminal organisation is closer to that of a criminal network than of a 
criminal organisation in its more traditional sense (such as the Mafia-like model for 
example). The former can or cannot take the shape of a criminal organisation but does 
not always have to do so. In fact, many networks of criminals are likely to commit 
crimes that are organised rather than crimes within the context of a criminal 
organisation.604  
 
Furthermore, the EU’s approach to organised crime has strong prosecutorial benefits due 
to its catch all characteristics. Indeed, organised crime has the potential to give rise to 
public fears; to empower police forces with more stringent policing means (which can 
often end up being used against less serious forms of criminality);605 and to open doors 
to harsher frameworks for punishment. In the European Union, this means bringing 
criminal investigation under Europol’s competence, criminalising more behaviours than 
before under the umbrella of organised crime,606 whilst ensuring a more severe penal 
framework to the crimes in question as the Framework Decision requires Member States 
                                                                  
603 Ibid.. 
604 For details and examples on how to distinguish organised crime from crime that is organised 
see for example J. Finckenauer, “Problems of Definition”, supra note 596, 76-78 or A.K. Cohen, 
“The Concept of a Criminal Organisation” (1977) 17 The British Journal of Criminology  97.  
605 D. Nelken, “The Globalization of Crime and Justice” (1997) 50 Current Legal Problems 251, 
255. An example of this can be found, for instance, in Portugal. Law 5/2002 of 11 January on 
covert means of surveillance as lawful means to obtain evidence was adopted in context of the 
fight against violent and organised criminality and it aimed at allowing police forces to make use 
of particular covert investigation techniques in relation to serious criminality only. However, it is 
now being discussed whether evidence related to other crimes obtained under these investigation 
operations could be used and under which conditions, J.F. Araújo, “Conhecimentos Fortuitos no 
Âmbito do Registo de Voz e de Imagem”, Dissertação de Mestrado em Ciências Policiais, 
Instituto Superior de Ciências Policias e Segurança Interna, Mimeo, Lisboa, 26 April de 2012.    
606 See for examples before Greek courts E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou, “Towards a New 
Definition of Organised Crime in the European Union” (2007) 15 European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 83, 93.  
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to consider such offences when committed in the context of a criminal organisation as 
aggravating circumstances.607 
 
The question is whether such legal changes are indeed reflecting and combating new 
realities or if they are used to squeeze through the back door tougher approaches to 
crime independently of such realities. In this sense, Levi notes that broad definitions of 
organised crime results from a tension between  
 
“a) those who want the legislator to cover a wide set of circumstances to avoid the risk 
that any major criminal might ‘get away with it’, and b) those who want the law to be 
quite tightly drawn to avoid the overreach of powers which might otherwise criminalise 
groups who are only a modest threat.” 608  
 
As seen in the first part of this thesis, organised crime has been central to the 
development of ECL often serving as an umbrella concept for the EU to legislate in 
domains more or less related to it. It is thus perhaps not surprising that the EU’s 
approach to organised crime is particularly broad. However, the EU’s technique of 
adopting broad definitions of crime is seen in many other examples. The EU’s definition 
of terrorism, for instance, has been particularly commented upon as being very wide.609 
Indeed, the EU defines terrorist acts as those committed with an  
 
“aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or 
international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously 
destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
structures of a country or an international organisation, shall be deemed to be terrorist 
offences.”610 
 
Article 1 of the Framework Decision oncombatting terrorism continues in more detail 
stating that those offences should comprise: 
 
 “(a) attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death; (b) attacks upon the physical 
integrity of a person; (c) kidnapping or hostage taking; (d) causing extensive destruction 
to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, 
including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a 
public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major 
                                                                  
607 Article 3 of the Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA, note 416. 
608 M. Levi, “Organised crime and terrorism”, see supra note 377, 780. 
609 See, inter alia, S. Douglas-Scott, “The Rule of Law in the European Union”, supra note 413, 
230-232. 
610 Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, supra note 413. 
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economic loss; (e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport; 
(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives 
or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and 
development of, biological and chemical weapons; (g) release of dangerous substances, 
or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life; (h) 
interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental 
natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life; (i) threatening to commit 
any of the acts listed in (a) to (h).” “Any action involving aggravated theft, extortion or 
drawing up false administrative documents with the view of committing any of the acts 
mentioned earlier, shall be considered terrorist linked activities.”611 
 
Examples of proposed academic and legislative approaches to terrorism are useful in 
helping to understand how broad and detailed the Framework Decision’s definition is. 
Commonly accepted definitions by law enforcement agencies, for instance, tend to be 
concise and narrower than the EU’s Framework Decision. The FBI considers terrorism  
 
“the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives.”; 612  
 
whereas the CIA defines it as  
 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an 
audience.” 613   
 
The contrast with previous national legislation on the definition of terrorism (or lack 
of) is also sharp. Indeed, before the adoption of the Framework Decision only six 
Member States criminalised terrorist acts autonomously: France, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and the UK.614 All of them had narrower definitions than the EU’s. 
                                                                  
611 Ibid.. 
612 Terrorism research centre, at http://www.terrorism-research.com/, visited on 22 November 
2011. 
613 Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d). 
614 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism, Brussels, 19.9.2001, 
COM (2001)521 final, 6 - 7. 
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France, for instance, criminalised as terrorism an act that could seriously alter public 
order through threat or terror. Portugal included acts that were able to prejudice 
national interests, to alter or disturb the State’s institutions, force public authorities to 
do or not to do something or threaten individuals or groups. Spain treated subverting 
constitutional order and seriously altering public peace as terrorist acts. Italy had a law 
similar to Spain’s, criminalising terrorist actions as those that are able to subvert the 
democratic order.615 Finally, the UK defined terrorist offences as acts capable of 
influencing the government or intimidating the public order or a section of the public 
with the purpose of supporting a political, religious, or ideological cause.616  
 
2.1. Increasing criminalisation at national level: the impact of broad definitions of 
crime 
 
In fact the large majority of Framework Decisions criminalising Euro-crimes adopted 
broad definitions of the criminal offences at stake. This expanded definitions of criminal 
offences or introduced new criminal offences altogether at national level, thus increasing 
the amount and scope of national criminal law, leading to more formal criminalisation 
across the European Union. This takes place as framework decisions require Member 
States to introduce, on occasion, new types of criminal offences that did not exist in their 
legal orders; and, second, as they require Member States to enlarge pre-existent national 
definitions of punishable conducts.617 These two effects translate directly in the 
enactment of more crimes as more conducts become subject to criminal liability.  
 
Among many examples, in order to comply with the Framework Decision on terrorism 
the six countries which already criminalised terrorist acts had to enlarge the number 
and type of behaviours to be included in their definitions.618 Furthermore, the definition 
of terrorist offences led to the adoption of new criminal offences in the majority of 
other Member States. Indeed, before the implementation of the Framework Decision, 
the majority of States treated terrorist actions under the framework of other offences 
(such as murder, offences against physical integrity, etc.). This changed with the 
                                                                  
615 Ibid., pages 3, 6 and 7. 
616 Ibid., pages 3, 6 and 7. 
617 A. Weyembergh speaks of a ‘repressive orientation’ of EU law in this regard when it makes 
use of broad and vague definitions of crime, namely in relation to the definition of terrorism, 
organised crime and facilitation of unauthorised entry, “Approximation of criminal law, the 
Constitutional Treaty and The Hague Programme”(2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 1567, 
1588.  
618 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism, 
supra note 614, 6 - 7. 
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Framework Decision, which obliged the 21 Member States to specifically define 
terrorist offences.619 The remaining EU Member States were required to create a ‘new 
offence’ that covers conducts that either were not punished before or were punished as 
‘common’ criminality and hence considered less serious or morally wrong, rather than 
specifically labeled as terrorist crimes, as they are now.620 
 
Moreover, the Framework Decision on trafficking in human beings, for example, 
defines the offence of trafficking for the purposes of labour or sexual exploitation as 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or subsequent reception of a 
person, including the exchange or transfer of control over that person. It specifies that 
such acts shall be punishable where use is made of coercion, force or threat, including 
abduction or where use is made of deceit or fraud or there is an abuse of authority or of 
a position of vulnerability or where payments or benefits are given or received to 
achieve the consent of the person.621 Member States such as Estonia and Poland did not 
have criminal offences corresponding with the conducts described in the Framework 
Decision, while all other Member States already contained provisions relating to such 
acts.622 However, even in countries where such acts were already considered as 
offences, the definition of trafficking in the Framework Decision is broader than most 
pre-existing definitions in national laws and even in international instruments. This was 
mainly due to the introduction of the additional general element of trafficking for 
purposes of “labour exploitation”. Indeed, most legislation covered trafficking only for 
the purposes of sexual exploitation, prostitution or forced or slave labour (trafficking 
for purposes of labour is usually covered by legislation on smuggling of human beings; 
the concept itself is very general and difficult to circumvent).  
 
For example, Dutch law did not include in its definition of trafficking any other 
purpose beside sexual exploitation.623 However, with the Framework Decision, the 
provision was amended in order to include “coerced or forced work or services, slavery 
                                                                  
619 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament based on Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on 
combating terrorism, Brussels, 08.06.2004, COM(2004) 409, final, 6. 
620 For the argument that major changes and new offences had been created at national level in 
consequence of EU’s action harmonising terrorism see also K. Nuotio, “Terrorism as a Catalyst 
for the Emergence, Harmonization and Reform of Criminal Law” (2006) 4 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 998, 1008-1010; and M. Cesoni, “Droit penal europeen: Une 
harmonisation perilleuse”, in G. de Kerchove and A. Weyembergh (eds) L’Espace penal 
europeeen: Enjeux and perspectives (Bruxelles: Universite de Bruxelles, 2002) 154-155. 
621 Article 1 of the Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, supra note 409. 
622 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament based on Article 10 of the Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on 
combating trafficking in human beings, Brussels, 02.05.2006, COM (2006) 187 final, 6. 
623 Article 250a of the Criminal Code, after changes introduced by the Act of 13 July 2002.  
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and practices and bondage comparable to slavery.”624 Likewise, Portuguese law, in the 
earlier versions of the Portuguese Penal Code, only considered trafficking of persons 
for the purpose of sexual exploitation.625 In 2007 the crime was expanded in order to 
incorporate the purpose of labour exploitation and extraction of organs thus complying 
with the Framework Decision. 626  
 
The Framework Decision also contains a broader definition than the UN measures in 
this domain. The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, especially women and children, for example, also offers a very broad notion 
of trafficking,627 but instead of the explicit purpose of “labour exploitation”, it 
mentions “forced labour or services, slavery or practices very similar to slavery” in a 
more limited formulation than that of the Framework Decision. 628 
 
In relation to illicit drug trafficking there are also some relevant changes in national 
legislation. The Framework Decision on drug trafficking requires the criminalisation of 
the 
 
“(a) the production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering, offering for sale, 
distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in 
transit, transport, importation or exportation of drugs”, “the cultivation of opium 
poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant”, “possession or purchase of drugs with the view 
of conducting one of the activities listed in (a)”, and of “the manufacture, transport 
and distribution of precursors, knowing that they are to be used in or for the illicit 
production or manufacture of drugs.”629  
 
The Commission noted how the national legislation of Member States did not include 
‘illicit drug trafficking’ as a particular criminal offence, although they often focused on 
punishing related offences, such as production, cultivation, extraction, acquisition, and 
                                                                  
624 Article 1 of the Framework Decision 2005/629/JHA, supra note 409. 
625 Article 169 in the version of Decreto Lei nº 48/95, 15 of March and following the alterations 
of Lei 99/2001, 25 of August. 
626 Lei 59/2007, 4 of September 2007.  
627 “The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a person, by means of the 
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation.”, Article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against 
Organised Crime, A753/383, Annex II, 2000. 
628 “The exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, slavery or practices very similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs”, ibid..  
629 Article 2 of the Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA, supra note 415. 
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possession, among others.630 A study by the United Nations showed that there were 
considerable differences between national laws.631 German law, for instance, 
criminalised ‘illicit narcotics trafficking’ and Italian law, the ‘distribution of illegal 
drugs’.632 The use of the expression ‘drug trafficking’ is necessarily broader than the 
latter, because ‘drug’ includes more substances than ‘narcotics’. Indeed, marijuana or 
even a prescription medication can be included in the concept of ‘drug’, while only 
opium, morphine or, in the broad sense, cocaine and heroin are considered 
‘narcotics’.633 Hence, to criminalise the trafficking of drugs is more restrictive than to 
criminalise the trafficking of narcotics or illegal drugs and while the former would not, 
strictu sensu, be considered a criminal offence under German law it is required to be so 
following the Framework Decision on drug trafficking. Finally, trafficking is a broader 
concept than mere ‘distribution’, hence the punishable conduct under Italian law had to 
be extended to cover cases which are not distribution but which might be considered 
trafficking. 
 
The Framework Decision on attacks against information systems also illustrates this 
trend. The Framework Decision requires the criminalisation of access without a right to 
the whole or any part of an information system (Member States have the choice to 
criminalise such conduct only when a ‘security rule’ was infringed), or the intentional 
serious hindering or interruption of the functioning of an information system by 
inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering, suppressing or 
rendering inaccessible computer data when committed without a right (the same is 
applicable to data in a computer system).634  
 
The explanatory text accompanying the proposal for a Framework Decision noted that 
national laws in this area contained significant gaps and differences. Spain, the 
Netherlands and Poland for instance did not criminalise the unauthorised but 
intentional access to information systems altogether (so-called “hacking”), whose 
criminalisation is now called for by Article 3 of the Framework Decision.635 Greece, 
                                                                  
630 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision laying down minimum provisions on the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking COM 
(2001) 259 final, Brussels, 23.5.2001, 5. 
631 UN Report covering Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK – E. Savona, Organised crime 
across-borders, The European Institute for crime prevention and control, affiliated with the 
United Nations, HEUNI Papers N 6, 1995, 27-28. 
632 Ibid., 27-28. 
633 Definitions from the A. Hornby et al, Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary (Oxford: OUP, 
2002). 
634 Article 2, 3 and 4 of the Framework Decision, supra note 343.  
635 M. Olinet, “Cybercriminalité: Énoncé du Cas Pratique et Synthèse des Réponses”, in M. 
Delmas-Marty, G. Giudicelli-Delage, E. Lambert-Abdelgawad (eds) L’Harmonisation des 
 170 
Italy and Slovenia, on the other hand, only criminalised hacking when the system was 
protected by security measures, a condition not required by the Framework Decision. In 
addition, Greece did not criminalise the illegal interference with data, whereas the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain and Finland criminalised only the alteration, 
damaging or deterioration of computer data,636 but not the deletion, suppression or 
rendering inaccessible of the same data, as required by the Article 4 of Framework 
Decision. Finally, the Danish criminal code was extended in order to also criminalise 
invasion of privacy and damage to property in a “systematic or organised” manner, 
whereas Finland extended the cases to be considered of serious damaged to property.637  
 
Furthermore, the Framework Decision on combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-
cash means of payment required the criminalisation, at least in relation to credit cards, 
Euro-cheque cards, other cards issued by financial institutions, travellers’ cheques, 
Euro-cheques and bills of exchange of the  
 
“theft or other unlawful appropriation of payment instruments”, of “the counterfeiting 
or falsification of payment instrument in order for it to be used fraudulently”, of the 
“receiving, obtaining, transporting, sale or transfer to another person or possession of 
a stolen or otherwise unlawfully appropriated, or a counterfeiting or falsified payment 
instrument in order for it to be used fraudulently”, and of “the fraudulent use of a 
stolen or otherwise unlawfully appropriated or of a counterfeited or falsified 
payment.”638  
 
Performing these same acts intentionally, without right “introducing, altering, deleting 
or suppressing computer data” by interfering with the functioning of a computer 
programme or system,639 or the fraudulent making, receiving, obtaining, sale or transfer 
to another person or possession of “instruments, articles, computer programmes and 
any other means peculiarly adapted for the commission of the previous referred 
offences” were also specified as matters which should be considered a criminal 
offence.640 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Sanction Penales en Europe, vol.5 (Paris: Societe de Legislation Compare, Unite Mixte de 
recherché de Droit Compare de Paris, 2003) 353, 355-356. 
636 Idem. 
637 T. Elholm, “Does EU Criminal Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression?” (2009) 
17 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 191, 201. 
638 Article 2 of the Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA, supra note 411. 
639 Article 3, ibid.. 
640 Article 4, ibid.. 
 171 
Again, the EU’s provision was broader than many national ones. Finland and France 
initiated new legislation to fully criminalise conducts referred to in Article 2 of the 
Framework Decision, whilst in 2004 Spain still did not criminalise the fraudulent 
altering of payment instruments.641 Likewise, Sweden provided for a narrow framework 
of criminalisation and did  
 
“not provide for punishment if the fraudulent use of a stolen o otherwise unlawfully 
appropriated, or of a counterfeited or falsified, payment instrument.”642 
 
Latvia and Lithuania introduced new offences in their national legislation with 
particular reference to computer programmes in order to comply with Article 4 of the 
Framework Decision.643 In 2006, Portuguese legislation also did not cover the offences 
under Article 4 (2), whilst Luxembourg did not contain any criminal offences as 
referred to in Article 4 of the Framework Decision.644 Finland in turn introduced a 
provision criminalising the possession of accessories and material for counterfeiting in 
order to comply with EU’s measure.645   
 
Still in the context of economic crime, Elholm notes how the implementation of the 
Framework Decision on counterfeiting of the Euro646 led to an increase in the scope of 
the offence of counterfeiting of coins and banknotes in Finland in order to include the 
import and export of forged coins and banknotes. Similarly in Sweden, it led to an 
introduction of a special offence on the purchasing of counterfeited money.647  
 
Similarly, the Framework Decision on combating corruption in the private sector 
requires Member States to criminalise intentional active and passive corruption, namely 
promising, offering or giving a person who directs or works for a private sector entity 
an undue advantage of any kind in order for that person to perform or refrain from 
performing any act in breach of his or her duties; or requesting or receiving an undue 
advantage of any kind or accepting the promise of such advantage while in any 
                                                                  
641 European Commission, Report from the Commission based on Article 14 of the Council 
Framework Decision of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of non cash means of 
payment, COM (2004)346 final, Brussels, 30.4.2004, 18. 
642 Ibid.,18. 
643 European Commission, Second Report based on Article 14 of the Council Framework 
Decision of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, 
COM (2006)65final, Brussels, 22.02.2006, 4. 
644 Ibid., 4. 
645 T. Elholm, “Does EU Criminal Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression?”, supra 
note  637, 194. 
646 Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA, supra note 452. 
647 T. Elholm, “Does EU Criminal Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression?”, supra 
note 637, 194.  
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capacity directing or working for a private sector entity, in order to perform or refrain 
from performing any act.648 Many Member States contained narrower provisions before 
the Framework Decision. Even after its implementation into national legal orders, 15 
Member States maintained narrower provisions than the EU’s one in relation to active 
private corruption and 9 did so in relation to passive corruption: 
 
“NL limited the offence to instances where the employer or principle was not informed 
of the case. LU requires that the employer is not aware and does not approve of the 
criminal behaviour. DE, AT, IT and PL had limited the scope of application in line with 
Article 2(3). DE limited the scope to acts relating to the purchase of goods or 
commercial services; AT limited the offence to ‘legal acts’ and PL limited the offence 
to behaviour resulting in losses, unfair competition or inadmissible preferential action. 
DE has informed the Commission that new legislation to meet this requirement of the 
Framework Decision is pending.”649     
 
3. Expanding criminalisation beyond definitions: increasing liable subjects and 
establishing minimum maximum punishment  
 
3.1. Expanding liability to legal persons 
 
Moreover, expansion of national criminal law as a direct or indirect effect of European 
criminal law was not confined to the expansion in scope of criminal offences. In 
addition to these, many framework decisions also require the extension of criminal 
liability to legal persons (and in any case require Member States to establish non 
criminal liability).650 Criminal liability of legal persons is a relatively new phenomenon 
which begins to find its place in legal systems in general.651 In 2004, for example, 
Greece, Germany, Luxembourg or Italy did not provide for any criminal accountability 
of legal persons.652 Lacey notes how corporate liability and more so criminal corporate 
                                                                  
648 Article 1 (a) (b) of the Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA, supra note 352.  
649 More details are further listed in the implementation report, Report from the Commission, 
supra note 450, 3-4. 
650 See for instance Articles 8 and 9 of Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, supra note 408; 
Article 5 of the Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA, supra note 417; or Articles 6 and 7 of the 
Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, supra note 414. 
651 For examples of how some national legal orders world wide have struggled with ensuring 
legal criminal liability see, for instance, for the UK, C. Wells, “Cry in the Dark: Corporate 
Manslaughter and Cultural Meaning” in Ian Loveland (ed) Frontiers of Criminality (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) 109; or for Canada, M. E. Beare, “Organized Corporate Liability: 
Corporate Complicity in Tobacco Smuggling”, in M. E. Beare (ed) Critical Reflections on 
Organized Crime, Money Laundering, and Corruption, op.cit.,183. 
652 European Commission, Green Paper on the approximation, mutual recognition and 
enforcement of criminal sanctions in the European Union, supra note 573, 31. 
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liability is a sensitive issue which touches upon social conventions that still tend to 
distinguish the ‘ordinary criminal’ from the ‘white collar criminal’:  
 
“…legislative and executive attempts to render corporations criminally liable for a 
range of fraudulent dealings, like prosecution strategies designed to render 
corporations liable for manslaughter, often founder. This is not so much because of 
concrete procedural or substantive barriers but rather because of discursive resistance 
exemplified in the practices of relevant decision-making agencies – courts, lawyers, the 
police. On other words, if corporate accountability or ideas of corporate 
blameworthiness find no place or only a marginal place in broader social 
understandings, it may be difficult or impossible to impose criminal liability.”653 
 
Most EU harmonisation measures attempt to break this ceiling of liability at national 
level, albeit still to a limited extent (as it gives Member States the option to choose 
between civil and criminal liability). The 2003 Framework Decision on private 
corruption, for instance, provides for liability of legal persons both in relation to active 
and private corruption when bribery is committed for their benefit by any person that 
has a leading position within that legal person and who is “acting individually or as 
part of an organ of the legal person.” Equally, liability should be extended to cases 
where the commission of the offence was made possible by lack of supervision or 
control.654  
 
The scope of many domestic laws was much narrower. In fact, it so remains in some 
cases. By 2007 there is still a lot of resistance to implementing these provisions, with 
only five Member States providing liability of legal persons under the Framework 
Decision conditions.655 By 2011, the Commission reported significant improvements 
but still an “overall poor transposition of Article 5” with at least two countries not 
having transposed Article 5(1) and 8 not having fully transposed Article 5(2). Slovakia 
for example informed the Commission that criminal liability of legal persons had been 
included in the draft amendments to the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code, 
whose adoption process was halted pending a Constitutional Court decision.656 
 
                                                                  
653 N. Lacey, “Contingency and Criminalisation”, in I. Loveland (ed) Frontiers of Criminality 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) 1, 13-14. 
654 Article 5 (1) and (2) Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA, supra note 417. 
655 European Commission Report COM(2007)328final, see supra note 450, 8. 
656 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council based on Article 9 of the Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 o 
combating corruption in the private sector, COM(2011)309final, 6.  
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Changes towards the extension of liability to legal persons were also made following 
the 2001 Framework Decision on combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash 
means of payment. By 2006, five Member States reported to the Commission that 
legislation expanding such liability was before their national parliaments awaiting 
approval. Belgium, Denmark, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia had also 
taken the necessary measures  
 
“to ensure that a legal person can be held liable where the lack of supervision or 
control by people in leading positions made the commission of offences possible” 
 
and provided for liability in the other cases required by the Framework Decision.657     
 
Examples of the introduction or extension of liability of legal persons can also be seen 
in consequence of the implementation of the 2002 Framework Decision on terrorism 
(amended in 2008), which also required the extension of liability to legal persons 
(Article 7). The Commission reported in 2007:  
 
“The Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia have failed to foresee the liability of legal 
persons for terrorist offences as requested in paragraph 1 and Luxembourg has not 
transmitted the relevant provisions. The other Member States evaluated have correctly 
implemented paragraph 1. Their provisions often go beyond the minimum level 
required by the Framework Decision through either setting more than one criterion or 
retaining wider criteria.”658   
 
Likewise, the Framework Decision on attacks against information systems also 
envisaged liability of legal persons.659 The Commission reported in 2008 that 16 
Member States had taken the necessary measures to ensure such accountability. Estonia 
however had not accepted to expand criminal liability, considering that its rules on civil 
liability covered all the conducts described in the Framework Decision.660 
 
 
                                                                  
657 European Commission, Report from the Commission, Second report based on Article 14 of the 
Council Framework Decision of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of non cash 
means of payment, COM(2006)65 final, Brussels, 20.02.2006, 6. 
658 European Commission, Report from the Commission based on Article 11 of the Council 
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, COM(2007)681final, Brussels, 
6/11,2007, 6. 
659 Article 8 of the Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA, note 543. 
660 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council based on Article 12 of the 
Council Framework Decision of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems, 
COM(2008)448 final, Brussels, 14.7.2008, 8. 
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3.2. A focus on minimum maximum penalties  
 
Moreover, the shift towards a potentially more severe penal law was also seen in other 
elements beyond the broad definition of offences and the extension of liability to legal 
persons, namely in relation to penalties.661 Most Framework Decisions require penalties 
to be effective, dissuasive and proportional (a criterion brought forward from the 
Maastricht years)662 but the feature mostly explored after Amsterdam was the setting of 
specific minimum maximum sentences.663 As the Commission noted in relation to 
harmonisation of custodial sentences in 2004,  
 
“The formula used to harmonise penalties has not been so much to determine effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive penalties as to set minimum levels for maximum 
penalties.”664  
  
The Framework Decision on the counterfeiting of the Euro for example established a 
minimum of not less than eight years custodial sentences for some of the conducts 
criminalised.665 The Framework Decision on money laundering provided for a 
maximum imprisonment penalty of at least four years.666 The Framework Decision on 
terrorism requires Member States to punish participation in offences related to terrorist 
groups with at least eight years and the direction of such a group with at least fifteen 
years.667 In turn, the Framework Decisions on combating corruption in the private 
sector,668 sexual exploitation of children,669 cyber-crime670 and illicit drug trafficking671 
all require a maximum penalty of at least 1-3 years’ imprisonment (the latter two 
require a minimum maximum of, respectively, 2-5 and 5-10 years in case of 
aggravating circumstances).  
                                                                  
661 For more details on the method used by the Council to determine the threshold of minimum 
maximum penalties see Council of Justice Ministers, Home Affairs and Civil Protection, 
Luxembourg, 25-26 April 2002, 2423rd Council meeting, 7991/02 (Presse 104), 15. 
662 Chapter 2.  
663 Note that no framework decision requires Member States to introduce, for example, 
mandatory penalties. For more details on the method used by the Council to determine the 
threshold of minimum maximum penalties see Council 2423rd Council meeting, 7991/02 (Presse 
104), supra note 661. 
664 European Commission Green Paper COM(2004)334final supra note 573, 15. 
665 Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA, note 452. Article 6 of the Framework Decision, 
ibid.. 
666 Article 2 of the Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA, see supra note 410. 
667 Article 5 (3) of the Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, see supra note 413. 
668 Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA, note 417 supra. 
669 Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, note 414 supra. 
670 Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, note 408 supra. 
671 Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA, note 415 supra. 
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There is a clear focus on harmonisation of ‘minimum maximum’ sentences but not 
‘maximum’ sentences for example.672 In fact, Elholm argues that on occasion some 
Member States with a history of leniency, while implementing several framework 
decisions, chose to upgrade their national penalties not only to the minimum imposed 
by the framework decision but, on occasion, to penalties more severe than the ones 
proposed by the European Union itself. In general, regarding penalties, the author finds 
that,  
 
“investigation of the Nordic countries shows that more than half the framework 
decisions have led to extensions of the penalty scales in one or more of the Nordic 
countries. In several cases the minimum and/ or maximum penalty for certain crimes 
have even more than doubled in one or more countries.”673  
 
This implementation by the Nordic countries shows how the national implementation 
often goes beyond the EU standard yet still complies with it. In the context of criminal 
law and, in particular, in the context of the implementation of criminalising provisions, 
such implementation can translate into an increase in the severity of the national 
standard of criminalisation and punishment.  
 
In fact, the examples of actual and potential extended criminalisation in the EU space 
given throughout the chapter, reflect the paradox of minimum harmonisation in 
criminal matters: whilst the harmonisation of criminal law envisaged was minimal, 
focusing merely on minimum elements constituent of crimes and penalties, this was 
sufficient to have a significant impact on national legal orders namely by increasing 
their scope of formal criminalisation. In fact, it was seen how many Member States 
introduced new criminal offences or expanded the scope of pre-existing ones, 
introduced criminal liability to legal persons or expanded the pre-existing framework of 
such accountability, and introduced minimum maximum sentences - at times beyond 
                                                                  
672 Indirectly however the fact that most framework decisions set the condition that penalties 
must be ‘proportional’ does add some limitation to the measure of punishment at national level. 
Moreover, all EU Member States have abolished the death penalty, see, for example, E. Baker, 
“The Emerging Role of the EU as a Penal Actor”, note 13 supra. Regardless of these two 
elements, the EU does not engage in the definition of what it thinks should be the actual 
maximum penalty applicable. 
673 T. Elholm, “Does EU Criminal Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression?”, supra 
note 637, 207; for the details on specific examples see pages 193-203. To be sure however, 
regardless of an increase in imprisonment rates in Nordic countries, rates have been relatively 
stable when compared with other legal systems. See comparable data on ‘World Prison Brief’, 
available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/?search=europe&x=Europe. 
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the threshold demanded by EU law. This however, was not without limitations, as it 
will be seen further below. 
 
3.3. Pressure on more lenient systems 
 
In addition to the trend of increasing criminalisation, harmonisation - as envisaged in 
ECL - places more pressure on more lenient legal systems than on more severe ones. 
This is so as Member States are required to criminalise at least the conduct defined in 
the Framework Decisions but can criminalise further if they choose to do so. They are 
required to introduce liability of legal persons in certain cases but allowed to introduce 
criminal liability in relation to more conducts. Finally, Member States are asked to 
introduce minimum maximum sentences but yet again given freedom to retain or 
introduce higher minimum maximum penalties than the ones set by the framework 
decisions. In fact, no framework decision establishes a ceiling of punishment, liability or 
criminalisation. This implies that Member States with more lenient criminal laws will 
more likely be required to introduce new higher standards in order to comply with the 
minimum EU standard. On the contrary, less lenient States are less likely to have to alter 
(or to alter more significantly) their national provisions, for they are more likely to 
already meet the minimum standard set by the EU’s legal acts. This was seen throughout 
the chapter. Member States whose national criminal law provided for definitions of 
criminal offences which were narrower than those proposed by the Framework Decision 
had to broaden the scope of behaviours covered by the national norm in order to meet 
the requirements of the EU framework decisions. On the contrary, Member States whose 
national criminal law already provided for the criminalisation of those conducts did not 
have to alter national law as national provisions already criminalised the behaviour at 
stake. Likewise, it was also seen how some Member States who did not envisage the 
liability of legal persons had to expand national rules on liability in order to meet the 
requirements of the diverse framework decisions. Conversely, national legal orders 
which already provided for the liability of legal persons did not have to expand the 
scope of their national liability provisions as these already met the minimum 
requirement of the framework decisions.  
 
Moreover, because most measures until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
focused primarily on criminalisation and facilitation of prosecution (and less so on 
procedural rights, for example), the bias towards an upper trend in severity of the 
criminal law is further accentuated. This suggests that EU criminal law sets in motion a 
dynamic where harmony between different domestic legal systems is sought through a 
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levelling up of formal criminalisation, potentially bringing about a harsher criminal law 
across the European Union.674   
 
Furthermore, the setting of minimum maximum sentences and the extension of the 
criminal liability to more subjects, namely legal persons, also contribute to this reality. 
As Husak explains,  
 
“Even when more behaviour is not punishable, the category of persons who face 
criminal prosecution [is] widened. The most obvious examples are juveniles and white-
collar offenders each of whom had relatively little to fear from the criminal justice 
system until the last quarter of the 20th century, but recently have become more 
common prosecutorial targets.” 675  
 
This scenario of increased criminalisation at national level as a consequence of EU law 
implementation is not without two important caveats. The first relates to the fact that 
ECL still leaves Member States with significant room to manoeuvre; the second relates 
to the need to distinguish between formal and substantive criminalisation, as will be 
explored in the next section. 
 
4. The limitations of minimum harmonisation in criminal matters: uneven 
implementation and unpredictable outcomes 
 
In fact, the trend set in place by harmonisation measures needs to be analysed carefully. 
Indeed, the harmonisation set in place does not avoid significant dissonance between 
national laws, nor does it ensure an equal standard of actual criminalisation and 
punishment at national level. It sets in motion a process but it does not have the tools to 
see it through entirely. First, because the setting of a minimum standard only falls short 
                                                                  
674 Husak in this regard argues that more criminalisation leads necessarily to more punishment: 
“it is patently clear that more criminalization produces more punishment in a straightforward 
manner: by expanding the type of conducts subject to liability. The incidence of punishment is at 
unprecedented levels partly because defendants are convicted of crimes that did not exist a few 
generations ago.” However, a direct causation between EU legislation and increase in 
criminalisation at national law is not clear-cut. In fact, the distinction between formal and 
substantive criminalisation is here essential. Hence, as it will be seen below in the chapter, formal 
criminalisation does not necessarily need to lead to more substantive criminalisation as it also 
depends on numerous factors of national criminal policy (Husak refers to the US system in 
particular but the theoretical reasoning can be applied to the EU framework or any other legal 
system for that matter); D. Husak, Overcriminalization, The Limits of the Criminal Law (New 
York: OUP, 2008) 19-20. 
675 We have omitted “has” and replaced it by [is]. Again, the author is referring to the US but his 
argument is being applied to the EU case, Husak, ibid., 20. 
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of ensuring a degree of homogeneity among Member States. This can be seen at two 
levels – a legislative one and an executive one.  
 
4.1. Disharmony in national laws  
 
Authors have stressed how the implementation of framework decisions often leads to 
dissonance among Member States who are equally compliant with the EU standard. The 
first striking example is precisely the Framework Decision on combating organised 
crime, which leaves Member States the option of criminalising both or only one offence 
of conspiracy to commit offences in the context of a criminal organisation or of 
membership of such organisation.676  
 
Indeed, the prima facie goal of harmonisation of national legislation seemed in itself to 
have been compromised in those provisions as Member States could choose to 
criminalise one or both offences of membership of a criminal organisation or conspiracy 
to commit offences in the context of such an organisation. The European Commission, 
joined by France and Italy, was particularly clear in this regard when it observed that the 
Framework Decision  
 
“does not achieve the minimum degree of approximation of acts of directing or 
participating in a criminal organisation on the basis of a single concept of such an 
organisation (…) but to continue to apply existing national criminal law by having 
recourse to general rules on participation in and preparation of specific offences.”677 
 
Dissonance was also pointed in relation to penalties by Horta Pinto, who noted that the 
harmonisation of minimum maximum penalties set in motion by the EU is unlikely to 
provide for actual harmonisation at national level. She demonstrates this lack of 
harmonisation even in maximum sentences in the light of one specific example of the 
implementation of Framework Decision on counterfeiting of the Euro which stipulated a 
minimum maximum sentence of at least eight years.  The author notes how, since 2001, 
Portugal punishes counterfeiting with custodial sentences from three to twelve years; 
                                                                  
676 This choice reflected the difficulties of agreeing on a common definition of organised crime 
among the 27 Member States particularly due to the existence of two models in the European 
Union: the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model that tackles organised crime primarily via conspiracy offences 
and the ‘Continental model’ which criminalises the participation in a criminal organisation 
instead. The European Commission sought first to harmonise along the lines of the Continental 
model but the UK was not willing to let go of its conspiracy approach. V. Mitsilegas, EU 
Criminal Law, supra note 14, 94-95. 
677 Statement by the Commission, joined by France and Italy, in Annex A to Annex to the 
Council Doc. 9067/06 on the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the fight against 
organised crime, Brussels, 10 May 2006, 12. 
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Spain with a imprisonment penalty from eight to twelve and with fine of up to ten times 
the value counterfeited; France with imprisonment up to thirty years and fine up to 450 
000 Euros; Italy applies custodial sentences which can range from three to twelve years 
and a fine from 516 to 3098 Euros; whilst in Germany the same conduct is punishable 
with custodial sentences ranging from one to fiftheen years (with some qualification 
depending on mitigating or aggravating circumstances).678 All these five Member States 
comply with the Framework Decision provisions on penalties, yet the different domestic 
provisions are hardly harmonised. Indeed, if one considers maximum penalties, whilst in 
France counterfeiting is punishable with custodial sentences of up to thirty years, Spain 
applies a maximum of ten years. Likewise, minimum penalties also vary greatly – see 
for instance the difference between one year in Germany to eight years in Spain. Clearly, 
the framework decision hardly led towards significant harmonisation. 
 
In fact, the Commission had voiced concerns about the difficulty in harmonising 
penalties and noted in its Green Paper on the Approximation, Mutual Recognition and 
Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions that 
 
“The differences between Member States’ legislation on penalties are still quite sharp. 
There are historical, cultural and legal reasons for this, deeply rooted in their legal 
systems, which have evolved over time and the expression of the way in which Member 
States have faced and answered fundamental questions about criminal law. These 
systems have their own internal coherence, and amending individual rules without 
regard to the overall picture would risk generating distortions.”679 
 
The risk of generating distortions is not negligible if one considers the existing 
differences. Maximum custodial sentences for example range from life imprisonment 
in countries such as Belgium, Greece, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, to 30 
years in Spain or even 25 years in Portugal and Greece. Among countries with life 
imprisonment the possibility of early release also varies immensely. Minimum periods 
can go up to 30 years in France, 20 years in Ireland, 15 in Germany or 10 in 
Belgium.680 A lack of coherence in the choice of the minimum maximum threshold for 
punishment was further pointed out by Weyembergh who notes in this regard, for 
example, how the Framework Decision against the counterfeiting of the Euro and the 
                                                                  
678 I. Horta Pinto, “Os Efeitos do ‘Direito Penal Europeau’ nos Sistemas Sancionatórios dos 
Estados Membros da Uniao Europeia”, in Estudos de Homenagem ao Prof. Doutor Jorge 
Figueiredo Dias, Vol I (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2009) 821, 831-32. Our translation. 
679 European Commission, Green Paper COM(2004)334final, see supra note 573, 8. 
680 Ibid., 29; I. Horta Pinto, “Os Efeitos do ‘Direito Penal Europeau’ nos Sistemas Sancionatórios 
dos Estados Membros da Uniao Europeia”, note 678 supra, 825. 
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Framework Decision on trafficking in human beings have thresholds of penalties of 
equal severity for offences against goods and against persons.681 
 
4.2. The distinction between formal and substantive criminalisation 
 
Second, harmonisation and the increase in criminalisation seen earlier might not 
translate in similar levels in prosecution and punishment in national legal systems. This 
is so as harmonisation of national criminal law focuses on legislative measures alone 
and it does not account for the functioning of criminal justice systems at national level 
(a domain largely ignored by ECL). Consequently, police and judicial norms, 
guidelines and practices, for example, remain outside the scope of EU harmonisation 
measures. However, whilst these are not harmonised, they determine strongly policing 
or prosecution and ultimately the levels of punishment of a legal system. Hence, even if 
Member States would all implement equally the same framework decision divergence 
could still occur. As Lacey notes, a distinction between formal criminalisation 
(legislation, treaties, statutes – ‘law in the books’) and substantive criminalisation 
(actual application of the law) ought to be made for  
 
“Substantive criminalisation might increase or decrease in a world of stable formal 
criminalisation, while expanded criminalisation will not necessarily lead to greater 
substantive criminalisation unless certain other conditions – notably an increase in the 
resources available to enforcement agencies, and/ or the changes in their incentives – 
are met.”682  
 
Hence, a wider scope of criminalisation in the law will contribute to but not always 
translate into actual harsher practices of punishment.683  
  
                                                                  
681 A. Weyembergh, “Approximation of Criminal Law”, supra note 617, 1585-88. 
682 N. Lacey, “Historicising Criminalisation: Conceptual and Empirical Issues” (2009) 72 The 
Modern Law Review 936, 946. 
683 An interesting example of mismatch between a high level of formal criminalisation and a 
comparably low substantive criminalisation is the case of Italy during the Mussolini’s regime. 
The Rocco Code adopted in 1930 laid down very severe maximum sentences, throughout 
statutory minimum sentences and imprisonment as the primary method of punishment. 
Nonetheless, sentencing practice during those years was much more lenient than such code would 
suggest, thus toning formal criminalisation down; see V. Ruggiero, “Flexibility and intermittent 
emergency in the Italian penal system”, in V. Ruggiero, V. Ryan and J. Sim (eds) Western 
European Penal Systems: A Critical Anatomy (London: Sage Publications, 1995) 46, 51-52. For 
more examples of mismatch between formal and substantive criminalisation mainly due to the 
practices of judges and prosecutors in France and Germany respectively, see M. Cavadino and J. 
Dignan, Penal Systems, supra note 78, 338. Chapter 5 will also point out how different States 
make radical different use of prosecution instruments. 
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The dissociation between formal and substantive criminalisation is further accentuated 
in the context of the European Union, as ECL relies entirely on Member States to 
translate EU standards into their national criminal justice systems. This was particularly 
significant under the post-Amsterdam treaties which provided for a rather limited 
institutional framework in criminal matters which could at times compromise correct 
implementation of ECL (decision-making was to be done by unanimity, framework 
decisions lacked direct effect, the Commission had no enforcement powers or specific 
control over the implementation of ECL into national legal orders).684 
 
The Lisbon reforms nevertheless will strengthen the ‘post formal criminalisation 
process’ as it will significantly improve the EU’s capacity to adopt directly effective 
legislation and to police its implementation (decision making will be done by qualified 
majority, framework decisions will be replaced by directives which have direct effect, 
enforcement mechanisms will be available to the Commission and the Court will have 
full jurisdiction).685 The new TFEU will also leave open doors to further expansion of 
the scope of EU Law.686 This might suggest that criminalisation trends are likely to be 
continued or further exacerbated as expansion in some domains, namely in relation to 
EU policies is bound to push ECL into further domains of regulatory criminal law.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter shed light on the nature of harmonisation of national criminal law. It noted 
how the Treaties envisaged harmonisation as minimal in its range and depth but how in 
fact it was taken considerably beyond these boundaries. Measures were adopted in 
relation to Euro-crimes and these were defined through broad and catch-all concepts. 
Organised crime in this regard continues to be a clear example of EU’s flexible and 
broad approach to criminality. The chapter went on to show how harmonisation in 
criminal matters is facilitating the expansion of the domestic punitive framework. This 
was seen in three different ways: first, through the adoption of broad definitions of 
crime by the EU which led some Member States to introduce new criminal offences in 
their legal systems or to extend the scope of pre-existing ones; second, by requiring that 
liability for criminal actions be extended to legal persons which led several Member 
States to expand their domestic accountability framework; finally, by establishing 
minimum maximum penalties to be applied by Member States which led at times to a 
harshening of sentences at national level even beyond the threshold required by the EU 
norm. Overall thus, it was shown that harmonisation of national criminal law is 
                                                                  
684 Chapter 3, section 2.1. 
685 Chapter 3, section 3. 
686 Chapter 3, section 3. 
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bringing about a harsher criminal law across the European Union whilst placing 
additional pressure on more lenient States.  
 
These qualities of ECL mirror to some extent tendencies that national legal orders in 
Europe and even around the world have been experiencing. In fact, the harshening of 
national legal systems is a phenomenon common to many western legal orders for 
some decades now. Whilst the USA and the UK are the most striking examples in this 
matter,687 many other European countries have been evolving towards a harsher 
penality either through the imposition of severer sentences or by passing stricter 
statutes (although the studies available focus almost exclusively on punishment and not 
on the definition of offences).688 Hence, the nature of harmonisation of national 
criminal law so far seems to have a repressive emphasis. This, it will be seen in the 
next chapter, has been further complemented by another mechanism of integration in 
criminal matters – the principle of mutual recognition – under which State prosecution 
and punishment has also been strengthened.  
                                                                  
687 See, for example, J. Simon, Governing through Crime, supra note 568; D. Garland, The 
Culture of Control, supra note 42; and B. Hudson, “Diversity, crime and criminal justice”, in M. 
Maguire, R. Morgan, and R. Reiner, (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Oxford: OUP, 
2007) 158; M. Cavadino, J. Dignan, Penal Systems, supra note 78; V. Ruggiero, V. Ryan and J. 
Sim (eds) Western European Penal Systems: A Critical Anatomy (London: Sage Publications, 
1995). 
688 M. Cavadino, J. Dignan, Penal Systems, supra note 78. Differences amongst EU countries are 
nevertheless very sharp. Data of 2003, for example, shows that some new Member States had a 
prison population proportionately six times higher than Scandinavian countries (the latter 
imprisoned in average 50 to 70 prisoners per 100 000 inhabitants whilst the former imprisoned an 
average of 350 prisoners per 100 000 inhabitants).   
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Chapter 5 Mutual recognition in criminal matters: building a European Union 
investigation, prosecution and punishment legal order 
 
Introduction 
 
The principle of mutual recognition was endorsed by the European Council as the 
cornerstone of judicial cooperation in the EU in 1999. Regardless of not being written in 
the Treaties at the time, it has ever since deeply reshaped European Union criminal law 
(ECL) and its relationship with national legal orders. This chapter will restate how in its 
light, ECL went beyond its focus on Euro-crime and became virtually applicable to any 
type of criminality. Furthermore, it will show that, being the most dynamic area of 
integration in criminal matters it allowed for yet a further expansion of ECL into 
domains thus far left untouched. It will be suggested that the ultimate goal of mutual 
recognition has been one of facilitating State investigation and prosecution, and securing 
and managing punishment beyond national borders. In doing so, the principle re 
empowers the ius puniendi of the the State. Furthermore, the features of the application 
of the principle in criminal matters accentuate its punitive emphasis by favouring States 
who more readily prosecute or which criminalise more broadly.  
 
Looking at the principle in more detail, it will be suggested that it experienced two main 
stages of development. The first one featured a powerfully built punitive impetus where 
prosecution and sentence enforcement were highly enhanced and fundamental rights 
considerations were largely absent. As national legal orders struggled to accept and 
adapt to the deep changes that this first period of mutual recognition brought about 
(changes of, at times, constitutional nature), the principle entered its second stage. The 
latter saw the punitive emphasis of mutual recognition surviving, although in a nuanced 
form. This was seen in the integration of other elements, namely fundamental rights 
protection, a more assertive role to the executing State, and a more managerial approach 
to mutual recognition.  
 
The chapter will seek to develop this argument through four main sections. Section 1 
will look at the introduction and development of the principle of mutual recognition in 
the domain of criminal law. It will provide an overview of how the principle was 
borrowed from other domains of EU integration and how this was reflected in an 
expansionist and demanding shape in ECL – in fact its application grants 
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extraterritoriality to nothing less than to the ius puniendi of the different Member States. 
Furthermore, not only does it require Member States who are receivers of requests to 
recognise a foreign decision, it obliges them to execute it too, often by lending its law 
enforcement apparatus to the service of the requesting State. This is a more demanding 
form of mutual recognition than in other EU policy areas. Section 2 will look at how this 
is reflected in practice. In particular, it will look at the infamous European Arrest 
Warrant – the first and most important legislative development of mutual recognition 
thus far. It will be seen how, with a view of facilitating the surrender of individuals to 
face criminal proceedings or serve sentences in a different Member State, the EAW 
dropped long lasting extradition protectionist principles that enshrined national 
constitutional orders and practices such as the principle of non extradition of nationals, 
the possibility to refuse extradition based on human rights concerns and the principle of 
dual criminality. It will be shown how these changes greatly enhanced States’ capacity 
to prosecute and seek sentence enforcement across the EU and how they have the 
potential to favour the most severe or more ‘active’ legal system. Indeed, it will be see 
how this punitive impetus is used differently by different States: whilst some have 
issued a significant amount of EAWs, others show little interest in seeking prosecution 
beyond their national borders. This section will then look at how the punitive impetus of 
the EAW had a strong impact upon many domestic systems and was not necessarily well 
received by many national constitutional courts. Thus, some Member States introduced 
more exceptions and qualifications than the ones specifically provided in the Framework 
Decision. This ultimately led to a fragmented and uneven implementation across the EU. 
These were mostly driven by concerns with the possible deterioration of individual 
protection and the enhanced position of requesting States in the context of the removal 
of the principle of dual criminality.  
 
The chapter will then turn to the evolution of mutual recognition post EAW. It will be 
seen how, regardless of the hurdles of the EAW implementation, mutual recognition 
continued its path towards facilitating criminal investigation, prosecution and sentence 
enforcement in domains of financial penalties, evidence, prison penalties and alternative 
sanctions (section 3). It will be argued that, regardless of its ongoing punitive impetus, 
mutual recognition became more moderate or at least more accommodating of interests 
of the several actors involved (and not only of the issuing/requesting Member State). 
This was seen mostly in three elements: in a very weak implementation of measures on 
mutual recognition of financial penalties, on the partial or complete reintroduction of the 
principle of dual criminality throughout framework decisions on evidence and 
imprisonment sentences and in the consideration of the position of the individual in the 
operation of some of these measures. The last section of the chapter will pick up on this 
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last point and look at how the CJEU has interpreted the principle of ne bis in idem in the 
context of mutual recognition in criminal matters. It will be seen how the CJEU had 
repeatedly taken a broad view of the interpretation of the principle granting a wide 
protection to individuals who might see themselves facing threats of repeat prosecution 
or punishment by different Member States. However, it will also be suggested that such 
a wide protection rewards the State which is faster to prosecute. This is the case, for 
example, where a second State can no longer prosecute the same individual because a 
first State has already given closure to criminal proceedings regarding the same 
offences. It will be seen in this last section that this can raise questions of opportunity 
and balance when, for example, States are taking longer to prosecute because in order to 
gather sufficient evidence related to criminal organisations. In a final remark to this 
section it will be suggested that the EU is further expanding mutual recognition into a 
more managerial approach, attempting at coordinating positive conflicts of jurisdiction 
preventing a priori situations where there can be a violation of the ne bis in idem 
principle. 
 
1. The expansionist and punitive bias of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters 
 
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters was introduced into the Treaties in 1993 as a 
main axis for cooperation in justice and home affairs, side by side with police 
cooperation. Nonetheless, during most of the nineties developments in this domain were 
somehow limited.689 In 1999 however judicial cooperation went through a significant 
transformation when the European Council endorsed the principle of mutual recognition 
as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters across the European 
Union.690  
 
To be sure, until the Treaty of Lisbon mutual recognition in criminal matters had no 
mention in the Treaties. However, as harmonisation was proving politically difficult to 
achieve, the UK proposed mutual recognition – a principle long responsible for the 
                                                                  
689 See chapter 1 and 2. 
690 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, see supra note 54, para 33. The Cardiff 
European Council in 1998 had already caled for the enhancement of effective judicial 
cooperation in the fight against cross-border crime, Presidency Conclusions, Cardiff European 
Council, 15 and 16 June 1998, para 39. 
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development of the single market - as an alternative.691 The Commission followed up on 
this idea submitting that, 
 
“… borrowing from concepts that have worked very well in the creation of the Single 
Market, the idea was born that judicial co-operation might also benefit from the concept 
of mutual recognition which, simply stated, means that once a certain measure, such as 
a decision taken by a judge in exercising his or her officials powers in one Member 
State, has been taken, that measure – in so far as it has extranational implications- 
would automatically be accepted in all other Member States, and have the same or at 
least similar effects there.”692 
 
The Commission continued by explaining that this automaticity was possible because 
there was mutual trust between Member States’ criminal justice systems, 
 
“Mutual recognition is a principle which is widely understood as being based on the 
thought that while another state may not deal with a certain matter in the same or even 
similar way as one’s own state, the results will be such that they are acceptable as 
equivalent to decisions by one’s own state. Mutual trust is an important element, not 
only trust in the adequacy of one’s partners’ rules, but also trust that these rules are 
correctly applied.  
 
Based on the idea of equivalence and the trust it is based on, the results the other state 
has reached are allowed to take effect in one’s own sphere of legal influence. On this 
basis, a decision taken by an authority in one state could be accepted as such in another 
state, even though a comparable authority may not even exist in that state or could not 
take such decisions, or would have taken an entirely different decision in a comparable 
case.”693 
                                                                  
691 UK Delegation, Note from UK Delegation to the K4 Committee, Document 7090/99 
submitted to the K4 Committee, Brussels, 29 March 1999, para 7 and 8. 
692 European Commission, Commission Communication to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Mutual Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters, COM(2000)495final, 
Brussels, 26.7.2000, 2. 
693 Ibid., 4. In 2001 the Commission released a very extensive Programme of measures 
envisaging the application of mutual recognition to a wide range of areas of the criminal justice 
process, from pre-trial orders, extradition, prison sentences, among others, European 
Commission, Programme of Measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of 
decisions in criminal matters, OJ C 12/10 (2001). The idea of mutual recognition and mutual 
trust was further reinforced by the Commission in 2005 in the Green PaperCOM(2004)334final, 
see supra note 573, 12.  
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1.1 Expanding State power 
 
The transferability of the principle from the single market to criminal matters 
nonetheless has shown to be more complex than envisaged by the Commission. In fact, 
it has been argued that the principle reaches further and is more demanding in the 
criminal law context than in other policy areas. This is so because, whilst in other 
domains mutual recognition ensures free movement of goods and persons, in criminal 
matters mutual recognition ensures the free movement of judgments – the result of the 
ultimate expression of national sovereignty.694 As Lavenex argues, the applicability of 
mutual recognition to criminal matters allows the principle to become an ‘instrument of 
governmentalisation’ as it facilitates the free circulation of sovereign governmental acts. 
This, the author suggests, enhances States’ sphere and capacity of intervention, in 
contrast with mutual recognition in trade and consumption, which tends to enlarge the 
freedom and rights of the individuals vis-à-vis the State.695 Hence, mutual recognition 
ensures that should a State choose to prosecute or punish someone the power to do so is 
no longer limited to its own borders and law enforcement means but rather facilitated 
across the European Union. National decisions can be deemed valid, recognised and 
enforced beyond the domestic legal order and its physical and systematic boundaries. 
Mutual recognition seems to lend a possibility of extraterritoriality to domestic judicial 
decisions, consequently enhancing the State’s sphere of action.696 Furthermore, mutual 
recognition is more demanding in criminal matters as the type of recognition imposed is 
not passive as in other domains. In fact, it requires States to lend their law enforcement 
structures for the sake of the effectiveness of another State sovereign power. This is 
ultimately a more demanding form of recognition – a form of ‘systems recognition’ as 
Miguel Maduro labels it.697 As Maduro explains, the mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions is not based simply on the recognition of an applicable norm. Rather, it is 
based on the assumption that the other State’s judicial and legislative decisions are 
legitimate in systematic terms. This, the author continues,  
                                                                  
694 For an overview and critique of the extension of the principle from other areas of EU 
integration to criminal matters see S. Peers, “Mutual Recognition and Criminal Law in the 
European Union: Has the Council Got it Wrong?” (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 5, 23-
28. 
695 S. Lavenex, “Mutual recognition and the monopoly of force: limits of the single market 
analogy” (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 762, 765. 
696 For more on the idea of mutual recognition as creator of extraterritoriality see K. Nicolaidis 
and G Shaffer, “Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without Global 
Government”  (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 263, 267-268. 
697 M. Maduro, “So Close and Yet So Far: the Paradoxes of Mutual Recognition” (2007) 14 
Journal of European Public Policy 814, 823. 
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“(… )involves the recognition of rules, goals and the processes and institutions through 
which they are adopted and implemented in another system. Other forms of recognition 
also entail some recognition of the other’s system, only the latter is, in reality, deduced 
from the existence of policy coincidence or overcome if goal differentiation takes place 
in a non-systematic area (a more limited and less sensitive policy).”698 
 
Finally, as Mitsilegas notes, mutual recognition is a true ‘journey into the unknown’ in 
the sense that it requires national authorities of one State to accept, recognise and – in 
criminal matters – execute a national standard from another Member State. Although 
what is specifically being recognised is a specific national judicial decision, the latter is, 
as just seen, the embodiment of a States’ policy choices. To be sure, in other domains, as 
well as in criminal matters grounds for refusal to recognise have been introduced to 
avoid the complete automaticity of mutual recognition. Hence, although a State is, in 
principle, required to accept the other State’s national standard, it can still verify if 
certain condition are met and, in case they are not, it can refuse such recognition. These 
checks and safeguards however are being heavily contested in criminal matters as being 
insufficient or inadequate as it will be seen below.699 
  
1.2 Expanding State power to any criminality 
 
The principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters also has a broad scope. It was 
seen so far in the thesis that ECL has been focusing for most of its existence on Euro-
crimes and that most of its measures have been adopted following an idea of need to 
fight organised crime and protect EC interests and policies. However, with the adoption 
of mutual recognition as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in the European Union, 
the previous focus of ECL unfolds into domains previously left entirely untouched by 
the EU and in fact potentially to the entire realm of offences dealt with by domestic 
criminal law. The influence of ECL on national law via mutual recognition has two 
spheres. The first is composed of 32 serious criminal offence types in relation to which 
recognition operates almost automatically.700 This is achieved mostly by the abolition of 
the principle of dual criminality in relation to those offences. Hence, States are required 
to recognise and enforce judicial decisions of other States even when they refer to acts 
which are not considered criminal offences by the law of the ‘recognising’ State. 
                                                                  
698 Ibid., 823. 
699 V. Mitsilegas “The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in 
the European Union” (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1277, 1281-1282. 
700 See, for example, Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, supra note 383.  
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Besides these listed offences, mutual recognition also operates in relation to any other 
crimes but in those cases States only have to recognise decisions which refer to acts 
which are also deemed as criminal by their own law. Ultimately then mutual recognition 
can involve any type of criminality and becomes a tool of extraterritorial enforcement in 
relation not only to crimes with a European, transnational or cross border element, but 
even in relation to crimes that are purely national.701    
 
2. European Arrest Warrant 
 
The 2002 Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant,702 adopted in 2002, 
aimed at making extradition between Member States an easier and swift process703 by 
adopting a simplified and fast procedure and weakening or abolishing some of its 
traditional principles and operational extradition mechanisms.704  
                                                                  
701 This broad application has a caveat in relation to the Framework Decision on the EAW which 
sets a general threshold of applicability as it will be seen below (see note 643 below). See also 
chapter 3. 
702 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, supra note 383. 
703 According to some authors and views this was felt to be necessary in order to compensate for 
a freedom of movement of fugitive criminals across borders, task which had arguably been taken 
away from States which, with the removal of internal borders, no longer had the tools or capacity 
to be guarantors of internal security. Accordingly, a common market could also be seen at the 
same time as a ‘common criminal space’. See for example, W. Wagner, “Building an Internal 
Security Community: The Democratic peace and the Politics of Extradition in Western Europe” 
(2000) 40 Journal of Peace Research 695, 705; and N. Vennemann, “The European Arrest 
Warrant and its Human Rights Implications” (2003) 63 Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentlishes 
Retch und Volkerrecht (ZaoRV) 103. See also chapters 1-3 of this thesis. 
704 We will use the terms surrender and extradition interchangeably in this dissertation. 
Nonetheless, it is fundamental to note that differences between extradition and surrender were 
debated by several authors whose opinion differed on whether the two were similar or distinct 
concepts. The controversia related to the fact that the Framework Decision replaces former 
European instruments on extradition whilst using the word ‘surrender’ instead of ‘extradition’. 
The debate was thus (and remains to some extent) whether amongst EU countries extradition in 
the classic sense had been replaced by ‘surrender’ of if the two concepts were synonyms. For a 
detailed account of distinction between the two from a substantive and procedural point of view 
see, for example, O. Lagodny, “’Extradition’ without granting procedure: The Concept of 
‘Surrender’”, in Judge R. Blekxtoon and W. van Ballegooij (eds) Handbook on the European 
Arrest Warrant (The Hague, The Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2005) 39. Lagodny argues 
that the EAW creates a “new system in relation to procedural aspects whilst giving a more 
modest qualitative leap”. A more distinctive account was given by Advocate General Ruiz- 
Jarabo Colomer, for instance, in its conclusions in the case Advocaten voor de Wereld, where he 
held that, besides the common rationale of serving the same purpose of surrendering individuals, 
the two had nothing in common. This position was justified mainly with the factors that 
extradition can be operated between two sovereign States only, is decided on a case-by-case 
basis, goes beyond the legal sphere into the political realm and enters the scope of international 
relations, and, finally, justifies the applicability of the principles of reciprocity and dual 
criminality. Advocate General Ruiz Jarabo Colomer, Case C-303/05, ECR I 3633 [2007] 41.  
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These changes in extradition across the European Union took place in a haste after the 
9/11 attacks in NY with the Commission’s submission of a draft proposal ten days after 
the events. The proposal was further pushed through the Council in three months only. 
To be sure, the Framework Decision was already being negotiated for a significant 
amount of time but those negotiations had, at that stage, no end in sight and the draft put 
forward by the Commission after 9/11 was significantly different. Hence, the EAW, 
which Douglas Scott called the “jewel in the crown of the EU’s responses to the terrorist 
attacks”, was passed through the deliberative process with extreme urgency.705 
 
The EAW is a judicial decision issued by a judicial authority of a Member State aiming 
at the arrest and surrender of a requested person by another Member State for the 
purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a detention order or a 
custodial sentence.706 Such a judicial decision can be issued only in relation to acts 
punishable by the law of the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention 
order of a maximum of at least 12 months, or by a passed sentence of a custodial 
sentence of at least 4 months.707  
 
The main objective of the Framework Decision is to make extradition in relation to such 
criminality a simpler and faster process.708 A first step to this involved the 
‘depoliticisation’ of the process which is now to be entirely decided by the judiciary. 
This was expected to make surrender based on more objective and formal criteria rather 
than bilateral processes that can involve political negotiation. Secondly, very tight 
deadlines for the execution of an EAW and the surrender of individuals in question were 
established. The wording of the framework decision is particularly telling when it noted 
that a request shall be dealt with as a ‘matter of urgency’.709 In fact, the final decision to 
surrender an individual shall be taken within 10 days (when the requested person 
consents to her surrender) or within 60 days (when there is no such consent).710 
Furthermore, the person requested shall be surrendered no later than 10 days after the 
                                                                  
705 Accordingly the speed of the process was such that the European Parliament even received out 
of date and last minute drafts, see S. Douglas-Scott, “The rule of law in the European Union”, see 
supra note 393, 228. 
706 See Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, supra note 383. 
707 Article 2(1), ibid..  
708 The EAW “should replace all the previous instruments concerning extradition”, Intent 11 of 
the Preamble of the Framework Decision, ibid.. 
709 Article 17 ibid.. 
710 Article 17 ibid..  
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final decision on the execution of the EAW.711 Moreover, the procedure is to be 
simplified and operated with great automaticity whilst the request is made through a 
form with limited details regarding the offence and facts at stake.712  
 
Furthermore, the simplification of the former extradition procedure was complemented 
by the partial abolition of three fundamental pillars of extradition - the principle of non-
extradition of nationals, the refusal to extradite on human rights grounds and the 
principle of dual criminality. 
 
The exception or principle of non-extradition of nationals was a long-standing feature of 
European extradition law dating back to the nineteenth century.713 The principle was 
based on an idea of a connection, a special link between the State and its own nationals, 
which would grant the latter the right to be protected by its own State in different ways, 
including by not being exposed to the violence and extra burden of a foreign criminal 
justice system. The reasons for non-extradition of nationals were varied and date back to 
the late nineteenth century as well.714 In Britain, a Commission appointed in 1978 to 
analyse the issue of extradition, summarised (and rejected)715 in four main points the 
                                                                  
711 Article 23 (2) ibid..  
712 The form ought to include information on the following elements only: identity and 
nationality of the requested person, contact details of the issuing judicial authority, evidence of an 
enforceable judgment, an arrest warrant or an enforceable judicial decision, the nature and legal 
classification of the offence, a description of the circumstances in which the offence was 
committed, including the time, place and degree of participation in the offence by the requested 
person (the form leaves a 5 line space for this information), the penalty imposed if there is a final 
judgement or the prescribed scale of penalties for the offence under the law of the issuing 
Member State, if possible other consequences of the offence. Article 8 and Annex to the 
Framework Decision, ibid.. 
713 France was the first European country to sign an extradition Treaty in 1834 specifically 
prohibiting the extradition of French nationals. By mid nineteenth century most European civil 
law countries had adopted this protection and such feature persisted until very recently (this 
included Switzerland, The Netherlands, Italy and a special agreement between Nordic countries). 
Common law countries did not make use of the exception of non extradition of nationals. For an 
account of the historical evolution of the principle ever since ancient Greece until today see M. 
Plachta, “(Non) Extradition of Nationals: A Neverending Story?” (1999) 13 Emory International 
Law Review 77. 
714 Deen-Racsmany and Blextoon note how the abolishment of the nationality exception in 
Europe was expected and predicted by many given the similarity of values and the long shared 
European history, Z. Deen-Racsmany and R. Blekxtoon, “The Decline of the Nationality 
Exception in European Extradition? The Impact of the Regulation of (Non)Surrender of 
Nationals and Dual Criminality under the European Arrest Warrant” (2005) 13 European Journal 
of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 317, 320-321. 
715 In fact, the principle of non-extradition of nationals is common to civil law countries but not 
necessarily to common law ones. The latter tend to prefer territorial jurisdiction and accept the 
extradition of their own nationals under due human rights conditions (whilst civil law systems 
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arguments against extradition of nationals: a subject ought not to be withdrawn from his 
natural judges; the state owed its citizens the protection of its laws; it is impossible to 
place entire confidence in the justice of a foreign country; and it is a serious 
disadvantage for a person to be tried in a foreign language and where he is separated 
from his friend and resources and from those who bear witness of his previous life and 
character.716  The main European legal instrument regarding extradition was, until 
recently, also along these lines. The European Convention on Extradition of 1957, for 
example, conferred the right to the contracting parties to refuse extradition of their 
nationals.717 In fact, at least 18 of the EU Member States had attached such a declaration 
to the Convention.718 Other European arrangements also abided by the principle, such as 
the Benelux Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters signed in 
1962 which laid down an obligation not to extradite.719  
 
A first sign that the use of this exception was beginning to subside in Europe was seen in 
the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement in 1990 which no longer 
prohibited directly the extradition of nationals as long as the person concerned would 
agree to it and the laws of the requested State did not prohibit it.720 This shift was later 
on confirmed by the 1996 Convention on Extradition between the Member States of the 
European Union which attempted to make the principle of non extradition of nationals 
the exception to the normal regime, whilst in fact still allowing it if a Member State 
would declare a wish to continue not to extradite its own nationals.721 Regardless of the 
proposed flexible framework, six Member States still attached declarations firmly 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
tended to prefer personal jurisdiction over territorial one). For a detailed account of English and 
Wales law see M. Hirst, Jurisdiction and the Ambit of the Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003). 
716 Royal Commission on Extradition, Report of the Commissioners, C.2039, 1878, in M. 
Plachta, “(Non) Extradition of Nationals”, supra note 713, 86-87. See also, for example, M. 
Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction of the Law of the Sea (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2007)13-14; and R. Donner, The Regulation of nationality in international law, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Transnational Publishers, 1994). 
717 Article 6 (1) (c) of the Council of Europe European Convention on Extradition, ETS No24, 13 
December 1957. 
718 The 18 countries were: Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain and Sweden in Z. Deen-Racsmany and R. Blekxtoon, “The Decline of the Nationality 
Exception”, supra note 714, 323. 
719 Article 5(1), Benelux Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 616 
UNTS 120, 27 June 1067. 
720 Article 66 of the Convention applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, supra note 
59. 
721 Article 7, Council Act drawing up the Convention relating to extradition between the Member 
States of the European Union, 27 September 1996, OJ C 313 [1996]. The Convention never 
entered into force mostly due to French and Italian failures to ratify (although it was 
provisionally applied between some Member States) and it was superseded by the Framework 
Decision on the EAW, see Article 31(1)(d) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, note 383. 
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refusing the extradition of their own nationals (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece 
Luxembourg and Latvia) whilst seven others (Belgium, Finland, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) declared they would allow extradition of 
nationals under certain conditions only (dual criminality, guarantees of return, 
reciprocity, among others).722   
 
The abolition of the principle of non-extradition of nationals seem thus to break the 
initial link between the national citizen and the State, embodying a new connection 
between the national citizens and the EU. In fact, in an increasingly more volatile and 
integrationist legal Europe - and world - the reasons for refusal to extradite nationals 
became partially out-dated and the long lasting connection between the State and its own 
nationals began to subside and be questioned by other notions such as residence or even 
EU citizenship. The new paradigm ultimately assumes that an individual can stand trial 
before any European court and not just before those of her State of nationality. The EU 
space becomes an area of justice where EU nationals are no longer granted the 
protection of the borders of their country of nationality or residence and are potentially 
equally accountable to any European court regardless of their geographical location, 
nationality or place of residence.723 This reshaped relationship between citizens and the 
State led to negative reactions in national legal orders and received strong criticisms 
from national constitutional courts, as will be seen below.  
 
Protection by the State, traditionally granted for individuals, was further shaken with the 
non-inclusion in the Framework Decision of the possible violation of human rights in 
the requesting State as an exception for non-surrender. Refusal on a human rights basis 
was common even in countries with liberal traditions of extradition (for example States 
which would extradite their nationals such as those with a common law tradition).724  
 
                                                                  
722 More details in Z. Deen-Racsmany and R. Blekxtoon, “The Decline of the Nationality 
Exception”, note 714, 326. 
723 Nonetheless, as it will be seen below, the Framework Decision leaves some options of retreat 
relating to the exercise of territorial jurisdiction and to the serving of the sentence. Article 4(7) 
allows a Member State to refuse surrender in case the offence was committed in whole or in part 
in its own territory; whereas Article 5(3) allows Member States to surrender under the condition 
of return of the person in order to serve a resulting custodial sentence or detention order in the 
State of origin.  
724 See, for example, M. Plachta, “(Non) Extradition of Nationals”, note 713, 86-87. It is argued 
by some that human rights do not necessarily always operate as a barrier to refusal as different 
human rights can have different importance or violations can vary in their severity. For a short 
summary of different positions in the literature and of the EcHR decisions on the matter see M. 
Mackarel, “Human Rights as a Barrier to Surrender”, in N. Keijzer and E. van Siiedregt (eds) The 
European Arrest Warrant in Practice (The Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009) 140-143. 
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To be sure, concerns with fundamental rights in general, although not enumerated as 
grounds for refusal to surrender, are mentioned in the preamble of the Framework 
Decision:  
 
“(12) This Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the principles 
recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular chapter VI thereof. Nothing in 
this Framework Decision shall be interpreted as prohibiting refusal to surrender a 
person for whom a European arrest warrant has been issued when there are reasons to 
believe, on the basis of objective elements, that the said arrest warrant has been issued 
for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on the grounds of his sex, race, 
religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, political opinions or sexual orientation, or 
that that person’s position may be prejudiced for any of those reasons (...) 
 
(13) No person should be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a 
serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”725  
 
Furthermore, Article 11 of the Framework Decision details the rights of the requested 
person: the latter shall be informed of the EAW and its contents and of the possibility of 
consenting to surrender; it shall furthermore have the right to be assisted by a legal 
counsel and by an interpreter in accordance with the law of the executing Member State. 
 
These elements, according to Morgan, should be a reassurance of the satisfactory level 
of protection offered by the Framework Decision and EU law as there are at least three 
categories of safeguards for a person subject to a European Arrest Warrant: the fair trial 
guarantees enshrined in the ECHR and other international instruments, additional 
measures by the Commission such as the proposal for a Framework Decision on certain 
procedural rights (whose negotiations failed – see chapter 3) and finally the safeguards 
built in the Framework Decision on the EAW itself, such as the reference to 
                                                                  
725 Intend (12) and (13), Preamble of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, note 383. This 
enunciation largely mirrors the European Court of Human Rights (EcHR) case law, namely its 
fundamental decision in 1989 prohibiting extradition when the person to be extradited would be 
likely to suffer inhuman or degrading treatment or torture. More significantly this prohibition 
concerned extradition from the UK to the USA, regardless of the latter not being signatory of the 
ECHR, Soering v. UK, No 14038/88, judgment of 7 July 1989. 
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fundamental rights in the preamble and the right to legal aid and interpretation enshrined 
in Article 11 of the Framework Decision.726  
 
This framework is significantly improved in the post Lisbon framework with the 
adoption of two Directives on procedural rights, namely the Directive on the right of 
information in the course of criminal proceedings which was very recently adopted.727 
The Directive envisages the provision of an ‘appropriate’ Letter of Rights to persons 
who are arrested for the purpose of the execution of an EAW, although it does not 
provide further details on the type of information that should be provided in those 
cases.728 Likewise, a Directive on translation and interpretation rights has also been 
adopted,729 covering the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings 
and proceedings for the execution of an EAW which shall apply to persons from the 
time they are made aware that they area suspected or accused of having committed a 
criminal offence until conclusion of the proceedings and if applicable sentencing and 
resolution of any appeal.730 
 
Regarding the Framework Decision on the EAW itself, however, the placement of the 
principle of protection of fundamental rights in extradition in the preamble, but not in 
the list of grounds for refusal or of conditions that can be demanded from the requesting 
State, creates a distinction between the two. This distinction is suggested by the 
Commission when it pointed out, in its implementing reports and working documents, 
that States which expressly introduced a ‘human rights clause’ - as grounds for refusal to 
surrender - in their national legislation implementing the Framework Decision, went 
beyond the wording of the latter.731 This implies that, in the Commission’s opinion, the 
                                                                  
726 C. Morgan, “The EAW and Defendant’s Rights”, in Judge R. Blekxtoon and W. van 
Ballegooij (eds) Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant (The Hague/ The Netherlands: 
T.M.C. Asser Press, 2005) 195. N. Keijzer and P. Garlick also share the idea of balance in the 
amount of protection given by the EU framework to the protection of the fundamental rights of 
the requested person, see N. Keijzer, “Extradition and Human Rights: A Dutch Perspective”, in 
Judge R. Blekxtoon and W. van Ballegooij (eds) Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant 
(The Hague/ The Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2005) 183; and P. Garlick, “The European 
Arrest Warrant and the ECHR”, in Judge R. Blekxtoon and W. van Ballegooij (eds) Handbook on 
the European Arrest Warrant (The Hague/ The Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2005) 181. 
727 Directive 2012/12/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the 
right to information in criminal proceedings, OJ L 142/1 [2012].  
728 Article 5, ibid.. 
729 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on 
the right of interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, OJ L 280/1 [2010]. 
730 Articles 1, 2 and 3, ibid.. 
731 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Annex to the Report from the 
Commission on the Implementation since 2005 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 
2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, 
SEC(2007)979, Brussels 11.7.2007; in relation to  Lithuania and Denmark who introduced a 
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text of the preamble does not amount to actually granting States the option of 
introducing a human rights exception in domestic laws. 732 
 
The absence of a human rights clause coupled with its statement in the preamble 
conveys the idea that the standard of protection of human rights across the European 
Union is satisfactory - the same basis that in any case allowed for the assumption of 
mutual trust between Member States. Nonetheless, this is not always the case. Alegre 
and Leaf point out in this regard that there is no mechanism for monitoring or ensuring 
that ECHR rights are respected and enforced across the EU.733 Additionally, many 
Member States have at times in fact struggled with meeting the Convention’s 
standard.734 The CJEU has recently clearly acknowledged so in case N.S. noting that the 
ratification of the ECHR by a Member State “…cannot result in the application of a 
conclusive presumption that that State observes those conventions.”735 Moreover, the 
Commission itself has voiced concerns on the relationship between the EAW and human 
rights. This was noted recently in the last implementing report: 
 
“From the issues raised in relation to the operation of the EAW it would seem that, 
despite the fact that the law and criminal procedures of all Member States are subject to 
the standards of the European Court of Human Rights, there are often some doubts 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
human rights exception as a mandatory ground for refusal, see page 9; in relation to Italy, who 
introduced a human rights exception as an optional ground for refusal  see page 16. 
732 It will be interesting to see if in the future a case concerning the introduction of these human 
rights provisions into national legal orders reaches the CJEU. This is so as the Court often refers 
to the preamble of legislation for guidance in its teleological reasoning. In doing so it requires 
that the object, scheme and purpose of the legislation be taken into account when interpreting 
specific provisions. In West, for example, an EAW related case, the CJEU commented on recitals 
5 and 7 of the preamble of the Framework Decision holding that: “(...) as is clear from recitals 5 
and 7 in the preamble to the Framework Decision, the purpose of the Framework Decision is to 
replace the multilateral system of extradition between Member States with a system of surrender, 
as between judicial authorities, of convicted persons or suspects for the purpose of enforcing 
judgments or of criminal proceedings, that system of surrender being based on the principle of 
mutual recognition (…)”; Case C-192/12 PPU Proceedings concerning the execution of a 
European arrest warrant issued in respect of Melvin West, not yet published, 54.  
733 S. Alegre and M. Leaf, European Arrest Warrant – a solution ahead of its time? (London: 
Justice, 2003) 14.  
734 P. Garlick, “The European Arrest Warrant and the ECHR”, supra note 726, 177. 
735 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. v Secretary of State, Judgment of the Court of 21 
December 2011, not yet published, para 103. The case concerns the transfer of asylum seekers 
from the UK back to Greece (their point of entrance). The Court further stated that the 
assumption that asylum sekeers will be treated  in a way which complies with fundamental rights 
must be rebutable, hence allowing in particular circunstances the reassesment of the conditions 
according to which, in this case asylum seekers, will be treated in the State where they would be 
returned to (see para 104-107). Hence, the Court found that the transfer of an asylum seeker to 
another Member State should not take place if the there are substantial grounds that the asylum 
seeker would face real risk of being suject to inhuman or degrading treatment which the Court 
found to be the case in this articular dispute.  
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about standards being similar across the EU. While an individual can have recourse to 
the European Court of Human Rights to assert rights rising from the European 
Convention of Human Rights, this can only be done after an alleged breach has 
occurred and all domestic legal avenues have been exhausted. This has not proved to be 
an effective means of ensuring that signatories comply with the Convention’s 
standards.”736  
 
The same concerns are also voiced specifically vis-à-vis defence rights laid down in 
Article 11 of the Framework Decision. These leave out a significant part of the surrender 
procedure, such as the right to legal representation in the executing State and detention 
conditions, for example. Again, the Commission came to voice this in 2011: 
 
“While welcoming the fact that the EAW is a successful mutual recognition instrument in 
practice, the Commission is also aware of the EAW’s remaining imperfections, notably 
when it comes to its implementation at national level. The Commission has received 
representations from European and national parliamentaries, defence lawyers, citizens 
and civil society groups highlighting a number of problems with the operation of the 
EAW: no entitlement to legal representation in the issuing state during the surrender 
proceedings in the executing state; detention conditions in some Member States 
combined with sometimes lengthy pre-trial detention for surrendered persons(…).”737 
 
Finally, the partial abolition of dual criminality738 - the principle which ensures that no 
one shall be punished for acts not deemed as criminal where and when they are 
committed (nullum crimen sine lege) - also weakened the position of the individuals.739 
The principle of dual criminality relates closely to the principle of legal certainty, 
according to which the law must be clear and precise, its legal implications foreseeable. 
The abolition of dual criminality also balanced the relationship between States 
themselves. The principle holds that States can refuse extradition in cases where the 
conduct at stake is not deemed as criminal by their own laws. This relies on the idea that 
                                                                  
736 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 
on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between the Member States, 
COM(2011) 175 final, Brussels, 11.4.2011, 6. 
737 European Commission Report, ibid. 6. For more details on detention see section below in this 
chapter.  
738 Also known as principle of double criminality. 
739 N. Keijzer, “The Double Criminality Requirement” in Judge R. Blekxtoon and W. van 
Ballegooij, Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant (The Hague/ The Netherlands: T.M.C. 
Asser Press, 2005) 137, 137-138. 
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States should not have to use their sovereign powers for the enforcement of norms 
contrary to their own conceptions of law. The principle was contemplated, for example, 
by the 1957 European Convention on Extradition and hence, previous to the EAW, the 
absence of dual criminality functioned as mandatory ground for refusal to extradite 
amongst Member States.  
 
Under the new EAW regime this guarantee can no longer be maintained in relation to 
requests regarding 32 types of offence listed as long as these are punishable in the 
issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or detention order of at least 3 years. The 
offences include Euro-crimes (such as trafficking in human beings or drugs, fraud, 
terrorism, participation in a criminal organisation, etc.), crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court, or serious crimes which have been untouched by 
harmonisation at EU level (such as arson, murder, rape, racketeering or extortion, among 
others).740 Hence, in relation to these offences as defined by the issuing Member States 
and as long as punishable with at least 3 years imprisonment, surrender of an individual 
cannot be refused even in the circumstance where the same acts are not deemed as 
criminal offences under the law of the executing Member State.  
 
The abolition of dual criminality raises several issues. First, it raises a question of 
whether it is necessary. If EU Member States share common values and understandings 
of the purpose and goals of criminal justice (as suggested by the assumption of mutual 
trust) it would be expected that, at least in relation to serious criminality (of which the 
32 types of offence to which dual criminality does not apply are certainly examples), 
their legal approaches would be similar to an extent where dual criminality would be 
practically irrelevant because different Member States would make similar criminalising 
options.741 
 
Hence, the fact that the principle of dual criminality was partly removed, suggests that 
such similarity is lacking and that Member States still criminalise certain crimes 
differently. In fact - different national laws do offer different definitions of the same 
offences.742 Hence, whilst in some countries a certain type of behaviour is considered a 
criminal offence, in others the same behaviour might simply escape the umbrella of the 
                                                                  
740 Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, note 383.  
741 See G. Vermeulen, “How Far can We Go in Applying the Principle of Mutual Recognition?”, 
in C. Fijnaut and J. Ouwerkerk (eds) The Future of Police and Judicial Cooperation in the 
European Union (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2010) 243. 
742 This in fact happens even in relation to crimes whose definition has been harmonised by the 
EU, see chapter 4. 
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criminal law altogether. The textbook example is, of course, that of euthanasia which is 
deemed as murder by most legal orders but is permitted, under certain statutory 
conditions, in Belgium and in the Netherlands. The lack of dual criminality in cases 
involving such acts and those countries can lead to cases where the limits of the EAW 
will be tested.  Deen-Racsmany and Blextoon give the hypothetical example of the 
Dutch doctor who is charged with murder in Italy for legal euthanasia in Belgium.743 
Equally representative would be the case of rape, an offence that has very different 
definitions in different Member States. Whilst in some the lack of consent of the victim 
for sexual penetration is sufficient to constitute rape, in other Member States the use of 
compulsion, threat or physical force is absolutely necessary.744 
 
These differences in the criminalisation of the same acts by different Member States 
partly defeat the idea of commonality between Member States’ views of crime. As the 
examples given by Deen-Racsmany and Blextoon show, the abolition of dual criminality 
clearly gives priority to the Member State who punishes a certain conduct even if the 
executing State does not consider the same conduct as a criminal act. Ultimately then, by 
dropping the requirement of dual criminality, the EAW gives preference to the legal 
order that punishes more widely. The more lenient system – for example the one that 
does not criminalise euthanasia – sees no use in the EAW in relation to those acts. 
Consequently, it becomes a mere receiver of other States’ requests. In this light, the 
EAW clearly becomes a tool of facilitation of prosecution and punishment for the States 
that criminalise more heavily and / or that have more proactive prosecuting authorities 
and policies.  
 
Data on the EAW in practice clearly suggests this imbalance – some Member States are 
heavy issuers of EAWs whilst others seem to use them moderately if not 
parsimoniously. Germany and Poland, for example, issue a significantly higher number 
of EAWs than any other country. If we look at the number of EAWs issued in 2009 we 
find 4844 EAWs issued by Poland and 2433 by Germany as opposed to, for example, 17 
EAWs issued by Cyprus, 220 by the UK, 263 EAWs by Finland and 1240 by France.745 
In fact, Poland has been a very active user of the EAW from the beginning.746 This can 
                                                                  
743 Z. Deen-Racsmany and Judge R. Blekxtoon, “The Decline of the Nationality Exception”, 
supra note 714, 353. 
744 See for a detailed list of differences N. Keijzer, “The Double Criminality Requirement, supra 
note 739, 152-160. 
745 See complete data (except for Italy who hasn’t provide information on their own practices yet) 
in European Commission 2011 Report, supra note 736, 12.  
746 The extremely high number of EAWs it issues, many to the UK, has led to slightly surreal 
situations as reported by The Economist in an article on the EAW in 2010: “Every fortnight an 
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be partly explained by the fact that the Polish criminal justice system endorses the 
principle of legality or compulsory prosecution, which obliges public prosecutors to 
institute or carry out preliminary proceedings when there is a good reason to suspect an 
offence has been committed. Nonetheless, the public prosecutor retains some 
discretionary powers,747 and, accordingly, the room for discretion in prosecution has 
been increasingly, especially in cases of lesser importance as noted by a representative 
of the Polish National Prosecution Officer.748 This discretion also exists in relation to the 
EAW – Article 607a of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure states that a Circuit Court 
may issue an EAW upon request of a public prosecutor.749 This suggests that the issuing 
of EAWs in Poland is subject to a degree of discretion which makes the Polish impetus 
to issue such a high number of EAWs all the more significant.  
 
The use of the EAW, in general, has been considered successful by the Commission who 
stated in 2006 that the EAW was an ‘overall success’ and that the average time to 
execute a warrant had fallen from more than 9 months to 43 days. In the period from 
January to September 2004, 2603 warrants were issued, 653 persons arrested and 104 
persons surrendered.750 Furthermore, a year later a new report by the Commission tells 
of renewed tales of success as the Commission reports,  
 
“For the whole of 2005, nearly 6 900 warrants were issued by the 23 Member States 
that sent in figures (excluding Belgium and Germany), twice as many as in 2004. In 
over 1 770 cases, the person wanted was traced and arrested.”751 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
aeroplane carrying Polish policemen touches down at an airport in southern England. Waiting 
for them each time is a glum of handcuffed men who are to be flown back to face trial in Poland. 
Extradited prisoners are normally to be transferred on ordinary commercial flights, but a surge 
in the number being sent from Britain to Poland means that now fortnightly ‘ConAIr’ service is 
being laid on by the Polish authorities. […].” The Economist, “Extraditions to Poland – Wanted, 
for chicken rustling”, January 2nd 2010.  
747 T. P. Marguery, “Unity and Diversity of the Public Prosecution Services in Europe, A study of 
the Czech, Dutch, French and Polish systems”, PhD Dissertation, University of Groningen, 12 
June 2008, 202-211. 
748 J. Szymanski, “Discretionary Powers of public prosecution: opportunity and legality principle 
– Advantages and disadvantages”, Conference of Prosecutors General of Europe, 5th Session, 
Council of Europe, Celle, 23-25 May 2004, 3. 
749 Translation available in “The European Arrest Warrant Database”, Council of the European 
Union, last visited on 23 May 2012. Available at 
http://www.law.uj.edu.pl/~kpk/eaw/legislation/Poland_National_legislation_EAW.pdf  
750 European Commission, Report from the Commission based on Article 34 of the Council 
Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States (revised version), COM(2006)8 final, 24.1.2006.  
751 European Commission, Report from the Commission since 2005 of the Council Framework 
Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, 
COM(2007)407final, 11.7.2007.  
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By 2011, numbers on the EAW were significantly higher: 
 
“Available statistics compiled for the years between 2005 and 2009 […] recorded 54 
689 EAWs issued and 11 630 EAWs executed. During that period between 51% and 
62% of requested persons consented to the surrender, on average within 14 to 17 days. 
The average surrender time for those who did not consent was 48 days.”752  
 
The average of executed EAWs was 2 326 during these years – more than 
double than 2004 number.  
 
A closer look at these data however puts the whole rationale of the EAW into 
perspective and brings further to the fore its punitive nature. The EU jewel in the crown 
of counter terrorism and of the EU fight against serious criminality753 is often being used 
by Member States to pursue the prosecution of much more trivial offences. Examples 
are many. Already in 2007, it was reported that Member States were issuing EAWs for 
non serious - if not petty – criminality. Examples varied from the possession of very 
small quantities of drugs (0,45 grams of cannabis; 1,5 grams of marijuana; 0,15 grams of 
heroin; 3 ecstasy tablets); to petty theft (theft of a piglet; theft of two car tyres); or for 
the driving of a car under the influence of alcohol where the limit was not significantly 
exceeded (0,81mg/l).754 In 2008, The Guardian reported similar cases of issuing of 
EAWs for theft of a dessert, for removal of a wardrobe door (EAWs issued by Poland) 
or ‘piglet rustling’ (EAW issued by Lithuania).755 And by 2011 this trend was 
maintained. This led the Commission to particularly address the issue of proportionality 
in its latest report in rather alarming terms: 
 
                                                                  
752 European Commission Report COM(2011)175 final, supra note 736, 3. 
753 Article 2(1) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA sets a threshold of punishability of 
offences below which EAWs may not be issued: “A European arrest warrant may be issued for 
acts punishable by the law of the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention 
order for a maximum period of at least 12 months or, where a sentence has been passed or a 
detention order has been made, for sentences of at least four months.”, supra note 383. 
754 Council, Note from the Presidency to the Working Party on Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
on the Proposed subject for discussion at the experts’ meeting on the application of the 
Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant on 17 July 2007 – the proportionality 
issue, Document 10975/07, Brussels, 9 July 2007, 3; See also Council of the European Union, 
Information Note 11371/07 on Replies to questionnaire on quantitative information on the 
practical cooperation of the European Arrest Warrant – Year 2006, Doc. 11371/2/07, REV2, 
Brussels, 27 July 2007.  
755 David Cronin, “No justice in EU extradition system”, The Guardian, 5 August 2009. 
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“Confidence in the application of the EAW has been undermined by the systematic issue 
of EAWs for the surrender of persons sought in respect of often very minor offences.”756 
 
This use of the EAW precisely suggests that the more pro-punishment and pro-
prosecutorial Member States can make use of an extra tool to expand their sovereign 
powers beyond their national borders – and this can be done not only in relation to 
extremely serious criminality but also petty crime as seen in the former section. Hence 
EU instruments whose stated political rationale was to fight serious criminality are de 
facto being used as instruments to prosecute or seek sentence enforcement for a 
significantly broader range of crimes. 
 
2.1 Nuancing the punitive impetus of the EAW: EU and national judicial reactions 
 
The CJEU and the EAW 
 
To be sure, the Framework Decision still offers several grounds for refusal to surrender. 
It allows Member States to maintain or introduce three mandatory grounds for refusal 
(cases where a Member State has to refuse the execution of a EAW): the offence being 
covered by an amnesty in the executing State (when that State has jurisdiction to 
prosecute such offence); when the person has already been finally judged by the same 
acts; when the person may not be held criminally responsible owing to his age.757 These 
mandatory grounds are complemented by optional grounds for non-execution of the 
warrant. The list is longer than the previous one and some criteria seem to overlap at 
least partially. Eight grounds for optional refusal of a EAW by the executing Member 
State are envisaged: the verification of dual criminality in relation to non-listed offences; 
ongoing criminal prosecution in the executing Member State for the same acts; where a 
final judgement has been passed in the executing Member State or when the latter 
decided not to prosecute or to halt proceedings; when prosecution is statute-barred 
according to the law of the executing Member State; when the requested person has been 
finally judged in a third State in respect to the same acts and a sentence has been served, 
is being served or can no longer be served under the law of the sentencing country; if the 
requested person is staying in, is a national or a resident of the executing State and the 
latter undertakes to execute the sentence or detention order in accordance with its 
domestic law; and finally, when the offences are regarded by the law of the executing 
                                                                  
756 European Commission Report COM(2011)175 final, supra note 736, 7. 
757 Article 3 of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, note 383.  
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State has having been committed in whole or in part in the territory of the executing 
Member State or when the offences were committed outside the territory of the issuing 
Member State and the law of the executing Member State does not allow prosecution for 
those offences when committed outside its territory.758    
 
Furthermore, besides grounds for refusal, Article 5 of the Framework Decision lists 
three conditions that executing State can demand for in order to agree to surrender an 
individual. First, it allows for the executing Member State to make surrender dependent 
upon giving the requested individual the opportunity to apply for a retrial when a 
sentence was passed in absentia and he or she was not summoned or otherwise informed 
of the trial.759 Second, where a life sentence could be imposed, the executing Member 
State can demand the guarantee that the sentence can be reviewed after 20 years at the 
latest.760 Finally, the surrender can be made conditional upon the return of the national or 
resident in order to serve the passed sentence in the territory of the Member State of 
origin.761 
 
The CJEU has had the opportunity to provide some guidance in the interpretation of 
several of these provisions. Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision, for instance, has 
been the focus of several cases brought before the Court. The provision is one of the 
listed optional grounds for refusal and stipulates that an executing authority may refuse 
to execute carry out an EAW issued for the purposes of executing a sentence where that 
warrant concerns a person who “is staying in, or is a national or a resident of the 
executing Member State” and in case that State undertakes to execute that sentence in 
accordance to its domestic law.  
 
In Kozlowski,762 the Court was asked to clarify the meaning of the terms ‘resident’ or 
‘staying in’ for the purposes of Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision. Mr. Kozlowski 
had been sentenced in Poland on 28 May 2003 to five months imprisonment for 
destruction of another person’s property. The sentence had become final but was not 
executed immediately. Since 10 May 2006, Mr. Kozlowski was imprisoned in Stuttgart 
(Germany) where he was serving a custodial sentence of 3 years and 6 months to which 
he was sentenced by two judgments of the Amtsgericht Stuttgart, dated 27 July 2006 and 
25 January 2007, in respect to 61 fraud offences committed in Germany. On 18 April 
                                                                  
758 Article 4 (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)and (7), ibid..  
759 Article 5(1), ibid.. 
760 Article 5(2), ibid.. 
761 Article 5(3), ibid.. 
762 Case 66/08 Proceedings concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant issued 
against Szymon Kozlowski ECR I-06041 [2008]. 
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2007, Polish authorities requested the German authorities to surrender Mr. Kozlowski, 
who did not consent to his surrender. The German executing authorities informed Mr. 
Kozlowski that they did not intend to raise any ground for non-execution, taking into 
account that he did not have habitual residence in Germany, his successive periods of 
residence were characterised by the commission of several crimes, he was single and 
childless, had no command of the German language, had grown up and lived in Poland 
until the end of 2003, and only from February 2005 until May 2006 had lived in 
Germany—with some interruptions. Providing guidance in relation to the meaning of the 
terms ‘resident’ or ‘staying in’, for the purposes of Article 4(6) of the Framework 
Decision, the Court explained that first, the provision has the goal of enabling the 
executing authority to consider the person’s chances of reintegrating into society.763 
Accordingly, it should cover situations in which the person in question either has 
established his actual place of residence in the executing Member State or has acquired, 
following a stable period of presence, connection with that State which is of a similar 
degree to those resulting from residence. The Court further clarified that, in order to 
determine whether, in a specific situation, there is such a connection between the person 
concerned and the executing Member State, it is necessary to make an overall 
assessment of the objective factors characterising the person’s situation—such as the 
length, nature and conditions of his presence, and the family and economic connections 
which he has with that State.764 The Court also noted that neither the fact that a person 
systematically commits crimes in the executing Member State nor the fact that he is in 
detention there, serving a custodial sentence, is a relevant factor in this regard.765 
Finally, the Court declared that Member States are not entitled to adopt a broader 
meaning, in this case of the term ‘staying in’, than that which derives from the Court’s 
uniform interpretation.766 
 
                                                                  
763 Para 44 of the judgment, ibid.. 
764 Para 48 and 54, ibid.. 
765 Para 51, ibid.. 
766 Para 43, ibid.. 
 206 
Subsequently, in Wolzenburg767, the Court gave guidance regarding the meaning of 
‘resident’ and the conditions under which Member States can make use of Article 4(6) 
of the Framework Decision. The Court found that a Member State’s requirement for a 
continuous period of five years residence for nationals of other Member States for the 
ground for non-execution of the EAW to apply, was not to be considered excessive, in 
particular having regard the requirements of integration of the requested person into 
society when the sentence imposed expires. In particular, the Court found that such 
requirements did not violate Article 12 EC (the principle of non discrimination on 
grounds of nationality).768 However, the Court did impose limits as to the demands that a 
Member State (in this case The Netherlands) could impose upon the requested person. 
The Court noted that a Member State cannot, in addition to the condition of the duration 
of residence, make application of the ground of non refusal of execution of the EAW 
subject to supplementary administrative requirements, such as the possession of a 
residence permit of indefinite duration.769    
 
The Court further clarified in Lopes da Silva770 that a Member State cannot limit the 
non-execution of a warrant on the grounds envisaged by Article 4(6) solely to their own 
nationals, by automatically and absolutely excluding nationals of other Member States 
who are staying in or are a resident of the executing Member State, irrespective of their 
connections with that Member State. This, the Court clarified, would not be compatible 
with the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality (now enshrined in 
Article 18 TFEU). 
 
                                                                  
767 Case C-123/08 Proceedings concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant issued 
against Dominic Wolzenburg ECR I-09621 [2009].  
768 Para 62- 74; in particular para 74 of the judgement, ibid.. 
769 See para 52 and 53 of the judgement, ibid.. 
770 Case C-42/11 Proceedings concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant issued 
against João Pedro Lopes da Silva Jorge, not yet published. 
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With these judgements, the Court stipulated minimum and maximum parameters of 
interpretation and application of Article 4(6). The Court held that the term ‘staying in’ 
could not be interpreted too broadly, thus avoiding too liberal interpretations of this 
ground for refusal in the Framework Decision. Hence, an executing authority cannot 
refuse the execution of an EAW simply based on the fact that the requested person is 
temporarily located in the territory of the executing Member State. This would defeat the 
purpose and goal of the Framework Decision. On the contrary, the executing Member 
State has to take into consideration the objective factors characterising the situation of 
that person and a degree of connection with the executing Member State is essential if 
grounds for refusal are to be considered. Furthermore, the Court also set limits in order 
to avoid too strict interpretations of such provision. Hence, it held that the executing 
State cannot, a priori, exclude nationals of other Member States from benefiting from 
the provision, as this would amount to a violation of the principle of non-discrimination 
based on nationality. 
 
Furthermore, in Leymann and Pustovarov the CJEU sought to strike a balance between 
the punitive impetus of the EAW and the protection of the person individual in relation 
to further prosecutions to which he or she can become exposed after being surrended.771 
In the case in question the CJEU had the opportunity to clarify the scope of Article 27 of 
the Framework Decision—the ‘specialty rule’—which holds that a person surrendered 
under an EAW for the purposes of prosecution for a criminal offence, can only be 
prosecuted for that same offence. The Court clarified that, in order to determine whether 
or not a different offence was concerned, it must be established whether the elements of 
the offences as described in the EAW are still present in the current prosecution and 
whether there is a sufficient connection between the two. Certain alterations are allowed 
under specific circumstances, such as those of time and place.772 Furthermore, in this 
specific case, the Court found that an alteration in the class of narcotics concerned (from 
amphetamines mentioned in the EAW to hashish mentioned in the criminal proceedings) 
was not, in itself, capable of characterising another offence. This was so, given that both 
offences were punishable by imprisonment of the same maximum period of at least three 
years and came under the rubric of ‘illegal trafficking in narcotic drugs.’773  
 
 
 
                                                                  
771 Case C-388/08 PPU Criminal proceedings against Artur Leymann and Aleksei Pustovarov 
ECR I-08993 [2008]. See also below Case C-261/09 Proceedings concerning the execution of a 
European arrest warrant issued in respect to Gaetano Mantello, ECR I-11477 [2010]. 
772 C-388/08 PPU, para 59, ibid.. 
773 Para 62-63, ibid.. 
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The national judiciary and the EAW 
 
These grounds for refusal and conditions that can be asked upon surrender have been 
often criticised by the national judiciary as being insufficient to compensate for the deep 
changes in the extradition regimes – from the abolition of non extradition of nationals, 
dual criminality, possibility of assessment by the executing State, etc. These changes 
caused difficulties often at national level and led readjustments of domestic legal orders. 
These were made via judicial reactions at national level – often from national 
constitutional or supreme courts – or via the laws implementing the Framework 
Decision into domestic legal systems.  
 
The Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany774 dealt with a large 
majority of these issues already in 2005 in an emblematic case involving Mamoun 
Darkazanli, a German-Syrian national, suspected of links to the 11 September attacks, of 
financing Al-Qaida and of connecting its members to Europe. He was sought in Spain 
and in Germany for crimes committed between 1993 and 2001. In Spain nevertheless he 
was also prosecuted for participation in a terrorist organisation (acts which were not 
criminalised in Germany before August 2002). Upon the issue of a EAW against him by 
Spain, Mr. Darkazanli challenged the EAW on several grounds, such as non respect of 
the principle of dual criminality (given that membership of a criminal organisation was 
not a crime in Germany at the date of the facts in relation to which the EAW against him 
had been issued) and breach of his right to judicial review as the extradition decision 
could not be challenged. The German Federal Constitutional Court found with Mr. 
Darkazanli and annulled the law implementing the Framework Decision in the German 
system. But in its reasoning, the Court took a wider approach to the matter than the one 
proposed by the defendant. First and foremost the Court found the law implementing the 
EAW in Germany did not adequately protect German citizens’ fundamental rights of 
recourse to a Court as argued by the party but also of freedom from extradition. More 
specifically, the Court attacked the implementing act as it did not implement the optional 
grounds for refusal allowed by the Framework Decision (such as the territorial 
exceptions - when the offences were committed fully or in part in German territory or 
when committed outside the territory of issuing and executing States and German law 
                                                                  
774 Judgment of the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany on the 
European Arrest Warrant, 18 July 2005, Zitierung: BVerfG, 2 BvR 2236/04 vom 18.7.2005, 
Absatz-Nr. (1 - 203) available here http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg05-
064en.html. 
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does not deem the acts in question as criminal).775 Furthermore, the German 
Constitutional Court also clarified that, in its view, although minimal conditions for trust 
could exist, these did not dispense with a procedure where all circumstances of the case 
and of the systems of criminal justice of the issuing state ought to be examined – a clear 
sign of mistrust in other States’ systems.776 
 
Similar issues such as dual criminality, equality before the law and legality in criminal 
proceedings were also raised before the Belgium Cour D’Arbitrage which referred the 
case to the CJEU.777 This was the first time the CJEU had the opportunity to address the 
controversial EAW and participate in the constitutional dialogue with national courts.778 
In a nutshell, the Cour d’Arbitrage questioned three main points - the legal basis of the 
framework decision (in fact whether a framework decision was the correct instrument 
for the EU to legislate on extradition matters); and, more importantly to our discussion 
here, the possible violation of the principle of equality and legality in criminal 
proceedings namely by the abolition of the principle of double criminality. This was so 
as the Framework Decision listed the 32 offence types to which dual criminality could 
not be applied without justifying such choice and with no reference to their legal 
definition and content.  
 
The CJEU offered a very formalistic and hermetic reasoning. In relation to the legality 
argument the Court noted that the list in the Framework Decision is not intended to 
create criminal offences and penalties per se but rather to simply refer to the law of the 
issuing Member State (hence it is this law that ought to fully comply to the principle of 
legality). The Court went on to focus on the ‘equality’ questions: namely that there was 
                                                                  
775 See para 65-100, ibid.. For a detailed analysis of the case see Nicolas Nohlen, “Germany: The 
European Arrest Warrant case” (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 153 or A. 
Hinarejos, Case Note (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 583.  
776 See mostly para 118 ibid.. Ironically, regardless of these findings, German authorities 
continued to issue European arrest warrants to other Member States although refusing to execute 
incoming requests. This was not well received by Spain or Hungary, for example, and both 
invoked the principle of reciprocity, refusing to recognise German warrants during that period. 
They considered that if Germany was not applying the principle of mutual trust they should not 
do so either. Section 2.1.2., page 5 of the 2007 Report from the Commission, see supra note 641. 
The Thessaloniki Supreme Court and the Greek High Court, for example, also took similar 
stances, see E. A. Stefanou & A. Kapardis, “The First Two Years of Fiddling around with the 
Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in Cyprus” in E. Guild (ed) 
Constitutional challenges to the European Arrest Warrant (Nijmegen: WLP, 2006) 75, 76. 
777 Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld , ECR I 3672 (2007).  
778 Apart from the EAW however the ECJ has adjudicated on a considerable number of cases in 
which it touched upon the relationship between national and EU legal orders and Community and 
national law. For more details on this case law, including the national case law in relation to the 
EAW, see V. Mitsilegas “Constitutional Principles of the European Community and European 
Criminal Law”, supra note 454, 301. See also chapter 3. 
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no justification to choose those specific 32 types of offences and not others. The CJEU 
again dismissed this argument in a rather circular manner deferring the justification to 
the choice previously made by the Council and noting that, 
 
“the council was able to form the view, on the basis of the principle of mutual 
recognition and in the light of the high degree if trust and solidarity between the 
member states, that, whether by reason of their inherent nature or by reason of the 
punishment incurred of a maximum of at least three years, the categories of offences in 
question feature among those the seriousness of which in terms of adversely affecting 
public order and public safety justified dispensing with the verification of double 
criminality.” 779 
 
In replying to the questions asked by the national Court, the CJEU evaded the main 
concerns of the claimants and of many constitutional courts.780 It did so by linking the 
justifications of the choice of principles and crimes either to the issuing State or to the 
political decision of the Council without entering into considerations regarding any of 
the two. In a nutshell, the CJEU held that the principle of legality was not violated given 
that the definition of offences and their clarity were to be assured by the law of the 
issuing State. This argument, however does not address the situation of the person who 
only travels through the issuing State and commits an offence, or more significantly, of 
the person who commits an offence outside the issuing State and sees prosecution being 
brought against her by the executing State. The fact that, for instance, rape has a clear 
definition in Portuguese law, does not provide legal certainty nor behavioural guidance 
to a person in Sweden or in the UK (or anywhere else besides Portugal). It is this 
‘dislocation’ that raises serious questions of legal certainty, with which the CJEU did not 
engage with in its decision. Secondly, when the Court circumvented discussing the 
choice of crimes in relation to which dual criminality is abolished, by noting that the 
Council had itself taken that choice upon itself, considering the inherent nature and 
gravity of those offences, it provided for a purely formal argument. Hence, instead of 
discussing the choice of crimes and seeking to look at why these listed offence types 
deserved an enhanced regime of cooperation amongst Member States, the Court simply 
stated that the Council made the decision according to its own reasoning. Hence, as 
Sarmiento argues, although this is a narrow decision by the Court, it strongly 
encapsulates the idea that both Council and Member States enjoyed a high degree of 
                                                                  
779 Case C-303/05, supra note 777, para 57. 
780 D. Leczykiewicz, “Constitutional conflicts and the third pillar” (2007) 33 European Law 
Review  230. 
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discretion in Title VI TEU(A), one which the Court, in this case, was not willing to 
scrutinise.781  
 
Most judicial resistance at national level related either to the abolition of the principle of 
non extradition of nationals or to the lack of a human rights and political clause as a 
ground for refusal to extradite. This resistance was signalling a shift in the paradigm of 
cooperation, not least because the previous legal status quo, which protected those 
guarantees, was enshrined in Member States’ constitutional orders. Hence, several 
Constitutional Courts had to take a stance on whether or not to allow extradition of their 
own nationals. On 27 April 2005, the Polish Constitutional Court delivered a decision in 
relation to a Dutch EAW that had been issued in respect to a Polish citizen to face 
criminal proceedings in the Netherlands. The Court was forced to annul the provision of 
national law implementing the Framework Decision on the EAW authorising the 
extradition of Polish nationals on the grounds that it was unconstitutional as it violated 
Article 55 (1) of the Polish Constitution which stated the prohibition of extradition of 
Polish citizens. Nonetheless, the will of the Court was one of conciliation between the 
Polish Constitutional legal order and EU law. It expressed this clearly when stating the 
EAW to be:  
 
“…a form of advanced cooperation between the Member States, assisting the fight 
against crime and improving security. Accordingly, ensuring the continuity of its 
functioning should constitute the Polish legislator’s highest priority.”782  
 
The Court found an alternative way thus to conciliate the national Constitution with the 
EAW and suspended the ruling for 18 months to allow for the necessary constitutional 
changes to take place.783 Once this would happen the annulled provisions could be 
                                                                  
781 D. Sarmiento, “European Union: The European Arrest Warrant and the quest for constitutional 
coherence” (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 171. 
782 Judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court on the European Arrest Warrant, P 1/05, 27 April 
2005; English Translation of the Decision can be found at http://www.asser.nl/eurowarrant-
webroot/documents/cms_eaw_74_1_EAWrelease_270405.pdf, last visited on 22 January 2012.  
783 Komarek, for example, is of opinion that the Court could have reached a similar outcome by 
interpreting the Constitution in a more “EU-opened way”, see J. Komarek, “European 
Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: Contrapunctual Principles in Disharmony”, 
Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/05, New York School of Law, NY 10012, 14; A. NuBberger, on 
the contrary, argues that although the judgement might seem to suggest that the Tribunal denies 
the supremacy of EU law and is adopting a Eurosceptical position given the obligation to apply 
consistently its constitutional provisions, its reasoning as a whole indicates a pro-European 
attitude, in “Poland: The Constitutional Tribunal on the Implementation of the European Arrest 
Warrant” (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 162.  
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normally reintroduced into national Polish law and surrender of nationals could take 
place.784 
 
The Czech Constitutional Court also issued the decision concerning the Czech national 
legislation on the European Arrest Warrant in May 2006 where it found that such 
legislation was compatible with both the Czech Charter of fundamental rights and the 
penal procedural code’s sprit.785 To be sure, this was not clear-cut and the court had to 
follow a broad interpretation of the wording of national legislation. The Czech Charter 
of Fundamental Rights holds that every citizen has the right to enter Czech territory 
freely and that all Czech citizens have the right not to be forced to leave their homeland. 
The Court stated in its ruling that such dispositions should be interpreted in order to 
meet the realities of the 21st century: 
 
“We must not forget that people are highly mobile these days, and that there is an 
increasing international cooperation and growing trust between the democratic States of 
the EU, which places new demands on extradition arrangements within the context of 
the union”. 786  
 
It continued then by noting that,  
 
“If Czech citizens benefit from the advantages of relating to the law of the EU 
citizenship, it is natural that along with the disadvantages they should accept a certain 
measure of responsibility…. In the opinion of the constitutional court there is no reason 
to assume that the current standards of protection for fundamental rights within the EU, 
through the application of the principles arising from these rights, offers a level of 
protection inferior to that which is provided in the Czech Republic.” 787  
 
                                                                  
784 However, as seen above, Polish law still applies dual criminality to extradition of their own 
nationals and maintains as a ground for refusal to extradite the fact that a Polish national commit 
a crime in Polish territory or in the territory on a third State (non requesting and non requested ) 
and Polish law doesn’t deem such acts as criminal. 
785 Decision of the Czech Constitutional Court No. Pl. ÚS 66/04 from May 3, 2006, available at 
http://www.eurowarrant.net/index.asp.  
786 Para 70 of the Decision, ibid.. 
787 Para 71, ibid.. 
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Such reasoning led the Court to conclude that the temporary surrender of a citizen, 
conditional upon his return to the homeland did not violate the Czech Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.788  
 
Finally, the French Conseil d’État dealt with the issue of the constitutionality of the law 
implementing the framework decision on the EAW in an opinion given as early as 
2002.789 The main issue of the Conseil d’État was not extradition of nationals (although 
France had a long established tradition in this regard, this was not embedded in the 
Constitution), but rather the lack of a political exception as a ground for refusal (this 
ground allows States to refuse to extradite individuals who are accussed of commiting 
offences of a political nature or with a political motivation). The French Constitution 
lays down the prohibition of extradition of any person for offences of political nature, 
whereas the EAW did not lay down such option. This was an important change. 
Extradition and surrender are often related closely with the political sphere of the 
individual or the State. The EAW seems to disregard such element by moving the 
decision completely to the realm of the judiciary and by excluding the reference to 
political offences. Regardless, the Conseil d’État ruled in a very ‘pro-European way’ 
holding that the French Constitution should be amended in order to enable the 
implementation of the EAW.    
 
These judicial constitutional challenges to the EAW are symptomatic of the deep 
changes in several fundamental principles of inter-State cooperation to fight crime.790 
One such underlying issue was the lack of trust in other criminal justice systems. In fact, 
this was also felt at a legislative level, as many Member States opted to introduce, via 
their implementing legislation, the nuances they thought necessary to achieve a 
‘functional level of trust’. This will be shown in the following section.  
 
 
 
                                                                  
788 The Supreme Court of Cyprus also found the surrender of Cypriots unconstitutional, leading 
the Government to a Constitution revision. The alteration, however, only allows the surrender of 
Cypriots for acts committed after the date of accession of Cyprus to the EU – May 2004.  Other 
Constitutional courts such as the Portuguese and the EL have also upheld domestic provisions 
authorising the surrender of their nationals, European Commission Report COM(2007)407 final, 
supra note 751, Section 2.1.2.  
789 Avis du Conseil d’État nº 368-282 (26 September 2002), available at 
http://www.senat.fr/rap/l02-126/l02-12610.html. 
790 For an overview and critique of most constitutional challenges see Z. Deen-Racsmany, “The 
European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender of Nationals Revisited: The Lessons of 
Constitutional Challenges” (2006) 14 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice 271. 
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2.1.1 Further resistance: national implementation 
 
The resistance to the changes introduced by the EAW was also felt at a legislative level. 
In fact, several Member States opted to maintain exceptions based on human rights, 
nationality, dual criminality, among some others. Examples are many and varied. Italy 
for instance added seven mandatory grounds for refusal including the political nature of 
the offence, insufficient evidence, subjection of the requested person to an indefinite 
period of preventive custody, or, unawareness that certain act are deemed as criminal in 
another State, where the requested person is an Italian citizen, where the requested 
person is pregnant or is a mother of a child less than 3 years old (except in 
circumstances of an exceptional gravity).791 
 
the Netherlands shall refuse extradition of a national if the Dutch executing authority 
finds out that there can be no doubt that the requested person is innocent.792 Portugal and 
Denmark both introduced political reasons as grounds for mandatory refusal.793  
 
The UK allows its Secretary of State to overrule the decision of a judge or direct a judge 
if he believes the requested person was acting in the interests of the UK. It also 
introduced other ground for refusal based on passage of time and extraneous 
considerations.794 
 
Poland introduced refusal based on political grounds and partly reintroduced the 
principles of non extradition of nationals and dual criminality by preventing execution 
when the offence was committed by a national in Polish territory or when the offence 
                                                                  
791 European Commission  Report COM(2007)407 final, supra note 751, 8-9. See also 
‘Disposizioni per conformare il diritto interno alla decisione quadro 2002/584/GAI del Consiglio, 
del 13 giugno 2002, relativa al mandato d'arresto europeo e alle procedure di consegna tra Stati 
membri’; available at 
http://www.asser.nl/upload/eurowarrantwebroot/documents/cms_eaw_41_1_EJN646.pdf. 
792 Ibid., 10. See for a link to Dutch national legislation implementing the EAW 
http://www.asser.nl/Default.aspx?site_id=8&level1=10789&level2=10836&level3=11077. 
793 Ibid., 10. See, in relation to Portugal, Law 65/2003 of 23 August, available at 
http://www.asser.nl/upload/eurowarrant-webroot/documents/cms_eaw_2_1_EJN468.pdf; and, in 
relation to Denmark, Law No 433 of 10 June 2003 amending the Law on the extradition of 
offenders and the Law on the extradition of offenders to Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden 
(transposition of the Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant, etc.), available 
at http://www.asser.nl/upload/eurowarrant-webroot/documents/cms_eaw_187_1_EJN402.pdf. 
794 Ibid., 10. See also Extradition Act 2003, available at http://www.asser.nl/upload/eurowarrant-
webroot/documents/cms_eaw_55_1_bill%20england.pdf. 
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was committed by a national abroad and the same acts do not constitute an offence 
under Polish law.795 
 
Denmark introduced further grounds for refusal based on human rights related issues, 
such as possible threat of torture, degrading treatment, violation of due process or 
unreasonable humanitarian grounds. Likewise, Lithuania also can refuse extradition 
when the “surrender of the person would be in breach of fundamental rights and (or ) 
liberty”.796 
 
As for the implementation of Article 4, relating to optional grounds for non-execution of 
an EAW, the situation is very confusing. The Commission’s conclusions are telling: 
 
“[...] many States have made these grounds for refusal mandatory. At the same time, 
since this Article is optional some Member States have not transposed it at all. [...] 
Hence the implementation of this article amounts to a patchwork which is contrary to 
the Framework Decision.”797 
 
Furthermore, although several Member States introduced alterations to comply with the 
Commission recommendations offered in its implementing reports in the light of these 
incorrect implementations these did not cover in most cases the change in the grounds 
for refusal as mentioned above. Protectionist national legislation hence continues in 
force.798 
 
3. Mutual recognition after the EAW: a continuously expanding and punitive dynamic 
with a more moderate approach 
 
Regardless of the difficulties experienced, mutual recognition in the EU continued to be 
expanded. Its aim continued to clearly be one of facilitating criminal investigation, 
prosecution or securing and managing punishment. In some aspects, new measures 
                                                                  
795 Ibid., 10. ‘Unofficial translation of the Polish provisions implementing Framework decision 
2002/584/ JHA of 13 June 2002 on European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States of the European Union.’ available at 
http://www.asser.nl/default.aspx?site_id=8&level1=10789&level2=10837&level3=11089&textid
=30333 
796 Ibid., 9. See the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania (Zin., 2000, No. 89-2741). 
797 European Commission, Commission Staff Working, supra note 731. 
798 European Commission Report COM(2011)175 final, supra note 736, 6-8. 
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further enhanced some of the punitive features of the EAW. In others, however, 
measures became more moderate because either their remit was narrower or their goals 
tentatively more balanced. Furthermore, implementation of measures post-EAW has 
been poor, which has contributed to the slowing down of mutual recognition in general.  
 
3.1 Financial penalties 
 
Measures focusing mostly on financial enforcement were adopted in the following years 
aiming at securing the enforcement of financial sentences and to a lesser extent of 
securing evidence: freezing, confiscation orders and financial penalties. These largely 
maintained the footprint of the EAW: almost automatic recognition, speedy execution, 
very limited grounds for refusal, largely absent individual considerations.  
 
Although maintaining the same footprint, they extended the application of mutual 
recognition to other domains: first to the enforcement of financial penalties – financial 
penalties broadly understood represent the large majority of criminal penalties imposed 
at national level;799 second as they expand mutual recognition to any type of crime for 
which a financial penalty is applicable, regardless of its seriousness. This contrasts with 
the EAW that could only be issued (even when dual criminality could be tested) in 
relation to acts punishable with at least one year custodial sentence.800 Hence, these new 
measures drop the threshold of gravity of the crime. Consequently, they are applicable to 
any crime regardless of its gravity, cross border or transnational connection.  
 
The first of these measures was the 2005 Framework Decision on the mutual recognition 
of financial penalties.801 It aimed at ensuring the swift recognition and enforcement of 
financial penalties (sums of money on conviction of an offence, compensation imposed 
to benefit victims or public funds for victims’ support, sums in respect to costs of courts 
or administrative proceedings leading to the decision).802 The authorities of the 
executing State are required to recognise a decision “without any further formality being 
required and shall forthwith take all the necessary measures for its execution”.803 
                                                                  
799 Financial penalties are the most used criminal sentence in England & Wales, K. Bullock, 
“Enforcing Financial Penalties: The Case of Confiscation Orders” (2010) 49 The Howard 
Journal of Criminal Justice 328. 
800 See former section. 
801 Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA, supra note 420.  
802 Article 1 (b), ibid.. 
803 Article 6, ibid.. 
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Furthermore, the list of types of offences to which dual criminality is not applicable is 
extended to 39 offences.804 
 
All grounds for refusal are optional: incomplete or inexistant certificate, ne bis in idem, 
lack of dual criminality for non listed types of offences, if the execution is statute barred, 
if the decision relates to acts committed in whole or in part in the territory of the 
execution State or on the territory of a third State and the law of the executing State does 
not allow for prosecutions for those offences when committed outside its territory, 
immunity, age not subject to full criminal liability yet, trial in absentia, or if a financial 
penalty is below EUR 70 or the equivalent of that amount.805  
 
Subsequently, in 2006, a Framework Decision on mutual recognition of confiscation 
orders was adopted.806 The terms of recognition and execution of these orders are similar 
to the other instruments.  The executing State “shall forthwith take all the necessary 
measures for its execution”.807 Dual criminality is abolished for the usual list of 32 types 
of offences.808 Grounds for refusal are optional.809 
 
Regardless of the surpassed deadlines for implementation,810 this group of framework 
decisions has a very poor implementation. By 2008, the Framework Decision on mutual 
recognition of financial penalties for example had only been implemented by 11 
Member States (none of the remaining 16 Member States had notified the Commission 
of its implementation).811 Of those States that notified the Commission many 
misimplemented it by for example not stipulating time limits for the execution of the 
penalties or by excluding the liability of legal persons (hence giving national laws a 
narrower approach than required by EU law).812 Similarly, by 2010 the Framework 
                                                                  
804 Article 5, ibid... 
805 Article 7 (1) (2), ibid..  
806 Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders, OJ L 328/59 [2006]. 
807 Article 7, ibid.. 
808 Article 6, ibid..  
809 Article 8, ibid..  
810 The deadline for implementation of the Framework Decision on financial penalties was 22 
March 2007, Article 20 of the Framework Decision, supra note 420.; 24 November 2008 for the 
Framework Decision on confiscation orders, note 806, Article 22 of the Framework Decision; 
and 2 August 2005 for the Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA on the execution of orders 
freezing property and evidence, OJ L 196/45 [2003], Article 14 of the Framework Decision. 
811 European Commission, Report from the Commission based on Article 20 of the Council 
Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition to financial penalties, COM(2008)888 final, Brussels, 22.12.2008, 2. 
812 Ibid., 6. 
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Decision on confiscation orders which had been adopted in 2006 had been implemented 
by 13 States only. Of these the Commission notes that they implemented the provisions 
of the Framework Decision correctly,  
 
“… with the exception of Article 8 on the grounds for refusal. Most Member States 
included additional grounds for refusal not provided for by the Framework Decision.”813 
 
It is unclear whether this is due to a protectionist reaction after the complexity of the 
EAW in practice or simply to a lack of interest or capacity of Member States.814 The fact 
that monies obtained from the execution of the decision shall accrue to the executing 
Member States unless otherwise agreed by the two States815 might contribute indeed to 
the latter. Either way this low implementation rate is a clear slow down in the 
mechanism of mutual recognition.  
 
3.2 Evidence  
 
Following these measures on financial enforcement, mutual recognition turned to yet 
other realms of the criminal justice process. In this context, the Framework Decision on 
the execution of orders freezing property and evidence enabling judicial authorities to 
quickly secure evidence and seize property across borders, adopted in 2003.816 The 
Framework Decision is applicable to freezing orders issued in relation to any offences 
and it further drops the verification of dual criminality in relation to the listed 32 offence 
types.817 Authorities in the executing Member States must recognise a freezing order  
 
                                                                  
813 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council based on Article 22 of the Council Framework Decision 2006/783/ JHA of 6 October 
2006 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders, 
COM(2010)428 final, Brussels, 23.8.2010, 2. 
814 The execution of financial penalties can in fact be a thorny issue even at national level, see – 
for the case of confiscation orders – K. Bullock, “Enforcing Financial Penalties”, supra note 799. 
815 Monies obtained from the enforcement of decisions shall accrue to the executing State unless 
otherwise agreed - Article 13, Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA, supra note 420.; Money 
obtained from the execution of the confiscation order shall be kept by executing Member State if 
below 10 000 EURO, if above the amount shall be shared by the two States (50%/50%) - Article 
16, Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA, supra note 806. 
816 Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA, supra note 806. 
817 Article 3 (1) (2) (4), ibid..  
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“without any further formality being required and shall forthwith take the necessary 
measures for its immediate execution in the same way as for a freezing order made by 
an authority of the executing State…”.818  
 
Grounds for refusal are substantially fewer than the ones in the EAW: an incomplete 
certificate (the form necessary for transmission of the order); immunity or privilege that 
makes it impossible to execute the order; ne bis in idem; dual criminality if regarding an 
offence outside the list of  32 serious criminal offence types.819  
 
Article 8 however does allow for grounds postponement of the execution namely the 
possible damage to an on-going criminal investigation, or when a property or evidence is 
already subjected to a freezing order in the executing State. The Framework Decision 
also provides for legal remedies for interested parties. An order might thus be challenged 
in both States (issuing and executing) by any interested party, including bona fide third 
parties (if the challenge relates to the substantive grounds of the case the action will 
have to be lodged on the issuing State).820 
 
Also in the context of mutual recognition of evidence there were proposals for the 
introduction of a European Evidence Warrant (EEW).821 The proposal for a Framework 
Decision on a EEW had been on the table since 2003.822 Yet because of difficult and 
lengthy negotiations a final draft surfaced only in 2006 and was finally published in 
2008. Difficulties during the negotiations varied from the general issues of automaticity 
of the EEW and the scope of the measure (types of evidence available) to issues of 
equivalence of admissibility and means of evidence between issuing and executing 
Member State (whether issuing State could use or request evidence which is not 
admissible under the laws of the issuing State but is so under the executing State regime; 
and whether the issuing State could oblige the executing State to use coercive means 
which are allowed in the issuing State).823 These concerns led to the limitation of the 
                                                                  
818 Article 5 (1), ibid..  
819 Article 7, ibid.. 
820 Article 11, ibid.. 
821 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European evidence 
warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in 
criminal matters, OJ L 350/72 (2008). 
822 For an overview and analysis of the initial proposal see C. Williams, “Overview of the 
Commission’s Proposal for a Framework Decision on the European Evidence Warrant”, in J.A.E. 
Vervaele (ed) European Evidence Warrant: Transnational Enquiries in the EU 
(Antwerpen/Oxford:Intersentia, 2005) 69. 
823 For an analysis of the major difficulties with an European system of evidence see John R. 
Spencer, “An Academic Critique of the EU Acquis in Relation to Trans-border Evidence 
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scope of the EEW. Hence, whilst there was a high degree of mutual recognition thus far 
in relation to surrender requests and financial sentences, mutual recognition of evidence 
was to be narrower. To be sure, the Framework Decision on the EEW never came into 
force and a Directive on an European investigation order with a broader scope has been 
proposed already.824 Yet, for the understanding of mutual recognition post EAW it is of 
interest to analyse the EEW. 
 
An European evidence warrant is thus a judicial decision issued  
 
“with a view of obtaining objects, documents and data from another Member State for 
use in criminal proceedings…”825  
 
before a judicial authority or in proceedings before an administrative authority in respect 
to acts which may give rise to proceedings before a court with jurisdiction in criminal 
matters, including proceedings brought against a legal person.826  
 
The request must be executed  
 
“without any further formality being required and shall forthwith take the necessary 
measures for its execution in the same way an authority of the executing State would 
obtain the objects, documents or data…”.827  
 
In the case of the listed 32 offence types the executing State needs to ensure that search 
and seizure are available (whilst it is not obliged to use search and seizure for the other 
non listed offences).828  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Gathering”, in ERA-Forum, Special Issue on European Evidence on Criminal Proceedings, 2005, 
28-40; for concerns relating to civil liberties in general see for example LIBERTY’s response to 
the Home Office consultation on the proposed European Evidence Warrant, July 2004; available 
at www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/resources/policy-papers/index.shtml.; for concerns relating 
to due process see for example S. Gless, “Mutual Recognition, Judicial Enquiries, Due process 
and Fundamental Rights”, in J.A.E. Vervaele (ed) European Evidence Warrant: Transnational 
Enquiries in the EU (Antwerpen/Oxford:Intersentia, 2005) 121.  
824 This new initiative will be considered in more length in chapter 6. Initiative (...) for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of... regarding the European 
Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ C 165/02 [2010]. 
825 Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA, supra note 821. 
826 Article 5, ibid.. 
827 Article 11, ibid..  
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An EEW can only be issued with the view to obtaining documents, objects and data.829 
In fact, the Framework Decision goes to lengths to specify that an EEW cannot be issued 
to conduct interviews, take statements or initiate other types of hearing with suspects, 
witnesses, experts or any other parties; neither to carry out bodily examinations or obtain 
biometric data including DNA; nor to obtain information in real time such as 
interception of communications, covert surveillance or monitoring of bank accounts; 
conducting analysis on objects, documents or data; to obtain communications data 
retained by providers if a publicly available electronic communications service or 
network.830 Furthermore, EEW can only be issued when the evidence sought is 
necessary and proportionate for the purposes of the proceeding and if the evidence could 
equally be obtained in a comparable case in the issuing State (even if different 
procedural measures apply). These conditions shall be assessed by the issuing State 
only.831  
 
The EEW was not only narrow in its scope. In fact, with it, dual criminality suffered its 
first set back with the introduction of a declaration by Germany, reserving its right to 
make execution of an EEW subject to verification of dual criminality when an EEW 
involved search and seizure in relation to the offences of terrorism, computer related 
crime, racism and xenophobia, sabotage, racketeering and extortion or swindling.832 This 
blow to the principle of dual criminality – one of the main features of mutual recognition 
and mutual trust – was symbolic of the slowing down and progressive moderation of the 
principle. As seen earlier in this chapter, the abolition of dual criminality gave priority to 
the more severe penal law or, said differently, to the legal order which adopted broader 
definitions of conducts to be criminalised. Having accepted the abolition of dual 
criminality in relation to the 32 types of offences in the EAW, Germany has imposed 
limitations regarding what crimes it is willing to help other States to build their 
prosecution against. It will be seen in the next section that the mutual recognition 
measures that followed the EEW allow for Member States to reintroduce dual 
criminality fully. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
828 Article 11 (3) (ii), ibid..  
829 Article 4 (1), ibid.. 
830 Article 4(2) (a)(b)(c)(d)(e), ibid.. In this regard Belfiore notes how the EU Convention on 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters of 2000 was more pioneering than the EEW as it 
included types of evidence not covered by the Framework Decision, R. Belfiore, “Movement of 
Evidence in the EU: The Present Scenario and Possible Future Developments” (2009) 17 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal justice 1, 17. 
831 Article 7 of the Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA, supra note 821. 
832 Article 23 (4), ibid.; Declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany, OJ L 350/92 [2008]. 
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3.3 Imprisonment and alternative sanctions 
 
After the EEW, mutual recognition was further expanded to the domains of enforcement 
and supervision of pre-trial detention, custodial sentences, probation and alternative 
sanctions. The principle continued to be largely focused on securing and managing 
punishment. However, these measures introduced a new gist to mutual recognition in 
criminal matters as ideas of rehabilitation and reintegration of prisoners began to surface 
in this new wave of measures. Furthermore, as mutual recognition further ventures into 
yet other fields of criminal justice, it suffers significant blows to its initial logic as it 
allows States to fully reintroduce the test of dual criminality in relation to all offences.  
 
3.3.1 Pre-trial measures 
 
In relation to pre-trial detention a Framework Decision on supervision measures as an 
alternative to provisional detention was adopted in 2009.833 The Framework Decision 
lays down the rules according to which one Member State recognises a decision on 
supervision measures issued in another Member State as an alternative to provisional 
detention, how it monitors the supervision of the measure and surrenders the person 
concerned again when the supervision is breached.834 Member States are thus required to 
recognise and apply six supervision measures: obligation of the person to inform the 
competent authorities of any change of residence; obligation not to enter certain 
localities, places or areas; obligation to remain at a certain place; limitations on leaving 
the territory of the executing State; obligation to report at certain times to a specific 
authority; obligation to avoid contact with certain people. Besides this list, Member 
States may choose to also make themselves available to monitor five other types of 
measures (which vary from obligation not to a drive a vehicle to obligation to undergo 
therapeutic treatment or treatment for addiction).835 The list of grounds for refusal is 
largely maintained (certificate incomplete or inexistent, lack of required consents, ne bis 
in idem, dual criminality when applicable, statute barred offences, immunity or the 
person being too young).836 
 
Again, recognition is expected to be swift,  
                                                                  
833 Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA, supra note 534. The date for implementation of 
the Framework Decision is 1 December 2012, Article 27, ibid.. 
834 Article 1, ibid.. 
835 Article 8 (1) and (2) ibid..  
836 Article 15, ibid.. 
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“The competent authorities in the executing State shall, as soon as possible and in any 
case within 20 working days  of receipt of the decision on supervision measures and 
certificate, recognise the decision on supervision measures forwarded… and without 
delay take all necessary measures for monitoring the supervision measures…”.837 
 
Regardless of these obligations, the executing State receives considerably more room to 
act than in any other mutual recognition instruments thus far, in what is a clear slowing 
down of the processes of mutual recognition. Indeed, dual criminality becomes fully 
optional in relation to any criminality – i.e. even in relation to the listed 32 serious 
criminal offence types. In fact, although the Framework Decision retains the same 
format as all others adopted thus far – hence providing for a special regime for the listed 
32 types of offences in case they are punishable by deprivation of liberty of at least three 
years – it also states that,  
 
“Member States may, for constitutional reasons… declare that they will not apply 
paragraph 1 in respect to some or all offences referred to in that paragraph.”838   
 
Pre trial detention has for long been a thorny issue in many criminal justice systems, 
both because of long detention periods and because of the disproportionate numbers of 
non nationals in pre-trial detention. Detention periods in many countries can be very 
long: although the average length of pre-trial detention in Member States is 5.5 months 
this disguises the extremely long periods in countries such as, for example Latvia, 
Greece or Hungary where the average is one year.839 In fact, countries such as Latvia or 
Spain stipulate that pre-trial detention can go up to 4 years, whilst Sweden does not have 
a maximum period at all.840 Furthermore, in EU Member States, there is a 
disproportionately high rate of incarceration of non-nationals, many of whom are in pre-
                                                                  
837 Article 12, ibid.. 
838 Article 14 (4), ibid..  
839 See Table 3.2 in Commission’s Staff Working Document accompanying docuemtnto the 
Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the European supervision order in pre-trial 
procedures between Member States of the European Union, COM (2006)468 final, Impact 
Assesment, Brussels, 29 August 2006, 10-11.  
840 Fair Trials International Report, “Detained without trial: Fair Trials International’s response to 
the European Commission’s Green Paper on detention”, October 2011, 28. In Sweden however, 
if no action towards conditional release is taken within 14 days of detention a new remand 
hearing is required, ibid.., 28.  
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trial detention.841 The Commission notes that this incidence relates to the fact that courts 
perceive a greater risk of flight of non-nationals due to their lack of social ties in the 
country where they are being prosecuted for a crime.842 This assessment increases 
significantly the burden upon the individual being prosecuted. In fact, in addition to the 
likelihood of remaining in detention whilst awaiting trial, other penalising elements of 
facing trial in a foreign country will be felt, such as language/communication 
difficulties, distance from family and friends and professional relations. The Framework 
Decision addresses this specific concern and holds in its preamble that,  
 
“There is a risk of different treatment between those who are resident in the State of trial 
and those who are not: a non-resident risks being remanded in custody pending trial 
even where, in similar circumstances, a resident would not.”843  
 
Furthermore, it refers to a need to accomodate the protection of the general public by 
ensuring the supervision of a person subject to criminal proceedings and the right to 
liberty and the presumption of innocence.844  
 
3.3.2 Post trial detention 
 
The application of the principle of mutual recognition to detention is further developed 
in 2008 with the Framework Decision on custodial sentences or measures involving 
deprivation of liberty.845 The Framework Decision focuses mostly on the transfer of 
                                                                  
841 The European Commission noted in 2006 that an estimated of 10000 EU nationals are 
detained in pre trial detention in EU countries other than their countries of residence in a total of 
4500 of EU nationals in pre trial detention in countries other than that of their nationality. 
Furthermore, the Commission estimated that at least 80% of those could have been applied 
alternative non-custodial measures. European Commission Staff Working Document on ESO, 
supra note 839.  For a more detailed overview of the problem in relation to all types of detention 
and foreigners, see A.M. van Kalmthout, F.B.A.M. Hofstee-van der Meulen and F. Dunkel, 
Foreigners in European Prisons, vol. I (Nijmegen/The Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers, 
2007), especially at 70-77. For a critical analysis see also L. Wacquant “Suitable Enemies: 
Foreigners and Immigrants in the Prisons of Europe” (1999) 1 Punishment and Society 215 and 
M. Tonry, “Symbol, Substance and Severity in Western Legal Systems” (2001) 3 Punishment 
and Society 517. 
842 See Commission’s Staff Working Document on ESO, supra note 839, 7; and A.M. van 
Kalmthout, Foreigners in European Prisons, supra note 841, 41-44. 
843 Intent (5) of the Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA, supra note 534. 
844 Intent (3) and (4), ibid..  
845 Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle 
of mutual recognition to judgements in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or 
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prisoners with the view of ‘facilitating the social rehabilitation of the sentenced 
person.’846 
 
The sentencing State can forward the judgment to the State of nationality where the 
sentenced person lives, to the State of nationality to where the sentenced person is to be 
deported once released from the sentence (regardless of being the State where the person 
usually lives) and, finally, to any other Member State as long as the latter and the 
sentenced person so consent.847 The right of initiative remains clearly on the sentencing 
State. This can also be derived from the fact that although Article 4 (5) allows the 
executing State and the sentenced person to place requests themselves for the forwarding 
of the sentence, those requests do not create any obligation on the sentencing State. 
Equally, an opinion on the suitability of the request by the executing State does need to 
be taken in consideration by the forwarding State.848 Furthermore, the issuing State may 
withdraw the certificate from the executing State as long as the enforcement of the 
sentence has not begun in which case the executing State shall no longer execute the 
sentence.849 
 
The executing State shall recognise the judgment and “shall forthwith take all necessary 
measures for the enforcement of the sentence”850  
 
It also shall decide  
 
“… as quickly as possible whether to recognise the judgment and enforce the 
sentence…” and “Unless a ground for postponement exists… the final decision… shall 
be taken within a period of 90 days of receipt of the judgment and the certificate.”851 
 
However, this exclusive right of initiative on the sentencing State is not a synonym for a 
completely passive position of the executing State. In fact, the latter recovers once again 
some of the guarantees that had initially been foregone in other mutual recognition 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European 
Union, OJ L 327/27 [2008].  
846 Article 1, ibid.. 
847 Article 4 (1) (a) (b) (c), ibid.. 
848 Article 4(4), ibid.. 
849 Article 13, ibid.. 
850 Article 8 (1), ibid.. 
851 Article 12 (1) and (2), ibid..  
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instruments, namely the possibility of applying dual criminality in relation to any type of 
crime – even one of the 32 listed types of offences.852 The executing State can also adapt 
the sentence in terms of its duration and of its nature (though measures shall correspond 
as closely as possible with those applied in the sentencing State and the sentence shall 
not be converted into a pecuniary punishment.853 Finally, the executing State may refuse 
the recognition and execution of the sentence in a number of cases, namely those of 
incomplete or incorrect certificate, when enforcement would be contrary to the principle 
of ne bis in idem, when there is immunity under the law of the executing State, when the 
judgment was rendered in absentia, among other criteria.854  
 
Besides giving more room to the executing State, the Framework Decision also 
continues to develop the trend of moderating mutual recognition in criminal matters by 
introducing the idea of rehabilitation of the offender, a theme thus far largely absent in 
the legal narratives of ECL.855 In fact, the facilitation of reintegration or rehabilitation of 
the offender by allowing for a custodial sentence to be served in the country of 
nationality or residence has been developed by several instruments in Europe ever since 
the 1970s.856 However, the Framework Decision introduces some nuances to these 
practices. Although the reintegration of the offender is stated as the main objective of 
the Framework Decision, both the consent of the executing State (as seen) and the 
consent of the offender are dispensed with in a large majority of cases (namely when 
transfer is to be made to the country of nationality where the offender lives or to the 
country of nationality where the offender is to be deported once the sentenced is served 
regardless of where he lives).857  
 
                                                                  
852 Article 7(4), ibid.. 
853 Article 8 (2) and (3), ibid.. This adaption cannot lead to an aggravation of the sentenced 
passed. Article 8(4), ibid.. 
854 Article 9, ibid.. 
855 See chapter 3 and 4. The CJEU however has on occasion made reference to the rehabilitation 
of offenders as, for example, in Tsakouridis.  In this case the Court noted that the wish for a State 
to expel an offender once a sentence against him had been enforced had to take into account the 
balance between the offender’s rehabilitation and the interests of the Union in general given that 
such individual would be able to exercise his or her rights of free movement once expelled, case 
C-145/09 ECR I-11979 [2010]. 
856 European Convention on the Supervision of Conditionally Sentenced or Conditionally 
Released Offenders of 1964, ratified by 19 countries; European Convention on the International 
Validity of Judgments of 1970, also ratified by 19 States; Convention on Transfer of Sentenced 
Persons of 1983 ratified by 61 countries (including all States of the European Union, the United 
States and Canada); additional Protocol to the latter from 1997 ratified by 31 countries; and the 
Agreement on the Application between the Member States of the European Communities of the 
Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons of 1987. 
857 Article 6 (2) of the Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, supra note 845. 
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The preamble explains this choice by explaining that,  
 
“Notwithstanding the need to provide the sentenced person with adequate safeguards, 
his or her involvement in the proceedings should no longer be dominant by requiring in 
all cases his or her consent to the forwarding of a judgement to another Member State 
for the purpose of its recognition and enforcement of the sentence imposed.”858  
 
To be sure, the person can be consulted but her opinion need not to be taken in 
consideration.859 Traditionally, the consent of the sentenced person was needed.860 As 
De Wree, Beken and Vermeulen point out, 
 
“The abolition of a requirement for consent evokes an ambitious response. On the one 
hand, it would not be difficult to accept that transfer to his home country is in a 
sentenced person’s interest. (…) On the other hand, the Transfer Convention included 
the requirement of consent because the legislator presumed that transfer without an 
offender’s consent would be counterproductive to his rehabilitation.”861 
 
As the authors go on to argue this raises questions about the intention of the legislator.862 
In fact, with no consent procedure there is no room for a proper dialogue nor to an actual 
understanding of the prisoners’ exact needs or concerns, which does not seem to be in 
agreement with the objective of his reintegration.863 Whilst the will of the prisoner is 
very often to be returned to the State of residence and nationality this might not always 
be the case especially if the countries at stake have very different detention conditions864 
or if there are political reasons for a prisoner to prefer to serve her sentence away from 
her State of nationality or residence. Furthermore, as Platcha argues, this categorical link 
with the State of nationality is inconsistent with the rationale behind the EAW which 
                                                                  
858 Intent (5) of the preamble, ibid.. 
859 Article 6(3), ibid.. 
860 See Article 3 (1) (d) of the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced 
Persons, Strasbourg, 21 March 1983; see also E. De Wree, T. Vander Beken and G. Vermeulen, 
“The transfer of sentenced persons in Europe – much ado about reintegration” (2009) 11 
Punishment and Society 111. 
861 Ibid., 118. 
862 Ibid., 119. 
863 M. Platcha, “Prisoner Transfer within the European Union: The European Enforcement Order 
and Beyond” in N. Keijzer and E. van Sliedregt (ed) The European Arrest Warrant (The 
Hague:T.M.C.Asser Press, 2009) 339.  
864 M. Platcha, ibid., 355. 
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delinked the national from its State of nationality – and caused so much struggle for 
doing so.865  
 
Thus the Framework Decision has the potential to become a tool for the regulation of 
prison costs and prison population. Indirectly it can become a tool which permits the 
attainment of migration policy goals such as the normalisation and compensation of high 
flux of migrants in some countries.866 Mitsilegas notes on this matter that  
 
“Although the proclaimed aim of the Framework Decision is to facilitate the social 
rehabilitation of the sentenced person, its real aim appears to be to alleviate the burden 
of prisons in EU Member States…”867 
 
The lack of need for consent on the part of the executing State also suggests this 
possibility. Furthermore, as seen in the previous section, the proportion of foreigners 
(both EU and non-EU nationals) in prisons in many EU countries is a thorny issue that 
Member States face. In fact, the risk that the Framework Decision might be used to 
aliviate overcrowding in one Member State whilst exacerbating overcrowding in another 
was noted by the Commission in its Green Paper on the application of EU criminal 
justice legislation in the field of detention.868 This was also a concern that some 
countries have voiced very clearly. Poland, for example, being a country of origin of 
many immigrants in Western Europe, asked for a derogation from the Framework 
Decision in order to be able to cope with the possible impact of transfer of Polish 
prisoners to Poland. Intent 11 of the preamble holds, 
 
“Poland needs more time than the other Member States to face the practical and 
material consequences of transfer of Polish citizens convicted in other Member States, 
especially in the light of an increased mobility of Polish citizens within the Union. For 
that reason, a temporary derogation of limited scope for a maximum period of five years 
should be foreseen.” 
 
                                                                  
865 M. Platcha, ibid., 359. 
866 See G. Vermeulen, “Mutual Instrumentalization of Criminal and Migration Law from an EU 
Perspective”(2007) 9 European Journal of Migration and Law 357. 
867 V. Mitsilegas, “The third wave of the third pillar” (2009) 32 European Law Review 523, 542. 
868 European Commission, Green Paper strenghtening mutual trust in the European judicial area 
– A Green Paper on the application of EU criminal justice legislation in the field of detention, 
COM(2011)327 final, Brussels, 14 June 2011, 6. 
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3.3.3 Probation and alternative sanctions 
 
Finally, this group of framework decisions on measures involving deprivation of liberty 
is complemented by a Framework Decision on probation and alternative sanctions,869 
whose aims are more eclectic than the previous sister measures: 
 
“This Framework Decision aims at facilitating the rehabilitation of sentenced persons, 
improving the protection of victims and of the general public, and facilitating the 
application of suitable probation measures and alternative sanctions, in case of 
offenders who do not live in the State of conviction.”870 
 
With this in mind the Framework Decision sets the rules for the recognition, 
enforcement and supervision of probation or alternative sanctions by a State other than 
the sentencing one. 
 
The Framework Decision introduces a clear moderation of the thus far problematic 
aspects of mutual recognition. This is so first, as it introduces the need for the consent 
both of the sentenced person and of the executing State. This is perhaps not surprising 
giving the considerable means and effort the executing State has to use to execute and 
supervise probation or an alternative sanction. Second, dual criminality can be applied 
even for the serious offences871 whilst the remaining grounds for refusal remain 
generally the same.872 Furthermore, the executing State will be responsible for all the 
subsequent decisions relating to  
 
“…a suspended sentence, conditional release, conditional sentence and alternative 
sanction, in particular in case of non-compliance with a probation measure or 
alternative sanction or if the sentenced persons commits a new criminal offence.”873 
 
The Framework Decision on probation appears as the first mutual recognition 
instrument where the individual and the executing State are afforded room to 
manoeuvre. This is so, on the one hand, as the individual’s consent is necessary; on the 
                                                                  
869 Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA, supra note 421. 
870 Article 1, ibid.. 
871 Article 10, ibid..  
872 Article 11, ibid..  
873 Article 14, ibid.. 
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other hand, as the executing State’s consent is also required and the principle of dual 
criminality can be applied. These features make sense in the light of the active role that 
the sentenced person and the executing State have to take, at this stage of the criminal 
process. 
   
4. Mutual Recognition and fundamental rights: managing positive conflicts of 
jurisdiction whilst protecting individual rights 
 
Ne bis in idem is a fundamental principle at the national level in most EU national legal 
orders874 and is also enshrined in international instruments.875 In its simplest form it 
basically states that no one should be tried or prosecuted twice for the same criminal 
conduct. The principle made its way into the EU legal order via the incorporation of the 
Schengen acquis by the TEU(A).876 Article 54 of the Schengen Convention holds: 
 
“A person whose trial has been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party may not be 
prosecuted in another contracting Party for the same acts provided that, if a penalty has 
been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can 
no longer be enforced under the laws of the Contracting Party.”   
 
Ne bis in idem aims at the recognition of finally disposed trials and is thus related to 
matters of mutual recognition. The rationale behind it is that a person who is exercising 
his or her free movement rights within the EU may not be penalised for the same acts 
because of the exercise of those rights. Hence, Member States must recognise the 
outcome of finally disposed criminal sentences in other Member States and refrain from 
prosecuting that same person for acts in relation to which he or she was already 
                                                                  
874 M. Fletcher, “Some Developments to the ne bis in idem principle in the European Union: 
Criminal Proceedings Against Huseyin Gozotuk and Klaus Brugge” (2003) 66 The Modern Law 
Review 769, 770.  
875 The principle is part of the European Convention of Human Rights which assures ne bis in 
idem at national level only. For an overview of the background of ne bis in idem in international 
instruments see M. Fletcher, “The Problem of Multiple Criminal Prosecutions” (2007) 26 
Yearbook of European Law 33, 34-38; for a comparison between the EcHR and the CJEU case 
law see R. Loof, “54 CISA and the Principles on ne bis in idem” (2007) 15 European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 309.  
876 The Schengen area and cooperation were initiated in 1985 with the Schengen Agreement and 
later developed in 1990 with the Schengen Convention which abolished internal borders checks 
and created comon rules regarding visas, asylums and checks at external borders, in order to 
allow for the free movement of persons within the Schengen area. The area has gradually 
expanded to include today nearly all Member States. The Schengen Agreement and Convention 
and the body of norms developing were incorporated in accordance with a protocol attached to 
the TEU(A). For more details see chapter 1, supra notes 59 and 194. 
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prosecuted elsewhere in the EU. Rather than an active obligation Member States are thus 
under an obligation to refrain from prosecuting or stopping prosecution.  
     
Mutual recognition in the light of the ne bis in idem principle can thus protect individual 
rights. This was significantly explored by the CJEU which has delivered important 
judgements on the principle of ne bis in idem. This case law has been welcomed for 
focusing mostly on the protection of the individual and hence striking some balance to 
the enhanced punitive framework of mutual recognition. It will be seen however how 
such wide protection can have a second effect of favouring a fast justice and an 
allocation of jurisdiction on a first come first served basis. 
 
The exact meaning and extent of the CISA provision has proven to be unclear and 
requests for its clarification have reached the CJEU. The first dispute on the 
interpretation of the provision reached the CJEU in 2003 in the joint cases Gozotuk and 
Brugge.877 Both cases involved the termination of criminal proceedings by public 
prosecutors via out of court settlements (by Belgium and Germany respectively) with 
another Schengen State seeking to prosecute and punish after that first settlement had 
been finalised. The question raised before the CJEU was in essence whether ne bis in 
idem applied to such out of court settlements. The Court took a broad view on the matter 
highlighting that any procedure which barred further prosecution - when taken by an 
authority playing a part in the administration of criminal justice in national systems - 
would be regarded as ‘finally disposed of’ for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA.878  
 
The Court noted that the Schengen acquis is aimed at enhancing European integration 
and, in particular, at enabling the EU to more rapidly become an area of freedom, 
security and justice. It continued by remarking that the objective of Article 54 CISA was 
to ensure that no individual would be prosecuted twice for the same facts in several 
Member States because of having exercised his free movement rights. This goal would 
not be fully attained if it would not apply to decisions definitely discontinuing 
                                                                  
877 Joined cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 [2003] ECR I-345. For a detailed analysis of the facts 
and the decision see J. Vervaele, Case note (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 795. 
878 In fact, it had been noted by for example Germany, Belgium and France that the application of 
ne bis in idem to cases where no court has been involved in the reaching of the final decision was 
not envisaged by the Contracting Parties to the Schengen Convention nor to other international 
instruments which also have a narrower interpretation of bis in this case. The Court disagreed and 
found that nothing in the wording of Article 54 precluded such an interpretation and further noted 
that when the Convention had been drafted it had been so not at the light of its future 
incorporation in the framework of the EU, hence that historical and teleogical argument would no 
longer be accurate, see para 41, 42 and 46, ibid.. 
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prosecution in a Member State, even when such decisions were adopted without the 
involvement of a court or did not take the form of a judicial decision.879  
 
This broad interpretation of the principle of ne bis in idem was followed by a significant 
number of cases in which the CJEU consistently took a wide interpretation when 
deciding on the meaning of idem,880 of bis881 and of the ‘enforcement of penalties’ (the 
last part of Article 54 CISA). The Courts’ decisions draw a clear parallel between 
national and European. Accordingly, what is valid nationally is also to be deemed valid 
and effective beyond those national boundaries. Ultimately this is tantamount to granting 
criminal decisions complete extraterritoriality. 
 
This broad line of interpretation of the principle was further developed and reasserted by 
the CJEU. In Van Esbroek the Court turned to examine the meaning of idem finding that 
it should be based on  
 
“the identity of the material acts, understood as the existence of a set of facts which are 
linked together, irrespective of the legal qualification given to them or the legal interest 
protected.” 882  
 
The Court found this broad interpretation necessary, once again, in the light of securing 
free movement:  
 
“Only if the perpetrator of an act knows that, once he has been found guilty and served 
his sentence, or, where applicable, been acquitted by a final judgment, he may travel 
within the Schengen territory without fear of prosecution in another Member State.”883 
 
The Court further developed this interpretation of ne bis in idem in Van Straaten884 and 
Gasparini.885 In Van Straaten the Court elaborated on the notion of ‘same acts’ and 
decided along the lines of Van Esbroek. In particular, the Court ruled that the movement 
                                                                  
879 Para 37, 38, ibid.. 
880 Same acts or same offences (or what constitutes either of these two). 
881 Whether the principle is applicable to decisions on the merits only (determining someone’s 
innocence or guilt) of if it also includes decisions on procedural grounds. 
882 Case C-436/04 Criminal proceedings against Van Esbroeck ECR I- 2333 [2006] para 42. 
883 Para 34, ibid.. 
884 Case C-150/05 Criminal proceedings against Van Straaten ECR I-9327 [2006]. 
885 Case C-467/04 Criminal proceedings against Gasparini  ECR I-9199 [2006]. 
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of drugs between two Schengen countries – the ‘export’ from one country and ‘import’ 
into the other country - are basically the same acts. As Wasmeier and Thwaites note  
 
“The ECJ clearly stated that the variety of interpretations linked to the EU’s nature is 
incompatible with the proper and consistent application of ne bis in idem as a 
fundamental principle. This echoes the European Council’s conclusions of its summit in 
Tampere where it was stressed that: ‘in a genuine European Area of Justice individuals 
(...) should not be prevented or discouraged from exercising their rights by the 
incompatibility or complexity of legal and administrative systems in the Member 
States.’”886 
 
In Van Straaten the CJEU went further when considering the concept of bis as well, 
finding that a courts’ final decision of acquittal for lack of evidence should be subsumed 
within the application of the principle. The Court noted that, not including these 
decisions in the concept of bis and allowing criminal proceedings in a different Member 
State for the same acts, would affect the exercise of the right of free movement and 
would undermine the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations.887 
 
Along the same lines in Gasparini888 the CJEU held that decisions where the defendant 
was acquitted because prosecution was time barred are to be included in the remit of the 
principle.889  
 
This wide interpretation has also been taken in relation to the last part of Article 54 
CISA namely to what is the meaning of enforcement of a penalty.890 In this regard the 
Court took the view that a suspended sentence is a penalty in the course of being 
                                                                  
886 M. Wasmeier and N. Thwaites, “The development of ne bis in idem into a transnational 
fundamental right in EU law: comments on recent developments” (2006) 31 European Law 
Review 565, 573. 
887 Case C-150/05, supra note 884, para 58-60.  
888 Case C-467/04, supra note 885. 
889 This went against the findings of AG Sharpston who found that a decision that does not 
involve examinations of the merits of the case does not settle societies account with the 
individual nor does it strike a balance between free movement and fighting crime which could 
lead to a forum shopping jurisdiction by offenders, para 74-76, 81, 84 and 104 of the AG 
Conclusions in Criminal proceedings against Gasparini delivered on 15 June 2006, ECR I- 9203. 
890 The last part of Article 54 CISA holds that for the principle to apply a penalty imposed “has 
been enforced, is actually in the process of being enforced or can no longer be enforced under 
the laws of the Contracting Party.” Supra note 59. 
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enforced891 and that a sentenced rendered in absentia that could never have been 
enforced is also covered by the principle.892  
 
However, the Court did not always withdraw the freedom of the State who wishes to 
prosecute. The case Mantello893 stands as a prime example where the Court chose to 
respect a margin of discretion of national prosecution authorities. In 2005, Mr. Mantello 
was convicted by the Tribunale di Catania (Italy) of unlawful possession of cocaine 
intended for onward sale. In 2008, the same court issued an EAW regarding Mr. 
Mantello, alleging that between 2004 and 2005 he had participated in organised drug 
trafficking in a number of Italian towns and as well as in Germany. In fact, at the time of 
the investigation that had led to Mr. Mantello’s conviction for the possession of cocaine, 
the Italian authorities already had enough evidence to prosecute him for participating in 
the organised trafficking of narcotic drugs.894 For the purposes of investigation, at the 
time, this information was not passed on to the investigating judge nor was he requested 
to prosecute such acts. The question was—whether the fact that Italian authorities had, 
at the time of the first conviction for possession of cocaine, evidence of the accused’s 
participation in a criminal organisation—meant that there was already a decision, which 
could be regarded as final, regarding the facts set out in the EAW. The CJEU reasserted 
that whether the person has been ‘finally judged’, is determined by the law of Member 
State in which the judgment was delivered. Consequently, a decision which does not 
                                                                  
891 Case C-288/05 Criminal proceedings against Ketzinger ECR I-6441 [2007]. 
892 Case C-297/07 Criminal proceedings against Bourquain ECR I-09425 [2008]. This later case 
was particularly thorny given the nuances of the trial having been in absentia and the fact that the 
sentence was never served and could never have been served in any case. Mr. Bourquain, a 
German citizen serving in the French legion in the Algerian war, was sentenced for desertion and 
homicide of another German legionnaire by a French permanent military tribunal in 1961. The 
trial and sentencing were in absentia and there was no proof that the defendant had ever been 
notified of the decision. Mr. Bourquain sought refuge in Germany. In 2003 the German Public 
Prosecutor charged him for the same acts and contacted the French authorities. The latter 
informed that, under French law, a non appealed judgment in absentia becomes time-barred (no 
appeal is admitted) after 20 years. Moreover, if the person convicted reappears during those 20 
years the sentence cannot in any case be enforced, rather, new proceedings must be initiated. 
Ultimately, this implies that such sentence could never have been enforced. Furthermore, the 
French authorities also informed that in 1968 France passed an amnesty in relation to all offences 
committed by military personnel serving in Algeria, fact that the Court ignored in its decision. 
The AG however did take this aspect into consideration in its conclusions suggesting that ne bis 
in idem should be applicable to such feature as well. See mostly para 11-13 of the Judgement and 
Para 18 of the Conclusions of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 8 April 2008,  ECR I-
09425. For a detailed analysis of the case see S. Brammer, Note case (2009) 46 Common Market 
Law Review 1685.  
893 Case C-261/09 Proceedings concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant issued in 
respect to Gaetano Mantello, ECR I-11477 [2010]. 
894 Para 27 of the judgment, ibid.. 
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definitely bar further prosecution at the national level does not constitute a procedural 
obstacle to the possible opening or continuation of criminal proceedings.895  
 
This wide interpretation of ne bis in idem by the Court goes hand in hand with other 
mutual recognition instruments in that it validates the national decision beyond the 
national territory, potentially to the entire European Union.896 Furthermore, mutual 
recognition as a punitive and protective tool raises questions regarding the nature and 
reach of the principle. As Mitsilegas puts it, 
 
“While the maximum mutual recognition of coercive measures such as the European 
Arrest Warrant leads to concerns regarding the extension of the State’s punitive sphere, 
a broad application of ne bis in idem (viewed as a facilitator of free movement) has thus 
far led to the opposite results – an extension of the protective sphere for the individual in 
the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’.”897 
 
4.1 Ne bis in idem as reassertion of ius puniendi 
 
However, the principle of ne bis in idem as it has been shaped, does not favour the 
individual alone but also the fastest State to give closure to a criminal process in 
whatever form. As shown above, the fact that a State gives closure to criminal 
proceedings will, in most cases, prevent other EU jurisdictions from prosecuting the 
same person for the same crime. This is tantamount to allocating adjudication on a ‘first 
come, first serve basis’, raising questions of policy, opportunity and legitimacy in the 
adjudication of criminal decisions across the EU.898 The Commission voiced these 
concerns in its Green Paper on ne bis idem noting that, 
 
“(...) without a system for allocating cases to an appropriate jurisdiction while 
proceedings are ongoing, ne bis in idem can lead to accidental or even arbitrary results: 
by giving preference to whichever jurisdiction can first take a final decision, its effects 
amount to a ‘first come first served’ principle. The choice of jurisdiction is currently left 
                                                                  
895 Para 46-47, ibid.. 
896 As noted above, the principle of ne bis in idem was introduced in the context of ECL via the 
incorporation of the Schengen acquis in EC and EU law by the Treaty of Amsterdam (TEU(A)), 
see supra note 194.  
897 V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law, supra note 14, 149. 
898 See AG Sharspton points on the shortcomings of preventing decisions on the merits of the 
case, in her Conclusions in the Gasparini case, supra note 889. 
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to chance, and this seems to be the reason why the principle of ne bis in idem is still 
subject to several exceptions.”899  
 
The Commission’s proposed solution is thus to act a priori by allocating jurisdiction 
before final decisions are reached by any State. This was in fact attempted with the 
adoption of Framework Decision on prevention and settlement of conflicts of exercise of 
jurisdiction in criminal proceedings,900 aiming at fostering and promoting cooperation 
between competent authorities of two or more Member States in cases of positive 
jurisdictions.901 The Framework Decision however does not set in place a system of 
allocation of jurisdiction but merely obligations on States to contact and reply to each 
other when there are grounds to believe that parallel proceedings are being conducted.902 
It also sets the obligation for States to enter into direct negotiations when there is 
confirmation that parallel proceedings are in course in two or more Member States.903 
 
This Framework Decision clearly ventures into a new realm of mutual recognition in 
criminal matters, a managerial/ regulatory one, and perhaps sets the foundations for 
future regulation of States’ competences and allocation of jurisdiction. This could help 
to prevent conflicts of jurisdiction a posteriori and could also permit a choice of the 
better jurisdiction which in cases of serious criminality (such as organised crime) or with 
vulnerable victims could be sensible and necessary for a proper evaluation of the merits 
of the case. However, as Mitsilegas suggests, the tone of the Commission’s Green paper 
raises concerns that the criteria for allocation of jurisdiction would prioritise the goal of 
prosecutorial efficiency. Additionally, a system of allocation of jurisdiction could 
represent an additional intrusion into the domestic sphere, namely by preventing 
Member States from prosecuting behaviour which may lead to a criminal conviction in 
their jurisdiction.904 Given that mutual recognition suffered several blows in the latest 
framework decisions, it is uncertain whether this path could be feasible.     
 
 
 
                                                                  
899 European Commission, Green Paper on Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Principle of ne bis in 
idem in Criminal Proceedings, COM(2005)696final, Brussels, 23.12.2005, 3. 
900 Council Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009 on prevention and 
settlement of conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings, OJ L 328/42 [2009]. 
901 Article 1, ibid..   
902 Articles 5 and 6, ibid.. 
903 Article 10, ibid.. 
904 V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law, supra note 14, 156. 
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Conclusion 
 
The introduction and development of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters embodies a paradox. Mutual recognition was chosen as an alternative to 
harmonisation as it was thought to be less demanding given that the measures adopted 
do not aim to alter national criminal law (this is a task for harmonisation). However, this 
perception does not match the impetus and reach of its influence. With mutual 
recognition, ECL now reaches virtually any type of criminality as well as extensive 
domains of criminal justice. Furthermore, it does so by facilitating and enhancing 
criminal investigations, prosecution and punishment beyond national borders, adding yet 
another punitive layer to ECL. The EAW is a stringent example of the punitive reach of 
mutual recognition in practice. 
    
However, these new developments of ECL were received with resistance by many legal 
orders which struggled to accept some of the most fundamental changes brought about 
by the EAW and mostly so the principle of non extradition of nationals and the abolition 
of dual criminality. Many of these reactions were of no small importance and re-wrote in 
part the constitutional dialogue between the EU and some Member States. This 
resistance was novel to ECL and might signal that the limits of ECL were partly reached 
for the time being. The lack of interest in the implementation of financial enforcement 
measures and the moderation in the tone of the instruments adopted post EAW also so 
suggests. Furthermore, the latest measures on mutual recognition show some moderation 
in the punitive tone that characterised some of the first framework decisions adopted. 
This modulation was done in particular via a partial or complete reintroduction of the 
principle of dual criminality and by an acknowledgement, even if to a limited extent, of 
the rights of individuals as defendants or prisoners. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that mutual recognition was made to continue to be the 
central area of development of ECL under the post-Lisbon settlement. Under the new 
framework, implementation will be required and enforcement mechanisms to sanction 
Member States will be in place.905 These changes can interfere with the status quo, given 
that so many Member States failed properly to implement the measures in force 
(implementation is thus likely to improve under the post-Lisbon framework). 
Furthermore, the passage of time will also shed light on how the more moderate 
instruments are being implemented and or used (or not) by Member States. In fact, it 
was seen in this chapter that mutual recognition tools are at the disposition of the States. 
                                                                  
905 See chapter 3. 
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In other words, the real impact of mutual recognition does not depend on a correct 
implementation alone - it depends also on the use Member States make of these new EU 
tools (Poland’s use of the EAW was a case in point). Ultimately, this will determine 
whether the future tone of mutual recognition will continue to be a punitive one or if, on 
the contrary, Member States will resort to the more moderate options given by mutual 
recognition (pre-detention and probation transfers, for example). 
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 Chapter 6 Conclusion: Towards a European Union Criminal Policy 
 
1. A changing penal world 
 
In the past decades criminal justice systems around the world have undergone significant 
changes. As David Garland has suggested there has been a growing sense that the State 
could no longer cope effectively with crime control by itself.906 Thus, internally, the 
State began to devolve some crime prevention and crime control responsibilities to civil 
society, which became increasingly involved in criminal matters.907 Externally, it began 
to seek transnational alliances in order to face an increasingly globalised world with new 
intertwined patterns of criminality between States and continents, which in turn brought 
about new perceived threats that the States struggled to tackle alone.908 Terrorism and 
organised crime in particular played to this idea of the insufficiency of the State’s 
response to crime at the national and, more so, at international level. Since the 1960s, 
ideas of organised crime threats in countries like the US and Italy have travelled across 
continents and played to the mind of the public, politicians and legislators.909 Similarly, 
both in the 1970s and at the beginning of the new millennium, terrorism led to a new 
impetus in international cooperation and, equally, to a re-empowering of the State at a 
domestic level.910 This has had political and legal repercussions and has brought about 
new tensions. In particular, in the light of these threats, academics, political actors and 
commentators have taken opposite stances between, as Walker and Loader explain, 
those who believe that Western humanist and liberal democracies face new, 
unprecedented threats to their values and that urgent decisive measures ought to be taken 
and those that, on the contrary, believe governments are reacting ‘selectively’ to threats 
in ways that shake long standing democratic principles and rights.911  
                                                                  
906 D. Garland, “The limits of the Sovereign State”, supra note 1. 
907 L. Johnston and C. Shearing, Governing Security, supra note 49. 
908 Baker and Roberts note how globalisation has contributed to the promotion of some short-term 
punitive policies, to the harmonisation of problems and responses and an acceleration of transfer 
of penal policies across different systems. These common trends however do not imply that 
globalisation will always have those effects across jurisdictions. E. Baker and J. Roberts, 
“Globalisation and the new punitiveness” in J. Pratt et al. (eds) The New Punitiveness (Portland: 
Willan Publishing, 2005) 122,136. See also D. Nelken, “The Globalization of Crime and 
Criminal Justice, Prospects and Problems”, supra note 605. 
909 V. Mitsilegas, “From National to Global, From Empirical to Legal: The Ambivalent Concept 
of Transnational Organized Crime”, supra note 595.  
910 K. Nuotio, “Terrorism as a Catalyst for the Emergence, Harmonization and Reform of 
Criminal Law”, supra note 620. 
911 I. Loader and N. Walker, Civilizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
2.  See also L. Lazarus and B. Goold, “Introduction: Security and Human Rights” in B. Goold 
and L. Lazarus (eds) Security and Human Rights (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007) 2-
8. For a similar opinion on the tension between opposite fears brought about by the globalisation 
of crime – mostly in the context of organised crime see D. Nelken, “The Globalization of Crime 
and Criminal Justice, Prospects and Problems”, supra note 605, 253-255. For an argument 
challenging the idea that the threats faced today are so unprecedented that they cannot be fought 
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It was seen how it was precisely at the beginning of these transformations – in the 1970s 
– that cooperation in criminal matters began to take place in the EC context albeit to a 
very limited extent and in an indirect or secretive fashion. On the one hand, the 
European legal order as merely complementary of national systems lacked the capacity 
to seek enforcement of its provisions to the same extent as national legal orders. On the 
other hand, the EC was in a privileged position to facilitate intergovernmental 
cooperation amongst like-minded countries that were facing similar pressures from 
crime.  Hence, the EU was often constructed as a forum that facilitated the adoption of 
solutions for these common perceived threats.912 Nonetheless, at the same time, the EU’s 
intervention in criminal matters was always deeply constrained by Member States’ 
reassertion of their own sovereign power and by the EU’s own limited institutional 
framework. Hence, kept at the centre of these tensions, ECL’s nature has been a 
changing and fragmented one.  
 
Regardless, this thesis has shown that some coherence can already be found in ECL and 
that its nature, despite remaining in transition, is beginning to acquire more defined 
contours. It was shown how ECL is evolving today along two clear dynamics and how 
its current shape is the culmination of incremental changes that have characterised the 
field ever since its early origins. This has been reflected both in its institutional 
arrangements and in its scope: ECL has moved from peripheral, informal and indirect 
arrangements towards a supranational formalised position at the core of the EU project; 
and has veered from an initial focus on matters of terrorism, drug trafficking, organised 
crime and some EC policies only, to potentially any type of criminality today. It was 
shown that this expansionist tendency was initially driven by two main rationales, 
namely that of the fight against organised crime and the protection of EC interests and 
policies. Through the development of these themes, ECL began to focus on Euro-
crime—a criminality with a complex structure affecting primarily public goods or goods 
in the public sphere. These crimes reflect, to some extent, the nature of contemporary 
societies where interactions are more volatile and entwined than before. Hence, at the 
end of the 1990s, ECL presented itself with an identifiable scope and claim. However, it 
was further seen that the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (TEU(A)) and the 
introduction of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters in 1999 deeply 
transformed this state of affairs. On the one hand, whilst the rationales and focus built 
thus far continued to be central to ECL and further developed, other themes began to 
emerge, although to a more limited degree, such as the protection of victims’ right. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
within the normal context of the criminal justice system see C. Gearty, Can Human Rights 
Survive? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
912 See for example, chapter 2, section 3. 
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Measures adopted along these narratives largely maintained their focus on Euro-crimes. 
On the other hand, however, with the introduction of the principle of mutual recognition 
in criminal matters in 1999, the idea of ECL as centred in particular types of offences 
and as developing around identifiable rationales faded as mutual recognition crafted 
ECL as potentially involved and applicable to any type of criminality. Furthermore, this 
thesis has shown how the legal mechanisms of ECL - harmonisation of national criminal 
law and mutual recognition in criminal matters - have been contributing to a potentially 
more severe penality by increasing levels of formal criminalisation, by facilitating 
criminal investigation, prosecution and punishment beyond national borders and by 
placing more pressure on more lenient States. 
 
However, this thesis has also shown that in recent years, ECL slightly toned down the 
punitive bias of sseveral measures, mostly in the realm of mutual recognition. This was 
so as several legal instruments reintroduced the principle of dual criminality and began 
to give consideration to other values such as the reintegration of offenders, for example.  
Equally, the CJEU and the national judiciary adjudicated on a number of important 
cases, which have clearly added qualifications as to whether and how some ECL 
measures—and their punitiveness—are to be interpreted and incorporated in national 
criminal justice systems. Furthermore, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 
deeply reshaped the EU’s architecture in criminal matters. Hence, this concluding 
chapter will look at the most recent developments in the field, particularly after the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, suggesting that ECL will continue to expand in scope 
and punitiveness. Nonetheless, the chapter will also highlight that criminalisation at the 
EU level is beginning to follow more objective criteria and the field is becoming ever 
more balanced as the protection of fundamental rights and the consideration of values, 
such as reintegration of offenders, are becoming increasingly important. This indicates 
that the future of ECL will be constructed on a dialogue between punitiveness and 
individual rights. The chapter will further suggest that the greatest challenge for the 
future of ECL will be one of maintaining its fragile coherence and not falling into 
increasing patterns of fragmentation.  
  
 
1. The dynamics of European Union Criminal Law after Lisbon: a continuously 
expanding field 
 
It was shown throughout this thesis that the evolution of ECL was always deeply 
constrained by the Union’s institutional structures (or lack thereof). In particular, the 
EC’s lack of competence (as asserted by the TEU(M)(A)) to act in criminal matters and 
the extent of the competence attributed to the EU, made a significant difference 
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regarding ECL’s evolution, to the fashion according to which it responded to common 
perceived threats and needs in criminal. To look at the history of ECL is thus to look not 
only but also at its institutional structures, at how these both limited and empowered 
political and legal actors and conditioned the focus, shape and dynamics in the field at 
different times. As seen in Chapter 3, the Lisbon Treaty made deep changes to the old 
institutional structure, which was divided into three pillars. After Lisbon, these were 
reconfigured into two Treaties: the Treaty on the European Union (TEU(L)) and the 
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),913 which pave the way to the 
merging of the old pillar structure. This is of major significance for criminal matters 
within the EU, which, as seen throughout the thesis, were always kept in the separate 
framework of the third pillar (although, as also, this did not prevent a growing presence 
of criminal matters within the first pillar). Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon has also 
elevated the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the same legal value as the Treaties.914 
Specific to ECL, the TFEU formalised previous developments and left room for more 
expansion in the field. The central provisions for ECL are now Article 82 and 83 TFEU 
which, respectively, concern mutual recognition in criminal matters and the 
harmonisation of national criminal law. It was also seen in chapter 4 and 5 of this 
dissertation that both principles of harmonisation of national criminal law and mutual 
recognition in criminal matters are contributing to a more severe penality across the EU. 
This was taking place in a threefold manner: first, by increasing levels of formal 
criminalisation at the national level;915 second, by facilitating criminal investigation, 
prosecution as well as securing punishment across the European Union;916 thirdly, by 
potentially placing more pressure on more lenient States.917 It will be seen below that, in 
the light of the new institutional framework of the Treaty of Lisbon, ECL is likely to 
continue to lead to an increase in formal criminalisation.  
 
1.1. Recent developments in harmonisation of national criminal law 
 
Recent developments in harmonisation of national criminal law suggest that the trends 
of increasing expansion and punitiveness will continue to echo throughout ECL. 
Expansion is seen first in the wording of the Article 83 TFEU, which envisages the 
possibility of adoption of further harmonisation measures in relation to serious and cross 
border crime on the basis of “developments of crime”;918 second, Lisbon also gives the 
EU competence to adopt criminal measures if these are necessary to ensure the effective 
                                                                  
913 Article 1 TEU(L) atributes the same legal value to both Treaties. This chapter will also refer to 
the two Treaties in more general terms as ‘Treaty of Lisbon’ or ‘Lisbon Treaty’. 
914 Article 6(1) TEU(L). 
915 Chapter 4. 
916 Chapter 5. 
917 Chapter 4 and 5. 
918 Article 83(1) TFEU. 
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implementation of Union policies.919 The latter development clearly extents the 
competence recognised by the CJEU in relation to the protection of EC environmental 
and transport policies via the criminal law.920 
 
2.1.1. Fighting serious cross-border crime 
 
Article 83(1) explicitly grants competence for the EU to establish minimum rules 
concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in area of serious cross-
border crime. Specifically, ten different areas of crime are identified: terrorism, 
trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug 
trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of 
means of payment, computer crime and organised crime. In this context, several new 
Directives have been adopted or proposed aiming at further harmonisation and at 
replacing previous framework decisions. Most of these instruments amend and further 
expand the scope of criminalisation.  
 
This broadened scope will likely lead to a second wave of increased formal 
criminalisation. This is seen, for example, in the new Directive on trafficking in human 
beings.921 The Directive replaces the former Framework Decision922 and adopts a 
broader concept of what should be considered under ‘trafficking in human beings’. 
Hence, it requires Member States to criminalise a broader range of conducts than the 
preceding Framework Decision. The new behaviours to be criminalised include: the 
exploitation of begging, including the use of a trafficked dependent person for begging; 
the exploitation of criminal activities, namely the exploitation of a person to commit , 
among other, pick-pocketing, shop-lifting, drug trafficking and other similar activities 
which are subject to penalties and imply financial gain; and trafficking for the purpose 
of organ removal.923 Similarly, the Directive also increases the level of penalties to be 
applied. A new minimum-maximum sentence of at least five years imprisonment is now 
to be applicable in ordinary trafficking offences, whilst previously the Framework 
Decision did not specify a minimum maximum for non-aggravated offences (it did 
require however, that the offences would be punishable by effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive penalties, which may entail extradition).924 Similarly, the minimum maximum 
sentence to be applied in cases where aggravating circumstances are verified is now at 
                                                                  
919 Article 83(2) TFEU. 
920 See chapter 3. 
921 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing 
Framework Decision 2002/626/JHA, OJ L 101/1 [2011]. 
922 Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, supra note 409. 
923 Article 2 of the Directive. See also intend 11 of the preamble, supra note 921.  
924 See Article 3(1) of the Framework Decision and Article 4 of the Directive, supra notes 409 
and 921. 
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least ten years imprisonment in contrast with eight years, provided in the Framework 
Decision.925 The Directive also broadens the concept of ‘aggravating circumstances’ to 
include all cases with child victims and the commission of the offence by public 
officials.926 Moreover, it further requires Member States to establish jurisdiction in cases 
where the offence was committed—in whole or in part—in their territory as well as 
when the offender is one of their nationals (this might potentially involve the assertion 
of jurisdiction beyond the EU’s territory).927  
 
A Directive on the sexual exploitation of children, amending and expanding the 
provisions of the Framework Decision on the same topic, was also adopted.928 The 
Framework Decision categorised these offences in two main categories: those of 
‘offences concerning the sexual exploitation of children’ and ‘offences concerning child 
pornography’.929 The Directive now categorises offences in four distinct categories: 
‘offences concerning sexual abuse’, ‘offences concerning sexual exploitation’, ‘offences 
concerning child pornography’ and ‘solicitation of children for sexual purposes’.930 
Besides these broader categorisations, the Directive requires Member States to 
criminalise more conducts than those required by the Framework Decision such as, for 
example, the causing a child who has not reached the age of sexual consent, to witness 
sexual activities or sexual abuse, for sexual purposes, even without being forced to 
participate.931 Further examples are to knowingly attend pornographic performances 
involving the participation of a child,932 and to knowingly obtain access, by means of 
information and communication technology, to child pornography.933 The Directive also 
lists a higher number of aggravating circumstances that Member States may consider 
than those listed in the Framework Decision. Examples of aggravating circumstances 
which were not mentioned in the Framework Decision are, for instance, the offence 
being committed against a child in a particular vulnerable situation, such as with a 
mental health or physical disability; the offence being committed by a member of the 
child’s family, a person cohabitating with the child or a person who has abused a 
recognised position of trust and authority; the offence being committed by several 
                                                                  
925 See Article 3(2) of the Framework Decision and Article 4(2) of the Directive, ibid.. 
926 Article 4 (2)(a) and(3) of the Directive, ibid.. 
927 Article 10 (1) (a) and (b), ibid.. 
928 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, OJ L 335/1 [2011]. 
929 Articles 2 and 3 of Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, supra note 414.  
930 Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Directive, respectively. Supra note 928.   
931 Article 3 (2) and (3) of the Directive, ibid.. 
932 Article 4(4), ibid.. 
933 Article 5(3), ibid.. 
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persons acting together; in the framework of a criminal organisation; or the offender 
having previously committed offences of the same nature.934 
 
Beyond those mentioned above, other harmonisation measures are currently being 
proposed. The European Commission has already put forward a proposal for a Directive 
on attacks against information systems, which will replace the Framework Decision on 
attacks against information systems.935 Similarly to the previous two Directives 
mentioned, the scope of conduct that the Directive will require Member States to 
criminalise, is broader than that of the Framework Decision. For example, the proposed 
Directive calls for the criminalisation of new methods of committing cyber crimes—
such as the use of bonnets.936  
 
2.1.2. Protecting EU interests and policies via the criminal law 
 
Harmonisation, in the context of Article 83(2) TFEU, is at the centre of ECL’s 
development, currently. The article provides that, if the approximation of criminal laws 
and regulations of the Member States proves essential to ensure the effective 
implementation of a Union policy in an area that has been subject to harmonisation 
measures, directives may establish minimum rules regarding the definition of offences 
and sanctions, in the area at stake. This provision affords a clear competence for the 
Union to reinforce its policies via the use of criminal norms as well as the application of 
criminal sanctions. Article 325(4) TFEU also provides this competence in relation to the 
EU’s financial interests.  
 
As shown throughout the thesis, the narrative of protection of EC interests was for the 
most part, developed indirectly. This was so because, for a significant period of ECL’s 
evolution, the EC did not have a recognised competence to seek the protection of its own 
interests and policies via criminal law. Nonetheless, this protection was sought indirectly 
via third pillar instruments as well as through the influence of the CJEU. This influence 
culminated in two important CJEU decisions in which the Court recognised competence 
for the EC to adopt criminal law measures in the context of its environmental and 
transport policies when these aimed at fighting serious environmental crime. The use of 
criminal law to protect EC policies was controversial at different levels, as it touched 
upon a number of difficult themes. The first of which related to the legitimacy and 
                                                                  
934 Article 9 (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), ibid.. 
935 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on attacks against 
information systems and repealing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, COM(2010) 
517 final, Brussels, 30.9.2010. 
936 Article 6 of the Proposal, ibid..; ‘Bonets are networks of private computers infected with 
malicious software and controlled, as a group, without the owners’ knowledged; see also page 3 
of the proposal for more details on what bonets are and how they operate.   
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competence of the EC to legislate in criminal matters. The different EC Treaties did not 
afford a competence to the EC to legislate in criminal matters and the fact that the third 
pillar provided for such competence was often understood as proof that the legislator 
intended to keep criminal law outside the realm of the EC. Regardless, concerns with the 
effectiveness of EC policies began to be felt very strongly and criminal law was 
increasingly envisaged by the Commission and the CJEU as a tool that could play an 
important role in improving the effective implementation and enforcement of EC goals. 
The raison d’être for the criminalisation of behaviour detrimental to EC policies and 
goals was (and is) very different from that initially offered for the existence of a criminal 
law of the EU. The initial EU criminal law was a direct consequence of the removal of 
internal borders and of a perceived crime increase and the opportunities for crime that 
could come with it. Accordingly, it was concerned with organised and other types of 
related criminality. Criminal law as a means to protect EC policies, however, began to 
be developed based on an idea of effectiveness of EC policies937 and this competence is 
acknowledged today by the TFEU. On the one hand, it seems natural that the Union 
would, sooner or later, seek the protection of its own goals via criminal law. This need 
could be said to be a natural urge of any legal order. On the other hand, however, this 
raises two sets of questions about the development of ECL. The first question relates to 
the expansion of criminal law from a substantive point of view. The EU is concerned 
prima facie with building and regulating a single market and securing the rights of free 
movement within that market. The use of criminal law to protect those values thus 
entails an expansion in the scope of ECL itself. Whilst substantive ECL was initially 
concerned with criminality associated with organised crime, now ECL is also concerned 
with other types of domains—those  related to EU policies.  
 
The potential future increase in the scope of ECL reflects, to some extent, tendencies 
also at the national level. Indeed, as seen in the introduction of this dissertation, national 
criminal law has, in the past century, moved from the protection of core fundamental 
values of society to assume a more regulatory role today and cover a significantly 
broader range of topics within its scope. This expansion of national criminal law has 
also revived normative debates on the criminal law about the functions of criminal law 
and the criteria for criminalisation. For example, if criminal law is increasingly being 
used as a regulatory tool, how can this accommodate principles such as the use of 
criminal law as ultima ratio. This leads to another question–that of the justification for 
the use of criminal law to protect EU policies. Before Lisbon, the effectiveness of EC 
                                                                  
937 E. Herlin-Karnell, “Commission v. Council: Some Reflections on Criminal Law on the First 
Pillar”, supra note 479; E. Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal 
Law (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2012).  
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policies appeared as the main criteria for criminalisation.938 In the post Lisbon 
framework, the Commission is now trying to reconcile this goal with the principles of 
subsidiarity and of criminal law as ultima ratio. 
 
2.1.3. The emergence of criteria for EU’s criminalisation  
 
The Commission issued a Communication in 2011 on the future of ECL and of a 
‘European Criminal Policy’.939 The Communication starts with the added value of 
ECL.940 This was something that thus far had not been addressed directly. According to 
Klip, the Commission’s articulation of the need for a more consistent and coherent 
criminal policy reflects the fact that ECL, thus far, was far from coherent and consistent 
and that the necessity for certain measures in the field of criminal law was presented at 
self-evident.941 In the Communication, the Commission offers four particular elements 
of added value of ECL, namely: the fostering of citizens’ confidence in their right to free 
movement; the prevention of existence of ‘safe havens’ for criminals; the strengthening 
of mutual trust for a better functioning of mutual recognition; and finally, the prevention 
and sanction of serious offences against EU law in important policy areas.942 
 
Furthermore, the Commission also clarifies which principles, in its opinion, should 
guide EU’s criteria of criminalisation. It mentions, first, the principle of subsidiarity, 
noting that the EU should only legislate if, due to the scale and effects of a proposed 
measure, its goals cannot be achieved more efficiently at a national or regional level. 
Secondly, criminalisation should be in line with fundamental rights, as guaranteed in the 
CFR and ECHR, particularly given the sensitivity of criminal law measures.  
 
The Commission, taking these two principles into account, proposes a two-step 
approach in criminal law legislation. A first stage when the EU should ask whether to 
adopt criminal law measures at all. In this regard, the Commission suggests the 
observance of the necessity and proportionality principles, i.e. the use of criminal law as 
‘ultima ratio’. This requires the legislator to analyse whether measures other than 
                                                                  
938 Ibid.. 
939 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, Towards 
an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal 
law, COM (2011) 573 final, Brussels, 20 September 2011. This focus was further reasserted in 
2012 by European Commissioner Viviane Reding, see her speech “Crime and Punishment: Using 
criminal law to support growth and economic recovery”, Speech to the Expert Group on EU 
Criminal Policy, Inaugural Meeting, Brussels, 19 June 2012. 
940 European Commission, Communication ‘Towards and EU Criminal Policy’, ibid., 2-5. 
941 A. Klip, “Editorial: European Criminal Policy” (2012) 20 European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 3. 
942 European Commission, Towards an EU Criminal Policy, supra note 939. Klip argues that the 
first three reasons given by the Commission are without merit, ibid., 5. 
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criminal sanctions, such as civil or administrative sanctions, will be sufficient to ensure 
policy implementation or whether criminal law would address the problems more 
effectively. The second stage in the adoption of EU legislation is the decision of which 
concrete measure to adopt when there is a demonstrated need for criminal law. Here, the 
Commission identifies four main elements to be taken into consideration. First, it 
reasserts the EU’s competence to adopt minimum rules only, although these must be 
clear enough to respect the principle of legality. Second, it reasserts the criteria of 
‘necessity’ and proportionality in the choice of criminal offences. Third, the need for 
clear factual evidence about the nature and effects of the crime in question as well as 
divergent legal situations in Member States which could jeopardise the effective 
enforcement of an EU policy. Finally, the Commission reasserts the need for 
effectiveness of the penalty applicable which might involve the ‘tailoring of the sanction 
to the crime’. This could involve the use of sanctions such as confiscation, for 
example.943 
 
The Commission’s Communication makes a clear first attempt at the formulation of 
principles of criminalisation or criteria for such formulation at the EU level. Underlying 
this attempt, three main ideas become salient: subsidiarity (the EU should only intervene 
if it is shown to be necessary due to the scale and effects of the measures needed); 
criminal law as ultima ratio (the principle according to which criminal law should be of 
last resort); and effectiveness (the demonstrated need that a particular EU policy is not 
efficient without the help of criminal sanctions).944  
  
How the EU in general, or the Commission in particular, will articulate these principles 
in practice is yet to be seen. Indeed, as seen in Chapter 3, the effectiveness of EC 
policies and interests was the strongest argument in the Commission and CJEU’s 
reasoning for the need to adopt of criminal measures. Particularly in relation to the 
protection of EC’s environmental policy via criminal law, there were arguments put 
forward that criminal law was not necessarily the most effective means to ensure 
compliance with environmental policies.945 However, the CJEU and the Commission 
both seemed to assume that criminal law could guarantee such effectiveness per se.946 
This suggests that the Commission will have to seek a balance between the criteria of 
effectiveness and that of ultima ratio. The necessity for this balance is indeed indirectly 
voiced in the Communication when, the need for more ‘factual evidence’ is mentioned 
by the Commission. In particular, the Commission mentions ‘Impact Assessments’ 
                                                                  
943 Ibid., 7-8. 
944 A. Klip, “Editorial: European Criminal Policy”, ibid., 6. 
945 M. Faure, “European Environmental Criminal Law”, supra note 480; and B. Lange, 
“Environmental Criminal Law in a European Context”, supra note 481.  
946 See chapter 3. 
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preceding any legislative proposal, as a means to provide for the necessary factual 
evidence in relation to particular policy areas, in order to determine whether the need for 
the use of criminal law is necessary or not. 947  
 
On a different level, in answering the question of in which EU policy areas might EU 
criminal law be needed, the Commission suggests that there a number of areas where it 
has been established that criminal law measures are required—namely, areas to fight 
serious damaging practices and illegal profits in economic sectors. These include the 
financial sector, in particular, measures concerning market manipulation and insider 
trading, the fight against EU fraud948 and the protection of the Euro against 
counterfeiting.949 Furthermore, the Commission voices its intention to reflect on how 
criminal law could contribute to economic recovery by tackling illegal economy and 
financial criminality. Finally, insofar as the subject-matter of ECL is concerned, the 
Commission asserts that it will further explore whether criminal law is a necessary tool 
to ensure the effective enforcement of other policy areas, such as road transport (and in 
particular, serious infringements of EU social, technical, safety and market rules for 
professional transports), data protection, customs rules, environmental protection, 
fisheries (policy where the EU has adopted a ‘zero tolerance’ campaign against illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing) and internal market policies (in order to fight illegal 
practices such as counterfeiting and corruption or undeclared conflict of interests in 
public procurement).950 
 
The Commission’s Communication suggests that the narrative of protection of EC 
policies and interests via criminal law will, most likely, become central in the future of 
the field. Moreover, besides the increasing scope of ECL, the explanatory 
memorandums of specific measures proposed suggest that these new measures will also 
encompass an increase in formal criminalisation in some national legal orders. For 
example, the Commission has put forward a proposal for a Directive on criminal 
sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation.951 The Directive will be the first 
instrument in ECL to directly require Member States to criminalise conducts relating to 
insider dealing and market manipulation. The Commission notes in the explanatory 
memorandum to the proposal that Member States sanctioning regimes in this area are 
                                                                  
947 Commission’s Communication, ‘Towards an EU Criminal Policy”, supra note 939, 7 
948 To date the specific legislation in this regard remains the 1995 Convention on the protection 
of financial interests of the EU and its protocols, and the Council Regulation 2988/95, supra note 
361. 
949 Commission’s Communication, ‘Towards an EU Criminal Policy”, supra note 939, 10. 
950 Ibid., 10-11. 
951 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal sanctions 
for insider dealing and market manipulation, COM(2011)654 final, Brussels, 20.10.2011. 
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weak and heterogeneous.952 Existing national sanctions to fight market abuse offences 
are lacking impact and are not sufficiently dissuasive, whilst national definitions of 
market abuse and insider dealing offences diverge considerably from Member State to 
Member State. In addition, five Member States do not provide for criminal sanctions for 
disclosing inside information by primary insiders and eight Member States do not do so 
in relation to secondary insiders. In addition, one Member State does not currently 
impose criminal sanctions for insider dealing by a primary insider and four do not do so 
for market manipulation.953 Therefore, the correct implementation of the Directive is, 
once again, likely to increase formal criminalisation in some Member States.  
 
Finally, the Commission has also put forward a Proposal for a Directive on the fight 
against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law.954 The 
explanatory memorandum notes that despite developments in this area, Member States 
have adopted diverging rules and consequently, often diverging levels of protection of 
the Union’s financial interests within their national legal systems. Again, the Directive 
requires Member States to criminalise more broadly than its predecessor—the  ‘PIF’ 
Convention—does.955 It will do so by no longer requiring that the prohibited conduct be 
‘in breach of official duties’ and by including in its scope ‘misappropriation’, which 
covers conduct by public officials that does not constitute fraud stricto sensu but which 
consists of misappropriation of funds or assets with the intention to damage the Union’s 
financial interests.956  Moreover, the Directive also introduces minimum penalties to be 
applied (previously ECL measures would only refer to minimum maximum penalties).957  
 
2.2. Recent developments in mutual recognition in criminal matters 
 
The second dynamic of ECL—the one brought about by mutual recognition—is also 
solidified and expanded. As seen in Chapter 3 and earlier in this chapter, Article 82 (1) 
of the Treaty of Lisbon formalises the role of mutual recognition as the hub of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters in the EU. This dynamic was the most expansive until 
Lisbon, as it incorporated potentially all criminality under its umbrella and touched upon 
an increasing number of domains in the domestic criminal justice systems. Its 
endorsement in the Treaty as the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
                                                                  
952 Ibid., 2. 
953 Ibid., 3. 
954 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the fight against 
fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law, COM(2012)363 final, Brussels, 
11.7.2012.  
955 Convention for the Protection of the European Communities financial interests, supra, note 
298. 
956 Article 4 of the Proposal; see also pages 8-9 of the explanatory memorandum, supra note 954. 
957 Ibid., 19. 
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suggests that mutual recognition will almost certainly continue to be an area of 
development.  
 
Similar to the case of harmonisation, directives have also been proposed in this domain, 
such as the Proposal for a Directive on a European Investigation Order—which will 
replace the Framework Decisions on the European evidence warrant (EEW) as well as 
the execution of orders freezing property and evidence. 958 The European Investigation 
Order will have a significantly wider scope than the previous two measures. First, the 
Framework Decision on orders freezing property and evidence solely covers the freezing 
of evidence or property and not its transfer; second, the Framework Decision on the 
EEW only covers evidence that already exists and, in any case, only documents, objects 
and data. The proposed European Investigation Order applies to nearly all investigative 
measures, with the exception of the setting up and gathering of information within a 
Joint Investigation Team and the interception with immediate transmission and 
interception of satellite telecommunications. The European Investigation Order, should 
it come into force, will represent a significant strengthening of the State’s capacity to 
investigate beyond national borders. Similarly, the Proposal for a Directive on the 
freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime in the EU, should it come into force, will 
also broaden the scope of existing instruments.959 For example, it will introduce 
provisions on non-conviction-based confiscation in limited circumstances, with a view 
of addressing cases where criminal prosecution cannot be exercised; allow for third-
party confiscation; and introduce the possibility of freezing powers in urgent cases in 
order to prevent asset dissipation in situations where, waiting for an order issued by a 
court, would jeopardize the possibility of freezing.960  
 
2.3. A more effective implementation 
 
Finally, another reason pressing towards the assertion of the features of the two present 
dynamics of ECL is the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon has created the conditions for the 
merger of the three pillars, bringing police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
into the ‘mainstream Union framework’. This will have a direct impact in the field by 
granting the European Commission the capacity to bring infringement proceedings 
against Member States who do not implement or incorrectly implement directives in this 
                                                                  
958 Initiative (...) for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of... regarding the 
European Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ C 165/02 [2010]. Note that the Framework 
Decision on the EEW was adopted but did not come into force. See chapter 5. Council 
Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA, supra note 700. 
959 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime in the European Union, 
COM(2012) 85 final, Brussels, 13.3.2012.  
960 Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the proposed draft, ibid.. 
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domain.961 This increased ‘policing power’ by the European Commission will very 
likely encourage better domestic compliance - and hence more effective implementation 
and functioning of the ECL mechanisms - given that implementation rates have been 
generally poor in particular in relation to mutual recognition.962 Furthermore, in relation 
to the EAW, this might imply that the protectionist measures that some Member States 
have adopted vis-à-vis dual criminality, the protection of human rights or the protection 
of their nationals, can be brought into question by the Commission. It was shown in 
chapter 5 how these national qualifications to mutual recognition brought about a degree 
of moderation to the punitive emphasis of mutual recognition. Hence, if Member States 
are forced to make these changes and withdraw these national qualifications mutual 
recognition instruments will become more efficient, thus streamlining their punitive 
features.  
  
3. ECL’s punitiveness in context: national responses and specificities 
 
It was seen in chapter 4 and 5 that the increase in scope of ECL is leading to more 
formal criminalisation at national level and increasing the States capacity to investigate, 
prosecute and punish. The trend in upwards punitiveness in ECL is, nevertheless, not 
without important caveats and limitations. Although ECL has indeed set in motion the 
conditions that can lead to a more severe criminal justice, its actual impact has 
limitations and remains in flux. These limitations were point out earlier in the thesis and 
remain valid in the post Lisbon framework. They were identified first in relation to the 
harmonisation of national criminal law, particularly in the fact that there is a substantial 
amount of national law that is left untouched by harmonisation measures—making the 
ultimate outcome of national implementation uneven if not unpredictable. This takes 
place because the focus on harmonisation is on legislative measures alone and does not 
account for practices of policing, prosecution and practices of sentencing at the national 
level. These, nonetheless, have a strong influence in the actual domestic levels of 
substantive criminalisation. Hence, a wider scope of formal criminalisation, such as the 
one set in motion by ECL, will not always translate into more substantive 
criminalisation or harsher practices of punishment. These will be equally dependent on 
national penal cultures and policies, which still vary significantly across the European 
Union.963  
 
Likewise, in relation to mutual recognition, it was shown how domestic legal orders 
reacted very differently to its introduction in criminal matters. This was particularly 
                                                                  
961 Article 267 TFEU. 
962 See chapter 5. 
963 Chapter 4, section 4. See also below. 
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clear in relation to the EAW. In fact, whilst the abolition of the principles of non-
extradition of nationals, dual criminality and refusal to extradite based on human rights 
raised concerns throughout the European Union, Member States reacted differently. 
Some willingly changed their constitutions and secondary legislation in order to comply 
with the Framework Decision. Others nonetheless set extensive conditions as to whether 
and how they were to accept the surrender of individuals to other Member States. Many 
of these conditions guaranteed additional protection to individuals; others maintained or 
introduced dual criminality as grounds for refusal to surrender.964 This suggests first, 
that not all Member States will make an intensive use of tools such as the EAW simply 
because they are at their disposal; and, second that many national legal orders have de 
facto introduced additional safeguards. Hence, the punitive and prosecutorial bias of 
some of the mutual recognition measures will not always translate into enhanced 
practices of prosecution and punishment (although, as noted in the previous section, this 
autonomy will be more constricted due to the Commission’s possible use of its new 
‘policing competencies’ under the Treaty of Lisbon).  
 
Certainly, national responses to ECL will always vary. First, because as just seen ECL 
leaves room for this; second, because there is a great diversity of penological approaches 
and trends among EU countries. Hence, on the hand, the proliferation of ECL measures 
that almost exclusively expand criminalisation and enhance the State’s punitive 
apparatus emphasise themes and trends of increasing punishment in national legal orders 
across the West. Garland notes how, from the 1970s onwards, ‘penal welfarism’ which 
combined liberal legal ideals of due process and proportional punishment with a belief 
in rehabilitation, welfare and criminological expertise began to favour of a rebirth of 
retributive and punitive approaches to crime control.965 In an historical, sociological and 
penological analysis, Garland maps out the history of these changes which have, in the 
author’s opinion, led to the emergence of a ‘culture of control’ involving a combination 
of repressive and managerial criminal justice strategies (mostly in the USA and the UK). 
These changes were reflected in certain features of crime control structures, such as, 
among others, the massive expansion of criminal justice systems in terms of caseload, 
employment, expenditure and use of custodial sentences to the detriment of alternative 
sentences such as fines and community supervision;966 the highlighting of the figure of 
the victim which epitomised the move from a primary concern with the causes of crime 
                                                                  
964 See national constitutional and supreme courts reactions to the EAW and national 
implementation of the Framework Decision, Chapter 5, sections 2.1 and 2.1.1. 
965 D. Garland, The Culture of Control, supra note 42, 27-51. For a critical overview of the new 
trends, see also J. Faria Costa, “A criminalidade em um mundo globalizado: ou plaidoyer por um 
direito penal não-securitário” (2005) 135 Revista de Legislação e Jurisprudência 26. 
966 D. Garland, The Culture of Control, supra note 42, 168. 
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to the consequences of crime;967 in the policing sector, a shift towards more proactive 
policing techniques and towards a more intensive policing of disorder, incivilities and 
misdemeanours, and the introduction of technology and new management techniques to 
produce more directed problem solving approaches and tighter control of resources. In 
particular, police forces began to develop flexible links with other partners.968 These 
transformations led to a paradoxical outcome according to which, Garland states, 
 
“…the State strengthens its punitive forces and increasingly acknowledges the 
inadequate nature of this sovereign strategy. Alongside an increasingly punitive 
structure, one also sees the development of new modes of exercising power by which the 
state seeks to ‘govern at a distance’ by forming alliances and activating the 
governmental powers of non-state agencies.”969 
 
Transformations towards more repressive criminal justice systems have also been seen 
in other countries, although changes were more moderate. These transformations are 
primarily visible in a generalised increase in national imprisonment figures. Cavadino 
and Dignan, in their comparative study of criminal justice systems around the world, 
including a significant number of European countries, found this upwards trend in 
punishment in eleven out of twelve countries between 1986 and 2002/3.970 This trend 
was also seen in countries not included in Cavadino and Dignan’s sample. Poland971 and 
Spain,972 for example, have also experienced a significant increase in imprisonment rates 
in the last 30 years and, during the same period, Eastern European countries’ rates were 
always considerably higher (more than double) than those in Western Europe.973  
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countries with the highest imprisonment rates (6th if Gibraltar is included) below Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and the Czech Republic (data from prison studies, see 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=europe&category=wb_poprat) 
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“Trust, Welfare and Political Culture: Explaining Differences in National Penal Policies” (2008) 
37 Crime and Justice 316. 
973 Ibid.. 
 255 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to draw comparisons between national and EU 
trends. Yet, this short overview provides some context to ECL, which appears to share 
some themes of this emerging ‘culture of control’:974 the sheer volume of penal 
measures, the emphasis on ‘safety’ and ‘security’ in the Treaty itself as well as 
secondary legislation, the often nearly populist tone of some policy documents (mostly 
the action plans on organised crime975), the importance given to the victim, and the 
secondary place given to the objective of rehabilitation, amongst some other 
characteristics.976 More significant to the main argument of this dissertation is the fact 
that, as shown in chapters 4, 5 and above on this chapter, ECL, in its present form, is 
capable of potentially accentuating some of the trends of increasing punitiveness at the 
national level by contributing to more formal criminalisation and by facilitating 
prosecution, investigation and sentence enforcement across the EU.  
 
On the other hand, however, although trends towards increasing severity are seen 
nowadays in many national penal orders, not all EU countries have taken that punitive 
turn. Hence, some countries have managed to escape this rise in penal severity or at least 
to maintain important levels of moderation and commitment to due process. Lacey 
points out how some ‘coordinated market economies’ (in opposition to ‘liberal market 
economies’ such as the US and the UK) although also enduring important 
transformations,977 have managed to sustain relatively moderate penal policies, and 
                                                                  
974 Garland mentions twelve main indices of changes to crime control in the UK and USA in the 
past 30 years, including the decline of rehabilitative ideal, the emergence of punitive sanctions 
and expressive justice, changes to the emotional tone of crime policy, the return of the victim, 
obedience to new mottos such as ‘above all, the public must be protected’ (this places emphasis 
on imprisonment – incapacitation – and has led to a relaxation of concerns about the suspects’ 
civil liberties and prisoners’ rights), politicisation and populism of crime control, the reinvention 
of the prison, the transformation of criminological thought, the expanding infrastructure of crime 
prevention and community safety, the commercialisation of crime control in civil society, new 
management styles and working practices, and a perpetual sense of crisis, D. Garland, The 
Culture of Control, supra note 42, 5-26. For an analysis on how these new cultures of crime 
control can help to explain some features of EU’s governance in the context of the area of 
freedom, security and justice, see E. Baker, “Governing Through Crime – the case of the 
European Union”, supra note 568. 
975 See mostly chapter 3. 
976 Possibly, the most striking commonalities are to be found in the domain of policing, not 
covered by this thesis. Very briefly, the EU has built for the past decades, a significant apparatus 
of databases for information sharing on individuals, between different national authorities and 
national and EU authorities. For an overview of EU developments see V. Mitsilegas, “Databases 
in the area of freedom, security and justice: Lessons for the centralisation of records and their 
maximum exchange” in C. Stefanou and H. Xanthaki (eds) Towards a European Criminal 
Record (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 311.  This echoes US trends towards a 
police culture of information gathering and information sharing which have been accentuated 
particularly after the 9/11 attacks, see, for example, P. P. Swire, “Privacy and Information 
Sharing in the War on Terrorism” (2006) 51 Villanova Law Review 951.  
977 As noted in chapter 4, section 3.2. some of these changes were a result of the implementation 
or direct influence of ECL harmonisation instruments, see in particular T. Elholm, “Does EU 
Criminal Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression?”, supra note 637. 
 256 
particularly so in the case of the Scandinavian Social Democracies.978 Indeed, many 
Western European democracies, even if coping with changes towards more restrictive 
penal laws and practices, have managed to sustain relatively moderate criminal justice 
systems in particular if compared to other Western democracies such as the US or other 
regimes around the world.979 These differences in national penological approaches and 
trends suggests that an increase in formal criminalisation in consequence of 
implementation of EU harmonisation measures and an enhanced capacity to investigate, 
prosecute and secure punishment as a result of the operability of the mutual recognition 
principle will not always and not necessarily translate into a harsher penality at national 
level. 
 
4. The emergence and development of more moderate nuances in ECL 
 
4.1. A more central role for fundamental rights 
 
The moderation of the ECL’s punitive tone in recent years is also seen in the significant 
improvement of the narrative of protection of fundamental rights in ECL. Indeed, 
fundamental rights—and particularly procedural rights in criminal procedure—have 
taken a more visible place with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. First and 
foremost, because Article 6(2) TEU(L) holds that the EU should accede to the ECHR.980 
The accession will bring added guarantees, the most obvious one being that EU acts will 
be challengeable before the EcHR. Moreover, as voiced by the Commission, accession 
will help to develop a common culture of fundamental rights in the EU; it will reinforce 
the credibility of the EU’s human rights’ system; it will show that the EU puts its weight 
behind the Strasbourg system of fundamental rights; and it will ensure that there is an 
harmonious development of CJEU and the EcHR’s case law.981  
 
                                                                  
978 N. Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 3-54, 55; 
see also T. Lappi-Seppala, “Trust, Welfare and Political Culture” , supra note 972, 313-316. In 
the English speaking world, where the adoption of more repressive penal policies was strongly 
felt, Canada, for example, has also been highlighted as an example of relative moderation 
regardless of remaining a considerably punitive system, see, for example, D. Moore and K. 
Hannah-Moffat, “The liberal vein: revisiting Canadian penality” in in J. Pratt et al. (eds) The New 
Punitiveness (Portland: Willan Publishing, 2005) 85-100.  
979 N. Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma, ibid., 26-28; M. Tonry, “Parochialism in U.S. Sentencing 
Policy” (1999) 45 Crime and Delinquency 48, 50. Tonry explores how the use of cost-effective 
sanctions such as prosecutorial fines, community service orders and day fines have proliferated in 
Europe, in contrast with symbolic policies and rhetoric such as ‘three strikes and you’re out’, 
‘boot camps’ etc., which have been used extensively in the US, used to some extent in the UK, 
but not in other European countries.  
980 See also Article 218 TFEU. The Commission began negotiations over accession with the 
Council of Europe in July 2010. On November 2012, negotiations were ongoing, see Council of 
the European Union, Note from the Presidency on the Stockholm Programme mid-term review, 
Document 15921/12, Brussels, 13 November 2012, 6-7.   
981 European Commission, Brussels, 17 March 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/reding/pdf/echr_background.pdf 
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Furthermore, Article 6 TEU(L) confers binding legal force to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR).982 The Charter was drafted in order 
to codify fundamental rights and principles existent at the EU level and to grant them 
more visibility.983 It enshrines the right to a fair trial, presumption of innocence, 
effective judicial remedies, and legality and proportionality of criminal offences.984 
Fundamental rights of the CFR are binding on the institutions and bodies of the EU and 
on Member States when they act within the scope of application of EU law. 
 
As noted by Marguery, regardless of these changes, the value of the Charter seems to be 
tempered for two reasons. First, because it establishes a distinction between rights and 
principles; second, because some Member States have signed a protocol concerning the 
Charter’s application. The distinction between ‘principles’ and ‘rights’ is made in 
Article 52(5), although it is not always clear which provisions of the Charter refer to 
principles and which refer to rights. According to the author, the most immediate 
consequences of this distinction are that only rights can be invoked before a court whilst 
principles can be invoked for interpretation and control of the legality of acts adopted by 
Institutions or bodies of the Union to implement these principles or by Member States 
when implementing EU law.985 Second, the CFR cannot be invoked against Poland and 
the UK as these two Member States signed a Protocol concerning the application of the 
Charter (the provisions of the Protocol have also now been extended to the Czech 
Republic).986 Article 2 of the Protocol provides that, 
 
“To the extent that a provision of the Charter refers to national laws and practices, it 
shall only apply to Poland or the United Kingdom [or the Czech Republic] to the extent 
that the rights or principles that it contains are recognised in the law and practices of 
Poland or the United Kingdom [or the Czech Republic].”  
 
However, the effects of the Protocol, in practice, have been doubted. In particular, the 
CJEU has recently held in N.S. that the Protocol 
 
                                                                  
982 Article 6 (1) TFEU and Articles 47 to 49 CFR, OJ C 364/1 [2000]. Fundamental rights were 
previously guaranteed at EU level by the CJEU trhough tis unwritten genearl principles of EU 
law, see chapter 3. 
983 Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 of June 1999, para 44-45. 
984 Articles 47 to 50 CFR. Beyond the realm of criminal law the Charter also provides protection 
to economic and social rights not covered by the ECHR. 
985 T.P. Marguery, “The protection of fundamental rights in European criminal law after Lisbon: 
what role for the Charter of Fundamental Rights?” (2001) 37 European Law Review 450. 
986 Protocol 30 on the application of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union to 
Poland and the United Kingdom, OJ C 83/313 [2010]; Protocol on the application of the Charter 
of fundamental rights of the European Union to the Czech Republic, Council Document 
15265/1/09 REV1, 1 December 2009, 14. 
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“(…) does not call into question the applicability of the Charter in the United Kingdom 
or in Poland (…) Article 6 TEU requires the Charter to be applied and interpreted by 
the courts of Poland and of the United Kingdom (…)”987 
 
Similarly, Craig and de Búrca, note that it is unlikely that the Protocol will have any 
significant effect in practice. This is because it does not overturn the CJEU’s earlier case 
law on fundamental rights, which was based on general principles of EU law, which are 
in turn, also not overturned by the Charter.988 Likewise, this is also the opinion of the 
House of Lords who noted that the Charter will apply in the UK and the Protocol may 
serve as an interpretative guide to the former.989 
  
4.2. The development of criminal procedure 
 
The relationship between the EU and procedural rights in criminal matters - at the core 
of many criticisms of imbalance in ECL990 - is also significantly improved by the TFEU, 
which grants clear competence for the EU to legislate in procedural criminal law (even if 
limited to facilitation of mutual recognition).991  
 
This has, in fact, been a dynamic domain of ECL ever since the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon. The Council has laid down the EU’s plan of action in this domain 
through two main resolutions, establishing road maps for the adoption of future 
measures on suspects’ and defendants’ rights as well as on victims’ rights. 992  
 
In relation to the rights of victims, the Council’s Roadmap for strengthening the rights 
and protection of the victims, particularly in criminal proceedings,993 planned the 
revision of previous measures and some further recommendations on guidance and best 
practices and the protection of victims also in civil proceedings.994 A Directive on the 
European protection order has already been adopted.995 This instrument expands the 
protection of victims by allowing a judicial or equivalent national authority in a Member 
State—in which a measure protecting a person against a criminal act by another person 
                                                                  
987 Case C-411/10 and C-493/10, supra note 735, 119-120. 
988 P. Craig and G. De Búrca, EU Law, 395, supra note 500.  
989 House of Lords – European Union Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment, 
supra note 552, 102. 
990 See chapter 3. 
991 Article 82 (2) TFEU. 
992 Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural 
rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings, OJ C 295/1 [2009]; and 
Resolution of the Council of 10 June 2011 on a Roadmap for strengthening the rights and 
protection of victims, particularly in criminal proceedings, OJ C 187/1 [2011]. 
993 Resolution on a Roadmap for strengthening the rights and protection of victims, ibid.. 
994 Idem.. 
995 Directive 2011/99/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
the European protection order, OJ L 338/2 [2011]. 
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that may endanger his or her life, physical integrity, dignity, personal liberty or sexual 
integrity—to issue a European protective order to protect the endangered person in 
another Member State.996 A second Directive establishing minimum standards on the 
rights, support and protection of victims of crime—thus replacing the Framework 
Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings—was also adopted, 
establishing minimum standards of legal protection, as well as support and access to 
justice for victims in EU Member States.997 The Directive covers a vast number of rights 
including: the right to receive information from the first contact with a competent 
authority, the right to interpretation and translation, the right to access victim support 
services, as well as several rights of participation in criminal proceedings such as right 
to be heard, to legal aid, to reimbursement of expenses, to return of property, to 
safeguards in the context of restorative justice services, and to avoid contact between 
victim and offender, among many others.998 
 
The expansion of victims’ protection was also undertaken by the new Directive on 
trafficking in persons, which now provides Member States with the possibility of not 
prosecuting or imposing criminal penalties on victims of trafficking for their 
involvement in criminal activities, which they have been compelled to commit.999 The 
Directive further provides for assistance and support to victims before, during and after 
the criminal proceedings,1000 as well as for special protection in criminal investigation 
and proceedings, which can range from legal representation to, as far as possible, 
avoiding secondary victimisation by, giving evidence in open court or unnecessarily 
concerning the victim’s private life (for example).1001 Furthermore, special protection is 
envisaged to child victims including, for instance, physical and psycho-social recovery 
support, the appointment of a guardian or representative when necessary, the provision 
of assistance and support for the family when they are in the territory of the Member 
State.1002 
 
In relation to defendants, the 2009 Road map for strengthening procedural rights of 
suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings envisages action in six different 
areas: translation and interpretation, information on rights and charges, legal advice and 
legal aid, communication with relatives, employers and consular authorities, special 
                                                                  
996 Article 1, ibid.. 
997 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 
establishing minimum standards on the rigths, support and protection of victims of crime, and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315/57 [2012].    
998 Articles 4 to 24 of the Directive, ibid.. 
999 Article 8, of the Directive, ibid.. 
1000 Article 11, ibid.. 
1001 Article 12, ibid.. 
1002 Articles 13-16, ibid.. 
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safeguards for suspected or accused vulnerable persons, and the issue of a green paper 
on pre-trial detention.1003  
 
Of these, some measures have already been put forward. A Directive on the right of 
information in the course of criminal proceedings was very recently adopted.1004 The 
Directive envisages a number of information rights from the moment a person is made 
aware by the competent authorities that they are suspected or accused of having 
committed a criminal offence until the conclusion of the proceedings.1005 These 
information rights include the right of information about rights, such as the right of 
access to a lawyer, entitlements to free legal advice, the right to be informed of the 
accusation, the right to interpretation and translation and the right to remain silent.1006 
Suspects or accused persons shall also be provided with a written Letter of Rights, 
which they are allowed to keep in their possession whilst in detention. Besides the rights 
mentioned above, the Letter shall also provide information about the application of 
rights under national law such as, inter alia, the right of access to the materials of the 
case and the maximum number of hours or days suspects or accused persons may be 
deprived of liberty before being brought before a judicial authority.1007 The Directive 
also envisages the provision of an ‘appropriate’ Letter of Rights to persons who are 
arrested for the purpose of the execution of an EAW, although it does not provide 
further details on the type of information that should be provided in those cases.1008 
Additional rights covered by the Directive are the rights of information on the 
accusation and on the access of materials of the case.1009 Likewise, a Directive on 
translation and interpretation rights has also been adopted,1010 covering the right to 
interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings and proceedings for the execution 
of a EAW, which shall apply to persons from the time they are made aware that they 
area suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence until conclusion of 
the proceedings and, if applicable, sentencing and resolution of any appeal.1011 
Furthermore, a Proposal for a Directive on the right to access a lawyer and on 
                                                                  
1003 Idem. 
1004 Directive 2012/12/EU, supra note 727.  
1005 Article 2 (1), ibid.. 
1006 Article 3, ibid.. 
1007 Article 4, ibid.. 
1008 Article 5, ibid.. 
1009 Articles 6 and 7, ibid.. 
1010 Directive 2010/64/EU, supra note 729. 
1011 Articles 1, 2 and 3, ibid.. 
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communication upon arrest1012 is under negotiation whilst other measures feature in the 
Commission’s working programme for 2012.1013  
 
These recent developments relating to individual, procedural and fundamental rights 
brought about by the TEU(L), the TFEU and the post-Lisbon reforms, considerably 
developed what this thesis called “the narrative of fundamental rights in ECL”. To be 
sure, albeit significant improvements, some criticisms are still being voiced in relation to 
some lacunas that remain in the protection of individual rights in ECL. Rijken, for 
example, noted in 2010, that many of the new legislative measures adopted largely 
mirror existent procedural rights as developed by the ECHR and, in doing so, do not 
provide an adequate response to the specific fundamental rights concerns that have 
emerged out of the application of mutual recognition in criminal matters and enhanced 
judicial and police cooperation. The author mentions in particular, rights of information 
for data subjects, rights of information for house owners of their rights to be present 
during searches and of subjects of the reasons for an EEW or EAW as examples of 
special rights that ought to be created in response to the enhanced judicial and police 
techniques used.1014 Ever since, rights on information at least in relation to the EAW 
have been improved (although as seen the Directive on information rights does not detail 
which information exactly should be offered in the Letter of Rights in case of EAWs). 
 
Regardless of any remaining gaps, the general framework is clearly more balanced at a 
legislative level than that existing before the Lisbon reforms. As Mitsilegas notes, the 
entry into force of the TEU(L) and TFEU has the potential to address concerns over 
fundamental rights within the AFSJ. In particular, the author notes that the new 
framework brings the position of the individual and the protection of their fundamental 
rights to the fore in three ways: 
 
“by strengthening the effects and extending the general reach of general fundamental 
rights instruments (in particular by granting binding status to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and enabling the accession of the European Union to the ECHR) – 
the impact of the Charter on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has already been 
felt in the landmark N.S. ruling; by prioritising the adoption of secondary legislation 
related to the protection of fundamental rights (the Treaty of Lisbon includes an express 
                                                                  
1012 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of access 
to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to communicate upon arrest, 
COM(2011)326final, 8 June 2011.  
1013 See for an overall picture House of Lords, European Union Committee, The European 
Union’s Policy on Criminal Procedure, 30th Report of Session 2010-12, Authority of the House 
of Lords, 26 April 2012. 
1014 C. Rijken, “Re-Balancing Security and Justice: Protection of Fundamental Rights in Police 
and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters” (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1490. 
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– albeit functional – legal basis enabling the adoption of EU measures on the rights of 
the defendant (…) ); and by creating a momentum for revisiting the existent third pillar 
enforcement measures.”1015  
 
5. The CJEU post Lisbon: an exercise of balance between punitiveness and the 
protection of the individual 
  
In defining the future of ECL and in constructing a balance between punitiveness and 
individual rights, the CJEU will be of central importance. As seen in Chapter 3, the 
Lisbon Treaty brought ECL under the full jurisdiction of the Court. The Commission is 
now able to bring infringement proceedings for Member States’ failure to fulfil their 
obligations under Title IV TFEU.1016 Furthermore, the Court now has full jurisdiction to 
hear preliminary rulings which should be given with minimum delay in cases involving 
individuals in custody;1017 to hear actions regarding compensation for damages;1018 
review the legality of legislative acts;1019 review the compliance of legislative acts with 
the principle of subsidiarity;1020 and review the legality of acts of the European Council 
and bodies, offices and agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects in 
relation to third parties.1021  
 
This is not say that the CJEU’s jurisdiction has no limitations. First, regardless of the 
significant increase in the Court’s jurisdiction post-Lisbon, the CJEU still cannot review 
the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police and other law 
enforcement agencies of a Member State or the exercise of responsibilities incumbent 
upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security.1022 Second, Article 10 of Protocol 36 to the Treaty of 
Lisbon holds that the CJEU’s powers remain the same—including preliminary rulings—
with regard to acts adopted in the field of police and judicial cooperation for a 
transitional period of five years (the transition period ends on 30 November 2014). 
 
Although the transitional period in still on-going, the Court has already delivered a 
number of decisions on ECL related matters or on topics of direct interest to ECL that 
provide some guidance on how the Court will adjudicate on the balancing of different 
                                                                  
1015 V. Mitsilegas, “FIDE General Report The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice from 
Amsterdam to Lisbon. Challenges of Implementation, Constitutionality and Fundamental Rights” 
XXV Congress Tallinn 2012, available at http://www.fide2012.eu/index.php?doc_id=90. 
1016 Articles 258 – 260 TFEU.  
1017 Articles 267 TFEU. 
1018 Article 268 TFEU. 
1019 Article 263 TFEU. 
1020 Article 8 of Protocol Nº2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality. 
1021 Article 263(1) TFEU. 
1022 Article 276 TFEU. 
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penal values in the future. Similar to the legislative developments described above, the 
CJEU appears to be conducting its own dialogue between punitiveness and the 
protection of the individual.  
 
One of the main areas of judicial development has been the interpretation of the 
Framework Decision on the EAW, namely the interpretation of some of the provisions 
that allow executing authorities to refuse to surrender the requested person. National 
implementation of these clauses and issues of how much can Member States 
discriminate between their own nationals and non-nationals have been important points 
of discussion. To be sure, this line of case law had its origins in the pre-Lisbon period, 
which needs to be briefly revisited. As seen in Chapter 5, at least two important cases 
provided guidance in regard to Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision on the EAW 
which allows Member States to refuse the surrender of the requested person in cases 
where the EAW was issued in respect to a person who is staying in, is a resident or a 
national of the executing State, and the latter undertakes to enforce the sentence himself. 
The first of those cases was Kozlowski in which the CJEU clarified the concept of 
‘staying in’ the executing State, noting that it should not be read broadly and that 
‘staying in’ entails a level of integration in the society of the executing States similar to 
that of residence. This, the Court further noted, should be assessed according to 
objective factors such as the length, nature and conditions of the presence as well as the 
family and economic conditions which the requested person enjoys in the executing 
State.1023 Subsequently, in Wolzenburg, the CJEU held that national legislation 
implementing Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision requiring nationals of other 
Member States to have lawfully resided for a continuous period of five years in the 
Member State of execution, in order to benefit from the non-execution exception, is not 
disproportionate and hence does not go beyond what was necessary to attain the 
objective of ensuring that nationals of other Member States achieve a degree of actual 
integration into the Member State of execution.1024 This threshold of five years had been 
directly derived from the Directive on the rights of Union citizens and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the EU. Recital 17 of the Directive’s 
preamble and Article 16 of the Directive determine a continuous period of five years as 
the length of time beyond which Union citizens acquire a permanent right of residence 
in the host Member State.1025 
 
                                                                  
1023 Case C-68/08, supra note 762, in particular at 48. 
1024 Case C-123/08, supra note 767. 
1025 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States, OJ L 158/77 [2004]. 
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In the post Lisbon period, the CJEU gave further guidance on the interpretation of the 
grounds for non-execution of an EAW. It did so in Lopes da Silva.1026 The facts of the 
case are as follows: Mr Lopes da Silva, a Portuguese national, was living in France, was 
employed by a French company since February 2008 as a long-distance lorry driver 
under an open-ended contract and had married a French national in 2009. On 14 
September 2006, the Court of Appeal of Amiens (France) was seised of proceedings 
relating to the execution of an EAW issued by the Lisbon Criminal Court in respect to 
Mr Lopes da Silva, who had been sentenced in Portugal to five years’ imprisonment for 
drug trafficking. He did not consent to his surrender and asked to be imprisoned in 
France, relying on Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision and on his right to private 
and family life as enshrined in the ECHR. However, the French legislation, which 
transposes the Framework Decision on the EAW, restricted the power not to execute an 
EAW on the grounds provided by Article 4(6) solely to French nationals. The Court of 
Appeal of Amiens decided to stay national proceedings and refer to the CJEU whether 
the French legislation limiting the possibility of refusal of the EAW’s execution to 
nationals only—thus absolutely excluding nationals from other Member States who are 
staying in, or a resident of its territory—was compatible with the Framework Decision.  
 
In its decision, the CJEU pointed out that although Member States are, in principle, 
obliged to act upon an EAW, they may allow their national authorities to decide that a 
sentence imposed can be enforced in the territory of the executing Member State in 
some circumstances, namely in the cases provided for in Article 4(6) of the Framework 
Decision. In this regard, the CJEU noted that this ground for non-execution has the 
objective of enabling the judicial authority to give particular weight to the possibility of 
increasing the requested person’s chances of reintegrating into society when his sentence 
expires. That objective is legitimately pursued when a certain degree of integration in 
the society of that Member State is demonstrated. The Court went on to note that it had 
already held in Wolzenburg1027 that a Member State may limit the benefit of that ground 
for non-execution of an EAW to its own nationals or to the nationals of the other 
Member States who have lawfully resided within the national territory for a continuous 
period of five years or more. That condition is justified in that it ensures the requested 
person is sufficiently integrated in the Member State of execution. Accordingly, in 
Lopes da Silva, the Court found that the Member States cannot, without undermining the 
principle that there should be no discrimination on the grounds of nationality—as 
enshrined in Article 18 TFEU—limit the non-execution of a warrant on the ground in 
question, solely to their own nationals, by automatically and absolutely excluding 
nationals of other Member States who are staying in or a resident of the territory of the 
                                                                  
1026 Case C-42/11, supra note 770. 
1027 Case C-123/08, supra note 767. 
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Member State of execution, irrespective of their connections with that Member State 
(the terms ‘resident’ and ‘staying in’ having to be defined uniformly by the Member 
States). The Court further clarified that this did not mean that national authorities were 
under obligation to refuse to execute an EAW issued in respect to a person staying in or 
a resident of its territory. However, in so far as there is a demonstrated degree of 
integration into the society, comparable to that of a national, the executing authority 
must be able to assess whether there is a legitimate interest which would justify the 
sentence imposed in the issuing Member States being enforced within the territory of the 
executing Member State.1028  
 
The case I.B., concerning the execution of an EAW and trials in absentia, also provided 
further guidance in relation to the grounds for non-execution of an EAW. At stake were, 
once again, Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision as well Article 5 (1) and (3). Article 
5(1) of the Framework Decision stipulates that where the EAW has been issued 
following a decision rendered in absentia, and if the person concerned has not been 
summoned in person or otherwise informed of the date and place of the hearing which 
led to the decision rendered in absentia, surrender may be subject to the condition that 
the issuing judicial authority gives an adequate assurance to guarantee the subject of the 
EAW will have an opportunity to apply for a retrial; in turn, Article 5(3) holds that the 
execution of an EAW, for the purposes of prosecution, may be subject to the condition 
that the national or resident in the executing State, after being heard, is returned to the 
executing Member State in order to serve the custodial sentence or detention order 
passed against him in the issuing State. In its decision, the Court emphasised the 
importance of granting some discretion to Member States in how they choose to 
implement the grounds for non-execution of an EAW (in case they choose to implement 
these optional grounds at all). In doing so, the Court reaffirmed that Member States 
ought to take into account the objective of enabling the possibility of increasing the 
requested person’s chances of reintegrating into society. The Court thus found that 
where the executing Member State has implemented Articles 4(6) and 5(1) and (3) of the 
Framework Decision, the execution of an EAW issued for the purposes of enforcement 
of a sentence imposed in absentia, may be subject to the condition that the person 
concerned, who is a national or resident of the executing Member State, should be 
returned to the executing State in order to serve the sentence passed against him, 
following a new trial, with his presence, in the issuing State.1029  
 
                                                                  
1028 Case C-42/11, supra note 770, 49-60.  
1029 Case C-306/09 Proceedings concerning the execution of a European arrest warrant against 
I.B. ECR I-10345 [2010] see, in particular, at 61. 
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These decisions reflect the increasing importance given to different penal values—such 
as the reintegration of the offender—as the CJEU reasserts the need for Member States 
to give weight to the person’s chances of reintegrating into the society with which the 
offender has stronger bonds. In doing so, however, the CJEU does not make it the 
primary priority, but rather develops a dialogue between the needs of the individual at 
stake and the obligations of the executing State. Hence, on the one hand, in setting, for 
example, the principle of non-discrimination between national and residents or persons 
‘staying in’ in particular territory, when Member States implement grounds for refusal 
provided for in the Framework Decision (as the Court did in Lopes da Silva), the CJEU 
extends the protection afforded by the national legislation to a broader class of 
individuals. However, ruling on the proportionality of the five year requirement before a 
Member State has to take into consideration the possibility of allowing a national of 
another Member State to serve a sentence in the territory of the executing Member State, 
the Court is also excluding the possibility of some people which might already have a 
considerable connection and level of integration into the society of the executing State 
from serving a sentence in the place where they are currently living (as seen for example 
in Wolzenburg and indirectly in Lopes da Silva). In the context of the Wolzenburg case, 
Herlin-Karnell suggests that the five-year residence requirement—before an individual 
can fully benefit from host State’s prisons—appears to be a reasonable decision that 
fully recognises the free movement dimension to the EAW and the burden undertaken 
by national tax payers.1030 
 
Yet, if in the context of the EAW, the CJEU is beginning to strike a balance between 
reintegration of the offender into his or her State of residence and the rules of free 
movement and punishment, this equilibrium becomes less clear in two recent cases on 
citizenship matters. The cases are not concerned with instruments of ECL directly, but 
give an important insight into how far the CJEU is willing to impose values of 
reintegration of offenders upon Member States, namely when considering expulsion 
from their territory. The cases were both in context of the already-mentioned Directive 
on the rights of he Union citizens and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the EU.1031 The preamble of the Directive notes that it establishes a system of 
protection against expulsion measures which is based on the degree of integration of 
Union citizens in the host Member State, so that the higher the degree of integration, the 
greater the degree of protection they are afforded. In turn, Article 28 of the Directive 
concerns decisions of expulsion on grounds of public policy and security and notes that, 
when taking such decisions, Member States shall take into account considerations such 
                                                                  
1030 E. Herlin-Karnell, “European Arrest Warrant Cases and the Principles of Non-discrimination 
and EU citizenship” (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 835. 
1031 Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 1025 . 
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as how long the individual concerned has resided on its territory, his/her age, state of 
health, family and economic condition, social and cultural integration into the host 
Member State and the extent of his/her links with their country of origin. Furthermore, 
the second paragraph of the same Article holds that the host Member State may not take 
a decision of expulsion against Union citizens, or their family members, who have the 
right of permanent residence in its territory, except on grounds of public policy and 
public security; whilst the third paragraph holds that a decision of expulsion may not be 
taken against Union citizens except if the decision is based on imperative grounds of 
public security or if they have resided in the host Member State for the previous ten 
years.  
 
The first case in question concerned Mr Tsakouridis, a Greek national, raised and born 
in Germany, who was convicted and sentenced to six years and six months 
imprisonment by the Regional Court of Stuttgart on eight counts of illegal dealing in 
substantial quantities of narcotics as part of an organised crime group. Consequently, the 
Regional Administration of Stuttgart determined that Mr Tsakouridis had lost his right 
of entry and residence in Germany and was liable to be subject of expulsion to 
Greece.1032 In appeal, the interpretation of the Directive on citizenship was raised. The 
CJEU found that dealing with narcotics as part of an organised crime group is a ‘diffuse’ 
type of crime with impressive economic and operational resources and frequently with 
transnational connections. Furthermore, it noted that in view of the devastating effects of 
crimes linked to drug trafficking, this type of criminality poses a threat to health, safety 
and quality of life for citizens of the Union, and to the legal economy, stability and 
security of Member States. It further noted that trafficking in narcotics as part of an 
organised crime group, could reach a level of intensity that might directly threaten the 
calm and physical security of the population as a whole, or a large part of it.1033 Hence 
the CJEU found that despite Mr Tsakouridis’ level of integration into German society, 
his dealing with narcotics as part of an organised crime group is capable of being 
covered by the concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’ and might justify a 
measure of expulsion from Germany.1034 
 
This line of reasoning was confirmed in P.I., a case concerning a decision of expulsion 
of an Italian national who had lived in Germany since 1987 and was convicted in 2006 
to a term of seven years and six months imprisonment for sexual assault, sexual coercion 
and rape of a minor (member of his family) between 1990 and 2001. Consequently, 
                                                                  
1032 Case C-145/09, supra note 855, 11-13. 
1033 Ibid., 46-47. 
1034 Ibid., 55. 
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Germany sought his expulsion to Italy.1035 The CJEU held that in order to determine 
whether the offences committed by Mr I were covered by the concept of ‘imperative 
grounds of public security’, a number of factors needed to be taken in consideration: 
namely, that Article 83(1)TFEU provides that sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of 
children constitute one of the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border 
dimension in which the EU legislature must intervene. The Court further notes that the 
recently adopted Directive on combating sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of 
children1036 states that such crimes constitute serious violations of fundamental rights. 
Thus, the CJEU held that Member States may regard criminal offences such as those 
referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 83(1) TFEU as constituting a 
particularly serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society, which in turn, 
may pose a direct threat to the calm and security of a population and can thus be covered 
by the concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’ capable of justifying an 
expulsion order.1037  In doing so, however, the Member State ought to also take into 
consideration conditions such as how long the individual has resided in its territory, age, 
health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration and whether the 
manner in which such offences were committed discloses particularly serious 
characteristics as well as whether the personal conduct of the individual concerned 
represents a genuine, present threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society 
or of the host Member State, such as the propensity of the concerned offender to act in 
the same way in the future.1038  
 
Strikingly, in P.I., the CJEU furthers the possibility of Member States to expand the 
concept of ‘public security’, as embedded in the Directive on citizenship, with the list of 
Euro-crimes of Article 83(1)TFEU. This link makes these crimes immediately eligible 
for consideration of expulsion, should all the other requirements be verified as well. 
Hence, it appears that, contrary to the cases on the EAW where the Court seemed to be 
reconciling values of reintegration and punishment, in these citizenship cases, the Court 
accommodates the goal of reintegration in society of the individuals at stake to a 
significantly lesser degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
1035 Case C-348/09 P.I. v Oberburgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid, not yet published; 9-11. 
1036 Directive 2011/92/EU, see supra note 928. 
1037 Case C-348/09 P.I., supra note 1035, 25-28.  
1038 Ibid., 29-32. 
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6. A renewed challenge for coherence 
 
Whilst ECL architecture seems now to be more balanced with the changes brought about 
the Treaty of Lisbon and the post Lisbon reforms, a closer look at the most recent 
developments in ECL highlights the future challenge in the field – that of avoiding 
fragmentation. As seen in chapter 3, the Treaty of Lisbon provides for emergency 
brakes, opt-outs and enhanced cooperation in ECL. At the time of this writing, Ireland 
and the UK have already exercised their right not to opt in to the Directive on access to a 
lawyer, for example.1039  The UK in particular has objected that the proposal would be 
disruptive to its criminal justice systems as it provides for the right to access to a lawyer 
too soon in the course of criminal proceedings, limits evidence admissible and allows no 
exceptions to the confidentiality of communications even in cases when the lawyer was 
involved in criminal activity, amongst other issues.1040 The UK and Irish opt-outs on this 
measure are the first practical examples of the Lisbon trade-off between further 
cooperation and maintaining ECL’s coherence. Furthermore, there are increasing signs 
that the UK might choose to opt out of all previously adopted in criminal matters under 
Protocol 36 of the Lisbon Treaty.1041 The exercise of these rights of non participation 
however does not necessarily prevent other States from going ahead and adopting the 
measure amongst themselves.1042  
 
Hence, Lisbon appears to leave ECL at the heart of several divides, yet again. A first 
divide between calls for more criminal law (and its increasing severity) and some 
moderation in its adoption, particularly by affording a more significant role to the 
protection of fundamental and individual rights and by the articulation of criteria for 
criminalisation such as the principle of subsidiarity and ultima ratio in the adoption of 
ECL measures. However, the compromise that Lisbon proposes to overcome this tension 
between punitiveness and individuals rights, appears to be one that leaves significant 
room for fragmentation in ECL, in particular by leaving behind States which see no 
conditions to pursue further integration. This second divide between fragmentation and 
                                                                  
1039 Proposal for a Directive COM(2011)326 final, supra note 1012. 
1040 See, for more details House of Lords, The European Union’s Policy on Criminal Procedure, 
supra note 1013, 31-34. Belgium, France and The Netherlands have also voiced serious 
reservations about the Commission’s proposal, noting it would present “substantial difficulties 
for the effective conduct of criminal proceedings by their investigating, prosecuting and judicial 
authorities”, Note from Belgium, France, Ireland, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom to 
the Proposal for a Directive of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to 
communicate upon arrest, Doc 14495/11, Brussels, 22 September 2011, 2. 
1041 A. Hinarejos, J.R. Spencer and S. Peers, “Opting Out of EU Criminal Law: What is actually 
involved?”, CELS Working Papers, University of Cambridge, New Series, Nº1, September 2012; 
See also, The Guardian, “Theresa May takes first step to opting out of EU law and order 
measures”, on 14 October 2012: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/oct/14/theresa-may-law-
and-order-measures 
1042 See chapter 3. 
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further integration in criminal matters could have a significant toll on legal certainty 
across the EU. The future coherence of European Union Criminal law will thus depend 
on how much the different actors are willing to keep new initiatives in a middle ground 
which would allow Member States and the EU to remain committed to a common idea 
of ECL. Future research in the field will certainly have to focus on the dialectic between 
these different strains.   
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